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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the construction, framing and representation of Britain and 
British identity in British and Commonwealth national newspaper coverage of the 
2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games.  Specifically, national 
newspapers from Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales were examined using a qualitative thematic content analysis.  
From this sample it is argued that when viewed as part of a long-term process, the 
relationship between Britain’s national and imperial histories can be used to explore 
contemporary media discourses on Britain and British identity.   
 
Theoretically the work of Norbert Elias and the process sociology perspective was 
used to explore how past and present figurations form an important part of group 
identifications.  Notably, the adoption of a process sociological approach to national 
identity formation provided the opportunity to explore how changes both within and 
outside the ‘nation’ have served to underlie its discursive construction.  That is, by 
drawing upon an established-outsider model, power-balances within Britain (U.K.) 
and between Britain and the Commonwealth were used to explore how complex 
relations and multi-national dynamics served to affect the framing of Britain in 
national newspaper discourses. 
 
The findings reveal that references to Britain’s imperial history and memories of its 
imperial past were routinely highlighted in both the British domestic and 
Commonwealth press.  However, when considered interdependently, it was evident 
that constructions of Britain revealed processes of integration and attachment (British 
unity) as well as disintegration and (dis)attachment (British dis-unity).  This was 
reflected in the discursive construction of home nation and British-Commonwealth 
relations (established-outsider relations), group identifications (national/British) and 
notions of disorientation, anxiety and apathy (post-imperial British decline).  
Correspondingly, while newspaper discourses served to provide particular 
‘established’ constructions of Britain, at the same time, representations of Britain 
were both resisted and (re)constructed by ‘outsider’ groups (Scottish Independence 
Referendum).  Here, it was possible to observe how newspaper constructions were 
related to power balances within and between the British state and Commonwealth, 
that is, as ‘integration struggles’. 
 ii 
 
Indeed, what emerges from these conclusions is how both established and outsider 
constructions within the British domestic and Commonwealth press served to 
dynamically frame Britain as well as actively (re)construct their relationship with 
Britain in ways that revealed processes of unification, re-unification and dis-
unification.  Therefore, in accordance with a multi-figurational analysis of Britain, 
this thesis argues that the ability to explore established-outsider relations and we/they 
images can allow one to consider how the construction, framing and representation of 
Britain and British identity is ‘multi-layered’.  
 !
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Introduction 
 
I. The research aims 
 
This thesis will explore the construction, framing and representation of Britain and 
British identity in national newspaper coverage of the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and 
London Olympic Games.  In particular, this thesis will argue that when viewed as part 
of a long-term development, the relationship between Britain’s national and imperial 
histories can be used to examine contemporary media discourses on Britain and 
British identity (Barkawi and Laffey, 2002; Cohen, 1995; Darian-Smith et al., 2007; 
Darwin, 2010; De Cillia et al., 1999; Goudsblom et al., 1996; Howe, 2010; Kumar, 
2000; 2003; 2006a; 2006b; 2010; MacKenzie, 1984; 1994; 1998; 1999; 2001; 
Mycock, 2010; 2012; Thompson, 2001; 2005; Ward, 2001a; 2001b).  These 
discourses will be used to examine how the mediated construction of Britain remains 
fixed upon a range of discourses pertaining to, and, influenced by, the British Empire 
(Darwin, 2010; Kumar, 2003; 2010; MacKenzie, 2001; Story and Childs, 1997; 
Thompson, 2000; 2005; Ward, 2001a; 2001b). 
Theoretically the work of Norbert Elias and the process sociology perspective 
will be used to explore how past and present figurations form an important part of 
group identifications (O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012).  Indeed, constructions of 
Britain are often ‘caught between the decline of old political identifications and new 
identities that are in the process of becoming’ (Mac An Ghaill, 2001: 194).  
Consequently, by drawing upon a process sociological approach, attention will be 
given to examining the ‘sequence of changes’ (Mennell, 1996b: 128) that have 
underlined Britain’s state formation as well as its imperial expansion and decline.  
Therefore, the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games will be used to 
explore ‘how far, and in what ways, the Imperial experience’ (Bayly, 2001: 71) served 
to shape the press’ framing of both events, and, as a consequence, will be used to 
consider how national circumstances within Britain and the former dominions make 
sense and give meaning to constructions of Britain and British identity, today.  To this 
end, a qualitative thematic content analysis of the British domestic (England, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales) and selected Commonwealth (Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand) national press will be used to examine the discursive construction of 
Britain during both the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games.   
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Previous research has highlighted how the discursive construction of the 
nation and its national identity forms an important part of the framing of national and 
international events (Lee and Maguire, 2004).  According to Kellner (2003), media 
spectacles ‘are those phenomena of media culture that embody contemporary 
society’s basic values, serve to initiate individuals into its way of life, and dramatize 
its controversies and struggles’ (2003: 2).  In addition, Dekavalla (2012) notes that 
media events can help bring ‘together heterogeneous communities at a national or 
transnational level, marking a new era and/or re-establishing the status and power of 
the organizers as social actors’ (2012: 297 [italics added]).   
With this in mind, both the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic 
Games were not merely ‘British’ national events.  Instead, both occasions formed part 
of a history of British and imperial/Commonwealth relations and took place within a 
fragmented and possibly dis-united, post-imperial Britain.  Indeed, while national 
media texts can be viewed as both active and functional in framing and representing 
societal relations and national identities (Tonkiss, 1998), such texts can also be used 
to examine how balances of power are produced in, and through, the discursive 
construction of the nation/nation-state (Bloyce et al., 2010; Malcolm, 2012; Poulton 
and Maguire, 2012).   
In light of this, it is possible to look closer at national newspaper 
representations of Britain in order to explore the power dynamics that underlie the 
discursive construction of Britain and British identity.  In particular, this thesis will 
employ an established-outsider model to highlight how power-balances within Britain 
(UK) and between Britain and the Commonwealth helped frame the press’ coverage 
(Bloyce et al., 2010; Maguire, 1993a; 1993b; Maguire and Burrows, 2005; Maguire 
and Poulton, 1999; Maguire and Tuck, 1998; 2005). 
Finally, by taking the above into consideration, a detailed examination of the 
multi-layered aspects of national habitus will be outlined (De Cillia et al., 1999; 
Maguire, 1999; Maguire and Burrows, 2005; Maguire and Tuck, 2005; Mennell, 
1994; Poulton, 2004; Tuck, 2003).  Indeed, 2012 provided a crucial opportunity to 
study contemporary British culture and identity in relation to both its domestic and 
international construction.  With this in mind, this chapter will seek to further explore 
these issues in regards to both royal and sporting occasions.  Additionally, work on 
the imperial history of Britain will be discussed before a brief introduction of the 
process sociological perspective is provided. 
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II. Analysing Britain and British identity: a ‘diverse, highly contested and varied 
label’ 
 
Geographically defining ‘Britain’ is a complicated process that has, over time, derived 
various definitions (Bradley, 2008).  Indeed, in 1603 the Union of the Crowns 
introduced the term ‘Great Britain’.1  After 1707, the ‘United Kingdom of Great 
Britain’ was used to refer to the political amalgamation of England, Scotland and 
Wales.2  Later in 1800, Ireland was added resulting in the ‘The United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland’.3  Alongside Britain’s imperial expansion, ‘Greater Britain’ 
has been used to refer to Britain’s overseas dominions, colonies and territories (Howe, 
2008).  After the formation of the Irish Free State in 1922, domestically Britain 
became known as ‘The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’.4  
Variations have included the ‘British Isles’, which refer to England, Scotland and 
Wales, minus the separated Ireland.  In addition, the four separate nations of England, 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are commonly referred to as the ‘home 
nations’.  Throughout the course of this thesis the terms ‘United Kingdom’ (UK) and 
‘home nations’ will be used to refer to England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales.   
 Aside from its geographical classifications, however, determining, and, indeed, 
defining, British national identity follows an equally complicated path.  In fact, Storry 
and Childs (1997) note that British identity is a ‘diverse, highly contested and varied 
label’ (Storry and Childs, 1997: 8).  Indeed, it is a ‘label’ that has been shaped and re-
shaped by numerous international and intra-national processes, which have often 
served to undermine popular understandings of Britain and purported ‘hallowed 
British traditions’ (Rojek, 2007: 10).  This has, amongst many academics and 
commentators, led to questions regarding ‘what “being British” means today’ (Rojek, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 In 1603 James VI (James I as King of England and Ireland) ascended the thrones of England and 
Ireland.  The union reflected the unification of the three realms – England (Wales was included under 
England), Scotland and Ireland – under one monarch.  All three kingdoms, despite sharing the same 
monarch, remained sovereign states. 
2 Under the 1707 Union both the Scottish Parliament and the English Parliament formed the Parliament 
of Great Britain, based at Westminster in London.  
3 The Union with Ireland Act (passed by the Parliament of Great Britain) and The Act of Union 
(Ireland) (passed by the Parliament of Ireland) united the Kingdoms of Ireland and the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain.  The union came into effect on 1st January 1801. 
4 In September 1997, the Parliament of the United Kingdom devolved some of its power to the Scottish 
Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the intermittent Northern Ireland Assembly.  England 
remained un-devolved.   
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2007: 10).  Indeed, for Baxter (n.d.) ‘the [British] nation has struggled to redefine its 
place on the global stage’, adding that: ‘It used to be simple: “British” meant global 
kingdom, “British” meant meticulous attention to manners, “British” meant military 
might and industrial power – “British” meant the top of the world’ (n.d.).5  Critically 
considered Baxter’s (n.d.) comments reveal how the nation’s past (‘military might and 
industrial power’) can often serve to underscore concerns regarding the nation’s 
contemporary significance (‘struggled to redefine its place’).  Furthermore, while 
notions of ‘group charisma’ (Elias and Scotson, 1994) form an important part of the 
nation’s ontological security (Karakul, 2010), constructions of Britain can reveal 
confused and disorientated visions that seek to delineate between those who should 
and shouldn’t belong. 
 Indeed, twelve months after the 2012 Olympic Games, the British and Irish 
Lions achieved their first test series victory in sixteen years against Australia, a 
former dominion of the British Empire.6  Guardian journalist Martin Kettle (2013) 
commented that: 
 
The Lions were our team. But who is this we? The team is made up of English, 
Welsh, Scottish and Irish rugby players, the Irish from north and south of the 
border, all playing as one. (2013 [italics added])7 
 
In the same weekend as the Lion’s victory, the Scottish born, British tennis athlete, 
Andy Murray, became the first British ‘male’ tennis player to win the Wimbledon 
Tennis Championship in 77 years.8  Again, Kettle (2013) highlighted that: 
 
A day later we – whoever exactly we are – basked in Andy Murray’s hoodoo 
breaking Wimbledon triumph. But is Murray a Scot or British, or both? Is he 
ours? Do the Irish, whose tries we cheered on Saturday get a slice of Murray 
reflected glory too? (2013 [italics added])9 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See http://realtruth.org/articles/120811-001.html, retrieved: 12 March 2014. 
6 The British and Irish Lions represent the combined rugby union test side that participates in rotating 
tours held every four years in Australia, South Africa or New Zealand.  Players are chosen from 
England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland (both from the Irish Free state and Northern Ireland).  Indeed, 
Bloyce et al. (2010) note that ‘the Lions series as a whole provides an interesting paradox in its 
juxtaposition of Celtic and Anglo-Saxon rivalries with international rivalries whilst, at the same time, it 
reflects unifying and divisive elements of national identity between, and for, the four Home Nations’ 
(2010: 463).  
7 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/11/ed-miliband-english-political-voice, 
retrieved: 12 July 2013. 
8 Female British tennis player, Virginia Wade, won Wimbledon in 1977, the tournament’s centenary 
year.  1977 was also the year of Queen Elizabeth’s Silver Jubilee. 
9 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/11/ed-miliband-english-political-voice, 
retrieved: 12 July 2013.  
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In accordance with Baxter (n.d.), Kettle’s (2013) remarks share in the same confusion 
and sense of bewilderment that stem from questions directed at determining who 
‘exactly we are’ (2013).10  More importantly, this confusion seeks to form part of 
discussions regarding who are believed to constitute the national collective and those 
who fail to share the same allegiances (‘Is he ours?’).  Certainly, Murray’s allegiance 
to both his home country and his participation in the British Olympic Team (Team 
GB) has served to expose the tensions underlying Scottish and British relations in 
light of the 2014 referendum on Scottish Independence (McGinty, 2013).11 
 These same discussions regarding British belonging are echoed in debates on 
British multiculturalism.  Rojek (2007) highlights that: 
 
Many ethnic British are equally confused about who they are and where they 
stand – in areas of mixed ethnic composition their children often suffer labelling 
and discrimination that leaves them feeling themselves to be strangers in their 
own land. (2007: 10) 
 
Indeed, debates on British multiculturalism and its ‘multiple iterations of national 
identity’ can be located in Britain’s overlapping and intersecting ‘national’ and 
‘imperial’ histories, which have led to complicated and often varied definitions 
regarding the identity of Britain and its constitutive nations (Codell, 2003; Howe, 
2010; Quirk, 2003; Van Duinen, 2013; Wilson, 2006).  For many, this history has 
been forged around the exploration and colonization of the globe by European 
imperialism.  In doing so, the various communities that operated throughout the 
British Empire, apart from being informally influenced by British values, were also 
geographically diverse, exhibiting a number of common themes and differences 
across time and space (Bickers, 2010; Maguire, 1995; Misra, 2008). 
 Yet, despite these common themes and notable differences, the effects of empire 
and its impact upon British society have received only recent academic attention 
(Howe, 2008; 2010; Stockwell, 2008; Ward, 2001a; 2001b).  Moreover, to focus 
entirely upon the identity politics surrounding the British ‘home nations’, is to ignore !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/11/ed-miliband-english-political-voice, 
retrieved: 12 July 2013. 
11 This thesis began in 2011 and finished in the same month of the 2014 Scottish Independence 
Referendum.  Due to these time constraints, the result of the referendum was not included in the 
project’s design or research aims.  Instead, the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic Games 
provided a valuable empirical source whereby the multi-national construction of Britain could be 
investigated and interpreted. 
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those other Britons who once formed part of the world’s largest global empire (Howe, 
2010).  Here, ‘the most important parts of the empire were seen as being Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand; sometimes described as parts of a world wide national 
family, a “Greater Britain.” (Howe, 2008: 163).   
 Consequently, forming part of a larger British Empire, speaking English and 
embodying ‘Western’ economies and cultural values (Ashkanasy, 2002), the white 
dominions display an archetypal British mix that is exemplified in their constitutions 
and political elites (Hopkins, 1999).  In fact, towards the end of the nineteenth-
century, the ‘settler-Dominions of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the 
prairie provinces of Canada’ were perceived ‘as a pastoral, rugged alternative to the 
effeminacy of industrial British life’ (Llewellyn, 2012: 49).  Certainly, the support of 
Australia and New Zealand in the Iraq War and the jubilation which was met by 
Queen Elizabeth and Prince Phillip’s visit to Australia in 2011 (Mercer, 2004), both 
reveal that to some extent the ‘British’ still are an imperial people. 
 Today, former imperial ties between Britain and the former dominions are 
maintained via the Commonwealth of Nations.  Head of this Commonwealth and the 
Head of State for Australia, Canada and New Zealand is the British monarch, Queen 
Elizabeth.  Indeed, Gare (2000) has argued that, ‘remnants of Australian Britishness 
still exist … the mere fact that many Australians are not prepared to discard an 
English monarch as their own testifies in part to this fact’ (2000: 1146).  Accordingly, 
apart from providing an enduring legacy of British imperialism in each of the now 
independent states, the role of the monarchy has continued throughout republican 
debates, revealing the importance that the monarchy plays in discussions regarding 
identity and citizenship within the former dominions (Gorman, 2010; McDougall, 
2005; McGregor, 2006).   
Furthermore, within Britain, Grove-White (2012) notes that the ‘presence and 
contribution’ of Commonwealth members has ‘driven development of many of the 
key sectors of the UK economy and public services since the second world war, … 
shap[ing] cultural life in ways which have largely become absorbed into what is 
thought of as “Britishness” (2012). 12   Nonetheless, this absorption has not been 
without its tensions.  In fact, while Freedland (2013) points out that the British female 
tennis player ‘Laura Robson was born in Melbourne and … So many England !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/ruth-grove-white/connecting-cultures-or-putting-
up-barriers-migration-and-commonwealth, retrieved: 13 May 2013. 
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cricketers were born in South Africa’ (2013), the labeling of certain British athletes by 
some members of the British press as ‘Plastic Brits’ (Poulton and Maguire, 2012), 
reveals how understandings of British national identity are interlinked with a power-
laden rhetoric that seeks to clearly delineate the national ‘we’ from the foreign 
‘they’.13 
Accordingly, Britain’s transition from a small state of nations to an imperial 
power remains an important aspect in understanding the development of British 
identity and the complexities that this development has ensured (O’Connor and 
Goodwin, 2012).  The importance of the imperial period in British history is 
exemplified by Kumar (2003), who notes that: 
 
Practically everything in the relations between England and its Celtic 
dependencies, and in the structure of those dependencies themselves, can be 
found somewhere or other, at some time or other, in the history of imperialism, 
including the later history of British Imperialism (2003: 88)   
 
However, while Kumar’s (2003) analysis focuses specifically on English nationalism, 
this thesis will argue that these relations can also be examined in order to elucidate 
upon the ‘identity crisis’ that has surrounded debates on Britain and British identity 
since the Second World War (Blake, 1986; Goodhart, 2013a; Nairn, 1977).  Indeed, 
writing before the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, Goodhart (2013b) 
suggested that: 
 
The coming few years will certainly require big arguments over the national 
question: about Scotland, England and the future of the United Kingdom; 
about Britain’s relationship to Europe, including the real possibility of leaving 
the EU; and about a conflict between a middle England view of the country 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/08/andy-murray-ghosts-sporting-failure, 
retrieved: 9 July 2013.  Moreover, this is not necessarily a ‘new’ phenomenon.  Historically, notions 
regarding British citizenship can be seen in the loose and seemingly interchangeable definitions of 
British subjecthood (citizenship)’ that surrounded early sporting competitions (Llewellyn, 2012: 48).  
At the 1936 Winter Olympic Games nine of the 13 man British squad that won gold in the ice hockey 
were from Canada (Fordyce, 2013).  Similarly, Llewellyn (2012) notes that: ‘At the inaugural Athens 
games in 1896, London-born middle-distance star, Edwin ‘Teddy’ Flack, claimed two gold medals in 
the 800- and- 1500- meter events for Australia … In turn, British-born athletes residing in British 
territories overseas sometimes opted to compete for the old mother country … world-class walker 
Ernie J. Webb also opted to compete under the colours of the Union Jack rather than those of Canada, a 
country where he had long resided’ (2012: 48).  Whereas, Llwellyn (2012) goes onto comment upon 
the exclusion of those subjects from Britain’s ‘darker’ colonies, his comments highlight how the ‘lines 
between Britain and Empire’, particularly across its white dominions, ‘were far more fluid’ than is 
commonly perceived (Llewellyn, 2012: 48). 
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(represented by the Daily Mail and UKIP) and a London metropolitan view. 
(2013b)14 
 
 Accordingly, taking the above into consideration, this thesis will aim to provide 
its own insight into the ‘national question’, specifically, the ‘British national 
question’.  In doing so, a range of secondary sources will be used in order to trace the 
historical development of British identification within the British home nations and 
the former ‘old white dominions’ of Australia, Canada and New Zealand.15  More 
importantly, this will provide a segue to exploring how the British national and 
selected Commonwealth press constructed, framed and represented British identity 
during the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games.16  The following 
section will explore both these events in further detail. 
 
III. 2012 – a year of British celebration 
 
Discussing the impact of empire on Britain, Darian-Smith et al. (2007) highlight that: 
 
At all levels of society, from the governing class to the factory workers, it has 
been argued that British culture and values during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries were fundamentally shaped by its imperial possessions: 
militarism, heroism, masculinity and monarchy formed a cluster of the core 
beliefs of imperial patriotism (2007: 4 [italics added])   
 
In fact, one additional British imperial possession that sought to shape the British 
Empire was sport (Maguire, 1999; Mangan, 1992a).17  The high status accorded to 
British institutions, such as, the British monarchy as well as the sporting practices of 
an imperial elite, helped to establish the socio-cultural codes that were typical of an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/david-goodhart/nation-state-is-in-rude-health-
solving-british-puzzle, retrieved: 4 June 2013. 
15 The term ‘old white dominions’ was commonly used to refer to the dominions of Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, the Irish Free State, Newfoundland and South Africa (Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003b; 
Rhodes et al., 2009).  Similarly, Australia, Canada and New Zealand are also referred to as the ‘White 
Commonwealth’ due to their majority white and English speaking populations (Paren et al., 2003).  For 
the purpose of this thesis, the terms: ‘former dominions’, ‘old white dominions’ and ‘dominions’ will 
be used to refer to Australia, Canada and New Zealand.     
16 The Diamond Jubilee took place from the 2nd to 5th June 2012 and the London Olympic Games 
officially started with the Opening Ceremony on the 27th July and finished with the Closing Ceremony 
on 12th August. 
17 Ho (2013) explores the relationship between Britain and Hong Kong, during the 2012 London 
Olympic Games.  Here, Ho (2013) highlights that ‘Britain is perhaps more deeply entangled with the 
world than any other country in spreading sports around the world through their empire’. (2013: 2220).  
As a result, ‘studies on the London 2012 Olympics should examine not only the celebration of 
nationalism, globalism, cosmopolitism and Olympism; Britain’s distinctive relation with Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and Wales; and the establishment of a sense of Britishness but also Britain’s colonial 
(re-)connectivity with the colonised’ (Ho, 2013: 2220). 
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‘expansionist occidental cosmology’ (Galtung, 1991: 150 see Maguire, 2005: 13).  
Collaboratively, these codes were maintained by a fusion of symbolic acts comprising 
imperial spectacle and ritual (Cannadine, 2001; McCarthy, 2010; Merchant and Rich, 
2004; Polley, 2014).  In doing so, the British achieved considerable success in 
legitimising their rule through the form and continuity that the imperial spectacle 
provided (Merchant and Rich, 2004). 
Indeed, the relationship between sport and the monarchy can be highlighted in 
the 1911 Festival of Empire, held to commemorate the coronation of King George V.  
The festival included an inter-Empire sports championship with competing teams 
from Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), Canada, New Zealand, South Africa 
and the United Kingdom (Moore, 1986).  Similar to the hosting of contemporary 
Olympic Games, Moore (1986) notes that: 
 
The overall scale of the Festival was massive, incorporating not only physical 
displays but also the Pageant of London, involving thousands of performers, in 
which the history of London, England, and the Empire would be recreated 
from prehistoric times (1986: 85)  
 
Accordingly, while sport was at the centre of an imperial culture of distinction that 
‘often reflected what was then widely held to represent, in social terms, the best of 
British’ (Apter, 2002: 582), the symbolic rituals associated with the British crown 
provided imperial rule an outward symbol of superiority and legitimacy (Cannadine, 
2001; Dawson, 2006; James, 1984; Kitchen, 1996; Maguire, 1999; Mangan, 1992a; 
1992b; Moore, 1986; Stoddart, 1986; 1988).  Here, Ward (2001b) argues that ‘the link 
between empire and the idea of a “greater Britain” was one of the formative 
influences in the evolution of a transnational “British” identity’ (2001b: 13 [italics 
added]).  This multinational appreciation of Britain and British identity draws 
attention to the ‘inherently contestable and indeed frequently contested’ defining of 
national identity (Karner, 2013).18  In doing so: 
 
monolithic accounts need to give way to analyses capable of illuminating the 
symbolic and institutional struggles, contradictions and ambivalences shaping 
and surrounding national identity negotiations. (Karner, 2013)19 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/christian-karner/from-collective-myth-to-
counterpublics-negotiating-national-identity-in-, retrieved: 13 May 2013. 
19 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/christian-karner/from-collective-myth-to-
counterpublics-negotiating-national-identity-in-, retrieved: 13 May 2013. 
 10 
With this in mind, it would be detrimental to view both national and 
international events as providing homogenous and unifying displays which accurately 
reflect the host nation and its population and which reveal no tension or discord 
(Cannadine, 2001; Mihelj, 2008).  Barnes and Aughey (2006) suggest that while 
national commemorative events provide an important role in sustaining national 
identifiers, they can also carry great risk, as often there are multiple national histories 
to be told and multiple versions of the nation to be found.  In fact, Rowe (2012) 
suggested that London 2012 ‘operated as something of a popular forum for debates on 
British multiculturalism and its associated, multiple iterations of national identity’ 
(2012: 5 [italics added]).  Indeed, the ‘multiple, partial and conflicting meanings that 
such events generate’ (Dawson, 2006: 7) can reveal dominant, residual or emergent 
versions of national identity, which over time are strengthened, show resistance or 
increase in variety (Easthope, 1999; Elias, 1978; 1996; Maguire, 1999; 2005; 
Williams, 1977).  To this extent, the ‘institutional struggles, contradictions and 
ambivalences’ (Karner, 2013) that shape and re-shape national identity, occur ‘not in 
isolation, but in the larger context of a network of interdependencies that stretch 
across time and space’ (Maguire, 1995: 16).20 
Here, one can begin to examine how British identity and British culture is 
intricately entwined with complex power dynamics, integration struggles and 
numerous paradoxes, which at the discursive level, are produced by the national 
media to ‘celebrate and denounce, project and promote, persuade and display’ the 
nation (Rowe, 2012: 2).  Taking this into consideration, the following section will 
explore how analyses of Britain can be considered in relation to the networks of 
interdependence that have shaped British history. 
 
IV. The study of Britain and British identity: an imperial perspective 
 
The ‘vigorous survival of a distinctive national cultural ethos … within the 
communities of Scotland and Wales’, echo Britain’s multi-national history (Bradshaw 
and Roberts, 1998: 3; see also Howe, 2010; Mangan, 1992a; Pocock, 1974).  This is 
alluded to in a statement by former British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, who noted 
that ‘the diversity of modern Britain expressed through devolution and 
multiculturalism is more consistent with the historical experience of our islands’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 This is shared by Calhoun (1997) who notes that ‘The idea of nation is also inherently international 
and works partly be contraposition of different nations to each other’ (1997: 93). 
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(Cook, 2001, cited in Condor et al., 2006: 125).  Here, Cook presents a vivid link 
between Britain’s diverse past and its multi-cultural present, but, perhaps, more 
importantly, his remarks are presented ‘both as a post-Imperial phenomenon, and also 
an enduring aspect of “our” way of life’ (Condor et al., 2006: 125).  That is, when 
considered as part of a long-term development, past and present analyses of Britain 
reveal a complex and often contested interplay between its multi-national state 
formation and an encompassing British identification (Cohen, 1994; Kumar, 2003; 
Llewellyn, 2012; Ward, 2001a).   
In effect, this interplay is explored further in Bradshaw and Roberts’s (1998) 
remarks on the concept of ‘Britishness’.  They note that: 
 
Its genius as an ideological concept is found in it capaciousness: its capacity to 
seem to buttress the self-esteem of each of the constituent nationalities of the 
British conglomerate – apart significantly from that of the Irish – while at the 
same time subsuming these identities under a more comprehensive category of 
nationality (Bradshaw and Roberts, 1998: 3) 
 
Importantly, however, this does not suggest the homogenous spread of a specific 
global culture, nor does it suggest that the intermixture of cultures within Britain and 
the former British Empire have inhibited the production of independent national 
identifications (Burton, 2010; Maguire, 1999).  Indeed, Arendt (1968) argues that 
‘wherever the nation-state appeared as conquered, it aroused national consciousness 
and desire for sovereignty among the conquered people’ (1968: 7).  Instead, Bradshaw 
and Roberts (1998) draw attention to the overlapping and intersecting national and 
imperial discourses that constitute constructions of Britain (Codell, 2003).   
Arguably, such statements demand an attention to British identity that is 
considerable to the constitutive identities of which it comprises (Cohen, 1994).  Here, 
the entwining of British ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ histories has led to complicated and 
often varied definitions regarding national identity in both Britain and the former 
British Empire (Quirk, 2003).  In fact, Codell (2003a) highlights that ‘each colony had 
its own relationship to Britain, to imperial life and authority, to its own history and to 
its own unstable, struggling national identity’ (Codell, 2003a: 21).21  Accordingly, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Accordingly, although ‘empires could call on subject peoples for tribute and sometimes foster 
substantial interaction among diverse subjects, they posed few demands for cultural homogenization’ 
(Calhoun, 1994: 317).  As a result, in Australia and New Zealand, ‘white settlers became numerically 
predominant, colonial rule made peoples out of new states’, whereas within Canada, ‘indigenous 
societies remained the basis of government [and] the state was fashioned from existing people’ 
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while Hechter (1975) argues that ‘all modern states participate to varying degrees in a 
world system which impinges upon many of their internal processes’ (1975: 234), 
Maguire (2005) asserts that: 
 
stress needs to be placed on the plurality of civilisations, noting the nature and 
extent of their interdependence, while also establishing their distinctive and 
formative features.  Understood in this way, civilisations are total phenomena: 
they entail economics, politics, and culture, which in various combinational 
syntheses move civilisations and their contacts with others in different 
directions (2005: 13)  
 
Consequently, this suggests ‘a closer connection … between empire and what later 
evolved into the nation-state’ (Kumar, 2006b: 3).22  Moreover, it indicates that by 
being aware of the interconnections between nationalism and imperialism (Thompson, 
2000), one can begin to explore the relationship between Britain’s largely imperial 
past and its fractious present in light of its effect upon and, relation to, contemporary 
national identity politics (Hopkins, 1999).  That is, Hopkins (1999) argues, ‘it ought 
to be possible to restore the international and essentially imperial dimension to 
national history without installing its former accompanist, deference too’ (1999: 
216).23 
 Therefore, in order to understand present social structures and patterns of action 
‘an understanding of the past is not only desirable, it is necessary’ (Maguire, 1995: 7 
[italics added]).  Indeed, while the British home nations and the old dominions try to 
forge – or in some cases invent – their own separate identities, in light of wider 
pluralising global flows, they remain fixed to a history that was once determined by 
imperialism (Howe, 2010; Kumar, 2003; 2010; Maguire, 1993b). 
Certainly, historians and sociologists have long been aware of Britain’s 
imperial history and its characteristics (Pocock, 1975; MacKenzie, 1984; 1994; 1998; 
1999; 2001; Said, 1995; Thompson, 2000; 2005; Ward, 2001a; 2001b).  Nonetheless, 
analyses of population growth, devolution, international unions and multiculturalism 
are written from a national history perspective, which is ‘inclined to minimize or even !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(Hopkins, 1999: 215).  In both instances, it was the interaction between people and states, which 
resulted in the fragmentary basis of so many national identities (Burton, 2010).   
22 Various academics have considered the relationship between imperialism and the expansion of the 
nation-state (Arendt, 1968; Hayes, 1976; Mansergh, 1976). 
23 Indeed, this is of particular importance, especially when one considers that the relationship between 
Britain’s imperial experience and its domestic society can illuminate upon the complimentary 
processes underpinning British identity, British state formation as well as Britain’s imperial expansion 
and decline (Elias, 1996; Darwin, 2010; Hopkins, 1999; 2008; Kumar, 2003; Thompson, 2000).   
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edit out countervailing themes’ (Hopkins, 1999: 202).  In particular, ‘one of the most 
striking features of the study of modern British history is the way in which the history 
of the nation-state has been separated from the history of the empire’ (Hopkins, 1999: 
207).24 
Therefore, it should not be forgotten that the ‘dominant European powers … 
were empires as well as states’ and that such statements are not modern assertions 
(Cox, Dunne and Booth, 2001: 6-7 cited in Barkawi and Laffey, 2002: 111).25  While 
drawing upon the work of Hobsbawm (1990), Diaz-Andreu (2004) notes that: 
 
From the 1830s to the 1870s the criteria to define a successful nation were 
transformed.  It increasingly became crucial not only to be an instituted, large 
state and have long-established cultural elite with a literary and administrative 
tradition in the vernacular language, but also … to have the capacity for 
conquest, to be an imperial people. (2004: 227 [italics added])26 
 
As a result, while many have alluded to the fact that the decline of the British Empire 
has led to a ‘rekindling of the suppressed nationalisms’ within the British Isles 
(MacKenzie, 1998: 231), MacKenzie (1998) notes that the establishment of a set of 
‘world-wide connections and global loops’ meant that Empire ‘had just as much an 
effect upon the preservation and strengthening of the distinctive identities of the Scots 
and the other ethnicities of Greater Britain’ (1998: 231).  In the same way that 
‘France’s revolutionary traditions are at the core of being French … Britishness was 
traditionally inextricably linked with empire’ (Jones, 2011).27  This encourages us to 
view national identity within Britain and the British Empire as part of an imperial web 
of interconnecting stories (Howe, 2010).   
 Accordingly, in such instances nationalism and imperialism are not 
incompatible but instead are interdependently linked (Peers, 2002).  In fact, Hopkins !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 This is echoed by Cannadine (2001) who notes that ‘the history of the British Empire is still all too 
often written as if it were completely separate and distinct from the history of the British nation’ 
(Cannadine, 2001: xvii). 
25 Indeed, the integration of both the nation-state and empire can be found in Henry VIII’s Act in 
Restraint of Appeals in 1533, which stated that ‘this realm of England is an empire’ (cited in Kumar, 
2006b: 3).  As a result, Kumar (2006b) notes that the ‘concept of empire was often closely related to 
the original meaning of imperium as sovereignty, rather than to its somewhat later – and generally 
modern – meaning of rule over a multiplicity of lands and people’ (2006b: 3). 
26 Similarly, according to Miliori (2005), ‘in the eyes of a number of nineteenth-century British 
historians, interested as much in the exploration of a shared European past as in contemporary 
European developments, the simplistic binary identification of “Empire” with the past and of “national 
liberty” with the future did not adequately describe the emergence of European modernity’ (2005: 29) 
27 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/oct/11/britain-model-unhappy-family, 
retrieved: 10 April 2013. 
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(1999) notes that: 
 
Seen from an imperial perspective, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were 
designed to be developmental states on the British model.  Greater Britain was 
to produce good Britons, and, if possible, better Britons.  The ideal colony of 
settlement was to be a suitably docile copy of the home country, though one 
assisted, of necessity, by social engineering (1999: 218)    
 
Subsequently, while the nation’s history can provide a number of ‘mnemonic’ cues, in 
the case of Britain, this history is constructed within a wide range of overlapping and, 
at times, competing layers of identification (Mennell, 1994; 2007; Wilson, 2006).  
Indeed, Schlesinger (1991) has argued that ‘we need to think in terms of the 
simultaneous interaction and parallelism of different cultural levels within given 
social formations’ (1991: 305 [italics added] cited in Boyle and Haines, 1996: 550-
551).  Consequently, in order to examine how these ‘levels’ have, under various 
circumstances, shaped and continue to shape Britain and British identity, a process 
(figurational) sociology perspective will be adopted.   
In particular, this theoretical perspective will be used to argue that these 
‘cultural levels’ are not just part of contemporary ‘social formations’ (Schlesinger, 
1991: 305 cited in Boyle and Haines, 1996: 551) but are instead related to past and 
present figurations.28  That is, by commenting upon the social historical context in 
which relations of interdependence between ‘Britain’ and the former dominions were 
forged, ‘a thoroughly processual and relational model’ can be formed that can 
elucidate upon the multifaceted and complex aspects of British identity which have 
accompanied its national and imperial transitions (Mennell, 2007: 4; see also 
O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012).  As a result, this thesis will be guided by an intention 
to examine the interdependent British domestic and imperial/Commonwealth 
figurations. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 This ‘layered’ approach to the study of state formation and national identity will be returned to 
frequently throughout this thesis (see chapter three and conclusion chapter).  Indeed, the use of the term 
‘layer’ is not intended to represent a hierarchical, pyramided structure, but is instead used to reflect the 
complex attachments that groups within groups possess.  To this extent, ‘layers’ can be identified in an 
individual’s attachment to a particular family, town, county, nation-state and continent.  In addition, 
these ‘layers’ are marked by variations in attachment.  Accordingly, while Schlesinger (1991) refers to 
various ‘cultural levels’ existing in a given social formation, Calhoun (1997) highlights how changes at 
the level of state formation are related to the formation of ‘new identities’.  Therefore, ‘New identities 
and movements arise, not just in response to but on the basis of the new scale of social organisation and 
cultural transmission’ (Calhoun, 1997: 92 [italics added]).  In such instances, new forms of social 
organisation may serve to add another ‘layer’ to an individual/group’s identity.  Notably, however, 
such changes are also matched by processes of disintegration though which certain layers may be 
marked by degrees of (dis)attachment.   
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V. The study of Britain and British identity: a process sociology perspective 
 
Malcolm (2012) highlights that ‘[process] sociology provides us with a particular 
framework for understanding national character and national identity’ (2012: 170).  
Underpinning this framework is an attention to long-term social processes and the 
levels of interconnection that these processes reveal (Anderson, 2003).  For Elias 
(1978; 2010; 2012), these interconnections are expressed through chains of 
interdependence, which combine various nation-states in larger supra-national 
relations.  Indeed, Linklater (2011b) highlights that Elias ‘was adamant that it was 
impossible to understand relations within societies without understanding relations 
between them’ (2011b: 3 [italics added]). 
 Therefore, in the case of Britain, the process sociology perspective can provide 
an important step in bridging the gap between Britain’s ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ 
histories as well as offering an appreciation of the ‘many incarnations of “Britain” 
over time and across space’ (Burton, 2011: 77).29  Indeed, this is echoed by Wilson 
(2006) who argues that the study of empire can: 
 
 present us with interconnected and interdependent sites, territorial and 
imaginative, that disrupt the naturalized oppositions between metropole and 
colony and exceed the boundaries of ‘national’ histories to account for the 
complexities generated by the flows of people, goods, and ideas across the globe 
since the late fifteenth century (2006: 212 [italics added])30 
 
In addition, the work of Lester (2001) has also sought to highlight the ‘geographies of 
connection’ that existed between Britain and the empire (2001: 5). 
 Importantly, by focusing upon ‘long-term processes’, examinations of 
‘historically and spatially located relationships or figurations that underpin … group !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Indeed, an important aspect of the process sociology perspective is avoiding dichotomies such as 
‘past’ and ‘present’ for accounts of society that reveal historical processes (Dunning et al., 2004; 
Dunning and Hughes, 2012; Elias, 1978; 1996; 2012; Maguire, 1995).  Indeed, such an approach can 
prove invaluable in understanding how representations of the national past are used in contemporary 
constructions, especially when such constructions are perceived as either ‘imagined’ or ‘invented’ 
(Anderson, 2006; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983).  In fact, a historical perspective offers a useful way of 
communicating and understanding the changing interdependencies, power balances and spacial 
orientations that impede upon the nation.  By historically locating social research (Dunning, 1992), 
social investigations can avoid perceiving social life as timeless or radically different in post-modern 
times (Maguire and Young, 2002). 
30 This interconnected approach to the study of British history is shared by Cannadine (2001).  
Commenting upon the study of British history, Cannadine (2001) argues that ‘By stressing the 
interconnections between social visions of the metropolis and the periphery, and the structures and 
systems that unified and undergirded them, it seeks to put the history of Britain back into the history of 
empire, and the history of the empire back into the history of Britain’ (2001: xx). 
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identities and behavioral standards’ can be observed (O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012: 
483).  Here, Elias’s (1991; 1996; 2008; 2012) conception of national habitus can 
provide a powerful tool in highlighting the underlying aspects of national culture and 
identity (Mennell, 1994).31  In particular, national habitus is not biologically fixed, 
but is instead closely connected with state formation processes, state apparatuses and 
citizen behaviour (Elias, 1996; 2012).  
 Accordingly, for Elias, this required developing a conceptual vocabulary, 
whereby both society and the individual were presented not as separate but as part of 
long-term processes of sociogenetic and psychogenetic transformation (Dunning and 
Hughes, 2012; Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998; O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012).  
O’Connor and Goodwin (2012) explain that while the sociogenetic level examines 
how ‘behavioral standards have merged and changed through long-term processes 
over generations and time’ the psychogenetic refers to the ‘individual level where 
individuals learn the adult standards of behavior and feelings of their society’ (2012: 
477).  Indeed, by understanding this relationship one can begin to elucidate upon the 
processes of identity formation and reformation, which underlie historically changing 
and emerging constructions of the nation (Beckstein, 2013).  In such instances, 
national identity is formed and transformed ‘within and relation to representations’ 
which ‘generate a specific sense of identity, loyalty and allegiance’ (Maguire, 1994: 
71).  Here, shared national characteristics formulate ‘sleeping memories’ within the 
individual, memories that become crystalized around national institutions and 
symbols (Maguire, 1999: 184).  Such national ‘memories’ can be brought to light 
during the media coverage surrounding sporting and royal events, through which a 
narrative of the nation becomes produced and re-produced (Lee and Maguire, 2009; 
Poulton, 2004; Tuck, 2003; Wardle and West, 2004).  Maguire (1999) notes that: 
 
By studying media discourse, aspects of the process through which national 
habitus/character construction is framed, constructed and represented by and 
through discursive practices becomes more evident (1999: 206 [italics added) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Studies of British national habitus are used comparatively in Elias’s The Civilizing Process (2012) 
and The Germans (1996).  Whereas, both these studies tend to focus on French and German national 
identity, Elias’s work on the British Royal Navy (see Elias, 1950, ‘Studies in the Genesis of the Naval 
Profession’, British Journal of Sociology 1, 4: 291-309) provides a critical insight into the changing 
power balances at play within the Naval profession and its relationship with English habitus more 
generally.  Due to the study’s unappreciated reception, the work was not fully completed.  Therefore, a 
selection of secondary sources and recently re-published material was used in order to draw upon the 
key analytical terms that Elias used in his analysis of British society (see also Elias, 2008a; Loyal and 
Quilley, 2004; Mennell and Gouldsblom, 1998; Moelker, 2003). 
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However, in order to recognise that such media coverage is based upon particular 
social, political and historical contexts and that this coverage, rather than fixed, is 
based upon variations and negotiations in representations of the nation, then an 
analysis of the discursive construction of power relations is required. 
With this in mind, Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model will 
be used in order to examine how constructions of Britain are shaped by 
interdependent multi-level figurational dynamics (British domestic figuration and 
imperial/Commonwealth figurations).  In addition to identifying examples of 
marginalisation, stigmatisation, group charisma and group disgrace within the press’ 
discourse (Elias and Scotson, 1994), the established-outsider model can help ‘to 
capture aspects of the construction and expression of national relations and tensions, 
and the ways in which power relations and interdependencies within, and between, 
national communities are produced in, and through, the meanings of newspaper texts’ 
(Bloyce et al., 2010: 451). 
 
VI. Concluding remarks: research aims 
 
It has been the purpose of this introduction chapter to outline the overall aims of this 
thesis of which the above sections have endeavoured to provide a brief overview of 
the underlying problems but also the prospective potential in re-examining 
constructions of Britain and British identity in 2012.  Indeed, this conclusion section 
will return to these aims as well as provide an overall structure of the forthcoming 
thesis.  Before this however, a number of important distinctions can be drawn from 
the above sections. 
 First, it has been the purpose of this chapter to highlight how analyses of 
Britain and British identity, and, indeed, the complications that so often arise when 
studying such a topic, have a history.  This is not just a history including important 
dates (1603, 1707, 1801) or important people (William Wallace, James I [James VI of 
Scotland], Alex Salmond) but a history of international and intra-national contact, 
through which the formation of Britain and British identity has been formed upon the 
contestations of particular groups.  Furthermore, there are sequences, and, more 
importantly, changes within these sequences, that can serve to elucidate upon the 
processual nature of national identity and its relationship to processes of sociogenetic 
and psychogenetic transformation (Elias, 2012; Van Krieken, 1998).  Indeed, at a 
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much larger level of analysis, Maguire (2012) notes that while ‘western civilisation, at 
this stage in human development, can be regarded as the established group in global 
terms, its history suggests that it too is part of a specific multi-civilizational sequence’ 
(Maguire, 2012).  Accordingly, to some degree this history has, in part, been forged 
around the exploration and colonization of the globe by European imperialism, of 
which the British Empire formed the largest global empire (Howe, 2010).  What is not 
clear however is the ‘impact that empire had on domestic politics and domestic 
culture’ and how underlying ‘imperial’ ideas and myths have influenced British 
identity today (Bickers, 2010; Cohen, 1994; Colley, 2005; Mackenzie, 1984; 1999; 
Maguire, 1993b; 2011; Moore, 1986; Woollacott, 1990). 
Subsequently, one way in which this thesis intends to explore these 
complicated congruencies and contiguities is through the media’s, and, more 
specifically, the national press’, construction of Britain and British identity.  By using 
substantive documentary evidence from examinations of contemporary press 
coverage, certain ‘symbolic elements in the language and ideology of nationalism’ 
(Smith, 2010: 3) will be used to explore the discursive relations that served to 
construct, frame and represent Britain during both the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and 
London Olympic Games.  By analysing what is produced, consumed and ignored as 
well as who is included and excluded during national mediated spectacles, one can 
develop a critical analysis that, in part, can elucidate upon contemporary Britain 
(Kellner, 2003).  
In addition, it is important to note, that despite attempts to re-align British 
identity around the importance of the empire no single study can investigate the 
British Empire in its entirety.  More importantly, the scale of diversity found across 
the former British Empire would far exude any single attempt to provide a complete 
analysis of Britain and British identification (Llewellyn, 2012).  Therefore, while 
analyses of British identity must consider the interdependent actions of both ‘Britain’ 
and the former dominions, which have collaboratively helped to define and re-define 
‘British’ ‘values, attitudes and lifestyle’ (Jacobson, 1997: 188), the boundaries of each 
analysis, both geographical and empirical, should be clearly stated.  Consequently, the 
former dominions of Australia, Canada and New Zealand reveal a rich history of 
shared culture, common sentiment and institutional values that links the national 
histories of these nations to the British Empire (Pietsch, 2010). 
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Theoretically, it has been argued that a process sociology perspective can be 
used to explore Britain’s ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ dynamics.  Certainly, this is not the 
only perspective that could have been used in this study and chapter one will aim to 
draw upon other theoretical approaches that have been used to analyse the 
nation/nation-state, nationalism and national identity.  However, what the process 
sociology perspective can provide is an analysis of British identity, viewed not as an 
isolated phenomena forged upon a specific set of unchanging values and 
characteristics, but as influenced by long-term processes of alteration and contestation 
across larger networks of international ‘imperial’ interaction (Bickers, 2010).  
Arguably, these interactions remain important when monarchical and sporting ties 
between Britain and its former empire remain, for now, in tact.  With this in mind, the 
final part of this conclusion shall provide an overview of the forthcoming chapters. 
 
VII. Concluding remarks: the study at hand 
 
The aim of chapter one will be to survey relevant literature on the nation/nation-state, 
nationalism and national identity in order to trace a suitable conceptual framework for 
this thesis.  In doing so, work by selected academics (Bauman, 2000; Billig, 1995; 
Giddens, 1985; 1990; 1991; 1993; 1998) will be considered in order to provide a 
theoretical overview of the study of nationalism and national identity as well as 
exploring the effects of processes of globalisation on the nation (Held and McGrew, 
2007; Robbins, 1991).  Following this, chapter one will aim to explore both the civic 
and ethnic conceptions of the nation and nation-state.  While the merits of both 
approaches will be considered, it will be argued that traditional civic-ethnic 
dichotomies can be transcended in order to consider broader processes of historical 
development, most notably, how processes of imperial expansion, have impacted 
upon both colonizing and colonized nation-states.  In accordance with section V, the 
final part of this chapter will seek to highlight that the civic/ethnic dichotomy can be 
overcome by viewing the entwined processes of state formation and national identity 
as processually orientated (Elias, 1996; 2012; Maguire, 2005; Malcolm, 2012; 
Mennell, 2007).  Here, Elias’s (2012) socio-historical account of European history, 
social development and national identity, will be considered.  Specifically, this will 
introduce Elias’s conception of national habitus and how this habitus forms part of 
state formation processes (sociogenetic/psychogenetic transformations).  Therefore, 
this chapter will establish a conceptual framework, which is, appropriative of and 
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augmentative to, debates concerning national identity, national habitus and 
state/imperial formation. 
 Chapter two will elaborate upon these aims by applying the process sociology 
perspective to the study of Britain and British identity.  Specifically, Elias’s notion of 
the figuration, interdependence, national habitus and personal pronouns will be used 
to examine the British domestic and imperial/Commonwealth figurations.  More 
importantly, this will be used to conduct a socio-historical analysis of the literature on 
Britain and British identity.  To this extent, the purpose of this chapter will be two 
fold. 
 First, this chapter will trace the emergence of the British imperial figuration 
after the American Revolution (1775-1783).  From this, a selection of important social 
developments within the formation of the British state and later the British Empire 
will be considered.  In particular, this will focus on the impact of the industrial 
revolution and the nationalization of the British royal family.   
 Second, an examination of the history of the British Empire as dictated via a 
synthesis of secondary sources, focusing in particular on the UK as well as Britain’s 
relationship with Australia, Canada and New Zealand will be provided.  This will 
include an examination of the interrelated processes affecting the British Empire 
during the twentieth-century, including processes of devolution within Britain, the 
move towards independence within the colonies and the integration of Britain within 
the European Union (EU).  Accordingly, it will be highlighted that ‘multiple axes of 
identification’ have resulted in Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales revealing overlapping similarities and differences 
between themselves and Britain (Cohen, 1994).  
 Therefore, chapter two will provide an appreciation of the interdependent and 
overlapping histories that have been forged between Britain and the former empire, 
through which the multi-layered and interconnected nature of British identity can be 
explored (Maguire, 1993b; Mennell, 1994).  Indeed, this will be elaborated upon in 
chapter three, where the multi-layered and multi-dimensional nature of national 
habitus will be considered.  In particular, it will be argued that in order to explore ‘the 
emotional dynamics of we-images among large and complex groups of interdependent 
people’ (Mennell, 1994: 191), Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model 
can provide an examination of the long-term structural developments and multi-
national sentiments underpinning Britain’s domestic and imperial/Commonwealth 
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figurations.  Ultimately, this can reveal important developments in the sociogenesis 
and psychogenesis of British identity, in particular, the long-term ‘historical’ 
processes underpinning British habitus.   
 To this extent, chapter three will begin the process of interpreting and analysing 
constructions of Britain and British identity.  That is, by examining important aspects 
in the social development of the British state and empire, this chapter will be used 
alongside later empirical work in order to shed light on the complex nature of British 
identity.  Accordingly, instead of analysing Britain in isolation, it will be argued that 
the processual development of Britain’s state formation, imperial expansion and 
decline, can reveal a number of transformations in the power balances between the 
British home nations and the former dominions, which have interdependently served 
to shape and re-shape the construction of Britain and British identity. 
 Following this, chapter four will outline the research strategy employed.  
Specifically, it will detail how a qualitative thematic content analysis of the 
Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and British press was conducted. 32   A brief 
overview of both the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games will be provided 
before chapters five and six present the research findings.   
 Chapters five and six will be organised around themes related to British unity 
and dis-unity.  More importantly, these categories should not be seen as separated.  
Indeed, throughout the analysis of data and the collating of themes, particular 
discourses would often overlap.  As a result, the separation of the findings into two 
findings chapters was based upon the ability to categorise particular significances 
across the data.  To this end, it was decided that in order to accurately reflect the 
press’ coverage, examples of British unity and dis-unity provided an overarching 
structure.  With this in mind, both chapters will seek to expose the discursive 
construction of established-outsider relations within the British and Commonwealth 
press as well as highlight how these constructions were tied to processes of British 
unity/dis-unity and forms of British attachment and (dis)attachment, both within the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 In light of work by MacInnes et al., (2007) (see also Rosie et al., 2004; Rosie et al., 2006) the term 
‘British’ national press is used collectively to refer to national newspapers in England, Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales.  It is not, as the aforementioned academics have highlighted, a way of 
neglecting the nationalist dimensions inherent in national newspaper coverage.  With this in mind, care 
was taken to select national newspapers from each nation that provided a varied account of British 
identity.  Each country’s selected ‘national’ newspaper will be considered in Chapter four.   
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British and Commonwealth press.  Key aspects of these findings will be re-considered 
in the concluding chapter. 
 Therefore, in sum, this thesis will focus on the construction, framing and 
representation of Britain and British identity during the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and the 
London Olympic Games.  Upon analysing the representation of British identity within 
the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and British newspaper coverage, a 
comprehensive and illustrative account of the press’ construction of Britain and 
British identity will be presented.  In doing so, a much wider analysis of the complex, 
contested and rapidly changing nature of Britain, one that is considerate to the 
complex and variable nature of British identity, will be made (Howe, 2010). 
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Chapter One: Typologies of Nationalism 
 
Introduction 
 
Across the academic literature there exists a diverse range of explanations 
regarding the conceptualisation of various categories of people and collective 
identity more generally.  Many of these explanations have examined the 
relationship between the nation/nation-state, nationalism and national identity 
(Anderson, 2006; Elias, 1991; 1996; 2010; Gellner, 1964; 1963; 2005; 2008; 
Guibernau, 2006; Hutchinson, 1987; Mayall, 1990; Smith, 1986; 1991; 1995; 
2005a; 2005b; 2010).  Indeed, there are differences between those who examine 
the ethnic origins of nationalism (Smith, 1986; 1991; 1995; 2005a; 2005b; 2010) 
as well as those who consider its emergence to be closely tied to the industrial 
revolution (Gellner, 1964; 1963; 2005; 2008).  For others, nationalism has formed 
part of the emergence of print capitalism (Anderson, 2006) or the modern state 
(Mann, 1992).  In contrast, nationalism has also been examined in relation to 
discourse and its ability to be performed in everyday routines and practices 
(Calhoun, 2004; Lavi, 2013).  Elsewhere, studies on globalisation have argued that 
global processes have served to re-structure national boundaries and disrupt 
local/national communities (Robins, 1991).  This has led to a multiplication or 
fracturing of national identities across a broader global platform, with individuals 
harbouring ‘multiple identities’, with little discord or tension (Jacobson, 1997; 
McGregor, 2006).  
 Indeed, there are, within each of these approaches, variations in how a 
subjective sense of belonging and patterns of shared feeling form part of an 
individual’s identification with a particular collective group (Duchesne, 2008).  In 
fact the level of intensity that nationalism can evoke (Duchesne, 2008), is explored 
by Schumpeter (1976), who notes that: 
 
No other appeal is as effective, except at a time when the people happen to 
be caught in the midst of flaming social struggle.  All other appeals are 
rooted in interests that must be grasped by reason.  This one alone arouses 
the dark powers of the subconscious, calls into play instincts that carry over 
from the life habits of the dim past.  Driven out everywhere else, the 
irrational seeks refuge in nationalism – the irrational which consist of 
belligerence, the need to hate, a goodly quota of inchoate idealism, the most 
naive (and hence also the most unrestrained) egotism.  This is precisely what 
constitutes the impact of nationalism. (1976: 73) 
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There are, within Schumpeter’s (1976) description, a number of important 
distinctions that can be drawn upon when investigating nationalism.  First, the 
extent to which nationalism can be aligned with moments of ‘social struggle’; 
second, ‘the dark power of the subconscious’ where, according to Schumpeter 
(1976), nationalist ‘instincts’ reside; third, nationalism’s connection with ‘habits 
of the dim past’ and fourth, the ability to distinguish between a nationalist ‘us’ and 
‘them’ so often portrayed through ‘the need to hate’.  Indeed, there is also the 
sense that Schumpeter’s (1976) remarks serve to portray nationalism as a 
dangerous and destructive phenomena.   
 On the contrary, more can be said when one observes how nationalism is 
observed as part of an integrational tension (‘struggle’), when it is perceived in 
relation to habitual practices and ways of being (‘subconscious’) and when a 
consideration of the past is observed in relation to contemporary constructions of 
the present (‘habits of the dim past’).  Enveloped in these aspects are emotional 
attachments that serve to differentiate between the national ‘we’ and ‘they’ (‘the 
need to hate’).  Both the following and forthcoming chapters will explore these 
latter aspects in further detail. 
 For now, however, the following sections will explore how various 
approaches have aimed to examine and explain the development of national ‘we-
identities’.  In particular, it will critically consider a range of theoretical 
approaches regarding the nation and nation-state as well as nationalism and 
national identity in order to develop an applicable model for this thesis.  
Consequently, the first section shall briefly consider identity, national identity and 
the impact of globalisation processes.  These processes will be considered in light 
of the paradoxes (homogenisation/heterogenisation) that have structured debates 
on globalisation and national sovereignty.  This will be followed by an 
examination of popular theoretical perspectives regarding nationalism and national 
identity (Bauman, 2000; Billig, 1995; Giddens, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008).  In 
addition, civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation/nation-state will be considered 
in regards to the work of Ernest Gellner (1964; 1973; 2005; 2008) and Anthony 
Smith (1986; 1991; 1995; 2001; 2005a; 2005b; 2010).  Indeed, the work of both 
authors has remained a ‘dominant contrast in typologies of nationhood’ (Wright et 
al., 2012: 470).   
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 Following these discussions, the application of several Eliasian theories on 
state formation and national identity will be considered.  It is argued here that one 
of the most sociologically significant aspects of Elias’s work is his emphasis on 
the long-term processes underpinning national identity formation.  In particular, 
these long-term processes can be used to provide further insight into the 
interdependencies that exist between national and imperial formations.  As a 
result, an imperial outlook will be proposed, which through a process sociological 
perspective can be used to examine the gradual emergence of the nation-state and 
its identity via Elias’s (1991; 1996; 2012) conception of national habitus.   
 
1.0. Reaction and pressure: national and global debates – a brief discussion 
 
The complex nature of national identity has been considered in relation to the 
effects of ‘globalizing pressures’ and forces (Karner, 2013).  Conceptually, work 
regarding globalization has often been constructed along paradoxical lines.  On the 
one hand, national boundaries and identities are re-configured by homogenizing 
influences (Held and McGrew, 2007; Maguire, 1999; 2005; 2011b).  In such 
instances, it has been assumed that greater global integration has resulted in the 
creation of a ‘global culture’, derived primarily from the influence of North 
America (Americanization) or Western Europe (Westernization) (Maguire, 1999).  
In particular, the management and control of sport, based upon Western models, 
has led to questions regarding the sustainability of national differences in light of 
the ‘sports-industrial complex’ (Maguire, 2005).   
 Indeed, there are, as McCrone (2006) highlights, ‘de-merits’ in adopting a 
homogenous appreciation of globalization and its threats upon the nation, 
especially with regards to the extent that it ‘universalises and essentialises social 
and cultural change in an unwanted manner and degree’ (2006: 17).  Accordingly, 
Mihelj (2011) adds that: 
 
the perception of globalisation as a threat to nation-states and national 
culture is far too simplistic to account for the nature of interaction between 
the global and the national in the contemporary world. (2011: 28) 
 
Alternatively therefore, heterogenizing influences have explored how national 
identifications have remained a prominent force within contemporary society 
(Bairner, 2001).  Here, national symbols, flags and anthems, and more 
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importantly, national teams remain an important part of sporting mega-events 
(Black, 2007).  While globalization processes have undoubtedly led to greater 
awareness of the international world, Hall (1992) assumes that national identities 
are instead strengthened as a form of resistance against globalization.  
Accordingly: 
 
the reinvigoration of national identities in the 21st century is, in part, to be 
understood as a reaction against boundary-transcending markets, as a retreat 
from globalizing pressures to the local, regional and familiar. (Karner, 
2013)1 
 
Indeed, Maguire (2012) notes that the ‘demands of the Celtic fringe provide a very 
good example of these processes at work’ (2012).  Here, the singing of ‘The 
Soldier’s Song (the national anthem of the Republic of Ireland) or the Flower of 
Scotland at rugby union matches’ (Maguire, 2012) provide two notable examples 
of Irish (Republicanism) and Scottish national identification that are presented in 
spite of Britain’s all-encompassing, ‘God the Save the Queen’. 2   Ultimately, 
however, the relationship between the nation and the wider international sphere, 
calls into question what is secular and secure about the national image and as a 
consequence can threaten or dislodge traditional conceptions regarding the nation 
and its ‘people’. 
 To this extent, the work of Giddens (1990; 1991; 1993), Beck (1992) and 
Beck et al. (1994) has highlighted how identity formation is affected by the 
unpredictability of life in post-modernity (Moore, 2010).  Moore (2010) notes that 
‘gone are the traditional social structures and collectivities that shaped and 
constrained an individual’s life experience and expectancies and in their place are 
individual choice, self-creation and self-determination’ (2010: 1.1).  As a result, 
identity is viewed as being fluid, fragmented and ‘liquid’ (Bauman, 2000), 
aligning with McCrone’s (2002) suggestion that national identity can be both a 
stable and salient phenomenon.   
 The following sections will elaborate upon this further, focusing in particular 
on the extent to which processes of globalization and the stability of national 
identity can be both salient and banal.  Specifically, this will be considered in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/christian-karner/from-collective-myth-to-
counterpublics-negotiating-national-identity-in-, retrieved: 13 May 2013. 
2 The tensions surrounding the British ‘national’ anthem will be returned to in the findings chapters 
(see chapter five, section 5.2.4.). 
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relation to the work of three notable theorists on identity: Michael Billig (1995), 
Anthony Giddens (1985; 1991; 1998) and Zygmunt Bauman (2000). 
 
1.1. Collective forgetting and collective projection: Billig’s banal nationalism 
 
Ontological understandings of identity have often been divided between those that 
focus upon the individual self (Cohen, 1994; Mead, 1934) and those that focus on 
group affiliations (Du Gay and Hall, 1996).  Although discussions on identity can 
include age, class, gender, race and even place, national identity can be conceived 
as being constructed via ‘culturally specific narrative strategies, language[s], 
beliefs, and practices that conceal assumptions about individuals, members of the 
group, and others’ (Gaines, 2012: 169).  It is these concealed assumptions based 
upon everyday existence, which Billig (1995) explores in his work on the ‘banal 
reproduction of nationalism in established nations’ (1995: 37).   
 For example, in Billig’s (1995) work the reproduction of national identity in 
national songs, popular expressions and sporting competitions forms part of a two-
way process of remembering and forgetting the nation.  Drawing upon the work of 
Freud, he notes that: 
 
 Freud claimed that projection depends upon forgetting.  He was referring to 
the individual repressing personal experiences of the past from conscious 
awareness.  There is also, by analogy, a form of collective forgetting and 
collective projection … ‘Our’ nationalism is routinely forgotten, being 
unnamed as nationalism.  Nationalism as a whole is projected on to others.  
But, again and again, not only ‘their’ nationalism seems to return; ‘ours’ 
does too (Billig, 1995: 49)   
 
Importantly, Billig’s (1995) understanding identifies clearly the implied 
togetherness (‘our’, ‘they’) that is associated with examples of banal nationalism, 
particularly those subliminally used within the national press. 
 However, Billig’s (1995) approach reflects an unproblematic appreciation of 
the national differences that continue to divide and which are often contested 
within multi-national units.  This is revealed in his analysis of press readership, 
which seemingly works to dissolve national difference.  MacInnes et al. (2007) 
state: 
 
Billig’s account overlooks how the envisioned boundaries of the ‘national’ 
vary in terms of territory (Britain, Wales, Scotland) and meaning (from 
‘state-wide’ to a geographical or market area to a community imagined in 
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specifically national terms); and ignored the various ways in which titles’ 
[newspaper’s] content may change as they cross ‘national’ boundaries within 
the UK (2007: 190 [italics in original])     
 
As a result, Billig’s (1995) work paradoxically exemplifies the very banal 
nationalism, which his analysis sought to highlight (MacInnes et al., 2007). 
 Furthermore, whereas, elements of banality may be found in the production 
of nationalism across the established world, Billig’s (1995) approach offers little 
explanation in regards to why nationalism has become such a powerful political 
force during the modern era (Wallwork and Dixon, 2004).  Instead, Billig (1995) 
re-instates a unilinear analysis of the nation through which established nation-
states have achieved a teological ‘banal nationalism’ (Mihelj, 2008).  In fact, 
processes of national integration and dis-integration as well as possible ruptures 
and changes within the national consciousness are ignored and unaccounted for.  
In addition, in his work on South Korean national identity, Lee (2013) highlights 
that a fundamental part of the South Korean national consciousness is sustained 
through the ‘everyday and commonplace reminders of the Japanese Other’ (Lee, 
2013: 5).  This is, Lee (2013) notes, ‘beyond “banal”, and instead, ‘quiet 
conspicuous’ (Lee, 2013: 5).   Indeed, this is particularly evident in ‘the highly 
publicised moments that have drawn international attention to the continuing 
antagonism between South Korea and Japan’ (Lee, 2013: 5).  Accordingly, Lee 
(2013) adds that: 
 
While moments such as this occur on the occasion, one should also consider 
the role of the legacies of Japanese colonial hegemony as it functions more 
routinely, such as in presidential discourse, or at national museums (Lee, 
2013: 5) 
 
 In regards to British identity, therefore, this issue becomes particularly 
important when placed within the context of its multi-national state and multi-
national imperial history (see MacInnes et al., 2007).  Here, Billig’s (1995) 
approach provides only a limited account of whether forms of banal Britishness 
are uniformly presented across the UK and whether this is shared, and, by 
extension, how it is shared, by former colonial and dominion territories within the 
former British Empire and the contemporary Commonwealth of Nations.  Instead, 
by enquiring into exactly what is ‘flagged’ by both the national and international 
press coverage, the embodied habits of social life that serve to reproduce national 
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identity and its dynamics can be traced. 
 
1.1.1. The ‘reflexive self’: Giddens and nationalism 
 
Whereas the work of Billig (1995) explores how nationalism forms part of the 
banality of daily routines, Giddens (1985; 1991; 1998) considers how nationalism 
is brought to attention when the ontological security of the nation or when daily 
routines are disrupted.  Accordingly, Giddens (1985; 1991; 1998) proposes that 
the centrality of the nation-state in international affairs and attachments to the 
nation have become eroded under modern social conditions.  Indeed, Giddens’s 
(1998) view of globalisation is conceived as impacting upon the nation-state in the 
following of ways.  First, Giddens’s (1998) argues that power would be acceded 
from the nation-state to inter-governmental organisations.  Second, the nation-state 
would be decentralised by local and regional powers, undermining the nation-state 
as a legitimate political actor.  Third, regions, cities, continents would be able to 
side-step national governments on issues relating to cross-national matters.  More 
importantly, although Giddens’s (1998) believed the nation-state’s power would 
be fundamentally curtailed by globalisation, he still conceded that the nation-state 
would provide a role in the modern era.  However, this role would be very 
different to that which it performed in the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries.   
 In light of this, Giddens’ (1985; 1991; 1998) proposes the concept of the 
‘reflexive self’, which serves to highlight the fluid and alterable nature of identity.  
Giddens’ (1991) notes that: 
 
 The process of ‘reaching back to one’s early experiences’ … is precisely part 
of a reflexive mobilising of self-identity … a general feature of modern 
social activity in relation to psychic organisation (1991: 33) 
 
As a result, identities are chosen and changed via a ‘reflexive project of the self’ as 
individuals create and re-create their lifestyles (Giddens, 1991).  Indeed, these 
choices are made within a context of high modernity, through which nationalism 
becomes ‘a phenomenon that is primarily psychological’ (Giddens, 1985: 116). 
 To this extent, Giddens’s (1991) insights may in fact place too much 
emphasis on individual agency and the ability of the individual to reflexively 
invent and reinterpret their identity.  Whereas, Giddens (1985) is undoubtedly 
aware of the effects that economic factors can have on an individual’s social 
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position, he forgets ‘that there are always simultaneously many mutually 
dependent individuals, whose interdependence to a greater or lesser extent limits 
each one’s scope for action’ (Elias, 1978: 167 [italics added]).  Instead, for 
Giddens the idea of national culture is intimately related to both the ontological 
security of the individual and the legitimacy of the corresponding administrative 
apparatus which seeks to uphold the nation-state (Arnason, 1989).  However, 
Meech and Kilborn (1992) highlight that in the wake of the Soviet Union collapse, 
the effect of culture aiding the identity of national groups that were not ‘nation-
states’, has revealed how particular groups can have a strong ontological security 
without the benefit of state structures.  Accordingly, such processes are evidently 
ignored in Giddens’s (1991) ‘general feature of modern social activity’ (1991: 33).  
To this extent, there is the tendency within Giddens’s (1991; 1998) approach to 
separate analyses of national identity between its political functionality and its 
psychological dimensions.  That is, there is a separation between the ‘sociological’ 
and ‘psychological’ aspects of national identity, rather than viewing the two as 
interconnected. 
 
1.1.2. The ‘cloakroom community’: Bauman and nationalism 
 
In contrast to Giddens’ (1991) primarily psychological approach, Bauman (2000) 
presents a much more sociological understanding of nationalism and national 
identity.  Bauman (2000) argues that certain events can, for a certain period, bring 
together a community or nation in recognition of its shared aspects, allowing 
dividing interests to be ‘temporarily laid aside, put on a slow burner or silenced 
altogether’ (Bauman, 2000: 200).  Indeed, the surreptitious reminder of these 
shared aspects are reinforced occasionally by particular events (Pritchard, 2012).  
Corresponding with Billig’s (1995) ‘banal nationalism’, this process of 
remembering the nation is formed through the elicitation of shared interests that 
lie dormant in otherwise disparate individuals (Bauman, 2000).  Adopting the 
analogy of an evening performance, Bauman (2000) notes that: 
 
 It is the evening performance which brought them all here – different as their 
interests and pastimes during the day could have been.  Before entering the 
auditorium they all leave the coats or anoraks they wore in the streets in the 
playhouse cloakroom … During the performance all eyes are on the stage; so 
is everybody’s attention.  Mirth and sadness, laughter and silence, rounds of 
applause, shouts of approval and gasps of surprise are synchronized – as if 
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carefully scripted and directed.  After the last fall of the curtain, however, 
the spectators collect their belongings from the cloakroom and when putting 
their street clothes on once more return to their ordinary mundane different 
roles, a few moments later again dissolving in the variegated crowd filling 
the city streets from which they emerged a few hours earlier (2000: 200) 
 
To some extent Bauman’s (2000) ‘cloakroom community’ highlights the 
sociological dynamics that are forgotten within Giddens’s (1991) notion of 
reflexivity.  In addition, the functional aspects of the evening performance provide 
a useful interpretation of the communal characteristics that are displayed during 
national events (Constantine, 2006; Dayan and Katz, 1992; Lee and Maguire, 
2009; Shaw, 2004; Wardle and West, 2004). 
 However, Bauman’s (2000) analysis can overemphasise the temporal nature 
of the community and its slow erosion at the hands of an ‘inherently transgressive, 
boundary-breaking, all-eroding modernity’ (2000: 6).  In regards to the 
sustainability of communal forms of organisation, such as those associated with 
the nation, Bauman’s (2000) insights simply reinvent its own 
continuity/discontinuity paradox. 
 The above theorists all highlight the exploratory potential of various 
approaches to the study of nationalism.  With this in mind, the following sections 
will aim to elucidate upon this work by exploring how understandings of 
nationalism and national identity have been based upon disparate civic and ethnic 
interpretations.  In correspondence with the above, such a discussion can help to 
orientate examinations of nationalism and national identity by exploring its 
emergence and correspondence with the nation’s history and cultural background 
as well as its emergence alongside wider processes, such as, the industrial 
revolution. 
 
1.2. A sovereign, united and unique nation: the civic approach 
 
Drawing upon the geographical importance of the nation, civic interpretations 
argue that the nation must possess a compact and well-defined territory.  In such 
instances, the formation of the modern nation-state is perceived as an artifact of 
modernity (Anderson, 2006; Breuilly, 1994; Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008; 
Hobsbawn, 1983; 1990).  Originating from the work of Ernest Gellner (1964; 
1973; 2005; 2008), modernists believe that the nation is primarily a civic creation, 
forged for the purpose of civic politics (McCrone, 1997).  Here, the defining of 
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boundaries and the establishment of a collective identity provide the crucial 
components of a political ‘national’ community that forms part of a modern world 
system of nation-states (Calhoun, 1994; Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008).  As an 
extension of Gellner’s work, Hechter (1975) locates nationalism in the uneven 
development of capitalist relations.  Here, ‘a complex web of colonial 
dependencies and centre-periphery dynamics’ are formed (Mihelj, 2011: 72).  
These relations resulted in the emergence of nationalist projects, and, as a result, 
are closely aligned with the economic and political effects brought on by the 
industrial revolution (Gellner, 2008).  Ultimately, this dictates that ‘nationalism 
and nations simply could not exist outside of the context of modern societies’ 
(Mihelj, 2011: 73). 
 Undoubtedly, the effect of the industrial revolution had a profound influence 
on the making of modern nation-states, particularly Britain.  Domestically, 
Robbins (1988) notes the importance which industrialization had on uniting the 
British Isles.  Improvements in transport links such as the railway provided 
journeys across England, Scotland and Wales to be completed much faster.  More 
importantly, these improvements led to a standardization of time across the 
country, creating a greater sense of interconnectedness.  Robbins (1988) notes: 
 
Time-tables could not function properly when ‘local time’ prevailed in 
different parts of the country.  By the late 1840’s, the [train] companies had 
succeeded in enforcing a uniformity across Britain which Greenwich 
standard time offered … However unpopular in particular localities, 
especially in the West, this measure was an ever-present reminder, from 
John O’Groat’s to Lands End, that all communities belonged to Britain 
(1988: 27) 
 
To this extent, modernists argue that nationalism places at its centre the sovereign, 
united and unique nation, instilling in the population a secular respect for the state 
and its laws (Anderson, 2006; Smith, 2005a). 
 However, in regards to Britain, Wellings (2003) has stressed that rather than 
emphasising popular sovereignty, Britain venerated its national institutions, 
indelibly linking British nationalism with a head of state and the British 
parliament.  Outside of the British Isles, the adoption of the parliamentary model 
and adherence to Westminster and the British crown, provided the groundwork for 
containing the imperial colonies within an extensive British polity (Meaney, 
2003).  Through the ‘invention’ of British ‘traditions’ and ‘imagined’ conceptions 
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of the ‘British race’, British state apparatuses formed part of an expansive network 
of colonies and imperial territories (Lester, 2001; 2006).  The following sections 
will elaborate upon these processes in further detail. 
 
1.2.1. ‘Imagining’ and ‘inventing’ the nation-state 
 
Whereas the work of Gellner (1964; 1973; 2005; 2008) views both the nation and 
nationalism as the foundation to statehood and sovereignty in world affairs, 
Anderson (2006) highlights how the importance of print capitalism, fuelled by the 
formation of a shared vernacular language, helped to establish the nation and its 
people as an ‘imagined community’ (2006: 6).  Importantly, Anderson (2006) 
provides some theoretical light between his work and that of Gellner’s, when he 
states that, ‘Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under 
false pretences that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’, rather 
than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’’ (2006: 6 [italics added]).  
 Consequently, due to changes in the development of print capitalism, mass 
populations were able to think about themselves and others as well as relate to 
themselves in profoundly new ways (Anderson, 2006).  Through vivid and 
identifiable ways, the nation was able to establish itself in a political and cultural 
domain previously held by monarchies, dynastic states and the aristocracy (Smith, 
2010).  In doing so, the appearance of ‘linguistic-nationalism’ provided elites the 
opportunity to escape marginalisation and to re-imagine themselves within the 
imagined community (Anderson, 2006: 101). 
 In particular, Anderson (2006) highlights how literacy and national history 
were both used to manufacture national identifications across the nation, a key 
aspect of which was the importance given to the historical characteristics of the 
nation.  Often, historical legacies are evoked during sporting and national 
ceremonies via the use of ‘invented traditions’ (Maguire, 1999: 178).  Hobsbawm 
(1983) notes that: 
 
‘invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by 
overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which 
seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which 
automatically implies continuity with the past (1983: 1)   
 
Here, Hobsbawm (1983) draws attention to the flourishing of national history, 
mythology and symbolism which occurred in Europe from 1830 onwards and 
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which culminated in a range of national traditions being established, such as, 
national anthems and national flags.  Central to this is the role of politicians, 
historians and journalists in the management of the nation-state and its associated 
nationalism.  This can be seen in the work of the imperial historians such as Cain 
and Hopkins (1993a; 1993b) who sought to direct the study of the British Empire 
towards the ‘gentleman capitalists’ who drove Britain’s imperial expansion. 
 In such instances, both the nation and its nationalism rested upon ‘exercises 
in social engineering that [were] often deliberate and always innovative, if only 
because historical novelty implies innovation’ (Hobsbawm, 1983: 13).  Often, the 
source of such invention was forged in relation to an awareness of the ‘other’ 
(Constantine, 2006).  Colley’s (2005) analysis of Britishness serves to expand 
upon this awareness by highlighting that in the history of Great Britain the role of 
the ‘other’ was provided and maintained via a series of wars against the Catholic 
French and North American rebels.  These historically diverse cultural and ethnic 
divisions signified ‘an invented nation superimposed, if only for a while, onto 
much older alignments and loyalties’ (2005: 5 [italics added]).  Indeed, such 
thoughts are shared by Gellner’s (1964) maxim that ‘nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist’ (1964: 169).  Consequently, whereas, it is clear that Anderson (2006) would 
prefer to view this invention as an imagining, the work of Gellner (1964; 1973; 
2005; 2008), Anderson (2006) and Hobsbawm (1983) points towards the 
functionality of nationalism and national identity as tools of national sovereignty 
through which political governments can channel their own ideals and policies 
(Varadarajan, 2008). 
 However, while focusing on the political motives behind the nation, 
nationalism and national identity, both Anderson’s (2006) ‘imagined’ and 
Hobsbawm’s (1983) ‘invented’ approaches, reveal a rather egocentric 
consideration of the nation and its identity.  In both instances, relations between 
the state and its population are presented as discrete and internally driven.  In 
contrast, the ‘imagined’ or ‘invented’ nation may in fact be aligned with wider 
collective communities that transcends the nation-state (MacInnes et al., 2007).  
MacInnes et al. (2007) indicate that: 
 
In February 2003 millions demonstrated across the world against the 
 35 
invasion of Iraq, exercising an imagination that stretched not only to 
alternative visions of the destiny of their particular state or nation, whether 
established, contested or not, but also to a community of interest well 
beyond any form of the national (2007: 204) 
 
Subsequently, whereas ‘the rise of industrial and mobile societies and the modern 
state makes some form of imagining beyond the ‘directly apprehended locality’ 
inevitable, it does not necessarily follow … that this must entirely supersede either 
more local or more global identities’ (MacInnes et al., 2007: 192).   
 Furthermore, McClintock (1993) claims that Hobsbawm’s analysis suffers 
from a ‘breathtaking Eurocentricism’ (1993: 67).  As a result, McClintock (1993) 
asserts that: 
 
there is no single narrative of the nation.  Different genders, classes, 
ethnicites and generations do not identify with, or experience the myriad 
national formations in the same way; nationalisms are invented, performed 
and consumed in ways that do not follow a universal blueprint. (1993: 67) 
 
McClintock’s (1993) comments are useful in highlighting how various 
interpretations of the nation can impact upon nationalism.  In fact, McClintock 
(1993) adds that ‘we might do well; to develop a more theoretically complex, and 
strategically subtle genealogy of nationalisms’ (1993: 67 [italics in original]).  
Indeed, there is much merit in this perspective, particularly in regards to the 
‘distinct’ yet ‘overlapping trajectories’ (McClintock, 1993: 67) which have 
resulted in varying interpretations of British nationalism.  To this extent, the 
transference of British culture throughout the British Empire directs attention 
towards processes of acceptance, negotiation and resistance as well as its 
construction and (re)construction. 
 Accordingly, instead, of the imagined community forming a coherent group, 
other communities, both within and outside the nation can be imagined (Mihelj, 
2011).  This suggest a more expansive conception of the ‘imagined community’, 
indeed, one that goes beyond the nation-state frontier to include more expansive 
spaces of association, such as, those drawn across former imperial networks.  
Here, the British Empire provides a critical example of the role played by societal 
elites in using both the monarchy and sport in re-creating British culture 
throughout the empire (Colley, 2005; Mangan, 1992a). 
 Finally, in sum, many nation-states can be found to pre-date processes of 
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industrialization (McCrone et al., 1998).  As a result the origins of the nation need 
to be located much further back than the modernists consider (Hastings, 2005).  
Consequently, Smith (2010) stresses that: 
 
Nationalist ideals are powerful in their own right; indeed, they have the 
power to lead people astray, to disorientate them and ultimately destroy 
them.  For Gellner, ideas have no such power, and the ideology of 
nationalism merely masks the true workings of industrial culture … [this] 
points to a glaring omission in modernization theory: it has no place for the 
role of individuals and their ideals (2010: 72)  
 
For Smith (2010), the ethnic origins of the nation are pre-modern and serve as the 
basis from which particular nationalisms have emerged.  Indeed, the following 
section will elaborate upon this process in further detail. 
 
1.2.2. Ancestrally related and culturally distinct: the ethnic approach 
 
The ethnic approach to nationalism and national identity derives much of its 
argument from the work of Anthony Smith (1986; 1991; 1995; 2005a; 2005b; 
2010).  Smith argues that the nation is not just a political entity but a system of 
cultural representation that produces meaning and which influences and organises 
human action (McCrone, 1997).  Thus, nations are embedded in particular 
collective pasts that emerge over long time spans through specific historical 
processes (Smith, 2005a).  Here, Smith highlights the role of ethnie, a term that 
Smith uses to denote ‘a named human population with myths of common ancestry, 
shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, 
including an association with a homeland’ (Smith, 2005a: 25). 
 As a result, some nations can be found to pre-date modernity, revealing 
ethnic antecedents (Smith, 2005a) that are associated with a national culture.  
Indeed, these ethno-national attributes are often depicted via a shared language, 
religion or particular geographical topography (Bairner, 2009; Smith, 2010).  In 
the following example by Laba (1992) both the geography of Canada and its 
national sport, ice hockey, are symbiotically used to help explain the sports 
popularity amongst ‘Canadians’: 
 
The romance of hockey is mythic – a romance that has regarded and 
rendered the game as a natural outgrowth of the daunting challenges of 
Canadian geography and climate, as organically rooted as snow, ice, forest, 
prairie, rock shield and the myriad of the country’s other geographic and 
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climatic facts (Laba, 1992: 343) 
 
Consequently, ethnically driven distinctions can help formulate a national identity 
that draws upon common cultural elements that are attributable to a particular 
ethnic group (Bairner, 2009; Smith, 2010).  Whereas, a civic interpretation views 
the formation of the nation as a specifically modern invention, ethnic accounts, 
view the nation as a historical phenomenon (Smith, 2005b). 
 Drawing upon an historical perspective is the work of both the perennial and 
primordial paradigms.  Indeed, for the perennial perspective nations have existed 
throughout history and since time immemorial (Smith, 2010).  Here, the nation 
reflects a recurrent form of social organization, through which nationalism 
represents a perennial mode of cultural belonging (Smith, 2005a).  As a result, the 
‘perennialists approach suggests depth of attachment, if only because it portrays 
nations as long-enduring, historic identities’ (Fenton, 2007: 323).  However, Smith 
(2010) stresses that: 
 
Perennialism should not be confused with a naturalist conception of the 
nation, which is the basis of latter day primordialism … All that is necessary 
for perennialism is a belief, founded on some empirical observation, that 
nations – or at least some nations – have existed for a long period of time, 
for whatever reason.  They do not have to regard nations as natural, organic 
or primordial; indeed they may and often do reject such ahistorical accounts 
(2010: 50 [italics added])  
 
Subsequently, primordial accounts tend to occupy a more ‘organic’ conception of 
the nation.  These often prescribe a socio-biological conception of the nation’s 
population, whereby cultural symbols act as markers of biological affinity and 
supremacy (Smith, 2010).  This socio-biological approach to the nation and its 
people can be found in sporting practices that helped to confirm the supremacy of 
the Christian British character as well as in sports use as a method of 
indoctrinating indigenous populations (Mangan, 1992a).  Similarly, Hokuwhitu 
(2003) notes how racial images of the Maori culture propagated the education of 
indigenous people.  Drawing upon the work of Simon (1990), Hokuwhitu (2003) 
highlights how one parliamentarian believed that: 
 
The ‘Haka’ is an expose of the evil which really lies at the root of their 
present prostrate condition, an exhibition of the substratum of utter 
immorality, depravity, and obscurity, which forms the ground work of their 
race … we shall do nothing until we alter their entire character, by taking in 
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hand the education, per force of the younger growing saplings (Simon, 1990: 
86 cited in Hokuwhitu, 2003: 199) 
 
Subsequently, imperial education was used to encourage the superiority of the 
British race, a superiority that was ultimately based upon a white male imperial 
fraternity (Hokowhitu, 2003; Mangan, 1992a). 
…….Today, primordial elements still remain part of identity constructions and 
concepts regarding national citizenship (Giesen, 2003).  There are, however, a 
number of problems regarding the ethno-centricity of the nation.  In particular, 
ethnic accounts can be depicted as constant and unchangeable (Goulbourne, 1991), 
presenting a rather essentialist appreciation of national identity that fails to 
distinguish between the multiplicity of ethnicities that can exist within a nation.  
Similarly, national identity can also provide a straddling ambiguity between the 
social and the spatial, denoting both a ‘people’ and a ‘place’ (Wallwork and 
Dixon, 2004).  With regards to the British nation-state, these ‘people’ were not 
only spread across the four ‘domestic’ nations of England, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales but also across a vast geographical network, incorporating a 
variety of cultural specificities both within the internal British nation-state and its 
external global empire (Armitage, 2000).  More importantly, for the purpose of 
tracing British identity across time, the ethnic approach can ‘struggle with the 
undoubted discontinuities between the past and the present’ (McCrone et al., 1998: 
16).  It is here that empires have played a decisive role in shifting populations and 
mixing ethnic groups.  The colonial migration of Indian railroad workers to Kenya 
highlights one example of inter-cultural mixing within the British Empire 
(Sunderland, 2004).  Indeed, difficulties can often arise in regards to which ethnie 
should be employed for which nation-state (Calhoun, 1994). 
 
1.3. Moving beyond the civic/ethnic dichotomy 
 
Taking the above section into consideration, it is clear that the subconscious bond 
that derives a common sense of belonging, a common language and a common 
history, between groups of people, has been widely attributed to the nation (Smith, 
2010).  Constructions of the nation perceive it as something more than just human 
nature maintained through human membership, but instead a phenomenon, which 
is reified through a national discourse concerning place and identity (Bairner, 
2009; Wallwork and Dixon, 2004).  Here, a connection to a territory, totemic site 
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or style of architecture forms the foundation of national culture (Smith, 2010; 
Wallwork and Dixon, 2004).   
     Nevertheless, ‘a good deal of the nation’s credibility and its attraction as the 
warrant of safety and durability has been derived from its intimate association with 
the state’ (Bauman, 2000: 185).  Accordingly, while the civic state represents a 
territorial sovereign, which is related to a demarcated boundary (Gellner, 1964; 
1973; 2005; 2008), the nation-state is formed when the border of a state 
corresponds with a collective national group (Smith, 2010).  For a nation-state to 
function, inhabitants of the state have to become citizens (Gellner, 1964; 1973; 
2005; 2008).  This process is usually established by creating a sense of national 
identity amongst the population and by experiences that evoke a national 
identification (Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008).  This has led some authors to 
conclude that it is the state that precedes the nation (Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 
2008; McCrone, 2002). 
Accordingly, it is possible to observe that traditional conceptions of what 
constitutes the nation-state have across ‘all of Western and Eastern Europe, been 
shaped by the internal discourse of nationalism – including both ethnic claims and 
civil projects of popular political participation’ (Calhoun, 1997: 89 [italics added]).  
Since civic networks are often interwoven with ethnic ties and sentiments, it 
remains conceptually difficult to ignore one for the other (Kumar, 2006a; 2006b).  
Indeed, in order for the nation to be ‘imagined’, the ‘imagining’ must be held by 
all members of a particular nation (Sumartojo, 2012).  Similarly, while the nation 
may also be ‘invented’ it is invented in multiple ways (Sumartojo, 2012). 
To this extent, the path to ‘nation building’ can become increasingly 
complex when related to a particular political community.  In Britain, this can be 
identified in recent government papers that seek to ‘recognise the diversity of 
Britain’ and ‘the common values and bonds that being British provide[s]’ (Leith, 
2010: 290).  Referring to the foreword written by former British Prime Minister, 
Gordon Brown, and foreign secretary, Jack Shaw, Leith (2010) highlights how the 
2007 Green Paper ‘clearly conflates nation and state, and society … proclaiming 
Britain as a nation, with a ‘shared national purpose’ (2010: 290).  In doing so, ‘the 
document consistently enforces the idea that the UK is a nation – even though the 
contemporary conception of the UK is that of a union state’ (2010: 290 [italics 
added]). 
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Similar confusions can also be brought to light through the attempts made 
by the British state to define nationality in accordance with parliamentary 
legislation.  Indeed, a central part of both the 1948 and 1981 British Nationality 
Acts involved framing a conception of British citizenship that included both the 
domestic British populous as well as those ‘Britons’ located within the British 
Empire.  As a result, both acts were marred by tension and confusion regarding 
UK citizenship and British identity (Mycock, 2010). 
Therefore, in contrast to adopting particular civic or ethnic conceptions, 
attention can be turned to an understanding of the nation and national identity that 
is fundamentally related to broader processes of historical and social development.  
Indeed, Goudsblom (1977) argues that we should ‘see all social phenomena as 
‘becoming’ (1977: 148).  That is, the study of social phenomena should be viewed 
as an emergent part of larger structures ‘of development, the course of which can 
be studied precisely and systematically’ (Goudsblom, 1977: 148).   
To this extent, few analyses within the study of national identity have 
thought critically about the political/civic and cultural/ethnic dichotomy in relation 
to historical processes of national development, such as, the emergence and 
decline of empire.  As a form of territorial organisation the ‘nation-state’ only 
began to take precedent during the twentieth-century before which the majority of 
the globe was part of, or, shaped by, imperial empires (Conrad, 2013).  To this 
extent, the following sections will explore the relationship between nationalism 
and imperialism in order to outline how imperial processes can disrupt traditional 
civic and ethnic dichotomies. 
 
1.3.1. Nationalism and national identity: an imperial outlook 
 
With regards to the civic approach it has been highlighted that Hobsbawm (1983) 
viewed the nation through the invention of particular national traditions.  Yet, it is 
also evident that attempts to ‘invent’ the nation, as separate to others, occurred 
alongside attempts to globalize the nation in particular ways.  For example, in 
comments relating to ‘The Parthenon Marbles’, Rose-Greenland (2013) highlights 
that: 
 
The marbles were imported to Britain. They became emblems of British 
nationhood. They functioned as signifiers of particular as well as universal 
cultural identity. They belonged simultaneously to no nation, to every 
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nation, and to Britain. (2013) 
 
Taken from Greece, the Marbles were subsequently redefined as an expression of 
British national character but also as an expression of global civilisation.  In such 
instances, we can observe that while the Parthenon Marbles were ‘invented’ as an 
emblem of British nationhood, ‘national’ symbols and artifacts could also carry 
‘global’ connotations.  Rose-Greenland (2013) adds: 
 
For scholars of nationalism, the case presents a conceptual puzzle. The 
nationalism literature takes for granted a nation’s desire to present itself as 
special and elect, relying on homegrown cultural products – from cuisine to 
folk costumes and artworks – to strengthen its ‘nationness’. The Parthenon 
marbles, however, puts a curious kink in this line of thinking. The sculptures 
were imported to Britain but they have become emblems of British 
nationhood. (2013) 
 
As can be seen in the above example, it is evident that notions of imperial prestige, 
national distinction and national culture were symbiotically tied to the imperial 
expansion of Britain, a process that arguably afforded it the ability to ‘appropriate’ 
a number of historic artifacts. 
Elsewhere, Darwin (2010) redefines the relationship between empire and 
ethnicity as a ‘imperial ethnicity’ (2010: 386).  Here, the cohabitation of various 
ethnic populations within an empire would often result in social and political 
practices being implemented in order to forge supranational identities of imperial 
citizenship (Gerasimov et al., 2005: 51).  For the ‘old’ dominions of Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand, Britishness not merely co-existed in the civic sense 
(joining the colonial nations in alignment with the imperial empire under an 
allegiance to the British crown), but also in an ethnic sense, by being substantially 
constitutive and mutually interactive within the formation of their own national 
identities (McGregor, 2006; MyCock, 2010).   
Taking this into consideration, it is important to appreciate that wider 
levels of identification can envelop our perspective of the isolated nation/nation-
state.  Goulbourne (1991) provides a summary of this process with regards to 
Britain, highlighting that: 
 
the nations of Britain have kept together despite strong ethnic sentiments in 
its historically quite distinct parts of England, Wales and Scotland … Thus, a 
variety of loyalties, often conflicting, logically irreconcilable and practically 
unrealizable, have bound different peoples together under traditional 
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nationalism (Goulbourne, 1991: 218 and 219 [italics added]) 
 
Whereas, Goulbourne (1991) refers to a variety of loyalties being held together 
under an overarching ‘traditional nationalism’, the same can also be said of those 
colonies, dominions and independent states brought together under much larger 
‘imperial’ or ‘supranational’ collectives. 
Indeed, Bowden (2012) provides a further examination of this wider 
perspective with regards to the study of civilisations.  Drawing upon the work 
Durkheim and Mauss (1971) as well as Braudel (1993), Bowden (2012) notes that 
‘a civilization constitutes a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of 
nations, each national culture being only a particular form of the whole’ 
(Durkheim and Mauss, 1971: 811 cited in Bowden, 2012).  Correspondingly, 
Braudel (1993) argues that ‘there can be no civilizations without the societies that 
support them and inspire their tensions and their progress’ (1993: 15 cited in 
Bowden, 2012).  In the British context, these ‘tensions’ (Braudel, 1993 cited in 
Bowden, 2012) become all the more prominent when considered in regards to 
Britain’s imperial history (Burton, 2010; Hopkins, 1999; Mac An Ghaill, 2001).   
Accordingly, whereas ‘in the imperial age, transnational connections 
reinforced the emerging British state and helped to create new states overseas’, 
correspondingly, ‘in the post-colonial world global influences challenge national 
boundaries and identities’ (Hopkins, 1999: 231).  Indeed, this corresponds with 
traditional debates regarding the sovereignty of the nation and its dependency 
upon a particular population and territorial boundary.  Here, the distinctions made 
by the ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ approaches have provided important boundaries in 
determining the permeability of those barriers used to delineate between the 
national group and the foreign outsider (Wright et al., 2012). 
With this in mind, the final section of this chapter will seek to draw upon 
the above in conjunction with Elias’s conception of national habitus.  
Significantly, this discussion can be useful in highlighting the effects of global 
interdependencies, not only in intra-state relations but also in regards to national 
identity formation (Elias, 1991; 2012). 
 
1.4. National identity as ‘a continuous process of development’ 
 
The theoretical work of Elias (1978; 1987; 1991; 1996; 2012) can help transcend 
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the formulation of distinct historical periods (traditional and modernity) (Bauman, 
2000; Giddens, 1985; 1990; 1998), civic/ethnic dichotomies (Gellner, 1964; 1973; 
2005; 2008; Smith, 1986; 1991; 1995; 2005a; 2005b; 2010) and imperial neglect 
(Hopkins, 1999; Howe, 2010) by proposing a ‘continuous process of 
development’ both within human personality structures and social relations (Van 
Krieken, 2005: 8).   
 Certainly, processual accounts of the nation are not unique to the process 
sociology perspective.  Indeed, Calhoun (1997) has examined how national 
identity is processually constructed through discursive practices related to how 
individuals talk about the nation.  This is shared by Wodak et al. (2009) as well as 
by others who have sought to examine how national identities are continually 
performed through practical everyday routines as well through formal rituals and 
national ceremonies (Edensor, 2002; ref).  In fact, Mennell (1990) has argued that 
while sociologists have often condemned ‘progress’ theories, there is a relative 
acceptance that societies have become more complex.  Elias’s conception of 
‘process’, however, allows us to highlight ‘relationships past, present and 
(possible) future’ as well as highlight ‘changing balances of power and changing 
interdependencies’ (O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012: 482-483).   
 One particular benefit in adopting a processual account is the ability to 
debunk frequently used concepts, such as, ‘modern’ or ‘post-modern’.  Indeed, the 
de-merits of such terms are highlighted by Inglis (2013): 
 
 Dichotomies of the supposed ‘modern’ and ‘pre-modern’ abound in classical 
theory, attesting to a very strong sense, held across generations, reinforced 
by educational institutions, and shared by those otherwise intellectually and 
politically opposed to each other, that the times they lived in were somehow 
radically qualitatively different from those in which people of the past had 
lived (2013: 7) 
 
Instead, if societies are ‘radically’ and ‘qualitatively different’ (Inglis, 2013: 7), 
then it is due to changes in their social structure and relations.  Indeed, this 
requires a long-term analysis of social processes: 
 
A sophisticated understanding of the contemporary world is made possible 
only by an equally sophisticated understanding of long-term historical 
processes, not just over the last five hundred years – since the so-called 
‘dawn of modernity’ – but over many millennia, and not just in ‘the West’ 
but across the whole planet. (Inglis, 2013: 2) 
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Consequently, while the work of Bauman (2000) and Giddens (1985; 1990; 1991; 
1993; 1998) has explored the disintegration of traditional forms of social bonding, 
in contrast, process sociological approaches view such changes in accordance with 
the multiplying of chains of interdependence. 
To this extent, it is important that national identity research focuses on the 
social processes inherent in national identity formation and how these formations 
are themselves constantly changing and adapting as well as being reproduced, 
reinterpreted and represented (James, 1997).  In addition, these processes form 
part of the discursive reproduction of national identities via social systems, such 
as, the media.  Here, the national press and in particular the tabloid press has 
proven particularly adept at ‘imagining’ the nation (Anderson, 2006).  Conboy 
(2006) notes: 
 
The material connection between the language of the tabloid newspapers and 
the longer narratives of the nation provides an essential element in enabling 
the imaginary community of the nation to retain its cultural and political 
authority … in its tabloid manifestation … [the nation] is able to reformulate 
and revise itself at prodigious speed to retains its claims to authenticity in the 
modern world (2006: 68)  
 
Indeed, this can have important implications in the context of Britain’s ‘imperial’ 
history, particularly, in regards to the editorial and linguistic strategies employed 
by the media and its appropriation of the nation’s past within the present (Conboy, 
2006).  More importantly, however, this can also elucidate upon ‘the actuality of 
constitutively different human natures formed across different societies, and … the 
contradictory subjectivities formed within the same society or the same person, 
[which] are often either disregarded or relegated to the realm of psychoanalysis’ 
(James, 1997: 185).  In such instances, identity is not just related to the 
psychological but is instead socially established through interdependent networks 
of societal relations and changing networks of interdependency that have 
characterized Britain’s history and which have left an indefinite mark on its 
culture and identity (Elias, 1978; 1996; James, 1997).  More to the point, such 
processes can be examined in relation to the Eliasian concept of habitus. 
 
1.4.1. Habitus: sociogenetic and psychogenetic processes 
 
Although popularised by Bourdieu, Elias’s use of the term habitus fits more 
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broadly with his process sociology framework by highlighting how ‘the dynamics 
of figurations are also dependent on the formation of a shared social habitus or 
personality make-up which constitutes the collective basis of individual human 
conduct’ (Van Krieken, 1998: 89 [italics in original]).  Consequently, Mennell 
(1994) adds that ‘the meaning of the technical term ‘habitus’ is, as Elias used to 
remark, captured exactly in the everyday English expression second nature’ 
(1994: 177 [italics in original]).  Accordingly, Elias (1991) notes that: 
 
 the concept of the social habitus enables us to bring social phenomena within 
the field of scientific investigation previously inaccessible to them.  
Consider, for example, the problem that is communicated in a pre-scientific 
way by the concept of national character.  That is a habitus par excellence 
(1991: 182 [italics in original]) 
 
Here, habitus is not just reflective of the individual but forms part of a complex 
inter-related socio-psychogenesis transformation (Maguire and Tuck, 2005).  
Mennell and Goudsblom (1998) add: 
 
 It seems that our individual habitus guides our behaviour; but, then, habitus 
itself is formed and continues to be moulded in social situations, marked by 
specific power differentials, and those situations, in turn, are embedded in 
larger social structures which change over time (1998: 15) 
 
Notably, Mennell and Goudsblom (1998) highlight how the individual habitus can 
only ever be understood ‘as an aspect of the wider social habitus’ (Moore, 2010: 
2.4).  To this extent: 
 
 At the individual level, there are a series of learned behavioural dispositions 
which are unique to the person.  At the social level, there reside a collection 
of personality characteristics which individuals share with other member of 
their group.  The social habitus of people forms a foundation from which 
more individual feelings can develop (Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 111) 
 
As a result, the concept has increasingly been used within studies of national 
identity, in order to capture the largely unconscious set of characteristics, which 
exist between members of a national community.   
 Arguably, therefore, it is possible to draw upon traditional conceptions of 
nationalism in conjunction with Elias’s overall approach to state development.  
Indeed, Elias’s use of Freud, in his conception of habitus, served to elucidate upon 
the existence and development of unconscious and conscious actions, values and 
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practices (Dunning and Hughes, 2012).  To this extent, Billig’s (1995) analysis of 
the omnipresent nature of nationalism is one that is shared by Calhoun’s (1997; 
2004) focus on the naturalness of speaking and thinking through a national 
identity, both of which can be incorporated into Elias’s conception of national 
habitus.  Through the familiar, taken for granted, daily actions that bind us to our 
national habitus, our particular ‘I/we identity’ is constructed (Maguire and 
Burrows, 2005).  Similarly, in response to outsider groups, the ‘we-identity’ of the 
national collective is brought closer to the individual’s ‘I-identity’ (Maguire and 
Tuck, 2005).  In doing so, the ‘individual can thus become the embodiment of the 
nation, and the social group represented by the nation, becomes that individual’ 
(Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 113 [italics added]).  Here, ‘the indissoluble link 
between socialization and individualization’ can be observed (Duffy, 2008: 62). 
 Furthermore, habitus can also be used alongside Hobsbawm and Ranger’s 
(1983) ‘invented traditions’ in order to consider the myths that are often associated 
with national traditions (Maguire, 1999).  By highlighting the deeply rooted and 
invented traditions that are used in generating a greater sense of national 
awareness the ‘impersonal symbols of a hallowed collectivity’ (Elias, 1996: 148; 
see also Smith, 2010) become closely ‘linked to the development of a national 
ethos that reflects, and is reflected by, the individual’ (Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 
111).  Consequently, ‘the French, the Germans, the Dutch, the Italians have 
different national habituses, differences that are shaped by their history and, in 
turn, help to shape it’ (Smith, 2001: 128).  Here, the importance of the nation’s 
past can help to reveal how cultural myths, memories and symbols are carried by 
various institutions into the modern epoch (Smith, 2010).  To this extent, an 
understanding of contemporary identity politics demands an appreciation of the 
wider social structures through which the individual and the national (including its 
civic and ethnic origins) have acquired their meaning (Elias, 1978; 1991; 2008b; 
Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998). 
 With this in mind, it is possible to highlight how, in contrast to Bourdieu, 
Elias’s conception of habitus seeks to explore the relationship between the 
psychogenetic and sociogenetic transformation underlining habitus formation.  
That is, through a series of ‘very grand and general observations’ (Mennell and 
Goudsblom, 1998: 15), Elias (2012) was able to view the development of habitus 
as strongly linked to wider social processes that were, over time, correspondingly 
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reflected in the refinement of individual manners and control of emotions.  Here, 
gradual shifts in the power relations between social groups ensured ‘both a social 
transformation (sociogenesis) and an associated psychological transformation 
(psychogenesis)’ in the personality structure of the individual (Maguire and Tuck, 
2005: 110; see also Elias, 2012; Mennell and Goudsblom, 2008).  In other words, 
it was through changes in the social structure that corresponding changes in the 
identity and emotional conduct of social human beings could be observed 
(Mennell, 2007). 
 For example, by undertaking a long-term perspective on the development of 
present societies, Elias (2012) observed how more and more people were forced to 
live in peace with each other.  This resulted in a ‘moulding of affects’ and 
alterations in the ‘standards of emotion-management’ (Elias, 2012) amongst 
individuals.  Indeed, this process can be observed in the appearance of the ‘court’ 
in England.  Drawing upon the work of Trevelyan (1985), Braithwaite (1993) 
notes that ‘the eighteenth-century reign of Beau Nash at the quasi-court of Bath 
civilized country squires by hastening the disappearance of the sword as the 
proper adornment of a gentleman’s thigh; as a result, the settling of disagreements 
with cold steel became increasingly infrequent’ (1993: 4).  As a result, alongside 
the emergence of the English court, forms of violent conduct were substituted for 
mastered gestures of emotional constraint and the gradual emergence of a more 
general pacification of the state (Braithwaite, 1993).   
 Consequently, as the above example illustrates, gradual changes in state 
formation and emotional control form part of much longer civilising processes 
(Van Benthem van den Bergh, 2012), through which individual security became 
increasingly provided by the state (Elias, 2012).  In doing so, Elias drew attention 
to the ‘complex inter-related socio-psychological transformations’, which led to 
collective identifications, such as, national identity (Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 
111).  The following section will elaborate upon these ‘socio-psychological 
transformations’ in order to highlight how national identity emerged from gradual 
changes in the way humans have been socially organised and collectively 
recognised (Dunning and Hughes, 2012).  Indeed, this ‘theoretical design’ will 
form the foundation for the proceeding chapters. 
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1.5. State development: sociogenetic and psychogenetic transformations 
 
Drawing upon the work of both Marx and Weber (Dunning and Hughes, 2012; 
Van Krieken, 2001), Elias’s sociological approach strove to move away from 
static conceptions of society and societal functions in order to examine how 
societies are fundamentally dynamic.  Van Krieken (2001) notes that: 
 
[Elias] drew on Marx’s materialism to explain the development of a 
particular personality structure, emphasising its ‘production’ by particular 
sets of social relations, and elaborated on Freud’s understanding of the 
effects of developing civilisation on psychic life in terms of Weber’s 
conception of the state as organised around a monopoly of the means of 
violence (2001)  
 
However, Elias (2012) differed from Weber, by arguing that the move from 
medieval to absolutist states witnessed both a monopolisation of the means of 
violence and a monopolization of the means of taxation.  Linklater and Mennell 
(2010) note how the decline in power of the cavalry and the nobility followed the 
development of a surplus manpower who helped form infantry armies, a process 
that no longer left the state dependent on the noble classes for protection and battle 
expertise.  As a result, the state’s ability to monopolise the collection of taxes 
helped, in part, to ensure the territories survival by allowing its rulers to pay for 
armies and forms of defense.  Correspondingly, the state’s monopolisation of the 
means of violence ensured that the flow of capital and trade was protected as well 
as forms of rational planning conducive to the running of a large, yet emerging, 
state could be administered (Dunning and Hughes, 2012).   
 In order for the above to occur, however, the ‘taming of the warriors’ – a 
necessary element in any process of state formation – was required (Mennell, 
2007).  Mennell and Goudsblom (1998) elaborate: 
 
One way in which this transformation occurred was through what Elias 
called ‘the taming of the warriors’: an upper stratum of warlords who, in the 
early Middle Ages, ruled over their own territories almost unrestrained by 
any outside authority, and were gradually transformed into a courtly 
aristocracy, subject to the never-ceasing constraints of life at a royal court 
(1998: 24)   
 
Indeed, Elias (2012) conceptualises this process in his theory of monopoly 
mechanism.  Here, Elias ‘seeks to capture the structured processes at work over 
time and place as social differentiation and integration among increasingly larger 
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groups become dominant and greater concentrations of power occur’ (Maguire, 
2005: 9).  He highlights that: 
 
 Its starting point is a situation where a whole class controls unorganized 
monopoly opportunities and where, accordingly, the distribution of these 
opportunities among the members of this class is decided by free 
competition and open force; it is then driven towards a situation where the 
control of monopoly opportunities and those dependent on them by one 
class, is centrally organized and secured by institutions; and where the 
distribution of the yields of monopoly follows a plan that is not exclusively 
governed by the interest of single individuals or single groups, but is 
orientated on the overall network of interdependencies binding all 
participating groups and individuals to each other and on its optimal 
functioning (Elias, 1982: 115) 
 
Variations of this general theme can be found within the development of the 
French, German and British states as well as across state-formation processes in 
Asia (Elias, 2012; Mennell, 2007).  These processes typically led to the formation 
of ‘central governments capable of exerting a considerable control over 
increasingly large numbers of people’ (Goudsblom, 1977: 142).  Indeed, these 
changes were central to Elias’s development of culture and civilization (Elias, 
2012; Fletcher, 1997) but also to a number of observable paradoxes in individual 
and state development.  That is, while the interconnections between societal 
groups grew larger, the civilizing process allowed individuals: 
 
the capacity to have a detached attitude towards themselves and their 
relationships with others … at the same time, however, the civilizing process 
join[ed] people together … human beings [were] drawn into ever-denser 
relations of mutual interdependence (Smith, 2001: 22) 
 
Consequently, as people were brought together in greater interdependence, a more 
detached perception of themselves paradoxically emerged.  In fact, similar 
paradoxes can also be seen in the nature of violent actions.  That is, while internal 
pacification of the state was achieved, and, in particular, more pleasurable forms 
of killing became condemned, violence between rival societies was not only 
permissible but increasingly destructive (Linklater and Mennell, 2010).  Therefore, 
while the state became pacified, the acquiring of new territory from neighbouring 
states required a largely organised and pacified internal population, which could 
both logistically prepare for, and, indeed, carry out, acts of war on neighbouring 
territories (Linklater and Mennell, 2010). 
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1.5.1. Functional democratization: an idealized image of nation and empire 
 
While the previous section has detailed how changes in the social structure could 
impact upon the personality structure of particular individuals/groups, it is 
important to highlight how the development of a new form of psychogenesis 
(national identity) can be attributed to the growing commercialisation of the 
nation-state and the rise of the bourgeoisie classes (Mennell and Goudsblom, 
1998).   
Indeed, corresponding with the Enlightenment movement across Europe, 
‘the British people’s image of themselves as a sovereign collectivity, as a nation, 
was formed, as a matter of course, in accordance with the demand of a moral 
code’ (Elias, 1996: 165-66).  Here: 
 
 Privatization and internalization … led to the transformation of private 
power, formerly held by individual rulers, into public power.  In other 
words, the creation of a monopoly of power in the private person of the 
individual ruler was increasingly displaced by its investment and dispersal in 
the public institution of the state (Ju Kim, 2006: 59) 
 
With regards to the parliamentization of British society, the habits and moral 
codes of both the aristocracy and the rising middle classes formed part of a wider 
process of functional democratization within Britain.  Here, the emergence of an 
individual self-hood alongside the nation-state provided the context for an 
ideological framework of national identity based on the collective appeal of the 
nation (Ju Kim, 2006).  Whereas a nation’s identity had previously been in the 
possession of the private person, such as, the royal monarch, the ‘awareness of self 
and other, which began to develop under medieval court society, was manifested 
in a new bourgeoisie sensibility’ (Ju Kim, 2006: 59).  As a result: 
 
The greater interpenetration of aristocratic and middle-class traditions from 
the eighteenth century on … and … the attempt of sections of the British 
middle class to combine the aristocratic code of norms in inter-state relations 
with the moralist and humanist code with which they had risen to the top, is 
only one of several instances of this basic sociological fact.  In this case, that 
is, the greater interpenetration of neighbouring social strata facilitated a 
specific fusion of their codes of norms and a general inclination towards 
pragmatic compromises (Elias, 1996: 165) 
 
In light of these social changes, national identity became inspired by an emphasis 
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on the civic rights and duties of the citizen (Gerasimov et al., 2005).  In doing so: 
 
Almost everywhere in Europe, the intellectual elites of the rising eighteenth 
century middle classes shared a general belief in moral principles, in the 
rights of human beings as such and in the natural progress of humanity … 
When, in one European country after another, men of middle class descent 
rose to power … [and] replaced aristocratic groups as the ruling groups of 
their countries … an idealized image of their nation moved into the centre of 
their self-image, their social beliefs and their scale of values (Elias, 1996: 
134-135) 
 
Here, functional democratization reflected a fundamental change in the total 
structure of national societies, which helped to consolidate social behaviour and 
national habitus within the individual (Dunning, 2004; Mennell and Goudsblom, 
1998).  Accordingly, ‘compared to their medieval predecessors, the members of 
European societies from the “Renaissance” on climbed to a new level of self-
consciousness’ (Elias, 1998b: 275).  These values had a decisive role in forming a 
political discourse of national sovereignty, which, in part, evolved around the 
balancing of state governance with moral values in state authority (Gerasimov et 
al., 2005). 
 Within Britain, the ‘nation was now regarded as the balanced combination of 
royal and parliamentary power’ (Breuilly, 1994: 86; see also Elias, 1996).  Indeed, 
through processes of functional democratisation, the middle classes had become 
more numerous and powerful by the end of the nineteenth-century (Thompson, 
2008).  Whereas the parliamentization of British social life occurred much earlier 
compared to other European states (Elias, 1986; 1996), the monopoly of the 
English parliament was able to unite the three kingdoms, at least politically, from 
the eighteenth-century onwards, with Ireland joining the Union in 1801.  Here, 
British power was ultimately organised and expressed through Parliament 
(Wellings, 2008) which provided both an ‘ideological and organisational function 
for the British state’ (Breuilly, 1994: 85).  More importantly, however, in ‘an age 
to which the notion of natural rights was foreign … the constitutional rights of 
Parliament had to be based upon historical precedent’ (Breuilly, 1994: 85).  
Therefore, middle class elites and its intellectual sections, increasingly founded an 
ideal image of themselves based not on family ancestry (a trait readily available 
for the aristocracy) but on the nation’s past (Elias, 1996).  Here, in conjunction 
with the working classes, national pride and sentiment became rooted in a nation’s 
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ancestry and past achievement (Elias, 1996).  In the case of Britain, however, such 
pride was also symbolically tied to its position as head of the a global empire 
(Elias, 1996; Howe, 2010; Kumar, 2003; ref) 
Accordingly, the parliamentization of a predominantly middle class 
electorate was entwined with the national image of a modern monarchy and an 
industrial bourgeoisie morality of middle class values.  More importantly, 
however, for Britain this process would also contain an important imperial 
dimension.  That is, alongside ‘the emergence of a state in which aristocratic 
principles of governance increasingly gave way to professional ones’ (Thompson, 
2008: 46) stood a ‘burgeoning bureaucratic and professional middle class [that] 
saw the British imperial world as their oyster; and their increasingly prominent 
and powerful position in the state is to be explained as much by their achievements 
abroad as at home’ (Thompson, 2008: 48).  Indeed, while ‘The contest between 
the aristocracy and the professions, as it manifested itself in the imperial sphere, 
was about where social authority ultimately lay’ (Thompson, 2008: 46), Devine 
(2011) notes that: 
 
The eighteenth century can, in retrospect, be seen as the classic period of 
British imperial expansion.  The following one hundred years maintained the 
territorial momentum but at the same time saw unprecedented British 
influence expand across the globe, even over nations where the United 
Kingdom claimed no sovereign authority. (2011: 56) 
 
Consequently, empire proved an important factor in creating a ‘Greater Britain’ 
outside the British Isles.  Proposed plans to form an ‘Imperial Federation’ during 
the nineteenth-century aimed to forge a military, economic and political union 
between Britain and the colonies (Schumpeter, 1976) as well as revealing how the 
‘imperial world’ (2008: 48) played an important part in notions of civilization and 
state identity.   
 Indeed, elsewhere Van Krieken (1999) has explored how processes of 
colonisation formed part of broader ‘civilizing processes’.  In fact, Dunning and 
Hughes (2012) highlight that according to Elias: 
 
the concept of ‘civilisation’ in French and English had … come to be a high-
praise term that expresse[d] the national self-consciousness of colonising 
peoples who had enjoyed secure national boundaries and a corresponding 
sense of national identity for centuries.  Together with this, went a tendency 
to want to ‘civilise barbarians’ in fact as well as in ideological justification 
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of their colonial exploitation of them. (Elias, 2012: 8) 
 
Accordingly, ‘Civilisation’ and its accompanying personality and behavioural 
tendencies were to reflect a ‘hegemonic belief in a European cultural mission and 
the concept of the gradual “elevation” of backward societies’ (Conrad, 2013: 553).  
Conrad (2013) notes: 
 
As evolutionist ideas became widespread, such ideas became pre-dominant, 
supported as they were by liberal, Social Darwinist and racial world-views.  
… All these initiatives, however, needed to engage with, and were 
frequently informed by, the hegemonic ideology of civilising mission and 
development. (2013: 553) 
 
As can be seen, perceptions regarding Europe’s higher state of civilization can be 
seen as emerging from the gradual transformations that began with the absolutist 
state (Linklater and Mennell, 2010).  Here, ‘Civilisation’, enacted through imperial 
nationalism, came to be the dominant mode of self-expression amongst Western 
states (of which the move from ruling class to state control had been achieved). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through his theory of ‘civilizing processes’ Elias (2012) was able to highlight a 
number of underlying structural processes in the relationship between state formation 
and personality structures.  Here, Elias (1982) argued that ‘civilization is very closely 
related to the growing interweaving and interdependence of people … this 
interweaving can be seen as it were in the process of becoming’ (1982: 52 [italics 
added]).  To this extent, a process sociological approach to national identity formation 
can be used to explore how past and present changes within and outside the nation 
have served to underlie its discursive construction. 
 With this in mind, this chapter has drawn upon various theoretical discussions 
regarding national identity as well as popular orientations regarding the nation and the 
emergence of the nation-state.  Indeed, when viewing the gradual emergence of the 
nation-state links can be drawn between the work of Gellner (1964; 1973; 2005; 
2008), Smith (1986; 1991; 1995; 2005a; 2005b; 2010) and Elias (1996; 2010; 2012).  
Indeed, while Gellner (1964; 1973; 2005; 2008) viewed nationalism as a political 
principle that emerged from within industrial societies, Elias’s approach viewed such 
processes as closely entwined with the gradual formation of the state, a process that 
was predicated on changes in the balance of power between the aristocracy and a 
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rising middle class (monopoly of taxation and violence/’taming of the warriors’).  
From this, a collective national identification emerged, through which both the 
‘imagining’ (Anderson, 2006) and ‘inventing’ (Hobsbawm, 1983; 1990) of the nation, 
its history, culture and identity (Elias, 1996; Maguire and Tuck, 2005) formed an 
important part of the construction of national identity. 
 Similarly, Elias’s attention towards the long-term developments 
(sociogenesis/psychogenesis) underpinning state formation and national identity 
corresponds with Smith’s (1986; 1991; 1995; 2005a; 2005b; 2010) work on national 
ethnie.  Contrary to Smith however, is Elias’s ability to inter-relate socio-
psychological transformations with the promulgation of an idealised national self-
image (Maguire and Tuck, 2005).  Here, transformations at the sociogenetic level can 
– over-time – have a gradual effect on identity and the emotional repertoire of 
individuals and collective groups.  
 Taking into consideration Elias’s work on state development processes and 
national habitus, it is possible to observe how civic and ethnic conceptions of the 
nation serve to analytically separate ‘ethno-linguistic layers of social habitus on the 
one side, and layers where the state has influenced the social habitus on the other’ 
(Kuzmics and Axtmann, 2007: 7).  This dichotomy denies examinations of how 
‘composite’ or ‘multi-layered states or empires’ are formed over time, and, more 
importantly, that ‘ethno-linguistic layers’ and state influences are fundamentally 
interdependent (Kuzmics and Axtmann, 2007: 7).  In particular, by exploring 
‘processes and change in figurations’ (Kaspersen and Gabriel, 2008: 374; see also 
Atkinson, 2003; Connolly and Dolan, 2012), studies of social habitus can go ‘beyond’ 
the nation-state in order to include broader processes of imperial expansion (Darwin, 
2010; Rose-Greenland, 2013). 
 With this in mind, the following chapter will explore how ties of 
interdependence, both within the UK and the British Empire, formed an important part 
of Britain’s state formation and imperial expansion.  Specifically, it will consider the 
effects of these processes in relation to the emergence of the British ‘domestic’, and, 
later, ‘imperial’ figurations.  
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Chapter Two: Britain – From State to Empire 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will develop upon the conclusions presented in chapter one by exploring 
how the complexity of international relationships can effect national identity 
formation.  Consequently, it will be argued that national identity ‘never signifies 
anything static, unchanging, or substantial, but rather is always an element situated in 
the flow of time, ever changing, something involved in a process’ (Wodak et al., 
1999: 11 [italics added]).  With this in mind, a process sociological perspective will 
be used to examine the relational complexities surrounding identification processes.  
In particular, this will be used to examine how state formation processes (‘taming of 
the warriors’/monopoly of taxation and violence) are related to, and, affected by, 
expanding webs of international interdependency. 
Furthermore, this chapter will be underpinned by an Eliasian appreciation that 
our ‘whole outlook on life continues to be psychologically tied to yesterday’s social 
reality’ (Elias, 1986: 35 cited in Van Krieken, 1998: 58).  Often, the ‘baggage handed 
down through the generations’ contains ‘a range of possible roles available to a given 
generation at a given time’ (Duffy, 2008: 62).  As a result, in the decades following 
the American Revolution, both the United States and British Canada (Upper Canada) 
were shaped by the imperial experiences of both Thomas Jefferson (third President of 
the United States, 1801-09) and John Graves Simcoe (first Lieutenant-Governor of 
Upper Canada, 1792-98).  Hatter (2012) notes: 
 
The common trans-continental ambitions of Jefferson and Simcoe and their 
similar prescriptions for empire reflect their shared experience as citizens of the 
British Atlantic world.  The shared past of Jefferson and Simcoe, as subjects of 
the British Empire, shaped the way both thought about governance, politics and 
economics (2012: 139) 
 
Both Jefferson and Simcoe’s visions of empire would reflect their own common 
experience of Anglo-American relations (Hatter, 2012).  In the case of Britain, this reveals 
the important role-played by its imperial history and how this can be utilised in order to 
examine contemporary forms of national identification.  Specifically, how do historical 
interrelations between former imperial and colonial nations allow us to make sense of 
national identifications? 
 The following sections will attempt to answer this question by examining the 
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dynamic complexities surrounding both national and imperial identifications across 
multinational, imperial units such as Britain and the former British Empire.  
Consequently, developing upon the arguments presented in the previous chapter, this 
chapter will serve to elaborate upon the entwined complexities involved in both state 
formation (sociogenesis) and national identification (psychogenesis) processes.  Maguire 
(1999) has commented upon the complexity of identity with regards to multi-national state 
systems, noting that, ‘people in complex nation-states, have multiple identities that are 
many-layered – local, regional, national [and] global’ (1999: 185).  Elsewhere, Elias 
(1996) also argues that ‘a multi-party parliamentary system is a considerably more 
complex and difficult governmental form which requires a correspondingly more complex 
and more differentiated personality structure’ (1996: 292).  Subsequently, while ‘national 
identities in the United Kingdom are highly complex and ambiguous’ (McCrone, 1992: 
208), a process sociological approach can provide a critical examination of the complex 
relations and multi-national dynamics underpinning British identity. 
 With this in mind, sections 2.0 to 2.1.1. will seek to draw upon a range of process 
sociological concepts and theories in order to examine how Britain’s domestic and 
imperial relations have been shaped by processes of functional democratization, 
expanding ties of state and imperial interdependence and the ‘figurational relationships 
and changing dynamics of “I”, “we” and “they” pronouns’ (Moore, 2010: 3.3).  More 
importantly, however, this discussion will be supplemented with an examination of the 
historical development of British identity both within Britain and the former British 
Empire (Goudsblom, 1977).   
 Indeed, studies of British identity have often focused upon the social and cultural 
context of the British Isles.  Rarely are the old dominions of the former empire given 
equal consideration.  Here, a historical analysis of the literature on the British Empire can 
expose the complex nature of British identity across the UK and the former British 
Empire.  In particular, by focusing on the imperial interdependences between Britain and 
the former dominions, an investigation of the structural processes underlying Britain’s 
state-formation as well as its imperial expansion and decline, can be considered.  
Moreover, this can provide a socio-historical analysis of the social processes that have 
served to shape the British national consciousness (Mennell, 1994).  To this extent, 
sections 2.3 and 2.3.1. will draw upon available literature regarding the British Empire, 
focusing in particular on Britain and the white dominions of Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand.  Central to this understanding will be a consideration of the social, cultural and 
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political relations between Australia, Canada, England, Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland 
and Wales. 
 Importantly, however, this chapter is not intended to offer a complete history of the 
British Empire.  Instead, the following sections will draw upon specific elements of the 
literature on British history that focuses specifically on British identity.  Consequently, the 
focus will be on the long-term developments in British identity and how this has impacted 
upon British social habitus (Elias, 1996).  For this to suceed, a closer look at Elias’s 
(1978) concept of the ‘figuration’ is required. 
 
2.0. Adopting a ‘figurational’ analysis 
 
Central to the work of Elias, and the process sociology perspective, is the concept of 
the ‘figuration’.  Elias (1978) explains: 
 
 The image of the mobile figurations of interdependent people on a dance floor 
perhaps makes it easier to imagine states, cities, families and also capitalist, 
communist and feudal systems as figurations.  By using this concept, we can 
eliminate the antithesis, resting finally on different values and ideals, immanent 
today in the use of the words ‘individual’ and ‘society’.  One can certainly 
speak of a dance in general, but no-one will imagine a dance as a structure 
outside the individual or as a mere abstraction.  The same figurations can 
certainly be danced by different people; but without a plurality of reciprocally 
orientated and dependent individuals, there is no dance.  Like every other social 
figuration, a dance figuration is relatively independent of the specific 
individuals forming it here and now, but not of individuals as such.  It would be 
absurd to say that dances are mental constructions abstracted from observations 
of individuals considered separately.  The same applies to all other figurations.  
Just as small dance figurations change – becoming now slower, now quicker – 
so too, gradually or more suddenly, do the large figurations we call societies 
(1978: 262)  
 
Indeed, Elias’s use of the dance floor metaphor serves to reflect how analyses of the 
nation-state form part of a far larger history of human organisation, before which, 
families, clans and tribes served as the basis of social organisation (Ozdalgo, 2005).  
In fact, Goudsblom (1977) states: 
 
 Since families form part of larger social figurations, it will be very difficult to 
explain the observed changes in terms of family life alone.  A wider perspective, 
in both a spatial and a temporal sense, is needed: the family must be seen in the 
context of other groups, and the changes occurring here and now must be 
recognised as episodes in much further reaching long-term developments (1977: 
3) 
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With this in mind, it is possible to observe how nation-states form part of much wider 
global figurations of nation-states, each comprising their own interdependent relations 
(Goudsblom, 1977).   
 There are important implications underlying this perspective.  Indeed, rather 
than viewing both the individual, and, at a larger level, nation-states, as independent, 
Elias’s figurational approach chose to explore the various pressures that individuals 
and groups placed on one another (Linklater and Mennell, 2010).  Maguire (2012) 
outlines this approach when he refers to the role of ‘civilizational complexes’: 
 
 Civilizational complexes can encompass whole families of societies … Such 
complexes clearly have long-term temporal dimensions, stretching across 
successive generations and societal formations … It is also important to note 
that, within these overall complexes, regional figurations arise and relatively 
distinctive patterns, and countervailing tendencies have and do emerge 
(Maguire, 2012) 
 
Importantly, this requires paying close attention to the inter-civilizational relations 
that have formed part of a long-term overall process of changing social development, 
whereby, the individual and the state have emerged to form part of increasingly 
complex and more closely integrated international networks (Mennell, 2007; Quilley 
and Loyal, 2004). 
 However, while we cannot deny the omnipresence of change in society, we fail 
to apply these same dynamics to social categories, which are inevitably portrayed as 
static and unchangeable.  Goudsblom (1977) elaborates: 
 
 Our whole vocabulary is attuned to a static conception of the social world; it 
tends to reduce all processes to conditions.  Terms expressing process like 
bureaucratization and industrialization are only derivatives from ‘bureaucracy’ 
and ‘industry’; the static concepts come first … There have been few attempts 
to put dynamic concepts at the centre of sociology (1977: 133) 
 
The state centricity of national identity research has often circumscribed the ability of 
scholars to understand the vast ensemble of globally-orientated movements, 
exchanges and practices, which are not reducible to the state (Biswas, 2007).  Thus, 
by ‘being committed to certain groups and to the immediate hopes and fears of these 
[national] groups’ they fail to ‘grasp larger figurational structures and long-term 
developments’ (Goudsblom, 1977: 8). 
 Consequently, while it is just as important not to think of individuals as fixed 
and invariable, it is equally important not to conceive national identity as static but as 
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continually changing and developing over the course of time and across space 
(Maguire, 1995). Goudsblom (1977) acknowledges this development when he notes 
that: 
 
 human societies themselves are not an eternal given; and in the few hundred 
millennia of their known existence, they have undergone such profound changes 
that it makes little sense to try to account for any given social structure without 
considering its developmental nature (1997: 133)   
 
Accordingly, while ‘British people moved around these transnational networks, webs, 
or systems, Britishness itself shifted and moved’ (Van Duinen, 2013: 344). 
 Parenthetically, these concerns are observed within the work of Williams 
(1977), who while commenting upon the ‘social’ nature of language, argued that the 
synchronic isolation of linguistic structures excluded the role of historical change 
(Morgan and Preston, 1993).  In line with Elias (1996), one can only begin to grasp 
these changes ‘when static models are replaced by dynamic models, when societies as 
well as individuals are seen as processes of development’ (1996: 335 [italics added]).   
 Here, processes of re-imagination (Anderson, 2006) and re-invention 
(Hobsbawm, 1983) can be used to grasp the continuous fluctuations affecting national 
identity in light of ‘post- or late-modern expressions of nationalism’ (McCrone et al., 
1998: 16).  As a result, national identity, much like social development, is not uni-
linear or inevitable but subject to adaptation, alteration and negotiation (Goudsblom, 
1977).  Indeed, R. Collins (2012) provides a similar argument by advocating for a 
‘dynamic theory of nationalism’, which is moulded by the ‘time patterns of social 
processes’ (2012: 3).  Viewed through an Eliasian lens, however, social processes of 
functional democratization within state formation and gradual changes in the personal 
identification of the individual with the nation, can be seen as occurring, not 
independently, but alongside a ‘dense web of interdependence under the aegis of a 
stable power monopoly’ (Smith, 2001: 127).  Indeed, the observed fluctuations in 
social relations (highlighted in the monopoly mechanism) can be used to consider 
‘changes in the way people habitually orient themselves in the world in which they 
live’ and how ‘these changes are directly related to the way they are bonded with each 
other’ (Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998: 19 [italics added]). 
 Ultimately, therefore, the desire here is to view the nation-state not as a static 
and separated phenomenon, but instead, to see its emergence, character and identity as 
part of a complex of past and present figurational relations.  In fact, in reference to 
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Britain, Rojek (2007) argues that the: 
 
values of each [home] nation in the union have been formed largely through 
their historical, economic, political and cultural relationships with the other 
three.  The past, present and destiny of the four nations are so intermingled that 
any attempt to regard them as separate entities would be misleading. (2007: 20) 
 
Indeed, this is shared by Hopkins (1999) who notes: 
 
the tradition of arranging history so that it fits within national borders surely 
needs to be revised.  It is increasingly at variance with the state of the world as it 
stands at the end of the twentieth century and it captures only a part of the past 
that it seeks to explain (1999: 243) 
 
With this in mind, a figurational analysis can help to provide ‘a more adequate 
theorisation of the “international” as a distinct space of social interaction – a space 
within which processes of mutual constitution are productive of the entities which 
populate the international system’ (Barkawi and Laffey, 2002: 111). 
 In fact, interdependent relations can be traced to the sixteenth century, where, 
within Britain, the combination of English, Danish and Norman social elements 
helped forge an ethnic community that was stabilised and preserved under the impact 
of external wars with Spain and France (Smith, 1986).  Kumar (2003) suggests that 
‘this has been the common experience of many peoples at all times, most of whom 
have lived in ‘composite’ or multi-layered states or empires’ (2003: 149).  This 
corresponds with the previous chapter’s discussion on civilisations and how numerous 
societies have formed part of larger civilizational networks (Bowden, 2009).1  Here, 
national identities can only be given meaning when considered alongside wider 
social, political and cultural contexts (Malcolm, 2012).  Moreover, whereas Elias did 
not focus on imperial relations per se his insights into European state development 
provide a framework for exploring the effects of ‘widening chains of 
interdependence’ within larger multi-national units, such as, the British Empire.2  The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See chapter one, sections: 1.3.1, 1.5. and 1.5.1. 
2 In fact, Gallo (2014) argues that the ‘imperial dimension’ and the evidence of an ‘imperial character’ 
have been neglected from Elias’s (1996; 2012) work on state formation.  Here, Gallo (2014) notes that 
Elias and his followers ‘did not fully consider the elitist, Eurocentric, and “dirigist” aspects of 
“civilising processes”, in which the imperial dimension is embedded’ (2014).  In fact, Gallo (2014) 
goes as far as to state that an ‘imperial dimension’ may form ‘a distinctive and recurrent feature of 
supposedly elite-driven and Eurocentric tendencies’ (2014).  To a certain extent, this is echoed by van 
Krieken (1999) who notes that, ‘The ways in which we might analyse civilizing processes outside 
Western Europe remains a badly under examined area of study. Central here is the question of 
colonialism and imperialism, the ways in which nation-states have established a brutal and violent 
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following section will consider this in further detail. 
 
2.0.1. Adopting an ‘interdependent’ analysis  
 
 The above section has served to trace a theoretical path that encourages us ‘to give up 
thinking in terms of single, isolated substances and to start thinking in terms of 
relationships and functions’ (Elias, 1991: 19 [italics removed]).  Consequently, 
instead of simply examining how the ‘other’ can play an important part in delineating 
the specificities of a national group (Colley, 2005), Malcolm (2012) argues that ‘to 
fully understand such relationships one must examine the dynamic interdependence, 
rather than simply the co-existence, of the respective parties’ (2012: 167 [italics 
added]).  Here, powerful and less-powerful nation-states are drawn together through 
processes of dynamic interdependence, in which both internal and external processes 
can encumber the nation (Van Benthem van den Bergh, 1992: 15).  Indeed, it is these 
processes that serve to shape group identity (De Swaan, 1995; Mennell, 1990; 
Kaspersen and Gabriel, 2008).  
 With regards to processes of identification, however, Elias (1978) argues that in 
order ‘to perceive oneself as a person of whom one says “I” involves perceiving other 
people as “he”, “she”, “we”, “you” or “they” (1978: 125).  This relationship between 
the individual ‘I’ (I-identity) and the collective ‘we’ (we-identity) offers one approach 
to transcending traditional individual/society debates (Quilley and Loyal, 2004).  Elias 
(1978) noted that such a dichotomy: 
 
[lead] people to believe that their actual ‘selves’ somehow exist ‘inside’ them; 
and that an invisible barrier separates their ‘inside’ from everything ‘outside’ – 
the so-called ‘outside world’ … this mode of self-perception and this image of 
mankind … lend[s] staying power and conviction to the ideas of ‘society’ 
existing beyond individuals or ‘individuals’ existing beyond society (1978: 119) 
 
Indeed, these concerns work alongside Elias’s critique of the homo clausus (closed 
people) image of society (Elias, 1978; Elias, 1991; 2008b).3  Elias (1994) elaborates:  
 
The conception of the individual as homo clausus, a little world in himself who !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
relationship between their own “civilization” and the supposedly “barbaric” cultures of subjected 
peoples’ (Van Krieken, 1999: 302 [italics added]). 
3 Furthermore, O’Connor and Goodwin (2012) elaborate that Elias persistently saw the homo clauses 
perspective of society as dominating sociology and leading ‘sociologists [to] continually … view the 
individual as something existing outside of society and society as existing beyond individuals’ (2012: 
483). 
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ultimately exists quite independently of the great world outside, determines the 
image of man [sic] in general.  Every other human being is likewise seen as a 
homo clausus; his core, his being, his true self appears likewise as something 
divided within him by an invisible wall from everything outside, including 
every other human being [sic] (Elias, 1994: 204 cited in Van Krieken, 1998: 13) 
 
Accordingly, theoretical models, such as symbolic interactionism, ‘fail to move 
beyond … [a] homo clausus model of human beings as possessing some basic identity 
prior to their interaction with others’ (Van Krieken, 1998: 65).  Moreover, such 
perspectives fail to account for those unplanned actions that are neither planned nor 
controlled by social actors (Elias, 1978).  Here it is evident that the ‘unplanned 
consequences of planned human action arise from their repercussion within a web 
woven by the actions of many people’ (Elias, 1978: 146).  As a result: 
 
without an adequate understanding of the essential interdependence of human 
beings within a wide network of relationships, even theories of interaction 
would posit a pre-social individual who only became social when they engaged 
in social interaction (Van Krieken, 1998: 65 [italics in original]) 
 
Appropriately, in counteraction to the homo clausus perception, Elias proposed his 
concept of homines aperti (open people) (Elias, 1978; 1991; 2008b).  This allowed 
one to understand that ‘the concept “individual” refers to interdependent people in the 
singular, and the concept “society” to interdependent people in the plural’ (Elias, 
1978: 125).  This prevents the unnecessary separation of both the individual from 
society and vice versa and encourages one to consider the dynamic interdependencies 
that are forged between individuals within society as well as between societies (Elias, 
1991; 2008b; Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998; O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012; Van 
Krieken, 1998). 
 Indeed, the process of distinguishing between the self (‘I’) and other (‘you’) has 
over the course of human history seen a closer alignment between that of the 
individual self (‘I’) and the national collective (‘we’) (Elias, 1991).  That is, at the 
societal level, one of the most potent forms of collectivity that one can refer to is the 
individual nation (Maguire and Burrows, 2005).  Elias (1991) elaborates: 
 
Collectivities which generate a nationalist ethos are structured in such a way 
that the individuals who from them can experience them – more specifically 
their emotion-laden symbols – as representatives of themselves.  The love for 
ones nation is never only a love for persons or groups of whom one says ‘you’; 
it is always also the love of a collectivity to which one can refer as ‘we’ (1991: 
151)  
 63 
 
Accordingly, the ‘multi-layered qualities of habitus, and the intertwining of the 
individual and society, can be understood by thinking in terms of what Elias (1991) 
called the ‘we-I balance’’ (Maguire and Tuck, 2005: 111).  Drawing upon the work of 
Sigmund Freud, Elias (1996) suggested that: 
 
 an individual does not only have an ego-image and an ego-ideal, but also a we-
image and a we-ideal.  It is a central aspect of the nationalization of individual 
ethos and sentiment, which can be observed empirically in nineteenth-and 
twentieth century industrial states-societies, that the image of these state-
societies, represented, among others, by verbal symbols such as ‘nation’, form 
an integral part of the we-images and the we-ideals of most of the individuals 
who form with each other societies of this type.  This, in short, is one of the 
many instances of correspondence between specific types of social structure and 
specific types of personality structure (1996: 152) 
 
Conductive with Elias’s individual (psychogenesis) and social (sociogenesis) 
relational analysis of civilizing processes, the conflation of the individual’s I-identity 
with that of a national ‘we’ corresponds with a group of people who can be 
distinguished as belonging to the nation and those who are deemed to be outside of it, 
often refereed to in the same set of pronouns as ‘they’ (Elias, 1991).4  Mennell (2007) 
argues that: 
 
 The intellectual and emotional construction of a group’s ‘we-image’ and ‘we-
feelings’ always takes place in tandem with the construction of a ‘they-image’ 
about some other group or groups of people, and with the development of 
feelings about them. (2007: 40) 
 
In fact, elsewhere, Wagner-Pacifici (2010) has noted that ‘Collective shifters like 
“we” and “they” become particularly charged in historical transitions in which 
identities change or in which the identity differences are being highlighted or elided’ 
(2010: 1360). 
 Indeed, changes within the British state, most notably, post-war immigration, 
have resulted in attitudes towards a collective British ‘we’ taking on greater political 
and social significance.  The perceived relationship between the collective national 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Maguire (1995) adds: ‘Identification with the ‘we’ perspective of different groups is necessary so the 
researcher can understand something of the sense in which certain actions are ‘meaningful’. At the 
same time it is necessary to grasp that no matter how sincere, these interpretations can be misleading. 
Comparison of different ‘we’ perspectives will help, but the employment of ‘they’ perspectives which 
show the interrelationships from a greater distance offers a more adequate view of how the intentions 
and actions of the various groups are interlocked’ (1995: 16) 
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‘we’ and the distinctly outsider ‘they’ has remained a contentious issue since the 
British Nationality Act of 1948.5  Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech provides a 
particular example of the political dynamics surrounding such a relationship and the 
‘homogenous we’ that a common sense of identity can elicit.  A summary of Powell’s 
description of Britain is provided by Parekh (2000): 
 
 Britain was a fundamentally individualist society and had always cherished the 
rights and liberties of the individual. This was more true of it than of any other 
society, and the roots of its individualism went as far back as the beginning of 
its history and were deeply embedded in the character of the British people … 
The British were a cohesive people, intensely aware of their ethnic identity, and 
bound by deep ties of kinship and loyalty to those of their kind at home and 
abroad. They had a strong sense of ‘the homogenous we’ and instinctively knew 
who was ‘one of them’ and who was an ‘outsider’ (2000: 9 [italics added]) 
 
Ironically, Powell’s portrayal of collective identity, common values and shared British 
character reflects a more general attitude within contemporary British identity politics 
(Parekh, 2000; see also Kramer, 2003; Milbank, 2011; Settle and Curtis, 2007; The 
Economist, 1999).  A more recent speech by British Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
stated that: 
 
 What I’m about to say is drawn from the British experience, but I believe there 
are general lessons for us all.  In the UK, some young men find it hard to 
identify with the traditional Islam practised at home by their parents whose 
customs can seem staid when transplanted to modern Western countries.  But 
they also find it hard to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the 
weakening of our collective identity (Cameron, 2011, PM’s speech made at the 
Munich Security Conference [italics added]) 
 
The idea of a shared collective identity (‘our collective identity’) is assumed through 
assumptions regarding a common British experience and the distinguishing of the 
‘they’, those whom find it difficult to assimilate with such values (Condor et al., 
2006).  Former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, shared similar assumptions, noting 
that: 
 
 While the United Kingdom has always been a country of different nations and 
thus of plural identities – a Welshman can be Welsh and British just as a 
Cornishman or woman is Cornish, English and British – and maybe Muslim, 
Pakistani or Afro Caribbean, Cornish, English and British – the issue is whether 
we retreat into more exclusive identities in 19th century conceptions of blood, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 This allowed imperial British subjects from locations, such as, the West Indies, to work within Britain 
without a visa (Rush, 2011). 
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race and territory, or whether we are still able to celebrate a British identity 
which is bigger than the sum of its parts and a Union that is strong because of 
the values we share and because of the way these values are expressed through 
our  history and our institutions (Brown, 2004, ‘British Identity’, British 
Council Annual Lecture, 7 July cited in Condor et al., 2006: 127 [italics added])   
 
The portrayal of shared values and common history within Cameron and Brown’s 
speeches can be identified as highlighting the collective embodiment of a national 
‘we’ image, which is based upon a common history and shared experience (Elias, 
1991).  Moreover, Brown’s mention of the ‘plural identities’ comprising Britain seeks 
to point towards the multiple and various levels of identity within Britain. 
 Therefore, in order to examine these multiple and various levels of identity 
within Britain, it is important to expand analyses of the nation to include the 
interdependencies that constitute and encompass the nation-state.6  In fact, in much 
the same way that individuals recognise one another, Hegel (1967) argued that a ‘state 
is as little an actual individual without relations to other states as an individual is 
actually a person without rapport with other persons’ (1967: 331n).  In this respect, 
Elias’s (1991) understanding of ‘we’ and ‘they’ identities can be used to further 
elaborate upon the interdependencies between, and, within, states as well as their 
effects upon the national-self image (Moore, 2010).  This can be particularly 
beneficial for the study of multi-national forms of identification, such as British 
identity, as well as those nations formerly part of larger imperial figurations.  Indeed, 
the work of Pocock (1975; 1992; see also Bourke, 2010) points to the mutual and 
reciprocal relations that both Elias (1978; 2012) and Goudsblom (1977) highlight in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 The following example by Elias (1991) can help to further elaborate on the importance of this wider 
collective: ‘One does not understand a melody by considering each of its notes in isolation, unrelated to 
other notes … It is similar with a house.  What we call its structure is not the structure of the individual 
stones but of the relations between the individual stones of which it is built; it is the complex of 
functions the stones have in relation to each other within the unity of the house … the structure of the 
house, cannot be explained by thinking about the shape of the individuals stones independently of their 
relations to each other; on the contrary, the shape of the stones can only be explained in terms of their 
function within the whole functional complex, the structure of the house.  One must start by thinking 
about the structure of the whole in order to understand the form of the individual parts.  These and 
many other phenomena have one thing in common, different as they may be in all other resects: to 
understand them it is necessary to give up thinking in terms of single, isolated substances and to start 
thinking in terms of relationships and functions.  And our thinking is only fully equipped to understand 
our social experience once we have made this switch’ (1991: 18-19 [italics in original]).  Consequently, 
while we cannot understand the house without the individual stone, similarly, one cannot understand 
national identity without considering the wider global complex (Elias, 2012; Goudsblom, 1977; 
Maguire, 2011; Smith, 2010). 
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their ‘interdependent’ examinations.7  Here, Pocock (1975) directs attention towards 
relations within the UK but also its culture overseas, both interacting with one another 
in multiple and complex ways.  Subsequently, Pocock (1982) states that British 
history: 
 
cannot be written as the memory of a single state or nation or as the process by 
which one came into existence.  It must be a plural history, tracing the processes 
by which a diversity of societies, nationalities and political structures came into 
being and situating in the history of each and in the history of their interactions 
the processes that have led them to whatever forms of association or unity exists 
in the present or have existed in the past (Pocock, 1982: 317, 320 cited in 
Kumar, 2003: 13)  
 
To this extent, the formation of the British state was itself a process closely entwined 
with the development of an imperial web of interdependence (Mennell, 1990).  
Consequently, by focusing upon the functional dynamics that structure collective 
groups, one is able to consider that how people and nations as well as multi-national 
organisations, such as, empires, both at an individual and a collective level, are 
interdependently related (Elias, 1978).   
 Despite this, however, examinations of the effects of globalisation processes and 
the intermingling of national economic, political and cultural structures, have often 
considered empire as a ‘pre-national category’ (Gerasimov et al., 2005: 35).  Indeed, 
the realities of a post-national world have resulted in what Howe (2010) describes as a 
lack of ‘big ideas’ in the study of empire, and in comparison with other spheres of 
historical and social scientific research, a lack of ‘theory building’ (2010: 5).  
Accordingly, it is here that the process sociological framework, and, in particular, its 
use of the ‘figuration’, can be used to provide an understanding of empire beyond the 
limited periods of the nation-centered analysis (Hutchings, 2006; Moore, 2010). 
 
2.1. Analysing the British domestic and imperial figurations 
 
The work of Darwin (1991; 1999; 2000; 2009; 2010; 2012) has been influential in 
building an approach to empire that is reflective of a networked imperial space.8  This 
‘networked’ approach is one advocated by Lester (2001; 2006) who argues for a focus 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Indeed an early advocate of a ‘new imperial history’ approach, Pocock, throughout his work, 
encouraged the expansion of British history to consider imperial societies located outside of the British 
Isles.   
8 Others have referred to a ‘British World-System’ (Darwin, 2009). 
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on ‘Imperial Networks’.9  Lester (2006) notes that: 
 
Scholars who propose a networked conception of empire generally consider it 
more useful to try to examine multiple meanings, projects, material practices, 
performances and experiences of colonial relations rather than locate their 
putative root causes, whether they are ‘economic’, ‘political’ or indeed 
‘cultural’. These relations were always stretched in contingent and non-
deterministic ways, across space, and they did not necessarily privilege either 
metropolitan or colonial spaces. They remade both metropolitan and colonial 
places in the act of connecting them. (2006: 131) 
 
The possibility for colonial sites to be ‘remade’ is considered further in Misra’s 
(2008) examination of ‘imperial agency’. 10   Indeed, while there has been ‘an 
understandable search to recover indigenous agency’ (Misra, 2008: 136) in imperial 
research, Misra (2008) argues that there is a tendency to exaggerate the effects of 
national agency within empire.11  Consequently, in accordance with Lester (2001; 
2006), Misra (2008) focuses attention on thinking about the British Empire as a 
system or network (Misra, 2008).  Both Misra’s (2008) ‘system’ and Lester’s (2006) 
‘network’ conceptions can be viewed through Elias’s conception of ‘figuration’.  
Accordingly, much like Lester’s (2006) promotion of an imperial ‘web’, a figurational 
analysis can serve to elucidate upon the ‘double nature of the imperial system’, its 
‘fragile’ and ‘dynamic’ qualities, as well as ‘remin[d] us that empires were not just 
structures, but processes as well’ (Lester, 2006: 133).   
 More importantly, however, a figurational analysis can conceptualise these 
‘processes’ in relation to ‘power balances’.  Here, balances of power between groups 
form an integral part of inter- and intra-group dynamics.  Calhoun’s (1994) references 
to the tensions underlying European identity serves to highlight the power balances 
that exist between larger collective units and smaller national communities: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Potter (2007) elaborates upon this change in analyses of the British Empire, noting that, ‘Historians of 
the British Empire have recently also begun to write about webs and networks and to discuss the role of 
the mass media in creating imperial communities. In particular, historians of the early nineteenth 
century have shown how groups of white settlers used newspapers to communicate information and 
opinion to audiences in Britain and other parts of the empire. Some of these historians argue that, in the 
process, settlers rehearsed claims to membership in a global British community and discussed ideas 
about the nature of “Britishness.”’ (Potter, 2007: 621).  In relation to analyses of the mass media, Potter 
(2007) adds that a networked conception, as used by scholars of globalization as well as by imperial 
historians, does help us escape a narrow national analyses of the mass media. 
10 Corresponding with studies that focus solely on the nation, examination of ‘imperial agency’ may 
tend to inevitably discover or over-exaggerate national differences and the nation’s unique aspects, 
rather than seeing the nation as part of a relational process (Dunning and Hughes, 2012).   
11 In Misra’s (2008) article, greater importance is placed on thinking about the British Empire as a 
system or network.  For the course of this thesis Misra’s (2008) ‘system’ will be supplemented with a 
process sociological vernacular, which shall view the empire as an ‘imperial figuration’. 
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Programs for the unification of Europe draw on new histories which emphasize 
the commonality of the European experience and identity; the specificity of 
Europe is counterposed to the rest of the world, rather than the specificity of 
France being counterposed to Britain or the Netherlands.  At the same time, 
fringe nationalist movements (and claims for regional autonomy) flourish within 
the European Community, while on its eastern border, the former Yugoslavia 
and perhaps other countries seem set to splinter into tiny nation-states (1994: 
319)  
 
Accordingly, the applicability of Elias’s conception of power and its relation to 
investigations of British identity will be considered further in Chapter Three.12  For 
now, however, it is possible to note that national identity is often dependent upon 
‘complex and multi-perspectival stor[ies] of interconnectedness and interdependency’ 
(Moore, 2010: 3.7), through which balances of power and struggles of integration 
form an important part of identification processes. 
 Subsequently, in order to make sense of ‘contemporary social behaviour’ it is 
important to observe how identities and ‘behaviours are formed, transformed, and 
understood over time, mainly as a result of shifting social interdependencies between 
people’ (Atkinson, 2003: 7).  As a result, ‘the whole position of the individual in his 
[sic] society, and thus the personality structures of individuals and their relations to 
each other, are changed in a specific way’ (Elias, 1991: 177).  That is, as the structural 
characteristics of societies change, so too does the personality of its inhabitants 
(Mennell, 1990).13   Indeed, when applied to the literature on Britain and British 
identity it is possible to examine how from 1707 onwards, national identity, amongst 
those nations comprising the imperial figuration, was often found in relation to the 
British Empire.14  In effect, whereas Kumar (2003) highlights the imperial aspects 
within English national identity, he presents just part of a wider imperial picture: the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See chapter three, section 3.1. 
13 This analysis can also be considered in relation to micro and macro dynamics.  Mennell (2009) 
highlights that Elias’s work combined both micro and macro endeavours within sociological research 
by exploring how behaviour by and between individuals was related to the formation and emergence of 
the nation-state (Mennell, 2009).  Here, Malcolm (2012) notes that changes in the social structure occur 
in accordance ‘with micro-level developments in emotional control’ (Malcolm, 2012: 170).  In regards 
to national identity, Malcolm (2012) adds that, ‘If … micro-level changes in emotional control relate to 
broader social structural changes, then it stands to reason that people in different social structural 
arrangements – that is to say nations – behave in different ways’ (2012: 171). 
14 The union of 1707 can be regarded as a significant point at which the conception of Great Britain 
was established, signifying the political union between England, Wales and Scotland.  Later, in 1801, 
Ireland would be included, forming the United Kingdom of Great Britain (Pittock, 2012).  Whereas, 
Colley (2005) highlights that such a union was made in defense of threats from abroad, predominantly 
the French, Cohen (1994) elaborates upon this to suggest that Britain was also perceived in light of the 
external opportunities provided by its expanding empire. 
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British Imperial picture.  Here, the British Empire helped to formulate a British 
national-imperial consciousness that drew together an extended range of national 
groups, whereby, the protection and oppression of national identity were ‘closely 
related social functions’ (Goudsblom, 1977: 147). 
 With this in mind, it remains necessary to map out precisely how this relates to 
the ‘deep-structural processes’ underpinning the British state and empire (Dunning, 
1986: 214).  As highlighted in the previous chapter, one can begin to perceive the 
social transformations, which occurred during the eighteenth century, as an important 
moment in the emergence of national characteristics and sentiments across Europe.15  
For Britain, this ideal image of the nation would, during the eighteenth-century, be 
marked by its imperial expansion, a process that would have important implications 
with regards to the identity, nature and character of Britain.  With this in mind, the 
following sections will consider the gradual emergence of the British domestic and 
imperial figuration. 
 
2.1.1. Growing ties of interdependence: the gradual emergence of the British 
domestic and imperial figurations 
 
The gradual emergence of the British state in 1707 was driven by the four warring 
home nations.  Indeed, Devine (2011) notes that ‘Scotland’s emergence as a nation 
made out of miscellaneous tribal groupings in the medieval period was in large part 
the result of a centuries-old struggle to defend the kingdom from English aggression’ 
(Devine, 2011: 8).  Similarly, within Ireland, English involvement can be traced to the 
twelfth-century.  After Henry II’s invasion in 1171: 
 
Anglo-Norman knights subsequently came to own significant quantities of Irish 
land, adopted a range of Irish customs and manners and, in the process, became 
distanced from the interests of the English. Ultimately, however, this group 
were never fully integrated, and formed the core of what subsequently became 
known as the Anglo-Irish. (Malcolm, 2012: 90) 
 
Furthermore, in 1284 Edward I, defeated the last of the Welsh princes, Llywelyn ap 
Gruffudd (1223-1282) (Malcolm, 2012).  Absorption of Welsh culture, education and 
legal systems were incorporated with England when the Tudor dynasty took charge of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Elias (1996) states that ‘a shift in priority from humanist and moral ideals and values applicable to 
people in general to nationalist ideals which placed an ideal image of country and nation above general 
human and moral ideals in one’s scale of values, can be observed in the outlook of the middle classes 
of most European countries between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries’ (1996: 134). 
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the English throne in 1485 (Weight, 2002).  In 1536, Henry VIII’s Act of Union 
officially incorporated Wales into the English realm (Weight, 2002).  
 Accordingly, while tensions between the four home nations would continue 
throughout the eighteenth-century it is possible to identify a sense of cultural 
nationalism in England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, held together by powerful 
emotional attachments to distinct ethnic groups (Bairner, 2001; McCrone, 1992; 2006; 
Perryman, 2009).  Indeed, despite the successful union of England, Scotland and 
Wales in 1707, cultural and national individuality was still prevalent, demonstrated 
via the Welsh language and the continuation of Scottish law and religion within 
Britain.  Not only did these national distinctions highlight the disparities between 
England and the surrounding Celtic nations but also between the individual nations 
themselves (Colley, 2005). 
 In particular, Colley (1984) notes that ‘one of the most notable phenomena in 
the social history of this period – the proliferation of clubs and learned societies – 
reflected an increase in patriotic as well as in dissident pressure groups (they could 
indeed be one and the same)’ (1984: 98).  In such instances, ‘one could both retain 
one’s distinctiveness in ethnic or even national terms and, at the same time, share in 
the new British identity made available by the newly created British state’ (Kumar, 
2003: 145).  This apparent assimilation between both national and British 
identifications was itself emerging as early as the Union of the Crowns in 1603.  
Pittock (2012) notes that ‘the Union of the Crowns created a paradox with respect to 
Scottish sovereignty: within it Scotland both was and was not a state in the 
Westphalian sense’ (2012: 12).  In fact, attempts at establishing various forms of 
British Union were tried by Edward I and Oliver Cromwell but these were largely 
‘attempts’ and nothing more (Rojek, 2007).16  Accordingly, after the Union of 1707, 
‘a militaristic tradition had been developed … in which ‘Scottish’ and ‘British’ were 
not incompatible’ (McCrone, 1992: 209).  By connecting both nationalist and British 
discourses, the British state provided a space in which British identity could be 
adopted, redefined and contested. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Rojek (2007) notes that, ‘the efforts of Edward I (1239-1307) – who sought to create the 
first ‘Empire’ in the British Isles by subduing the Welsh and crushing the Scots (one of his 
soubriquets was ‘the Hammer of the Scots’) – and Oliver Cromwell’s conquest of Ireland and 
Scotland during the seventeenth century ‘Commonwealth’ … both laid the ground for durable 
alliances between national factions in all four nations and London and sowed the seeds of 
lasting enmities’ (2007: 14) 
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 With this in mind, two interrelated factors helped lay the foundations for an 
emerging British identity during the eighteenth-century (Colley, 2005; Kumar, 2003; 
Schama, 2001).  Firstly, whereas the work of Colley (2005) highlights the importance 
of the Protestant religion in uniting both Britain and its emerging colonies, Kumar 
(2003) reveals that ‘competing regional and even national identities could crystalize 
around whichever branch of the Protestant family happened to be dominant’ (2003: 
160).  In fact, broader attempts to explain the development of Western nation-states 
have often been aligned with Max Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic’ (McCrone, 1992).  
Commenting upon the work of Gordon Marshall, McCrone (1992) notes that ‘by the 
late seventeenth century, certain Scottish entrepreneurs … not only adhered to the 
principles of capitalist business practice, but did so through the values and ideals of 
ascetic Calvinism’ (1992: 38-39). 
 Accordingly, these values and ideals were part of a much broader process of 
cultural, economical and political transformation occurring within Britain.  Instead, 
the Protestant faith obtained its greatest strength when it ‘could be seen as the core of 
a worldwide empire through which Protestant culture could be diffused on the widest 
possible scale’ (Kumar, 2003: 164).  Consequently, whereas religion would provide a 
paradoxical role in Ireland, as well as display its own national variations within 
Scotland and Wales (Coakley, 2004), the Protestant faith helped forge a sense of 
British unionism and entitlement against the Catholic-French during the Seven Years 
War (Colley, 2005).  Britain was not necessarily a deeply religious state but the 
Protestant faith remained so engraved within the forming of British culture that it 
continued as an enduring part of people’s daily lives (Colley, 2005). 
 Secondly, alongside a shared Protestant faith was the rise of a ‘British’ landed 
gentry across Britain (Colley, 2005).  Indeed, Colley (2005) notes that: 
 
all of these developments – a massive transfer of land by way of inheritance and 
purchase, an unprecedented rise in the profitability of land and increasing 
intermarriage between Celtic and English dynasties – helped to consolidate a 
new unitary ruling class in place of those separate and specific landed 
establishments that had characterised England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland in 
the Tudor and Stuart eras (2005: 161) 
 
Consequently, whereas the amalgamation of upper and middle-class behaviours, such 
as that witnessed between the urban bourgeoisie circles and the landed nobility, 
helped to forge the beginnings of a British ‘nationalization’ (Elias, 2012), local rule of 
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Britain’s peripheral nations was intricately tied to the British state.  Here, the example 
of Highland dress reveals how: 
 
Highland elites used cultural imagery because it helped them to secure political 
capital within the fiscal-military state. Counter-intuitively, in adopting Highland 
dress, elites attempted to express a Highland affinity with Whig narratives of 
Britain’s political, commercial and constitutional pre-eminence, thus advancing 
the legitimacy of local rule. As had been the case for several generations of 
Highland elites, good relations with the state were believed to be the surest 
means of safeguarding certain socio-economic aspects of local authority. 
(Dziennik, 2012: 145) 
 
Therefore, it is possible to conceive how the legitimacy of the Highland elite in 
Scotland was a status that was interdependently tied to the wider political balance of 
power within Britain, power that ultimately resided in London.   
 In fact, from the beginning of the English settlement in Ireland, to the political 
union of England, Scotland and Wales, a series of power relations between the four 
nations can be sketched.  Indeed, this can reveal broader structural processes 
underpinning the development of Western European nations more broadly.  Elias 
(1982) states that in ‘The mechanism of state-formation … we always find, at least in 
the history of the great European states, an early phase in which units of the size of a 
territory play the decisive role within the area later to become a state’ (1982: 98).  As 
a result, ‘areas like the principality of Wales or the kingdom of Scotland, now merged 
with England in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ (Elias, 
1982: 98). 
 Consequently, national identity and British identity were not static classificatory 
systems but processes of development that occurred alongside changes in the social 
structures surrounding them (Goudsblom, 1977).  More broadly, these developments 
within Britain can be aligned with changes in the concept of empire and the European 
sense-of-self.  Smith (2001) highlights that: 
 
In this broad sense, empire has a close relationship to the idea of sovereignty, 
the absolute control asserted by secular monarch over their subjects and, later, 
by the state within the polity.  The term ‘empire’ also refers to the total 
command over nature envisaged by Europe’s philosophers of science from 
Francis Bacon onward … The idea of human empire was a major ideal and 
legitimizing concept in modern Europe, especially as religious authority 
declined and belief in divine guidance began to fade.  Scientific exploration, 
service to the state and the conquest of other peoples were mutually supportive 
activities, all expressing the belief in ‘empire’ (2001: 122) 
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Indeed, the awareness of an external geography outside of Britain helped to facilitate 
a sense of Britishness that allowed British citizens to believe themselves as different 
from those within Europe (Colley, 2005).  As a result, the enclosed British Isles 
provided a British boundary that exhibited a stark contrast to Europe, where national 
boundaries would continue to fluctuate throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries (Colley, 2005). 
 Certainly, within Britain, a combination of ‘imperial’ interpretations would 
occur.  That is, changing power balances within British society, reveal a major shift, 
not only in the decentring of power from the monarchy (a heredity position that had 
been weakened greatly by the English Civil War) but also in the early formation of a 
collective ‘imperial’ British identity.  Accordingly, if ‘imperial prosperity was to 
continue apace, then the four diverse preindustrial cultural ‘nations’ that constituted 
the UK had to be reconciled to an ideological ‘Greater Britain’ (Pittock, 2012: 328).  
In part, this would be shaped by the resulting acquisitions in colonial territory that 
followed Britain’s victory in The Seven Years War (Colley, 1984).  As a result, over 
the coming century British identity would undergo its own transformations in relation 
to changes within ‘state power, increased long-distance economic ties, new 
communications and transportation capacities, and new political projects’ (Calhoun, 
2004: 29).  In such instances, empire, monarchy, sport and spectacle would begin to 
take on a more ‘imperial’ role. 
 With this in mind, the following sections will examine how particular processes 
within the development of the British state and empire served to underlie the 
formation of the British sense of self.  In particular, these sections will stay true to 
Elias’s figurational analysis by examining how changes in the interdependencies 
between groups impacted upon forms of national identification.  Importantly, 
however, Dunning and Hughes (2012) note that: 
 
Elias’s emphasis on long-term ‘blind’ historical processes should by no means 
be taken as denying how, at particular historical junctures and under certain 
figurational conditions, specific individuals have been able for a while to ‘steer’ 
the course of social development in limited but nonetheless important ways. … 
Napoleon in France in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries and Hitler 
in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s are obvious examples. (2012: 153) 
 
To this extent, the following sections will examine three important processes or 
strands in British history that helped ‘steer’ the emergence of the British state and the 
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construction of British identity.  First, consideration will be given to the American 
War of Independence (1775-1783); second, the British monarchy, in particular, the 
reign of George III and the emergence of the British royal image, and, finally, the 
Industrial Revolution and British imperial emigration, will be considered. 
 
2.2. The American Revolution: crisis and reinforcement in British Identity   
  
Originating from Britain’s economic links in North America and the West Indies, 
early attempts at empire were largely driven by commercial incentive (Schama, 
2001).  Whereas, America would gain independence in 1783, political life within the 
British colonies would be situated upon a balance between metropolitan authority and 
colonial autonomy (Anderson, 2000).  Indeed, this would be supported by mass 
immigration, economic legislation, ethnic ancestry, royal patronage and sporting 
heritage (Guttmann, 1994; Malcolm, 2012; Maguire, 1993b; Mangan, 1992a).   
 Accordingly, throughout the 1800s, Britain’s external empire would expand via 
the colonization of Australia, Canada, India and New Zealand.  In particular, within 
New Zealand, a long tradition of European and North American trading links had led 
to British vessels frequenting the northern harbours of the island taking cargoes of 
flax and timber as well as trading with the indigenous Maori population (Dalziel, 
1999).  Crucially, the importance of these trade links (along with the introduction of 
guns and farming) would ensure that the New Zealand islands maintained a close 
connection with the developing British Empire (Dalziel, 1999; Mein Smith, 2012).   
 Importantly, however, the colonisation of Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
would follow in the wake of Britain’s failed attempt to maintain the thirteen colonies.  
For many who had migrated to the North American colonies, the ‘British’ adjective 
seems to have provided a ‘common term to describe their heritage, the central symbol 
of which was their common allegiance to the British crown’ (Bridge and Fedorowich, 
2003a: 2-3).  Indeed, Anderson (2000) argues that this ‘transatlantic political 
community … questioned neither their common allegiance to the Crown nor their 
common British identity’ (2000: xxiiii).  However, inspired by the spread of 
egalitarian values across Europe: 
 
men like Washington and Franklin, who otherwise would have liked nothing 
better than to pursue honor, wealth, and power within the British imperial 
framework – were compelled to confront issues of sovereignty in ways that 
imparted new, universalistic meaning to an inherited language of rights and 
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liberties (Anderson, 2000: 745)   
 
As a result, in accordance with the imperial rhetoric of the period, the American 
Revolution provided the opportunity to form what the revolutionaries described as an 
‘empire of liberty’ (Anderson, 2000: 745). 
 Indeed, within Britain, concerns regarding the loss of the American colonies 
were highlighted by the Whig politician, Horace Walpole, who noted that ‘whatever 
way this war ends, it will be fatal to this country’ (Cunningham, 1857: 385-6 cited in 
Wasson, 2011: 22).  Thus, Wasson (2011) argues that ‘The … American Revolution 
was not lost on the political elite.  Attempts were made to reconstruct the governance 
of the remaining colonies and, whether by accident or design, more and more territory 
was added to the burgeoning empire’ (2011: 85).  Accordingly, the outbreak of 
revolution in the North American colonies in 1775 would have a resounding effect on 
British identity and the British social habitus (Hatter, 2012).  In particular, whereas 
before 1775, the British Empire reflected a geographically incoherent and politically 
isolated cluster of disparate colonies (Bumsted, 2008), by the end of the nineteenth-
century this cluster would resemble a plethora of tightly linked colonies, some 
displaying responsible government, but all embraced under a collective British 
identity (Bumsted, 2008; Rush, 2011).17 
 Furthermore, Anglo-Scottish relations would also be cemented during the 
American War of Independence, a relationship that would be reinforced during the 
Napoleonic wars.  Devine (2011) notes that: 
 
Between 1776 and 1783 the Scots were enthusiastically loyal to the British 
Crown.  Even in the American colonies more loyalists were apparently born in 
Scotland than in any other country. (2011: 11) 
 
After independence, Britain was left with territories in the north, soon to become 
Canada (Devine, 2011), whereupon Scottish emigrants were ‘able to introduce 
Scottish institutions into the fabric of wary colonial society’ (Devine, 2011: 19). 
 In this respect, the loss of the American colonies in 1783 reveal not the 
dispelling of a wider British imperial identity but instead a moment of deep 
introspection within Britain with regards to the consolidation of its imperial empire 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Indeed, more importantly for Britain, the loss of America did not dislodge Britain as a world or naval 
power (Gould, 2008). 
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and image (Colley, 1984; Hatter, 2012).18  Consequently, whereas: 
 
the war of American Independence created a new nation in the United States of 
America … It helped forge a very different Great Britain in which both men and 
women would have to work out their ideas of patriotism as never before 
(Colley, 2005: 145 [italics in original])   
 
To this extent, the American war of Independence helped reinforce the perception of 
Britain’s empire as a vast diasporic nation (Gould, 2012), indeed, one that was 
acknowledged as forming part of a much larger British polity.  Thus, for Britain and 
the remaining empire, it became essential to reconfigure the relations between the 
mother country and the colonies in order to forge an enduring and closely integrated 
global polity (Bell, 2006).  Owram (2001) notes: 
 
the British North American colonies were a laboratory in the period between the 
fall of the first British Empire and the rise of the second.  Britain had learned 
from the American defeat that colonial government required a measure of 
colonial autonomy and a degree of flexibility (2001: 149) 
 
Consequently, there emerged a far more conscious and officially constructed attempt 
to foster British patriotism during this period (Bayly, 2001).19 
 Accordingly, the American Revolution instigated the beginning of a second 
British Empire, distinguishable to the old colonial system of the British Atlantic world 
and underscored by an industrial imperial objective (Bayly, 2001; Armitage, 2000; 
Mac An Ghail, 2001).  The following years would also witness ‘both the remodelling 
of authority within Great Britain, and a recasting of what it meant to be British’ 
(Colley, 2005: 193).  This would include ‘the British monarchy assuming many of the 
characteristics and much of the patriotic importance that it retains today’ (Colley, 
2005: 193).  These characteristics will now be considered.   
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Indeed, discussions regarding the future of the empire would not again take shape until the Boer War 
(1899-1902), whereby Britain’s image as a global power would once again come under attack (Pugh, 
2008). 
19 Hatter (2012) reveals that this re-construction of empire was not just attributed to the efforts of 
Westminster but also by the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, John Graves Simcoe.  Hatter 
(2012) notes that ‘Simcoe articulated a vision of western development in which the perfection of 
English, social, political, and legal institutions would place Upper Canada at the heart of a trans-
continental empire’ (2012: 135). 
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2.2.1. Britain and the royal image 
 
Commenting upon the English Civil War, Schumpeter (1976) notes that: 
 
Under the Tudors and Stuarts the absolute monarchy developed in England 
much as it did at the same time on the Continent.  Specifically, the British 
Crown also succeeded in winning over the part of the nobility, the ‘cavaliers’, 
who subsequently sided with it against the ‘roundheads’ and who, but for the 
outcome of the battles of Naseby and Marston Moor, would surely have become 
a military palace guard. (1976: 76) 
 
In contrast to Europe, an ‘early sympto[m] of democratisation’ within Britain was the 
curbing of monarchial powers (Dunning et al., 2004: 9).  Indeed, Dunning et al. 
(2004) elaborate that ‘a variety of processes contributed in England to the landed 
classes retaining a high degree of autonomy viv-a-vis the monarchial state and also, 
via parliament, sharing with the monarch in the tasks of ruling’ (2004: 9-10). 
 Accordingly, alongside the gradual emergence of Britain’s parliamentization, 
examinations of Britain’s monarchial families can reveal how the British royal family 
emerged as an important part of, and, indeed, a contentious factor in, the construction 
of Britain and notions of Britishness.  Here, the work of Elias (1982; 1996) and 
Colley (2005) can be used to examine the establishment of the British royal family as 
a constitutive part of Britain’s national, and, later, imperial image.  In particular, it is 
Colley’s (2005) reference to the reign of King George III, which can be used to trace 
long-term developments in the nationalization of the British royal family (Elias, 1978; 
1996).   
 Referring to the loss of the American colonies in 1783, Colley (2005) reveals 
that: 
 
As a limited monarch, [King] George was able to evade most of the blame for 
British defeat in America.  The former Prime Minister, Lord North, was made 
the scapegoat for national humiliation; while [King George], because of his 
undoubted domestic prohibity, his obstinate patriotism and his adroit alliance 
with the boy wonder, William Pitt the Younger, came to represent for many 
Britons reassuring stability and honest, uncomplicated worth in the midst of 
disaster and disillusionment (2005: 212) 
 
Indeed, the reign of King George III has been widely debated within literature on the 
influence of the British royal family during this period (Butterfield, 1957; Reitan, 
1964).  Much of this has centred on the King’s failure at maintaining the loyalty of the 
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American colonies during the American War of Independence (Middlekauff, 1982).20  
In fact, Colley’s (1984) analysis of London prints during the late 1760s reveals a 
propensity to ridicule both George and the British monarchy. 
 Yet, from the late 1780s onwards, a shift in the public image of George seems to 
have occurred.  Colley (1984) highlights that ‘after 1789 prints portrayed him 
regularly as St. George, as John Bull and, after his mental collapse in 1810, as a wise, 
Lear-like patriarch and the celestial guardian of his nation’ (1984: 102).21  Similarly, 
in many respects, King George III can be regarded as the first ‘British’ monarch.  
Indeed, he was the first Hanoverian monarch to be born in Britain and speak English 
as his first language (Watson, 1960).  Furthermore, King George would also go on to 
survive a reign lasting longer that any of his predecessors.22 
 More importantly, however, are the characteristics of British royalty, which 
were established during George III’s reign.  Here, royal pageantry and spectacle as 
well as values of domestic and familial responsibility became established as key 
tenets of the royal image.  In regards to the ability of the monarchy to draw together 
Britain’s disparate nations, the ‘supreme symbol of integration … was the monarchy’ 
and in doing so the ‘royal function became an identifiable reality as well as a symbol 
in a way it had never become before’ (Robbins, 1988: 171 [italics added]).  Similarly, 
during the Georgian period: The union flag, Jerusalem, Rule Britannia, Ordnance 
Survey maps, national debt, the Bank of England, national budget, public railways 
and the industrialisation of London, Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow would become 
established (Betts, 2014).  In addition, Georgian Britain would also see the 
materialization of the office of prime minister, with the term ‘first minister’ entering 
common usage (Wasson, 2011). 
 Later, royal visits to Scotland during the nineteenth-century would help to 
encourage Scottish attachments to the British monarch.  The kilted King George IV’s 
visit to Scotland in 1822 helped to reinvent the plaided tartan (a symbol of highland 
culture) as an iconic image of Scottish national identity and heritage (Hobsbawm, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 The Royal Proclamation of 1763, issued by King George III would help fuel colonial unrest within 
the thirteen colonies. 
21 Referring to the King’s reign, Colley (2005) notes that ‘George III’s unusual longevity both as a king 
and as a man could be seen as a symbol of his nation’s relative stability … Very easily, the king 
became a lucky charm’ (2005: 224).   
22 Only Queen Victoria and the current monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, have reigned longer.  Indeed, 
Colley (1984) adds that ‘the wartime context which allowed the king to be celebrated not only for his 
royalty but also because his uniquely long reign had become the prime symbol of Britain’s national 
identity and, in European terms, her singular success in resisting French domination’ (1984: 113). 
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1983; Parissien, 2001).  In fact, within Wales, British sentiments were aided by ‘the 
monarchial embodiment of state and people’ (Loughlin, 2013: 4).   Commenting upon 
the royal-Welsh connection, Loughling (2013) notes that: 
 
In Wales national myth had a distinctly Whiggish character, an early history of 
English persecution having long been resolved through a sense of identity 
rooted in the Welsh origins of the Tudor dynasty, reinforced – despite sectional 
antagonism – by a state-wide Protestant heritage, and resulting in a sense of 
national identity as much British as Welsh, with the region’s respectable 
Nonconformist values un-problematically mirrored in those of the queen. Thus 
the royal-Welsh relationship in the later nineteenth century might be seen as an 
‘organic’ relationship establishing emotive bonds of belonging that transcended 
the local and national spheres of life – even if in reality it was mainly one-sided 
– in a way the monarchy’s relationship with Catholic and nationalist Ireland did 
not. (2013: 18) 
 
Within Scotland, the efforts of Queen Victoria would succeed ‘in establishing a 
Scottish identity for the monarchy’ (Loughlin, 2013: 7).  Through the British 
monarchy, and, most notably, through the close connection between Queen Victoria 
and her Balmoral estate, ‘Highlandism … [was] given wholehearted royal approval 
and tartan [was] recognized as the badge of Scottish identity’ (Devine, 2011: 170).  
Here: 
 
Victoria deliberately set out to take possession of the Scottish royal past in both 
its Catholic Jacobite and post-1688 dimensions, presenting herself as the 
personal embodiment and synthesis of those separate strains, identifying with 
Scottish cultural traditions, especially its hegemonic Presbyterian faith. 
(Loughlin, 2013: 7) 
 
 Notably, the reign of Queen Victoria would also serve an important imperial 
function.  Coinciding with Britain’s emergence as the leading industrial global power, 
her idealised representation across the empire served as a linchpin of British imperial 
identity (Bell, 2006).  Furthermore, her reign would also see the organisation of both a 
Golden and Diamond Jubilee (Thompson, 2005).  Whereas, the Golden Jubilee of 
1887 would be a largely British affair, the 1897 Diamond Jubilee was proclaimed a 
festival of the British Empire (Waller, 2006).  This included troops and politicians 
from across the dominions, whom all took part in the imperial celebrations (Hibbert, 
2001; Thompson, 2005; Waller, 2006).  Cannadine (1983) highlights that: 
 
from 1877, when Disraeli made Victoria empress of India, and 1897, when 
Joseph Chamberlain brought the colonial premiers and troops to parade in the 
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Diamond Jubilee procession, every great royal occasion was also an imperial 
occasion (1983: 124 [italics in original]) 
 
This was encouraged, in part, during the Victorian period by the expansion of the 
press (Pugh, 2008).  Here ‘both the national dailies and the expanding women’s 
magazines promoted popular interests in the monarchy with the extra advantage of 
photographic illustrations’ (Pugh, 2008: 95).  Indeed, it is here that relations between 
the British monarchy and the British media would gradually emerge with the media 
acting as an important link between the often obscure royal family and their British 
and imperial citizens.  In addition, imperial relations would become closely aligned 
with the British monarchy during and after the reign of Queen Victoria, with frequent 
royal tours throughout the empire occupying the royal calendar.  However, despite the 
royal grandeur of such occasions, the British Empire would, under the reign of Queen 
Elizabeth II, undergo further transformations, most notably, in its name. 
 Despite such changes, however, the British monarchy would remain closely tied 
to Britain’s imperial image.  Cannadine (1983) notes: 
 
The last great ceremony … successfully conflating monarchy and empire, 
stressing stability in an age of change, and celebrating the continuity of Britain 
as a great power, was the coronation of Elizabeth II in 1953.  For it was still 
avowedly an imperial occasion, with the queen’s dress containing embroidered 
emblems of the dominions, with regiments of Commonwealth and colonial 
troops marching in procession, with the prime ministers of the Dominions and 
India present in the Abbey, and an assortment of heads of state from various 
exotic colonial protectorates (1983: 153 [italics in original]) 
 
Nevertheless, while royal occasions were presented as ‘imperial’ occasions, from 
Elizabeth’s coronation onwards a ‘more “modern” attitude would begin to emerge 
towards royalty’ (Coward, 2008: 134).  For those news journalists returning from the 
Second World War with ‘democratic ideals and new attitudes towards popular 
journalism’ a new, less deferential, relationship was forged between the British royal 
family and the British press (Coward, 2008: 134).  This would stand in contrast to the 
pre-war royal press coverage that tended to report on royal matters in an awed and 
hushed manner (Cannadine, 1983).23 
 Indeed, this relationship would come under considerable strain in light of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Indeed, the British press refrained from reporting on the ‘scandalous’ aspects surrounding the 
abdication of Edward VIII (1936).  Instead, foreign newspapers (particularly America) provided the 
bulk of news regarding the Royal crisis. 
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Princess Diana.  Coward (2008) notes: 
 
It is impossible to separate Diana’s life from her relationship with the press and 
equally impossible to look at the press’ relationship with the monarchy without 
considering the Dianna effect.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s she was a 
tabloid sensation: the human face of royalty, the first glamorous and media-
friendly British royal.  She also became half of an unprecedented royal divorce 
which exposed hitherto areas of royal behaviour (2008: 136) 
 
While Diana’s own ‘mediated’ image provided reflection on what it meant to be a 
modern woman during the 1980s, her death during the 1990s led to further questions 
regarding British identity and the its relationship with the monarchy (Coward, 2008).  
While the nation mourned its national ‘sweetheart’, the Royal family itself came 
under fire from a UK who questioned their own desire for an out-dated regime 
(Greenslade, 1997). 
 Despite this, however, it is possible to observe how, over the course of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries; the British Royal family became intricately 
related to the British ‘we-image’ (Elias, 1996).  Together, with increasing levels of 
democratization across British society the ‘symbolic function of royalty as a living 
representation of a national ideal steadily … increased’ (Elias, 1996: 165).24  Indeed, 
Elias (1996) elaborates: 
 
Royalty … as the living symbol of how Britons ought to behave, of the national 
we-ideal, had to comply, therefore, with the demands of middle-class and later 
of working class morality.  The royal dynasty retained a limited place in the 
multipolar power equilibrium of British society and a larger place in the 
affections of the people as the embodiment of the ideal ‘we’, the collective self 
of the nation, provided the members of the royal house fitted into the role of a 
living ideal and complied, or appeared to comply, with the demands of middle- 
and working-class morality (1996: 166) 
 
As a result, the symbolic function of the royal family along with the greater emphasis 
upon royal spectacle within Britain, helped to further stimulate a sense of Britishness 
across the UK (Moelker, 2003). 
 
2.2.2. Industrialization and immigration 
 
Together, industrialization and migration from Britain and the colonies as well as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 In addition, continued war with France on the continent and a decrease in monarchical power within 
Britain, helped celebrate Britain’s national liberty, a constitutive part of its social and civic duty 
(Colley, 1984).   
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between the colonies would serve to further encourage a sense of Britain overseas 
(Gaines, 2012; Rush, 2011; Varadarajan, 2008).  Industrial developments across 
Britain underscored Britain’s naval expansion (Devine, 2011) allowing for the 
transportation of people as well as encouraging investment in the developing colonies 
(Devine, 2011).  Many Scottish workers, driven out by a British domestic economy 
that failed to provide enough jobs for its growing labour force (MacKenzie, 1998; 
Pugh, 2008), looked towards the colonies for work.  Accordingly: 
 
although the administration and legal systems of empire seemed to be 
predominantly English, the Scots set about exporting those aspects of their civil 
culture that had been preserved by the 1707 Act of Union. They asserted their 
right to develop Presbyterian missions and education in India freed from the 
established Anglican hierarchy. They developed colleges and schools in India 
and elsewhere in the dependent territories. (MacKenzie, 1998: 222) 
 
In addition, the British Empire would also provide an opportunity for Irish Catholics 
to flee ethnic persecution in Ireland.  Clayton (2005) notes that: 
 
The Irish colonial experience included two contradictory elements, both shared 
by other colonised peoples.  On the one hand, there was an intensification of the 
long tradition of subjecting the Catholic Irish to racist stereotyping, whose 
content and motivation was almost identical to that experienced by indigenous 
peoples in other parts of the British Empire.  On the other hand, Irish Catholics 
played a part in the empire not only as subjects but as agents of the imperial 
power in the maintenance of the empire (2005: 236) 
 
As a result, within Australia and New Zealand, Irish immigration aided the spread of 
both national and British culture across the colonies.  In fact, Parent (2007) alludes to 
the greater ‘British’ cohesion that was found within the dominions compared to 
Britain.  He notes: 
 
Those of British ancestry cohered reasonably effectively in Australia because of 
expedience; they needed to cooperate to secure a distant outpost of British 
imperialism.  So while in the British Isles there was much conflict between the 
Irish and the British, in Australia, though there was some friction, the Irish were 
generally integrated into the dominant ethnic group of whites with British 
ancestry (2007: 6)25 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Similarly, Irish influence in Australia would also be found within sport.  McConville and Hess 
(2012) note that in the emergence of Australian Rules Football, ‘the driving influence in the Victorian 
game [Australian Rules Football] seemed to come, as in so many of the new institutions of the gold 
colony, from men whose background was in Ireland rather than England. Thomas Henry Smith, a 
sports master at Scotch College (which along with the Melbourne Grammar School was one of the 
schools competing in the landmark game of 1858) had graduated from Trinity College, Dublin’ (2012: 
2361). 
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Subsequently, during the assimilation of Irish Catholics abroad, many ‘found it easier 
to accommodate themselves to Britishness abroad than at home’ (Dubow, 2009: 11).  
The effects of the Great Famine in Ireland would eventually result in Irish migration 
far outnumbering England, Scotland and Wales throughout the nineteenth-century 
(Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003b).26 
 Within Wales, Jenkins (2008) notes that ‘by the mid-nineteenth century … 
Australia was viewed by the Welsh as a land of opportunity rather than a place of 
exile’ (2008: 189).  Supported by the gold rush of the 1850s ‘energetic prospectors 
and Welsh families determined to make a fresh start’ were migrating to the emerging 
dominion (Jenkins, 2008: 189).  Along, with their Scottish and Irish counterparts, 
Wales’s own identity became increasingly entwined with the British Empire. 
 Indeed, the dispersal of British emigrants throughout the colonies would also 
help to encourage a separate and distinct form of colonial identification.  In particular, 
immigration provided an important source of labour for the imperial system while at 
the same time acting as a powerful agent in its subversion (Varadarajan, 2008: 271).  
As a result, anti-British sentiment was fostered amongst the Australian working class 
who helped to encourage indigenous forms of national identification (Mein Smith, 
2012).   
 Notably, the migration of Irish, Scottish and Welsh citizens during this period 
followed in the wake of the cramped conditions emerging in the industrial cities of 
Britain.  Following the industrial expansion of Britain the ‘tobacco lords of Glasgow, 
the jute manufacturers of Dundee, the steel magnates of Sheffield, the millocracy of 
Manchester … the merchant princes of London and the outports, and the discreet 
bankers of the City’ obtained a wealth that was directly dependent on empire and 
imperial expansion (Hopkins, 1999: 210).  Accordingly, for many of the ports and 
harbours throughout the empire, the outward destination was not England but the 
industrial ports of Aberdeen and Glasgow.  Throughout this period Scotland was 
becoming, along with Britain, an industrial society (McCrone, 1992).  In addition, 
Wales would also see an expansion of its commercial and urban communities (Evans, 
1989).  Here, ‘iron and coal production from south Wales became vitally important, 
particularly in terms of British imperial ambition’ (Pritchard, 2012: 328).  Clydeside !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 The Great Famine occurred between 1845 and 1852 causing mass starvation and disease across 
Ireland. 
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and the South Wales would help form the ‘control points from which trade and 
manufacture flowed out to the world, carried in part by the trade routes of the British 
Empire’ (Kumar, 2003: 168).  As a result, the effects of Britain’s industrial revolution 
served to strengthen its ties of interdependence within Britain via an expanding global 
network of trade and commerce.  
 Furthermore, while accounts of the industrial revolution have often considered it 
to be a largely British phenomenon, it was also a revolution that was sustained and 
encouraged by the British Empire.  Here, ‘the vital contribution of the slave trade, 
slavery … [and] colonial relations’ helped to maintain its development (Bhambra, 
2010: 138).  In fact, in her critique of Mann’s (2006) analysis of the Industrial 
Revolution, Bhambra (2010) argues that ‘industrialization continues to be regarded as 
a European phenomenon subsequently diffused to the rest of the world rather than one 
which was global in its instantiation and which had differential impacts across the 
globe’ (2010: 138). 
 Consequently, in conjunction with the rise of industry across Britain came social 
changes in the composition of British society.  Most notably, industrial changes aided 
the emergence of ‘a British working class and a British labour movement’ (Kumar, 
2003: 169).  While for many, class loyalties provided an important sense of 
identification (Kumar, 2003), across British society, entrepreneurs and factory 
owners, along with various other middle class professionals, formed part of a rising 
middle class elite (Allen, 2009; MacKenzie, 1984; Kumar, 2000).  Through a greater 
permeability in stratum barriers ‘the large industrial classes, one after the other, rose 
into the position of ruling classes’ (Elias, 1996: 165-66).  Accordingly, ‘Oxbridge’ 
graduates would form just part of a wider ‘colonial’ diaspora that would help serve as 
‘part of the bureaucratic machinery that formed the very basis of imperial power’ 
(Varadarajan, 2008: 283; see also Gaines, 2012).  Here, sport would provide an 
important role in transferring ‘Western notions of civilized conduct … across the 
world as the ideas of the imperial ruling strata spread to the belief systems in the 
colonies’ (Linklater and Mennell, 2010). 
 Nevertheless, the social and political structure within Britain would also be 
closely dependent upon its emerging colonies.  Indeed, ‘many of the central principles 
of modern British democracy were experimented with in the colonies of settlement 
and shipped back to the United Kingdom’ (Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003a: 5).  Bridge 
and Fedorowich (2003a) elaborate: 
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in the 1840s, Canada, not Britain, was first to define responsible government.  
By the 1850s, five of the six Australian colonies had developed the secret ballot, 
more than ten years before it was introduced in the United Kingdom.  In 1893, 
New Zealand women were the first in the empire to gain the vote, a generation 
before their sisters in Britain.  The schools in the Australian colony of Victoria 
were ‘secular, compulsory and free’ well before their counterparts back home 
(2003a: 5) 
 
With this in mind, the following sections will explore, in further detail, the effects of 
these processes in shaping British identity both within the British home nations and 
the former dominions.27 
 
2.3. Imperial Britain: British identity in the UK 
 
Within England, concerns regarding British nationalism and English patriotism, were 
denounced by a Westminster government who was ‘at pains to praise the imperial 
instincts of England’s neighbours precisely because they felt that they needed 
reassuring that the cry of a shared allegiance to empire was not a cloak for English 
aggrandisement’ (Thompson, 2005: 198).  To this extent, Thompson (2008) argues 
that the Scots ‘were the first peoples of the British Isles to take on an imperial 
mentality and possible the longest to sustain one’ (2008: 51). 
 Indeed, over the course of the eighteenth-century Scottish involvement in 
empire would form an important part of Scotland’s domestic society.  Despite many 
who assumed Scotland’s position within the British state to resemble that of Britain’s 
overseas colonies (Hechter, 1975), the Scots played a vital role in the administration 
of the British Empire.  Finlay (1997) argues that: 
 
The political vocabulary of nineteenth-century Scotland was replete with the 
words empire and imperial. The Union with England was referred to as the 
imperial partnership, Scottish Members of Parliament sat in the Imperial 
parliament at Westminster, Glasgow was Second City of the Empire, the 
Scottish economy was the Workshop of Empire and the Scots themselves were a 
race of Empire builders. (1997: 16) 
 
Accordingly, throughout the nineteenth-century Scottish politicians would attempt to 
make the empire their own, with Scottish law, education and medicine providing the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 In particular, section 2.3. will focus upon the effects of the British Empire on the Scottish, Welsh and 
Irish identities.  A closer examination of England and English identity will be considered in chapter 
three, section 3.2.2..  This section will explore how English constructions have formed an important 
part of the hegemonic representation of Britain.   
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backbone to the British imperial project (Colls, 2002).  In addition, McCrone (1992) 
adds that: 
 
by means of the tobacco trade – a supremely ‘colonial activity’ – Glasgow was 
raised from the status of provincial centre to its latter dominant position in the 
Scottish economy.  Building on its native traditions, an indigenous bourgeoisie 
began to prosper in what was a considerably open system of social mobility 
(1992: 44) 
 
As a result, towards the end of the eighteenth-century, a combination of imperial 
expansion and marriage alliances between the English and Scottish peerage, aided the 
development of a ‘British’ identification between the two nations (Colley, 2005).   
 However, some have perceived the lack of Scottish political autonomy as 
resulting in a crisis in the Scottish national consciousness (Finley, 1997; Nairn, 1977).  
Here, ‘Industrialisation and urbanisation was transforming the country, destroying old 
rural ways and values and the urban conurbations which rose up in their stead were 
indistinguishable from those in England’ (Finlay, 1997: 14).  Underlying these 
developments sits a distinction between the benefits unionism offered for the Scottish 
elite and the Scottish public (Hechter, 1975; McCrone, 1992).  Accordingly, Nairn 
(1977) has highlighted how the British Empire served only to benefit a small Scottish 
elite, whose alliance with England and Wales in 1707 served to form part of a wider 
British social stratum.  In contrast, however, Finlay (1997) notes that the ‘value-laden 
judgement’ of such assessments is often based upon the assumption ‘that Scottish 
nationalism must be intrinsically hostile to the British state’ (1997: 15).  Instead, ‘for 
most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century there was no sense of contradiction 
in being both Scottish and British’, in fact for Finley (1997), ‘they were mutually 
reinforcing’ (1997: 15). 
 Consequently, it is possible to observe how the ‘expansion of capitalism in 
Scotland seems to have owed more to external changes than to anything going on 
within its boundaries’ (McCrone, 1992: 41).  Pugh (2008) elaborates: 
 
Scotland had become a major element in the Victorian success story by taking 
advantage of the wider market for her coal, iron, ships, textiles and chemicals … 
Scotland was, in fact, so bound up with empire that great imperial crises like the 
Boer War generated powerful political support for the British cause north of the 
border (2008: 82) 
 
In fact, it was during times of crisis, such as, the Boer War, that Scottish allegiances 
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to Britain were openly displayed, particularly, amongst its Highland elite (Reid, 
2013).28  Indeed, Reid (2013) highlights that ‘The willingness of Highlanders to serve 
in the British imperial forces … was always displayed more overtly by Highland 
communities in times of imperial crisis’ (2013: 2107).  Indeed, the loyalty of 
Scotland’s Highland elites suggests how the Anglicisation of Scotland worked 
alongside wider British expressions.  Reid (2013) adds: 
 
The image depicted included the reproduction of tartan symbolism and clan 
regalia, and images of harmony between social classes in the Highlands. This 
constructed representation came to symbolise an unstated acceptance of a 
particular expression of Britishness. This Anglo-British Celtic vision of 
Scotland drew on a sentimental and romantic image of Scotland’s Gaelic past, 
but reinforced the hegemony of the British (including Scots) social elite in the 
Highlands. (Reid, 2013: 2105 [italics added]) 
 
The cultural representation of Scotland through its Highland elite was particularly 
noticeable in its style of dress through which ‘Highland dress was manipulated to 
demonstrate an unerringly ‘British’ social hierarchy’ (Dziennik, 2012: 136).  Here, 
Highland imagery helped to underlie Scottish interests in the Union: 
 
Highland dress was a visual declaration of modernity: a visual declaration of a 
gendered, refined, outward-looking and imperially connected society.  Highland 
elites, particularly those who wished to gain personally from the increasing 
fiscal-military outlay of the imperial state, recognized the value of the region’s 
inclusion in the British nation, and used the imagery of Highland dress to 
advance these processes. (Dziennik, 2012: 120) 
 
To this extent, it is possible to observe how Scottish attachments to Britain were 
both complex and contradictory.  In fact, attempts to suppress regional identities 
through educational and linguistic policies were often unsuccessful, and, instead, had 
resulted in a number of cultural revivals (MacKenzie, 1998).  Equally, the British 
Empire provided the opportunity for Scottish culture to go ‘beyond Scotland’ 
(MacKenzie, 1998).  Often this was the result of migrant Scots ‘eager to maintain 
their cultural identities in colonies of settlement, notably Canada and New Zealand’ 
(MacKenzie, 1998: 231).  As a result, through empire: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Dziennik (2012) notes that ‘The military symbolism of Highland dress allowed elites to define the 
Highlands as a military region par excellence, and thereby to benefit from the political capital this gave 
them as consummate supporters of British expansion’ (2012: 122). 
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emigre Scottish communities were quick to adopt the symbols and traditions of 
Scotland with pipe bands, Burns’ Nights, statues to Wallace and Bruce and 
Highland Games abounding in ‘little Scotlands’ all over the globe. Furthermore, 
emigre communities had extensive contacts with the homeland as such 
representations were transmitted back to Scotland which had the effect of 
further reinforcing imperial notions of Scottish identity. (Finlay, 1997: 16) 
 
Consequently, within Scotland imperial service would become the focus of a 
specifically Scottish national pride (Bayly, 1989: 136 cited in Kumar, 2003: 171). 
 Elsewhere within Ireland, the dominance of the Irish Protestant classes would 
secure Ireland’s union with Britain in 1801.  Accordingly, while unionism within 
Ireland would often be supported by the Protestant classes this did not defer them 
from referring to themselves as Protestant ‘Irish’ (Kumar, 2003).  Indeed, this sense of 
Irish identity would be supported by continued campaigns for Irish self-government 
within the United Kingdom.  Conversely, Irish Catholics tended to display a form of 
colonial nationalism that centred on defending Irish interests and fostering greater 
independence from Britain (Coakley, 2004).  This evolving character allowed Ireland 
to uphold a constitutional and institutional separateness, which common to British 
rule, paradoxically allowed it to be both distinct and analogous to British culture 
(McDonough, 2005; Moynahan, 1995).  Accordingly, Connolly (2010) notes that: 
 
The rise from the 1690s of the Irish parliament, and the emergence of a 
partnership between British chief governors and Irish undertakers, on the basis 
of a division of patronage and influence, can be seen as part of the same 
development (2010: 385) 
 
Subsequently, Irish leaders, such as William Molyneux and Henry Gratton, placed 
great importance in harbouring Irish claims for legislative freedom in Ireland, drawing 
upon the Protestant ethnic heritage of the ‘free born Englishmen’ and promoting 
Ireland’s role within the empire (Kumar, 2003; Pugh, 2008).  Here, ‘political 
calculation thus combined with … a new sense of national unity transcending long-
standing religious differences’ (Connolly, 2010: 418).  Accordingly, the formation of 
an independent Irish parliament in 1782, not only led to a repeal of the Penal Laws 
against Irish Catholics as well as allowing Catholics the right to cast vote in Ireland, 
but also more importantly, revealed that for a period of time, Irish nationalism was 
interdependent with Irish Protestant culture (Barnard, 2003; Connolly, 2010; Kidd, 
1993; Kumar, 2003). 
 Indeed, the complicated relationship between Britain and Ireland is echoed in 
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attitudes towards the viceroyalty.29   In fact, while the viceroyalty was positioned 
within Ireland ‘as a surrogate for the [British] monarch’ the position’s principal 
priority ‘was … to secure British rule in Ireland’ (Loughlin, 2013: 3).  However, 
‘nationalists came to regard it as an important signifier of Ireland’s distinctive 
national status under the Union, and were generally opposed to its abolition’ 
(Loughlin, 2013: 3).30  Accordingly, Ryder (2005) elaborates that: 
 
Leading nationalists like Daniel O’Connell usually made a clear distinction 
between Ireland’s political status and the status of Britain’s colonies in Asia, 
Africa, Australia, North America and New Zealand.  Colonial activity in itself 
was not necessarily seen in a negative light- and Irish nationalist like William 
Smith O’Brien could be a whole-hearted advocate of ‘colonization’ scheme in 
Australia at the same time as he argued for Irish self-determination (2005: 165) 
 
In many respects, Ryder’s (2005) extract can highlight the competing dynamics at 
play within ‘imperial’ and ‘national’ identifications.  What is clear, is that in a similar 
vein to England, Scotland and Wales, the Irish were often enthusiastic contributors to 
the British imperial project overseas, joining their Welsh, Scottish and English 
brethren in the enterprise of empire (Kumar, 2003; Ryder, 2005). 
 Indeed, Welsh involvement in empire would be bolstered by the work of Welsh 
Christian missionaries throughout Africa and India (Evans, 1989; Pittock 1999).  For 
many, the harbouring of a British identity was in no way detrimental to Welsh 
nationalism.  Jenkins (2008) highlights that: 
 
to be part of the imperial adventure was a matter of great pride rather than 
shame to leading Welsh liberals and to the soldiers and sailors who extended 
British colonial rule in wars against Afghans, Zulus and Indians.  By the end of 
the Victorian era, the British empire constituted one-fifth of the world’s 
landmass and no one cheered louder than the Welsh when the seemingly 
indestructible Queen Victoria – the ‘Great White Mother’ – celebrated her 
Golden Jubilee in 1887 and her Diamond Jubilee in 1897 (2008: 224)  
 
Nowhere was the interdependency between Welsh nationalism and British 
imperialism more apparent than in sport.  Here, the game of rugby provided an 
important medium through which Welsh patronage could be fought for.  Yet, it also 
provided the opportunity to reinforce the Welsh identity within the British state.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 The position’s official name was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.  The position would stand until 
December 1922 when the Irish Free State gained independence from the UK. 
30 Indeed, Loughlin (2013) notes that the position ‘would be retained in the Home Rule schemes 
devised by Gladstone’ (2013: 3). 
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Andrews (1991) reveals: 
 
The rejection of the leek and the subsequent adoption of the Prince of Wales’ 
three plumed insignia as the motif worn on international jerseys, along with his 
motto Ich Dien (I Serve), represented a move by the Welsh rugby administration 
to … underline its loyalty to and place within the British Imperial state 
formation (1991: 346)   
 
Together, these aspects fitted more broadly with the proudly dubbed belief that Wales 
represented ‘Ancient Britain’ (Jenkins, 2008).  This affirmed ‘their standing as the 
first possessors of the British Isles, as the speakers of the senior “British” tongue and 
as the guardians of the authentic “British” history’ (Jenkins, 2008: 172).  As a result, 
Welsh culture and British imperialism were interdependently woven into the fabric of 
the Welsh identity (Pritchard, 2012). 
 
2.3.1. Imperial Britain: British identity in the ‘old dominions’ 
 
For much of the nineteenth-century Australia would operate as the mode of Great 
Britain in the Pacific (Dubow, 2009).  Originally, serving as a penal colony for 
Britain, the ‘termination of transportation to the eastern Australian colonies in the 
1840s and 1850s helped to reduce some of the negative publicity previously 
associated with free migration there’ (Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003a: 4).  As a result, 
‘Australia developed, and came almost to full stature, as a European settlement on the 
other side of the world, which remained European in its customs and manners’ 
(Miller, 1965: 159).  This was most apparent in relation to British culture, where 
McGregor (2006) notes that: 
 
Britishness was the source of heritage, history, culture and symbols, that made 
Australia heir to a glorious past … Aborigines did not have a ‘history’ in the 
sense demanded by late-nineteenth and early twentieth century nationalists.  
Relics of humanity in a prehistoric phase, their past was inglorious, their present 
deplorable and their future extinction (2006: 502) 
 
As a result, British history provided a key sense of national cohesion within Australia, 
a process that underscored both Australian and British attachments (Van Duinen, 
2013).  This is echoed by Van Duinen (2013), who argues that ‘These identities 
[Australian and British] interacted at different times and in different ways in response 
to shifting national and international imperatives but, rather than being antagonistic, 
they were ambivalent or intermingling, or even mutually reinforcing’ (2013: 346).  
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Accordingly, throughout both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Australianness 
would reflect an acceptance and negotiation of Britishness, exhibiting a degree of 
mutuality between the two (McGregor, 2006). 
 In particular, for the Australian middle classes, a sense of Britishness proved to 
be an important part of their ‘national’ identity.31  As Cashman (1992) elaborates: 
 
middle-class Australians viewed themselves as dual citizens, as much British as 
Australian; they were citizens both of a particular nation and a wider empire.  In 
the minds of middle-class Australia, there was no clear distinction between an 
Englishman or a Scot and an Australian.  The essential difference was between a 
metropolitan and a colonial citizen.  The common reference to Britain as ‘home’ 
underline the strength of the British attachment.  A successful return to England 
or Scotland was a desirable form of progression for middle-class Australians.  
Most regarded ‘home’ as culturally superior (Cashman, 1992: 128) 
 
Indeed, it was a colonial middle class that provided the force of pro-imperial 
sentiment during the nineteenth-century, with a greater proportion of these individuals 
originating from England and Scotland (Cashman, 1992).  Consequently, when 
‘indigenous nationalism began to emerge from the 1860s, it was not in any sense anti-
British; rather, it was decidedly Anglicist and expressed in terms of Anglo-Australian 
ideals’ (Cashman, 1992: 128). 
 In many respects, similar national motivations can also be observed within 
Canada.  Korneski’s (2007) study of social division within the city of Winnipeg notes 
that: 
 
it was obvious and often deeply unsettling, to many middle-class observers that 
a large number of settlers were from an array of kingdoms and countries.  
Britishness defined in the [ethnic way] … was appealing because, even though 
there may have been no obvious core ‘ethnie’, nationalists could maintain that 
with a measure of diligence on their part, a still-developing, linguistically and 
ethnically uniform, fixed Canadian type would be British, meaning that it would 
conform to the politico-ethical principles that were common to the most 
‘advanced’ and globally predominant segments of humanity.  They could hold 
that the diverse collection of men and women within Canada could be ‘refined’ 
into Britishness, meaning that they could be infused with the qualities necessary 
to realize the ideally functioning liberal-capitalist society nationalists envisaged 
(2007: 169) 
 
Importantly, throughout this period a flexible conception of Canadian identity can be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Pietsch’s (2010) examination of the diaries of J.T. Wilson (a young Scottish medical student who 
between 1884 and 1887 travelled to Australia), notes that, ‘Australia seemed very much to be a part of 
Britain’ (2010: 444).  Importantly, for Wilson, this was an Australia where ‘Scots played a prominent 
role’ (Pietsch, 2010: 444).  
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observed (Hastings, 2008; Korneski, 2007).  In particular, ‘English-Canadian 
commentators often sought to explain and negotiate Canada’s status in relation to both 
the British metropole and the other colonies’ (Hastings, 2008: 8).  In doing so, 
imperial connections with Britain provided a source of pride and protection from its 
North American neighbours (Owram, 2001).  Indeed, British-Canadian relations 
would be heavily influenced via the movement of Scottish settlers after the American 
War of Independence (Devine, 2011).  Although ‘highly critical of the British 
establishment in the home context, in Canada the Scots came to occupy a central 
place in government, and emerged as a highly loyalist, pro-British element against the 
pressures exerted by both France and America’ (Pugh, 2008: 113). 
 Elsewhere within Canada, Anglophone dominance would be strengthened, most 
notably, within Quebec.  While Quebec would maintain strong cultural attachments to 
its Francophone origins, Anglophones would maintain ‘a privileged and superordinate 
position in Québec society, particularly because they controlled Québec’s economy’ 
(Pettinicchio, 2012: 2).  This dominance would continue throughout the first half of 
the twentieth-century (Pettinicchio, 2012).  Consequently, despite the ‘cultural 
division of labour’ within Quebec (Pettinicchio, 2012: 2), Canadian identity 
throughout the nineteenth-century existed through an imperial context that was 
closely connected to the British Isles (Korneski, 2007; Owram, 2001).  
 Within New Zealand, Maori culture would remain a residual part of 
contemporary New Zealand society providing an important reminder of New 
Zealand’s position within a wider imperial collective.  In fact, New Zealand’s support 
for Britain in both the First and Second World War would be based upon a sense of 
imperial identification.  Dubow (2009) notes that: 
 
For Australia, New Zealand and Canada, participation in these conflicts showed 
that it was possible to express one’s colonial nationalism through the medium of 
imperialism … New Zealanders could become ‘better Britons’, as politicians 
and opinion-formers in the early years of the twentieth century promised, 
namely, to outdo the mother country (and their Australian cousins) by 
exemplifying British virtues and eliminating its vices (2009: 14)   
 
Consequently, the distance travelled by New Zealand forces during the First and 
Second World War was not ‘an impediment to be regretted as an endeavour to be 
celebrated’ (Jeffery, 2008: 454).  Therefore, whereas in New Zealand ‘the maturing of 
a native-born generation [had] led to self-conscious attempts to express a new identity 
 93 
in Native Associations, nationalistic literary journals, and through competition in 
sport’ many did not see ‘this nationalism as in any way contradictory to a continued 
dependence on British markets and British naval force’ (Dalziel, 1999 [italics added]).  
Here, a British imperial identity could be used to fulfil ‘nationalist aspiration for unity 
while maintaining solidarity with the wider British world’ (McGregor, 2006: 501).  
Dalziel (1999) adds: 
 
A strident Imperialism and the presentation of New Zealand as a social 
laboratory for the new century were both attempts by a settler society to 
convince themselves and others that they had secured a home and an identity yet 
remained part of an important global community (1999: 595) 
 
As a result, New Zealand nationalism would often attempt to highlight its ethnic 
homogeneity with the ‘Mother Country’ in what Belich (2001) defines as a process of 
‘re-colonization’.  In contrast to ‘the steady development of national maturity and 
independence’ (Belich, 2001: 182), Belich (2001) argues that New Zealand’s ‘re-
colonization’ represented ‘a tightening of links with the metropolis’ (Belich, 2001: 
182).  Consequently, re-colonization resulted in the consolidation of colonial myth-
history.  While this served to distinguish New Zealand from Australia it also helped to 
transform its national image during the twentieth-century.  In fact, relations between 
Britain and the dominion’s would undergo a number of transformations during the 
twentieth-century.  The following section will explore this in further detail. 
 
2.4. A loosening of attachments: The Commonwealth of Nations, The European 
Union, New Labour and an independent Scotland? 
 
At the turn of the twentieth-century, Howe (2008) argues that ‘empire was at its most 
important to Britain, when popular enthusiasm for imperialism was at its height, and 
when ideas about empire most thoroughly saturated domestic British culture’ (2008: 
160).  That is, while imperial supremacy had formed an important part of British 
culture, ‘specialized colonial exhibitions designed to maintain public support for 
imperial projects’ (Smits and Jansen, 2012: 176) aimed to ensure that the British 
Empire remained an important part of British public life.  Consequently, MacKenzie 
(1998) argues that: 
 
All the characteristics of an imperial culture seem, on the contrary, to continue 
in a relatively unbroken line until after the Second World War. Despite the 
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economic disasters of the inter-war years, for example, Glasgow continued to 
stress her imperial status and emphasised the municipal socialism that was 
closely related to it. (1998: 228) 
 
 Similarly, across the Commonwealth, Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
would become an integral part of and equal partner in Commonwealth activities both 
politically and culturally (Meaney, 2003; Miller, 1965; Owram, 2001).32   By the 
1890s, indigenous nationalism within Australia was able to challenge the pro-British 
tenets of imperial identity, encouraging a distinct Australian identity via a range of 
cultural attributes arising from art, literature and, importantly, sporting prowess 
(Cashman, 1992; McGregor, 2006).33  Nevertheless, McGregor (2006) notes that: 
 
such cultural fragments did not add up to the rich and complex heritage essential 
for a people to imagine itself as a community of destiny … The myths and 
memories that resonated most deeply and meaningfully among the Australian 
people were Britannic myths and memories (2006: 502) 
 
As a result, Australian republicanism became motivated by a right to express their 
constitutional rights despite loyalty to the British Crown (Gare, 2000).  In fact, 
‘loyalist first, and republican second’ would often characterise republican attitudes 
during the nineteenth-century (McKenna, 1996: 58 cited in Gare, 2000: 1154). 
 Consequently, despite republican movements, a series of constitutions gradually 
set about installing responsible government within the white settler colonies, of which 
‘dominion’ status was eventually conferred on those colonies ‘settled by men of 
British race and tradition inheriting or acquiring representative institutions’ (Colls, 
2002: 99-100).  Here, dominion status formed an important part of the emerging 
national narratives of Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Barnes, 2013).  As a 
result, ‘progressive nationalist narratives, joining the experiences of the Great War, 
the development of “national” schools of art and literature and even the rise of Labour 
politics’ were reflective of the ‘[British] empire’s loosening grip on the dominions in 
the first part of the twentieth century’ (Belich, 2013: 4).  Here, the colonies would !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 In particular, Barnes (2013) has explored how dominion involvement in the Empire Marketing 
Board’s various campaigns coalesced with dominion attitudes towards the empire, and, more 
importantly, their position within it.  Indeed, Barnes (2013) notes that ‘it was not simply membership in 
a wider empire that acceptance of the [Balfour] declaration preserved, but their special position as 
dominions within it. Read this way, New Zealand, for example, no longer appears to be a reluctant 
dominion, clinging to ‘colonial’ status, but determinedly one’ (2013: 3). 
33 Later during the First World War the treatment of conscript colonial recruits by British generals 
would help propel the working class movement towars an insular nationalism as opposed to a collective 
imperialism (Cohen, 1994). 
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begin to impose their own values and moral authority upon the empire as accepted 
dominions (Hastings, 2008). 
 In particular, colonial relations would undergo further changes after the First 
World War.  Writing in 1922, Alfred P. Dennis notes that: 
 
The change came through war, but a war in which the dominions played their 
full part side by side with Great Britain. The young men of Canada, of 
Newfoundland, of Australia, of New Zealand, and of South Africa died for the 
unity and preservation of the empire. By their blood thus freely given they 
brought about a rapid evolution in the constitution of the British Empire and 
won for the dominions a new voice in British foreign policy and representation 
in the diplomacy of the world (1922: 590) 
 
Subsequently, after the First World War, English Canadian nationalism would begin 
to openly look for autonomy from Britain rather than dependence (Owram, 2001).34  
This was shared by Dennis (1922) who argued that ‘in addition to their rights in the 
matter of commercial treaties [the] dominions were now also to have a part in making 
political treaties for the empire as a whole’ (1922: 590).  Accordingly, Owram (2001) 
adds that ‘Dominion participation in the war effort and Dominion insistence on 
recognition in London promoted the final constitutional step’ so that ‘by 1917 the 
British government had recognized the equality of the nationhood between the 
dominion and the Mother Country’ (2001: 151).  As a result, during the 1926 Imperial 
Conference the dominions were provided equal status with Britain, with shared 
allegiances in the British crown (Hamer, 1994).  This was later formalized in 1931 by 
the Statute of Westminster, which established legislative equality for the self-
governing dominions of the British Empire and formerly demonstrated the 
independence of Australia, Canada and New Zealand to the world (Kitchen, 1996).35 
 In doing so, imperial loyalty was sustained via the benefits that the 
Commonwealth provided.  Accordingly, for New Zealand and Ireland: 
 
Possible trading opportunities – especially based round the potentialities of 
empire flax-growing to supply raw material for the linen industry – were a 
constant theme in public speeches, and the itineraries arranged for visiting !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Similarly, in Australia, the First and Second World Wars would also help to challenge Australian 
Britishness in the soon-to-be independent nation (Gare, 2000).  Australian dissatisfaction with Britain 
had been dealt a decisive blow when Britain failed to secure the safety of Australia from the threat of 
Japanese invasion (Gare, 2000).   
35 Whereas, the relationship between Britain and the dominions had been formerly organized within the 
Statute of Westminster, various forms of self-government had been actively in place within the 
colonies since the mid 1800s. 
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politicians (Jeffery, 2008: 468) 
 
Here, Commonwealth relations provided an important role in maintaining the 
expansion of ‘local nationalism into a wider sense of belonging’ (Dubow, 2009: 15).  
Notably, Miller (1965) notes that ‘To be effective, Canadian national unity needed the 
symbols of national status.  And it is here that the Commonwealth, as a form of 
political association, has been of crucial importance in Canadian development’ (1965: 
124). 
 Consequently, the loosening of imperial links between Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand were, arguably, rather gradual.  Bridge and Fedorowich (2003a) 
elaborate: 
 
In 1965, the senior Dominion [Canada] replaced its old flag, the union Jack, 
with a new one featuring a maple leaf.  It patriated its constitution in 1982.  
Imperial honours were abandoned in Australia in 1975 and in New Zealand in 
1996; Canada had done it in the 1920s.  Australia’s High Court finally 
pronounced that Britain was legally a ‘foreign’ country in 1999!  Nonetheless, 
the Crown remains a central part of the constituents of Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand (2003a: 10)     
 
Subsequently, throughout the second half of the twentieth-century, British imperial 
control would shift from colonial rule to one of informal influence (Butler, 2002).  
The development of a larger Western Bloc, comprising the former colonial nations, 
would play an important part in global power relations, as Britain maintained its 
alliance with the US (Butler, 2002). As a result, ‘co-operation, equality and autonomy 
rather than coercion’ characterised Britain’s international relations during this period 
(Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003a: 8).  Accordingly, Brand (1978) states that by the 
1960s: 
 
[Britain was] shorn of her imperial splendour.  At the same time she became 
more prosperous than for many years.  The austerities of the 1940s and 1950s 
had gone but the new wealth existed alongside a feeling almost of 
irresponsibility.  This was, after all, the swinging sixties.  Britain seemed 
released from the cares and self-consciousness of being a world power (1978: 
50) 
 
Therefore, whereas Britain’s political power across the globe would begin to weaken, 
its imperial legacies would continue to dominate British politics throughout the 
twentieth-century.  This would have important implications upon the British we-
image (Thompson, 2005), most notably, in regards to Britain’s relationship with the 
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EU.36 
 
2.4.1. ‘Little England’ or ‘Cool Britannia’: reconstructing post-imperial Britain  
 
Politically, Britain’s commitment to the EU would serve to dissolve Britain ‘from a 
global sense of Britishness which had given many of the white dominions their 
identity’ (Meaney, 2003: 124).  Indeed, this unique sense of British identity, was far 
different to that on the continent, as the former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
made clear: ‘I always said and believed that the British character is quite different 
from the character of the people on the continent – quite different’ (Margaret 
Thatcher, Newsweek, 1992 cited in Parekh, 1999: 323).  In fact, similar traces of 
Euroscepticism echoed across Britain.  Such skepticism acted ‘as the guardian of 
powerful national myths and drew on assumptions about British political identity that 
appeared to further the process of post-imperial decline’ (Gifford, 2008: 10).  For 
many, Britain’s declining empire proved to be a fundamental part of its inability to 
commit to the EU.  In an interview with the former German Chancellor, Helmut 
Schmidt, Schmidt stated that ‘Winston Churchill was a great European but he was 
quite clear that Britain was not joining because it had the empire. But it’s gone, even 
though you think it still exists’ (Elliot, 2013).37 
 Despite such sentiments, since the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, 
Britain has been committed, in principle, to Europe (Kumar, 2003).  Indeed, for many, 
Britain’s move towards Europe suggested a ‘significant loss of the parliamentary 
sovereignty that ha[d] been the central pillar of the British constitution’ (Kumar, 
2003: 241).  Particularly within England, this has been echoed in concerns regarding 
its own ‘crisis in identity’ (Doty, 1996; Kumar, 2003; Maguire, 1993b).  Accordingly, 
suggestions of ‘Little England’ and an increase in English nationalism followed 
Britain’s imperial downsizing, leading to exclusionary practices regarding 
immigration and ethnicity (Doty, 1996). 
 Further confusion regarding ‘Britishness’ has also filtered throughout British 
political discourse since the 1970s.  For Thatcher and John Major, Britishness was 
seen to reflect a heavy dose of nostalgic sentiment, with the Falklands War providing 
a return to imperial Britain and the battle for an invaded British land (Mandler, 2006; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 See Thompson (2005) for his analysis of the Suez Crisis, the Falklands War and the passing of Hong 
Kong to China in 1997 as key events in the decline of the British Empire. 
37 See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/22/helmut-schmidt-europe-crisis-interview, 
retrieved: 5 January 2014. 
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Osmond, 1988).  This sense of nostalgia would be all the more profound in Major’s 
famous declaration of Britain as the country of ‘long shadows on county (cricket) 
ground, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and pool fillers’ (The 
Independent, 1993).38   Major’s ‘British’ was undoubtedly very ‘English’, and, as 
such, was largely ignorant of Britain’s Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh population.  
In fact, such imagery often failed to inspire those in the North of England whose 
industrial centers were a far cry from imagery more commonly associated with the 
southern countryside. 
 Consequently, under New Labour the defining of British identity was equally 
important and a new cultural tone was promoted (Mandler, 2006).  Mandler (2006) 
highlights that ‘just as one American news magazine, Time, had dubbed London ‘the 
Swinging City’ in April 1966, now another, Newsweek, publicized ‘Cool Britannia’, 
from where it was greatly received by New Labour’ (2006: 236).  In particular, it 
would seem that the Labour government hoped to unify Britain by implementing 
greater autonomy, in the form of devolution, to both Scotland and Wales.  Indeed, 
Britain’s devolutionary measures have led to numerous debates regarding the effects 
of such measures on British identity and a possible increase in contrasting ‘Scottish’ 
and ‘Welsh’ identifications (Holden, 2011; Leith, 2010; Perryman, 2009).  Indeed, the 
manner in which Britishness and Scottishness is framed provides a crucial 
understanding of the impacts of devolution in Scotland and its future within the UK 
(Leith, 2010).  
 Surprisingly, however, similarities can be found between New Labour’s 
‘Britain’ and the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) attempt to frame its own 
independent Scottish identity.  Whereas, Labour’s framing of Britain would lack a 
sense of the imperial history that had once formed an important part of the British 
consciousness, the SNP has frequently overlooked Scotland’s history within the 
British Empire (Mycock, 2012: 63).  For example: 
 
Enduring anti-imperialist themes evident within SNP narratives of Scottish 
nationalism and independence reflect a propensity for Scotland to focus too 
much on its own ‘colonization’ by England whilst overlooking that modern 
Scotland is a ‘product of empire’ whose economic success had a dark side 
linked to exploitation and slavery (Mycock, 2012: 63)    
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 See http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/leading-article-what-a-lot-of-tosh-1457335.html, retrieved: 
10 October 2014. 
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Ironically, post-1945 metropolitan societies and cultures have found themselves 
‘more deeply marked by the long-term effects of Imperial connections than in earlier 
generations when Empire seemed real but remote’ (MacKenzie, 1999b: 231).  
Consequently, while significant post-imperial developments have taken place both 
within Britain and across the globe, ‘reconstructions of empire’ can also be found 
(Shaw, 2002: 331 [italics in original]).39  The effects of which will be considered in 
the final part of this chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that while one cannot ignore the gradual 
decline of the British Empire over the course of the twentieth-century, the evidence of 
previous centuries should not be forgotten.  That is, it should not be forgotten that British 
identity was fashioned through a tapestry of domestic and international relations that were 
interdependently linked across both a ‘domestic’ and ‘imperial/Commonwealth’ 
figuration.  Rüger (2004) provides a similar argument when he states that: 
 
 [The] complex landscape of identities [within Britain] does not necessarily have to 
be interpreted in terms of conflict or friction.  There were multiple and contingent 
sense of national belonging, and there is evidence that for many living in the British 
isles it was normal to ascribe changing national attributes to themselves, depending 
on context and situation (2004: 163) 
 
Consequently, in accordance with chapter one, Ruger’s (2004) remarks encourage us 
to understand national identities, not as static, isolated phenomena, but as processes 
that are written and re-written, imagined and re-imagined, invented and re-invented 
over time and across space (Anderson, 2006; Hobsbawm, 1983; Thompson, 2000).40  
Arguably, it encourages us to evaluate the development of these identities in relation 
to state formation processes both at the national and international (imperial) level 
(Delmotte, 2012). 
 Therefore, based on the above sections, the multi-national character of the 
British Empire can be used to shed new light on British identity in relation to its 
imperial context.  Indeed, both European and British politics, national culture and 
economic order were ‘thoroughly embedded in the practices and assumptions of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Former concerns regarding the role of empire and imperialism, may now be shaped by new debates 
regarding the role of transnational corporations, continental unions and supranational organisations 
(Rhoden, 2012; Ward, 2001b). 
40 See chapter one, section 1.4. 
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imperialism’ (Smith, 2001: 123).  Furthermore, while analyses of Britain have served 
to focus on Britain’s decline as an imperial power (Nairn, 1977), Ward (2001b) 
highlights that ‘work on empire and metropolitan culture has collectively shown, an 
imperial outlook’ and has subsequently ‘been an integral feature of British public life 
for several generations’ (2001b: 4 [italics added]).  Set against the literature in this 
chapter and Elias’ (1991) comments regarding the long-term transformations of the 
social habitus, debates concerning the end of empire (Colls, 2012; Strachey, 1959; 
Nairn, 1977) suggest not a sudden dislocation of imperial attitudes and sentiments but 
instead a balancing of nationalist agendas through an imperial prism (Ward, 2001a). 
 With this in mind, this chapter has sought to draw upon the sociology of Elias 
and the process sociology perspective in order to examine how the nation-centered 
analysis can be expanded upon in order to include a ‘panoramic and pan-imperial 
view’ (Gerasimov et al., 2005: 51).  Therefore, in sum, it has been the purpose of this 
chapter to highlight important social changes that have occurred across both the UK 
and British Empire.  
 Subsequently, it is the contention of this chapter that studies of Britain and 
British identity need to be related to the long-term processes underpinning Britain’s 
state and imperial development (Delmotte, 2012; Hobson, 2012; Linklater, 2011a; 
2011b).  The importance of observing broader historical changes in the structure of 
societies and the individuals who form them is central to Elias’s desire to relate long-
term changes in interdependence and power balances with broader processes of social 
development (Elias, 1991; 2008c; 2008d; Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998).  The long-
term developments discussed in the above sections have endeavoured to portray, how 
changing power relations and social development processes, both within and between 
states, can have a powerful effect on the national we-image (Delmotte, 2012; Elias, 
1991; Mennell, 1994).  Importantly, this encourages an examination of how the 
national habitus is developed over time and between increasingly interdependent 
social groupings (Elias, 1982). 
 To this extent, while political integration may, today, only be maintained via the 
Commonwealth, the emotional identification between the former dominions and the 
current British monarchy remain persistently strong.  Similarly, through sporting ties 
such as the Commonwealth Games, British and Irish Lions tours’ and the Ashes, 
extremely emotional, and often, extremely competitive, relations are preserved 
between Britain and the former dominions.  Mennell (1994) elaborates upon these 
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attachments with regards to Australia, writing that: 
 
as a small nation (in terms of population) closely entangled in a world economy 
and global society, [Australia] is still looking for a wider we-identity.  
Politically (or economically) motivated exhortations to Australians to identify 
with Asia seem as yet unconvincing, given that the cultural and institutional 
roots of Australia are still preponderantly European (1994: 190)  
 
For the former dominions, those tensions inflicted by national and global levels of 
affiliation (such as empire) have often required and still do require negotiation 
(Rüger, 2004).  For Britain, the evidence of a wider we-identity, with that of Europe, 
remains questionable, particularly in light of the national press coverage of sporting 
events (Maguire et al., 1999; Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Vincent et al., 2010). 
 With this in mind, how does one begin to examine these processes with regards 
to the present?  In this instance, one of the major changes in the development of the 
British state has been its degradation from an imperial global power.  Accordingly, 
Elias (1991) notes that: 
 
In studying social development processes we repeatedly come across a 
constellation in which the dynamic of unplanned social processes is tending to 
advance beyond a given stage towards another, which may be higher or lower, 
while the people affected by this change cling to the earlier stage in their 
personality structure, their social habitus.  It depends entirely on the relative 
strength of the social shift and the deep-rootedness and therefore the resistance 
of the social habitus whether – and how quickly – the dynamic of the unplanned 
social process brings about a more or less radical restructuring of this habitus, or 
whether the social habitus of individuals successfully opposes the social 
dynamic, either by slowing it down or blocking it entirely (1991: 211) 
 
Subsequently, much like its former dominions, Britain’s transformation from empire 
to nation can illuminate upon the ‘deep-rooted’ nature of habitus and how this habitus 
is restructured in relation to changing social dynamics (Elias, 1991; Goulbourne, 
1991; Van Krieken, 2005).  Issues of power and distinction play and important part in 
this process and will be duly considered within the following chapter, whereby 
Britain’s internal (domestic) and external (imperial) dynamics will be examined in 
relation to the discursive construction of power. 
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Chapter Three: Power, Discourse and Established-Outsider Relations 
 
Introduction 
 
As highlighted in chapter two, the impact of British imperialism can be seen in the 
effects of the American revolution, the emergence of the royal family as a symbol of 
the British state and through the expansion of British industry (Colley, 2005). For 
British home nations, such as, Scotland, ‘British national and imperial identity 
chimed quite nicely with a powerful strand of Scottish national identity, reinforced by 
Protestantism, Unionism and militarism’ (McCrone, 1992: 209 [italics added]).  
Subsequently, while the British Empire expanded, so did Britain’s perception of itself 
as an imperial nation.   
 Here, the relationship between home nation and dominion nationalism reveals a 
particular complex within the construction and representation of Britain and British 
identity.  Indeed, Osmond (1988) notes: 
 
When the particular nature of the survival of England’s Parliamentary tradition 
is joined with the consciousness of an Anglo-British military and imperial 
extension into the world, and the whole is held in a monarchical embrace, there 
is a formula for a unique and powerful identity (1988: 24) 
 
However, while Osmond’s (1988) discussion of a ‘unique and powerful [British] 
identity’ may suggest a sense of British uniformity, and, indeed, an underlying 
English-centricism, Thompson (2005) provides a more critical reflection on regional 
disparities embroiled within Britain and the empire.  He adds that: 
 
While a range of domestic forces – railways, education, migration and sport – 
were working to ‘blend’ different cultures within the United Kingdom, regional 
distinctiveness was as likely to be underlined as undermined by the empire 
(Thompson, 2005: 198) 
 
Accordingly, alongside Britain’s vast and varied imperial control (Perkin, 1989), the 
‘blending’ of various cultures within Britain and the empire exposes the important 
dynamics surrounding Britain’s ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ identifications.  Specifically, 
the inherent contradictions embroiled in the moral and libertarian values that followed 
the French and American Revolutions resulted in Britain occupying a curious position 
with regards to both its claims of civic duty and its imperial aspirations.  Easthope 
(1999) notes that ‘imperial cultures must claim they are doing what they have to do in 
the name of some universal idea rather than a narrow, national interest’ (1999: 27).  In 
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sum, Easthope (1999) asserts that for imperial power to be achieved, national 
distinctiveness must be subjected.  As a result, this has largely been evident in the 
lack of any specific English identity and the encompassing of a much broader sense of 
Britishness that included both the domestic nations and imperial colonies.   
 Nevertheless, while Easthope (1999) seeks to highlight the problems posed by 
national interests in the wake of larger imperial projects, conversely, empire could 
also serve to underline ‘national sentiment’ (Schumpeter, 1976: 73).  That is, ‘the 
acquisition of colonies’ could become ‘a matter of national prestige’ (Whittam Smith, 
2013). 1   In such instances, empire could help encourage a sense of national 
superiority.  Accordingly, Linklater and Mennell (2010) note that: 
 
during the eighteenth century the Europeans came to think that civilization was 
not a process but a condition that was part of their natural endowment – and 
from that point on, they assumed the right to civilize others, to mold them in the 
image of the European or Western powers. (2010: 409) 
 
This is echoed by Schumpeter (1976), who argues that colonial accession provided a 
form of exploitation that served to exclude foreign nations.2  As a result, throughout 
human history, established groups – on a global scale – have often been imperial 
powers, a logistical capability that modern states could perform and maintain 
(Linklater and Mennell, 2010).   
 Indeed, one can draw connections between Schumpeter’s (1976) highlighting of 
an ‘instinctive urge to domination’ (1976: 73) and notions of imperial prestige that 
inevitably followed the conquering, occupying and annexation of large parts of the 
globe (Elias, 1996; Wood, 2014).  Consequently, Wilson (2004) argues that: 
 
Georgian Britons fretted over or boasted about the distinctiveness, superiority, 
and modernity of Britishness, and British imperial endeavours played a large 
role in sustaining or challenging that perception and self-image (2004: 8) 
 
Consequently, Wood (2014) has explored how national prestige, and, most notably, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/once-the-west-set-out-to-conquer-the-world-
those-days-have-gone-for-ever-8807245.html, retrieved: 11 September 2013. 
2 Schumpeter (1976) provides one example of the ‘national’ desire to dominate other territories.  He 
notes that ‘In 1815 the Ionian Islands became an English protectorate, not to be surrended until 1863.  
Long before then, however, one foreign secretary after another had realized that this possession was 
meaningless and untenable - not in the absolute sense, but simply because no reasonable person in 
England would have approved of the smallest sacrifice on its behalf.  Nevertheless, none dared 
surrender it, for it was clear that this would have appeared as a loss and a defeat, chalked up against the 
cabinet in question.  The only thing to do was to insist that Corfu was a military base of the highest 
importance which must be retained’ (1976: 74). 
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notions of imperial prestige, form an important part of the nation’s image (see also 
Zarakol, 2010).  Here, national myths and symbolism are closely tied to accounts of 
the nation’s political, military and technological endeavours.  What is apparent, 
however, is the extent to which notions of national prestige, pride and significance are 
interdependently shaped and affected in ‘relation’ to other nation states.  For example, 
China’s investment in Britain’s high-speed rail project, encouraged the following 
response from Ringen (2014): 
 
To beg the Chinese state for these investments is to represent Britain as a poor 
developing country that cannot afford to make its own necessary investments. 
For a British prime minister, a leader of the democratic world, to crawl on his 
knees in front of the masters in Beijing, is to do damage to the standing of 
democracy in the world. (2014)3 
 
As can be seen in Ringen’s (2014) account of a ‘begging’ Britain, notions of British 
prestige had clearly been undermined by the involvement of Chinese investors in a 
‘British’ rail project. 
 With this in mind, this chapter will seek to develop upon the multi-national 
analysis adopted in chapter two by exploring how the subjection of national 
distinctiveness, notions of imperial prestige and the blending and mixing of national 
cultures, has formed an important part of the construction, representation and framing 
of Britain.  Specifically, this task will draw upon an interdependent analysis of power, 
one that hopes to steer attention away from traditional economic and political notions 
(Calhoun et al., 1993; Foucault, 1978; 1980; 2000a; 2000b).  Here, the discursive 
construction of power balances within media discourses will be used to examine how 
established and outsider relations form an important part of the construction of Britain 
and British identity (Bignell, 2002; Fairclough, 1995; De Cillia et al., 1999).  In 
particular, the ‘tension filled mutual engagement between established and outsider 
groups’ (Smith, 2001: 128) will be used to explore the ‘integration struggles’ that 
underlie constructions of Britain and the tensions that these struggles reveal (Mennell, 
2007).  Indeed, the study of intra-group tensions, their history and the effect that these 
tensions have had on national personality formed an important part of Elias’s (1996) 
examination of German society (Heinich, 2013).  Therefore, it will help to provide a 
theoretical framework that, based upon the history of Britain and the British Empire, 
can be used to examine the domestic and Commonwealth press. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See https://www.opendemocracy.net/stein-ringen/britain-–-state-of-nation, retrieved: 21 July 2014. 
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3.0. British ‘integration struggles’: the ‘nationalism/imperial loyalty’ 
 
Analyses of Britain and the British Empire reveal a complex social network of 
national interdependencies.  That is, through internal and external relations, 
competing as well as complementing ethnic and cultural groups have formed 
collective identities that have been constructed and (re)constructed across pluralistic 
lines.  While commenting upon the plurality of ‘identities’ that are found across 
Britain, Dawson (1997) writes that ‘Britain today is a very complex society made up 
of people from numerous backgrounds’ (1997: 327 [italics added]).  Certainly, while 
such statements shed light upon the possible number of national identities – both 
domestic and foreign – within Britain, the belief that this ‘complex society’ is a 
depiction of Britain today stands in contrast to the literature considered in the 
previous chapter. 
 Indeed, from 1707 onwards, the British Empire was not a singular place but a 
set of interdependent geographical and cultural spaces.  Central to this was a set of 
common characteristics that encompassed a wider ethno-cultural family of collective 
identities and aspirations (Elias, 1991; Smith, 2010).  Kumar (2003) notes: 
 
While Britishness might be seen to have a civic rather than an ethnic character – 
a point emphasized particularly by Scottish and Welsh nationalists – it has over 
the centuries developed a set of institutions, symbols and traditions that can lead 
to a form of emotional identification remarkably similar to that evoked by ethnic 
nationhood (2003: 238-239)   
 
These ethnic origins can be found throughout recorded history across various nation-
states, held together by a plethora of networks (Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003b).  
Consequently, through mass migration, a British imperial identity emerged alongside 
varying forms of colonial nationalism.  In most instances, national identity throughout 
the empire was not restrained by a wider British identification but instead harboured 
within the imperial context that aided its development (McGregor, 2006).   
 Subsequently, MacKenzie (1998) has proposed that instead ‘of creating an 
overall national identity’, the British Empire may have ‘enabled the sub-nationalisms 
of the United Kingdom to survive and flourish’ (1998: 230).  The same can also be 
said with regards to the former dominions, where for Australia: 
 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Australian nationalism were 
compounded by ethno-cultural elements deriving from a Britannic heritage and 
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civic/territorial components centring on the distinctive entitlements and 
obligations of the Australian citizen and commitment to an Australian homeland 
(McGregor, 2006: 499) 
 
For many colonial nations this ‘national’ commitment was dependent upon ‘British’ 
cultural codes, through which British sporting practices provided an important role 
(Mangan, 1992a).  Here, imperial sport was embroiled with ethnic-colonial 
characteristics that bound ‘cousins of the tongue far more closely than any amount of 
diplomacy and trade convention’ (Cambridge University Magazine, 20/06/1886, pg. 
21 cited in Mangan, 1992b: 5). 
 Nevertheless, sporting diffusion could also serve to highlight some of the 
contradictions underlying British imperialism.  Here, the game of cricket ‘provides an 
excellent example of the way in which cricket was taken to a new cultural 
environment by British colonizers, was embraced by a colonized people, and was 
subsequently a vehicle for the assertion of a separate and distinct “national” identity’ 
(Malcolm, 2012: 77).  Indeed, such examples serve to highlight how ‘the 
“nationalism/imperial loyalty” dynamic was much more complicated than such an 
either/or choice, particularly for the dominions’ (Van Duinen, 2013: 351). 
 To this extent, attachments to Britain elicited a number of tensions, most 
notably, in the Union of 1707 and in the colonization of the Australian, Canadian and 
New Zealand colonies.  Indeed, while antagonisms with the French in Quebec would 
continue to provide a source of confrontation with Canada’s encroaching 
Anglicisation, Maori and Aboriginal populations would also suffer at the hands of 
British imperialism.  This would be further compounded by the development of 
distinctive national identities within each of the colonies.4  Subsequently, both within 
Britain and across the dominions, ‘The “national” found itself propelled towards the 
“imperial”’ (Nairn, 2014).5  It is here that tensions between a separate and distinct 
national identity, and, participation in, and identification with, a larger ‘imperial’ 
Britain can be found. 
 Accordingly, while imperial expansion could arouse ‘an intense emotional and 
intellectual response’ others such as ‘leading liberal, socialist, and communist !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 In fact, Hopkins (2008) has highlighted how campaigns for the rights of indigenous populations 
increased after the Second World War, providing an important and counteracting part in the nationalist 
movements of the dominions and their decolonization. 
5 See https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/tom-nairn/old-nation-new-age, retrieved: 23 April 
2014. 
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thinkers, attacked it bitterly’ (Wright, 1976: ix).  Indeed, within Britain, the 
‘colonisation’ of Scottish minds (Williamson, 2009) was revolted against through the 
poetry of Robert Fergusson and Robert Burns, who, Williamson (2009) notes, ‘kept a 
unique sense of Scottish identity alive and visible whilst the upper classes were 
celebrating their new-found Britishness in pretentious displays of Anglicised diction’ 
(2009: 59).  Certainly, this tension in maintaining a ‘Scottish identity’ while 
‘celebrating … Britishness’ is not left to the past but forms part of a recurring theme 
in British history and contemporary British relations.  Here, competing visions of 
Britain and the identities of its home nations have formed part of the long-term 
development of the UK (Colley, 2014a; 2014b).  Indeed, Colley (2014b) notes that: 
 
It is a reminder, to begin with, that fiercely competing visions of the 
organisation and identities of the UK have a long history. Accounts of the 
forthcoming independence referendum in Scotland sometimes give the 
impression that it’s merely a recent and specific piece of purely local difficulty. 
In reality, there have always been cracks in the fabric, and not just north of the 
border. Many of the Victorian and Edwardian activists who campaigned for 
Irish home rule, for instance, also wanted what they called ‘home rule all 
round’: separate parliaments not simply for Ireland, but also for the Scots and 
the Welsh – and for the English. (2014b)6 
 
Accordingly, under Gladstone, national reform was directed towards advocating for 
‘disestablishment and equality with other national groups’ in Wales (Loughlin, 2013: 
10) and ‘legislative autonomy’ in Ireland (2013: 10). 
 Subsequently, while drawing upon the work of Doyle (1986), Bowden (2011) 
notes that imperialism is often unequal, a power relationship ‘that constitutes a vast 
web of connections in an increasingly globalized world’ (2011: 192).  Therefore, 
representations of Britain, British identity and British culture can be viewed ‘as a set 
of meaning-producing practices developed in contexts of power [that were] 
fundamental to the shaping of identities in both metropole and colony’ (Pietsch, 2010: 
426).  More importantly, these ‘meaning-producing practices’ are related to changing 
interdependencies and are underscored by power balances (Dunning and Hughes, 
2012; Elias, 1978).  While forms of British identification could reveal ‘collaboration 
and consensus’ they could also generate tensions via ‘conflict and coercion’ as well as 
through ‘derogatory stereotypes of other, alien, subordinated societies’ (Cannadine, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/05/solutions-governing-disunited-
kingdom-break-up-uk-ireland, retrieved: 5 January 2014. 
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2001: xvi). 
 To this extent, definitions of Britain have been largely contested, both within 
Britain and the former dominions (Jackson, 2014).7   In fact, the close historical 
connections between the British home nations and the former dominions has resulted 
in a number of untanglings in the legal and symbolic attachments that once binded 
Britain to its former dominions and which have undoubtedly shaded their post-
imperial developments (Fox, 2014).  Yet, in order to explore as well as ‘use’ these 
contestations as part of the study of Britain, such struggles, complexes and tensions 
can be viewed as reflexive of broader power relations and discursive constructions 
(Maguire, 2005).  Whereas the British Empire may have helped to ensure a ‘plurality 
of British identities’, an examination of the discourses used to construct Britain can 
serve to reveal how this ‘plurality’ is based upon broader balances of power.  Here, 
the process of identifying a British identification should fundamentally be considered 
not in isolation but as part of a wider process of interdependent developments 
emerging out of power relations between the British home nations, and, eventually, a 
global empire.  That is, the capacity for mutual identification on a British domestic 
and later imperial scale was itself embedded within power relations characteristic of 
established and outsider groups (Elias and Scotson, 1994).  
 Consequently, before attention is given to examining the applicability of an 
established-outsider framework to the discursive construction of British identity, the 
following section will seek to draw upon traditional theoretical conceptions of power 
(Bauman, 2000; Foucault, 1972; 1978; 1980; 2000a; 2000b; Van Benthem van den 
Bergh, 1992; Williams, 1977) in order to consider how the use of power in discourse 
can help to elucidate upon interdependent relations and national identifications.  
 
3.1. Notions of power 
 
The relationship between culture, nationalism and power is referred to by Mihelj 
(2011), who highlights that: 
 
The link between culture and power lies at the core of any form of nationalism 
in the modern world. … nationalist movements around the world transformed 
culture into a fundamental basis of social organisation and power relationships. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Jackson (2014) notes that ‘For proponents and opponents of religious instruction in Ontario the 
British identity served as a battleground over which rival interpretations of the nation competed’ (2014: 
12). 
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(2011: 9) 
 
Indeed, the transformation of culture in the pursuit of nationalist agendas has been 
explored in, and, applied through, the work of Foucault, particularly to the extent in 
which techniques of power have been imposed upon colonised territories.  Here, 
colonial forms of power could also rebound upon the domestic societies of the West.  
Foucault (2003) argued that: 
 
while colonization, with its techniques and its political and juridical weapons, 
obviously transported European models to other continents, it also had a 
considerable boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on 
the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power. A whole series of 
colonial models was brought back to the West, and the result was that the West 
could practice something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on 
itself. (2003: 103 cited in Pugliese, 2010: 52) 
 
Certainly, this approach serves to divert attention away from literary scholars whose 
analysis of ‘system[s] of power and domination’ (Cannadine, 2001: xvi) – although 
important – can focus too much on how particular colonial groups were subject to a 
‘hegemonic imperial project’ (Cannadine, 2001: xvi).  Instead, power relations can 
have important effects on the personality of both colonising and colonised groups, 
revealing a two-way power relationship between the metropole and periphery. 
 In convergence, therefore, both Elias (1978; 1991) and Foucault (1978; 1980; 
2000a; 2000b) sought to explore how individual behaviours became increasingly self-
regulating, and, more importantly, were formed through social relations (Burkitt, 
1993).  For Foucault (1978; 1980; 2000a; 2000b) social relations and political power 
served to define the ‘subject’, upon which, ‘domains of knowledge’ and ‘relations 
with truth are formed’ (Foucault, 2000b: 15).  To this extent, Foucault’s (1978; 2000a; 
2000b) analysis reveals how forms of ‘truth’ and ‘technologies of the self’ are 
legitimised in particular historical conditions.   
 However, while Foucault’s analysis can help to uncover how particular groups 
serve to dominate and apply their power, less is said on the hegemonic contestation of 
power (Hall, 1988), and, more importantly, its effect upon processes of identification 
between multiple groups with various power differentials.  Instead, the consideration 
that national identity is embroiled in an ever-changing network of social relations can 
be seen as dependent upon the appreciation that social processes are themselves 
involved in a relationship of changing power balances (Newton, 1999).  Importantly, 
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‘power is not an amulet possessed by one person … [but] is a structural characteristic 
of … all human relationships’ (Elias, 1978: 74 [italics in original]).  This makes it 
difficult for any one group, or indeed, any one nation, to determine history, as social 
and international actions are moderated by their dependence upon others (Newton, 
1999).   
 This ‘power balance’ contrasts with that of Bauman (2000) who states: 
 
For power to be free to flow, the world must be free of fences, barriers, fortified 
borders and checkpoints.  Any dense and tight network of social bonds, and 
particularly a territorially rooted tight network, is an obstacle to be cleared out 
of the way.  Global powers are bent on dismantling such networks for the sake 
of their continuous and growing fluidity, that principal source of their strength 
and the warrant of their invincibility (2000: 14 [italics added]) 
 
Whereas, Bauman’s (2000) comments show an appreciation of the ‘human bonds and 
networks’ that structure power relations, his focus on the fragility of these networks in 
the face of ‘global powers’, fails to appreciate how such powers are often obtained, 
and, as a consequence, are maintained by, such networks.  As a consequence, power is 
perceived as external and removed from such networks, rather than the product of 
social interdependence (Moore, 2010). 
 This is echoed by Said (1995) and his work on Western interpretations of the 
‘Orient’.  Whereas, Said (1995) considers the role of power in the forging of 
boundaries between groups, he tends to homogenize hegemonic relations, rather than 
exploring the relational dynamics that power exerts on both parties.  In doing so, he 
essentialises the complex nature of identities, disregarding the possibility that 
dominant and dominated groups are mutually subject to corresponding assumptions 
(McKerrell, 2012; Van Dijk, 1988; 1997; 2011).  Here, a binary opposition is 
proposed between East and West, which fails to consider how orientalist discourses 
can be negotiated and rejected.  As a consequence, Mackenzie (1994) highlights that 
‘the record of constant change, the instability, heterogeneity, and sheer porousness of 
imperial culture’ stands in contrast to the ‘essentalialized … unchanging self’ 
(MacKenzie, 1994: 12), which Said promotes. 
 In contrast, therefore, Van Benthem van den Bergh (1992) seeks to explore 
international relations amongst the global powers over the past three centuries.  
Notably, he highlights that when examined from a long-term perspective, neither the 
dominant power of the time nor its rivals had complete ‘hegemonic’ control but 
 111 
instead were locked together in a series of trans-national power relations.  
Importantly, this analysis can highlight important aspects regarding the multi-polar 
nature of imperial rule and its capacity to maintain conflicting and sometimes 
contradictory trends and characteristics. 
 Similarly, Williams’s (1977) examination of social experience provides a 
further alternative to Bauman’s (2000) and Said’s (1995) analyses.  He notes that ‘no 
mode of production and therefore no dominant social order and therefore no dominant 
culture ever in reality includes or exhausts all human practice, human agency, and 
human intention’ (Williams, 1977: 125 [italics removed]).  Consequently, in all 
nations, national identities can reveal dominant, emergent and residual forms 
(Maguire, 2005; Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Williams, 1977).8 
 Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that while imperialism could 
provide particular discursive and epistemic conditions, through which colonised 
groups were subject to differential power relations, there are many examples – some 
of which have been highlighted in previous sections – of colonised groups resisting 
and reinterpreting the culture, values and identities of imperial groups).9  As a result, 
concepts like ‘orientalism’ were for Elias: 
 
a very typical facet of the relations between more powerful established groups 
and less powerful outsider groups; that such concepts came under challenge in 
the present century is also to be seen as a typical manifestation of relatively 
more equal power ratios between such groups (Mennell, 1996b: 126 [italics 
added]) 
 
Indeed, the variety of cultural relations that exists between and amongst various 
groups as well as the social and historical dynamics surrounding them, requires a 
more dynamic appreciation of identity and the boundaries it creates.  That is, through 
processes of functional democratization changes in the power relations between 
groups could subsequently have, over long periods of time, a corresponding change in 
the personality and behavior of the groups involved (Mennell, 2007).  Here, the ability 
to see power in the form of a balance or a ratio can be achieved when one considers 
that no single individual or group are independent but rely on the actions and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Eldridge and Eldridge (1994) provide a summary of these categories: ‘The residual, the continuation 
of earlier values, beliefs and practices, could sometimes be seen as an alternative to the dominant 
forms, for example rural life in opposition to urban industrial capitalism.  The emergent – the 
development of new meanings, values and practices, as in working-class movements of the nineteenth 
century – could also provide oppositional elements to the dominant culture’ (1994: 96 [italics added]). 
9 See chapter two, sections 2.2., 2.3., 2.3.1. and 2.4. 
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constraints imposed upon them, both by more established or less-established 
individuals/groups (Burkitt, 1993).  That is, within a figuration, ‘everyone has a 
degree of power to determine one’s own actions as well as the actions of others’ 
(Burkitt, 1993: 52 [italics in original]).  
 In sum, therefore, while Foucault (1980; 2000a; 2000b), Bauman (2000) and 
Said (1994; 1995) perceive power in an oppositional sense, both negate how such 
actions form part of power balances.  Indeed, while much can be borrowed from 
Foucault’s analysis of discourse, and, indeed, this will be considered in section 3.2.3., 
for now, Elias’s (1978) balanced conception of power will be discussed in order to 
examine how the relationships between multiple groups can serve to shape and define 
national identity construction. 
 
3.2. The established-outsider model: analysing power relations 
 
Analyses of power has often been considered in relation to the accumulation of 
various resources by particular groups.  The work of Bourdieu (1984) has served to 
extend Marx’s own analyses of power by examining how the accumulation of various 
forms of ‘capital’ are obtained by particular groups (see also Calhoun et al., 1993).  
For Elias, however, power is fundamentally a relational concept that rather than 
depicting hierarchical stratifications, is instead, perceived through forms of 
interdependence (Arnason, 1989; Burkitt, 1993; Heinich, 2013).10  To this extent, 
Elias’s (1978) analysis of power reveals how certain resources and functions, within a 
given figuration, are ‘determined by their function in the entire figurational network 
of social interdependence and thus can be understood only by placing them in the 
context of the changing pattern of power balances between different social groups’ 
(Burkitt, 1993: 51).   
 As a result, contra Foucault, power is not apriori or reified as a separate entity 
that establishes its own intentions and plans (Dunning and Hughes, 2012; Wetherell 
and Potter, 1992) but is instead part of sociogenetic and psychogenetic processes (Van 
Stolk and Wouters, 1987).  It is here that: 
 
one should always look for the sociogenesis and psychogenesis of the values 
and traditions in changing social structures (particularly balances of power and 
control), and then at the ways in which values and traditions have become !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Notably, power did not only reside in human relationships but could also be found in the relationship 
between humans and nature (Arnason, 1989).   
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embodied in social structures and practices (Mennell, 2007: 313) 
 
Indeed, Burkitt (1993) points out that ‘the psychogenesis of individuals – their 
capacity for autonomy in constituting action and also the social contour that are built 
into the psyche – is always linked to the sociogenesis of social power in the 
figuration’ (1993: 54).  In such instances, the drives and personality of the individual 
are altered in accordance with the power relations of the figuration (Burkitt, 1993).11  
Thus: 
 
In Elias’s theory, none of the emotions remain in a pure form but are malleable 
and open to change within social experience; they exist together as part of the 
life of a social being an they change together, blending and remixing as the 
personality itself is restructured in social change. … the aim and intensity of all 
drives are open to transmutation and remodelling. (Burkitt, 1993: 69) 
 
More importantly, Burkitt (1993) notes that ‘a restructuring of social relations, 
involving a redistribution of power and freedom, would also alter the whole structure 
of constraints and the form of conflict within society’ (1993: 68).12 
 Therefore, in order to explore how a ‘restructuring of social relations’ can 
impact upon identity processes, an examination of the power differentials embedded 
in established-outsider relations can be made.  Specifically, this can be used to 
explore how power inequalities can become ‘common sense’ (Hanson-Easey et al., 
2014), forming an important part of ‘we-images’ and group charisma (Van Stolk and 
Wouters, 1987).  Indeed, the effects that power can have upon particular groups is 
highlighted by Mennell (2007) who notes that ‘when some people have a larger power 
advantage, the experience affects in quite specific ways how they perceive themselves 
and others’ (2007: 311 [italics added]).  Consequently, in the context of imperial 
relations, power differentials can be used to examine how economic, political and 
cultural forms of domination can have both cultural and psychological repercussions !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Accordingly, as Burkitt (1993) highlights, such a notion stands in contrast to Foucault’s appreciation 
of human drives remaining consistent and unchanged as well as embedded in a state of ‘permanent 
provocation’.   
12 This is also explored in the work of Hechter (1975) and his internal colonialism model.  Hechter’s 
(1975) model examines how unequal distributions of resources between dominant and subordinate 
groups are driven by the monopolisation of particular advantages for the dominant groups, usually 
within the realm of political or material gain.  Hecher (1975) argues ‘The uneven wave of 
industrialisation over territorial space creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups, and 
therefore acute cleavages of interest arise between these groups.  As a consequence of this initial 
fortuitous advantage there is a crystallisation of the unequal distribution of recoups and power between 
the two groups’ (1975: 39).  A stratification system is formed, which affiliates particular roles and 
identities on the dominant and subordinated groups.   
 114 
for colonised (outsider) groups.  With this in mind, a brief introduction of Elias and 
Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model is required. 
 
3.2.1. The established-outsider model: the study of Winston Parva 
 
Elias and Scotson’s (1964/1994) original study examined the town of Winston Parva, 
and, specifically, two neighbourhoods within the town.  During their analysis it was 
observed that a number of important characteristics were at play between two 
interdependent, yet, seemingly, separated groups.  Indeed, what they observed was an 
established neighbourhood, whose history within the town had allowed them to forge 
closely-knit relations and established positions and an outsider group who were 
stigmatized and perceived to be an inferior collective.  Unlike the established 
neighbourhood, the outsider group failed to control the same positions of power as 
well as have the historical longevity and ties of interdependence that the established 
group had been able to achieve.  Accordingly, through interviews with the town’s 
residents Elias and Scotson (1994) were able to observe particular ‘systems of 
inferiority’ that served to stigmatize the outsider group.  Based upon the established 
group’s exclusion and derision, feelings of inferiority formed part of the outsider 
group’s collective conscience.  Indeed, this contrasted with the established group’s 
‘group charisma’ and sense of superiority.   
 To this extent, Elias and Scotson (1994) were able to observe a number of 
characteristics that at a larger level could be used to examine power relations within 
multi-group scenarios (Lake, 2013; Mennell, 2007; Sutton and Vertigans, 2012; Van 
Stolk and Wouters, 1987).  That is, when one particular group has more power than 
another, forms of superiority and virtue can form part of the group’s collective 
conscience as well as their established status.  Similarly, for outsider groups, 
exclusion from important resources and positions of power can result in feelings of 
inferiority that form part of the outsider group’s collective conscience and we-
identity. 
 Taking the above into consideration, I wish to argue that this established-
outsider model can be used to examine how established and outsider groups, in the 
context of British domestic and Commonwealth relations, serve to construct Britain 
and British identity.  Indeed, while Elias and Scotson’s (1994) study did not focus 
specifically on national identity, the dynamics explored within the relationship can be 
used to examine how ‘national identity “works” by contrasting the best elements of 
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“us” (the established) with the worst elements of “them” (the outsiders)’ (Maguire and 
Tuck, 2005: 112).  Importantly, relations of inclusion and exclusion are central to this 
process, particularly in regards to the formation of ‘systems of states and the growth 
and development of inter-state balances of power’ (Mennell, 1990: 360 [italics in 
original]; see also Moore, 2010).  Central to these systems is Elias’s (1978) reference 
to the double-bind processes at work within them.  That is, the emotional fantasies 
and beliefs of interdependent groups form part of a double-bind process whereby 
‘each side’s they-image involves a distortion of the vices of the other side, just as its 
we-image is an exaggerated picture of virtue’ (Mennell, 1990: 366).  Therefore, in 
accordance with a media analysis, an established-outsider framework can be used to 
highlight how media discourses seek to discursively construct ‘hierarchical 
assumptions’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 169). 
 Notably, Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model presents the 
opportunity to examine how differences between groups are constructed and formed.  
Indeed, it has already been highlighted that the use of personal pronouns can be used 
to separate who is ‘one of them’ and who is an ‘outsider’ (Parekh, 2000: 9; see also 
Elias, 1991).  Accordingly, by exploring how outsider groups interpret and translate 
their apparent inferiority, conclusions can be drawn regarding the intergroup 
dynamics of particular figurations and how the particular characteristics of such 
figurations can provide a context through which forms inclusion and exclusion, 
superiority and inferiority are formed. 
 
3.2.2.  The established-outsider model: acceptance, resistance and negotiation 
 
It is evident that feelings of superiority and inferiority go hand-in-hand with the 
colonisation of foreign territories (Dunning and Hughes, 2012; Linklater and Mennell, 
2010; Schumpeter, 1976; Van Krieken, 1999; Zarakol, 2010).  While the acquisition 
of foreign lands formed an important part of England’s national, and, later, imperial 
prestige (Wood, 2014), elsewhere, Van Duinen (2013) notes that attempts ‘to identify 
a number of early champions of Australian nationalism in politics or the arts, … were 
found to be trumped or drowned out by various manifestations of Britishness’ (2013: 
345).  As a result ‘the perceived need for British military protection’ and ‘a 
conservative and frustratingly prevalent “Anglo-Australianness”’ stood alongside ‘a 
nagging inferiority complex or “cultural cringe”’ (Van Duinen, 2013: 345-346 [italics 
added]).   
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 In fact, similar examples can be observed in media discourses on immigration 
(Hanson-Easey et al., 2014; Loyal, 2000).  These discourses serve to highlight the 
perceived individual/group’s lack of resemblance and failure to adhere to the 
established culture of the home nation.  Accordingly, Hanson-Easey et al. (2014) 
argue that refugees ‘do not arrive and occupy an empty discursive and 
representational context, enabling them to construct and manage their own group 
identity(ies)’, instead, ‘they are socially constructed by the in-group and, thus, 
positioned relative to a pre-formed social matrix of understandings’ (2014: 376 
[italics added]). 
 In such instances, practices of stigmatisation and exclusion are adopted by the 
established group (‘in-group’) in order to assert their superiority (Engh et al., 2013) 
but also to delineate markers of cultural distinction and prestige.  These markers are 
distinguishable through various attributes and affects, indeed, what Bourdieu (1984) 
has referred to as tastes or markers of distinction.  Other examples can be found in 
relation to the use of speech and manners as ascriptions of established behaviour, 
characteristics that are subsequently used to delineate between established and 
outsider groups.  In particular, the dominance of English cultural and linguistics 
expressions has come at the cost and growing decline in the Gaelic (Goidelic) 
languages.  Similarly, Craig (2011) notes that: 
 
[The Scottish] language or dialect was rejected as inferior and the centres of 
power and influence increasingly moved outwith the country.  Following the 
Union, the definition of good manners, pronunciation and correct usage of the 
English language emanating from the English ruling class led the Scots to 
question their speech and manners. (2011: 276)13  
 
As can be seen from Craig’s (2011) remarks, the influence of established groups can 
often provide a form of emulation for outsider groups to follow.  Indeed, with regards 
to the Thirteen Colonies in North America, Eustace (2008) notes that: 
 
Wish though they might to assert their full membership in the British Empire, 
colonists frequently found themselves placed at the literal and figurative 
periphery of British life, their attempts to master the emotional subtleties of 
British-style gentility ignored or even mocked by those in the metropolis. (2008: 
8) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Indeed, Little (2014) reports that ‘Scottish children had always been punished for using Scots idioms 
and locutions in school. Standard English was thumped into you’ (2014: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-28882770, retrieved: 29 August 2014) 
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However, despite attempts by the colonists to emulate the British gentility, such 
emulation did not prevent the eventful disrupture of the colonies from the British 
Empire. 
 Therefore, while the power differentials between established and outsider 
groups can reveal examples of inferiority (Craig, 2011) and emulation (Eustace, 2008; 
Mennell, 2007), examples of ‘outsider’ resistance can also be identified (Vogler, 
2000).  This is, however, a process that is clearly power balanced and based upon the 
tensions between a desire for national autonomy/distinctiveness and attempts to 
follow established models of state rationalization.  Whereas peripheral nations ‘often 
try to emulate or appropriate models developed by the world’s most powerful nations’ 
they can also develop ‘alternative models of nation-building’ (Mihelj, 2011: 31).  
Nonetheless while nation-building can often take diverse and contrasting approaches, 
particularly within former colonial societies, ‘the imprint of earlier imperial systems 
of thought still exists in many parts of the world and continues to colour perceptions 
of identity, definitions of difference, and expectations of community’ (Manz, 2003: 72 
[italics added]).  In fact, Mihelj (2011) argues that ‘even post-colonial states, 
established after decolonisation in the 1940s and 1950s, were all quite consciously 
replicating the model of the modern state and forms of rule’ (2011: 31).14 
 In such instances, there are degrees of acceptance, as can be seen in comments 
by Nairn (2008), who notes that while Scotland avoided ‘conquest or assimilation’, 
the Scottish performed an act of ‘self-colonisation’ that allowed them to ‘conserv[e] a 
distinct civil society – but only by accepting (and in fact eagerly embracing and 
preaching) the broader rules of the new age, as laid down by France, England and 
other more viable polities’ (2008). 15  Accordingly, power relations between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Elsewhere, Shaw has (2002) highlighted that ‘India today is a vast state ruling more people than 
belonged to the entire British empire in the mid-20th century.  The gap between rich and powerful and 
the village poor is huge, and the centre disposes its armies to hold on to rebellious Kashmir, even to the 
point of risking nuclear war with Pakistan, in a way that reminds us of how European empires 
blundered to war in 1914.  It is of more than polemic significance to suggest that the British Raj was 
not abolished but Indianised and Pakistanised by the new national elites’ (2002: 333).  Importantly, 
these processes reveal that in order to understand national identity, the integration of the nation-state 
with imperial factors is essential and should not be ignored  (Darwin, 2010; Kumar, 2003; 2010; 
Pocock, 1975; 1991).   
15 See 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/article/globalisation/institutions_government/nationalism_the_new_de
al, retrieved: 3 October 2014.  Indeed, Finlay (1997) adds that ‘The failure of Scottish nationalism to 
manifest itself into a major force in mid-nineteenth century Scottish politics can be accounted for by 
the ability of the Scots to re-invent their national identity in ways which accommodated themselves to 
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established and outsider groups are not fixed but can, over time, change (Sutton and 
Vertigans, 2002).  That is, whereas: 
 
many bourgeoisie people in ancien regiem France followed aristocratic models 
as best they could in manners, speech and fashion … [this] did not prevent them 
simultaneously resenting aristocratic privileges.  Nor did it prevent the French 
Revolution (Mennell, 2007: 313) 
 
In fact, Vogler (2000) has noted that national identities become strongest amongst 
those ‘outsider’ groups when they ‘feel relatively excluded from the polity … and 
who are also experiencing significant economic and social dislocation’ (2000: 31).16 
 Indeed, these examples suggest a degree of flexibility when investigating those 
actions, customs and identities that help construct the boundaries between various 
groups (Cohen, 1994).  Accordingly, while ‘Imperialism was repressive in many 
ways, … throughout the British Empire, it had a tendency to perpetuate and enhance 
regional and ethnic identities among indigenous peoples, whether through indirect 
rule policies or divide and rule tactics’ (MacKenzie, 1998: 231).  With this in mind, it 
is important to note that established-outsider relations are neither fixed nor static but 
are dependent upon multi-figurational dynamics.  Indeed, this posits an examination 
of the relations between established-outsider groups at various levels (British 
domestic and Commonwealth) and the processes of attachment and (dis)attachment 
that this entails.  This can be identified in the ways that the ‘habitus of the established 
groups is acquired, typically in a slightly altered form, by the outsider groups which 
in the same process ceases to be “outside” to the same extent’ (Smith, 2001: 128).  
Importantly, this does not mean that outsider practices disappear (Elias and Scotson, 
1994; Sutton and Vertigans, 2002). 
 With this in mind, the following section will explore how established-outsider !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the British state and Empire. … the Scots used the opportunities afforded by the growth of British 
imperialism as a stage upon which they could vindicate and assert the romantic notions associated with 
mid and late nineteenth century European nationalism. Scottish military prowess and other examples of 
Scottish national virility were given ample opportunity for expression throughout the British Empire’ 
(1997: 15).  Similarly, elsewhere, Macphee (2013) has noted that ‘Resentment at the historical 
suppression of Irish, Scottish, and Welsh national identities under the overarching banner of Britishness 
is tempered by the recognition that the UK dispensation involved both the hegemony of a particular 
national identity (namely Englishness), and the state-based negotiation of social demands’ (2013: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/graham-macphee/careful-what-you-wish-for-thinking-
through-neoliberal-nation, retrieved: 8 May 2013). 
16 This same form of ‘outsider’ resistance has been examined in the internal colonialism model (see 
Hechter, 1975) through which ‘Subordination creates strong solidarity in the periphery, where the 
subordinate group forms a separate collective national identity in order to redress inequality by seeking 
independence from the core’ (Pettinicchio, 2012: 4). 
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relations amongst the British home nations as well as between Britain and the 
Commonwealth have served to shape constructions of Britain.  Again, an historical 
analysis of the emergence of the British state and empire as well as the power 
relations that Britain’s imperial expansion helped forge can prove effective in 
elucidating upon the tensions and struggles that form part of the construction and 
representation of Britain and British identity.  To this end, it is appropriate to explore 
how constructions of Britain have often been tied to, and, used as, a reflection of 
English attributes and characteristics, a process that is closely tied to the imperial 
expansion of England (Kumar, 2003). 
 
3.2.3. The established-outsider model: established England/Britain 
 
While the formation of the 1707 Acts of Union can be viewed as a partnership 
between the British home nations, it was undoubtedly a partnership with one 
dominant and two weaker nations (Malcolm, 2012).  Indeed, Malcolm (2012) notes 
that: 
 
The conquest and colonization of the ‘Celtic fringe’, it has been argued, acted as 
a kind of trial run of English, later British, imperialism. There are a number of 
parallels between the internal and external phases of colonialism which provide 
empirical support for this view. The various Celtic peoples were stereotyped 
and stigmatized in ways which bolstered English self-images of superiority. At 
times a civilizing mission was evoked to legitimize English expansion. In Wales 
and Ireland in particular, English communities existed in parallel with ‘native’ 
communities and dominated the main cities, occupied the best land, etc. The 
language and culture of English communities and their laws and administrative 
systems became pre-eminent. As in North America and Australia, the attitudes 
English emigrants expressed toward the ‘mother country’ fluctuated between 
anglophile and angry resentment at their ‘unfair’ treatment. Forms of colonial 
resistance were evident throughout, and in Ireland particularly violent. (2012: 
89-90) 
 
Hechter (1975) and Kumar (2003) have each examined how, in varying ways, 
England’s dominance within Britain was reflected as a form of ‘internal colonialism’ 
and that the unification of Britain represented ‘the first English Empire’ (Kumar, 
2003: 60).  As a result, ‘England’s contentment with the United Kingdom and its 
traditional attachment to a British identity can be largely explained by England’s 
hegemony of the commanding heights of Britain’s constitution, institutions and 
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economy’ (Evans, 2013).17  In fact, Devine (2011) notes that ‘The English state had 
been pursuing a policy of aggressively extending its economic and military resources 
since c.1650 and the process was virtually complete by the time of the Anglo-Scottish 
Union in 1707’ (2011: 3).  Similarly, within Ireland, Bartlett (2004) notes that: 
 
While individual Irish merchants, and small houses, were to be found 
throughout the chief trading ports of the empire, the Irish colonial trade was 
dominated by England merchant houses, English intermediaries and English 
capital. (2004: 67) 
 
To this extent, it is possible to trace how England’s established position within the 
British domestic figuration has resulted in attitudes of superiority and a propensity to 
prioritize ‘England’ in constructions of ‘Britain’.  In fact, commenting upon the Battle 
of Trafalgar, Wasson (2011) highlights that while Nelson’s ‘ships went into battle off 
the southwestern coast of Spain against a combined French and Spanish fleet, 
Admiral Lord Nelson (1758-1805) famously signalled: “England expects every man 
will do his duty” (2011: 76-77).  However ‘the patriotic symbols, music, and emotions 
engulfing the ships and sailors appears to have been “British” not “English’’ (Wasson, 
2011: 77).  Indeed, the same ‘England expects…’ call would also be used in the 
conscription of British troops during the First World War.   
 Consequently, Macphee (2013) has commented upon ‘imperial Britishness’ and 
its ‘decidedly English character’: 
 
The power of imperial Britishness lay precisely in its claim to rise above 
‘particular’ nationalisms (and so provide a home for them under its overarching 
banner), while at the same time giving its supposedly inclusive framework a 
decidedly English character. … what this meant was that Britishness could 
sustain an appeal to universal political ideals (legality, freedom, justice) while 
inflecting these ideals in terms of the habits, values, and interests of a particular 
social coalition, an intra- and cross-class alliance centered on South-East 
England but with varying levels of penetration across the British Isles. While 
Britishness is much more English than it is prepared to admit, Englishness is 
much more imperial than it likes to remember. (2013)18 
 
Accordingly, while both Britain and the British Empire were shaped by ‘a decidedly 
English character’, it is important to remember that ‘the Anglo-Saxon dominance’ of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-english-dog-unmuzzled/, retrieved: 6 July 2013. 
18 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/graham-macphee/careful-what-you-wish-for-
thinking-through-neoliberal-nation, retrieved: 8 May 2013. 
 121 
Britain ‘has never been complete’ (Ramsay, 2014b).19  Indeed, the aforementioned 
‘tensions’ underlying British relations have served to reveal the contested nature of 
identification in Britain.20  Rojek (2007) argues that ‘there are problems in proposing 
a “dominant nation thesis” of the UK which posits that England defines the context in 
which the other three nations function’ (2007: 19 [italics in original]).  Here, he adds 
that: 
 
The United Kingdom is a decollate balance of contradictory elements, legally 
binding and unwritten conventions and reciprocal understandings that organise 
relations between the four nations.  Although English dominance is pivotal, it 
has not resulted in uniform acculturation – Britain is one thing, but England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are different. (Rojek, 2007: 19 [italics in 
origional]) 
 
Certainly, this difference between the British home nations should not be ignored.  
Indeed, the previous section has endeavored to highlight how outsider groups can 
often resist and reassert their we-image in relation to acts of stigmatisation or 
exclusion.  Yet, it is the ‘contradictory elements’ (Rojek, 2007: 19) within 
constructions of Britain and Britishness that serve to reveal wider power differentials 
within the British state and which are brought to light in the construction of Britain 
and British identity.  As a result: 
 
Despite the disproportionate Scottish influence in the Union, England remained 
by far its largest member.  Once enthused with the idea of being British, the 
English had the power to dominate the construction and articulation of 
Britishness and to make economic and political decisions in affairs of state 
which often disregarded, and at time prejudiced, the interests of their partners. 
(Weight, 2002: 10) 
 
Here, England’s power and dominance within Britain, ‘resided precisely in its 
assumed hegemony over “the nations” and historically over the Empire’ (Seth-Smith, 
2013).21 
 Accordingly, ‘centered on South-East England’ (Macphee, 2013), England’s 
‘assumed hegemony’ (Seth-Smith, 2013) and ‘arrogance born of ancient prejudice’ 
(Weight, 2002: 10) has formed an important part of anti-English sentiment in both !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 See https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/adam-ramsay/quick-response-to-ellie-mae-ohagan-
on-british-nationalism-and-welsh-language, retrieved: 24 July 2014. 
20 See chapter two, sections 2.3. and 2.3.1. 
21 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/niki-seth-smith/ukip-and-rise-of-english-
nationalism, retrieved: 18 July 2013. 
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Scotland and Wales (Bloyce et al., 2010).22  Underlying these attitudes, established-
outsider dynamics can be observed.  In fact, England’s imperial ambitions has led 
Weight (2002) to exclaim that ‘the English were extremely reluctant Britons’, adding 
that: 
 
Reared on images of Scotland as a barbarous country, they saw the Union as a 
plank for a parasitic people to feed off England’s greater wealth and superior 
civilisation.  Protests about the success of Scottish trade and the influence of 
Scots in public life were common.  Consequently, while their partners came to 
think of themselves as Scottish/Welsh and British, the English refused to adopt 
a dual national identity. (2002: 5) 
 
Even after Union, opinion in England sought to view the Scots ‘as greedy mendicants 
growing wealthy on England’s rich pastures’ (Devine, 2011: 11).  As a result, 
Marshall (2008) has noted that while the Union in Scotland was perceived to be a 
partnership, in England it was an acquisition. 23   Indeed, while ‘well-born and 
educated Englishmen … [were] more likely to have the pick of the jobs at home 
through established networks of personal connection and patronage. … Within the 
imperial relationship the Scots could feel that they were the peers of the English’ 
(Devine, 2011: 29 and 168 [italics added]).  As a result, Devine (2011) argues that it 
was ‘the “outsiders” within the British Isles who were most willing to abandon their 
home country for overseas adventures’ (2011: 29 [italics added]).   
 Consequently, when examining constructions of Britain and British identity one 
is drawn to a context in which relations of power were interdependently dispersed 
across both a domestic and imperial figurational complex.  Indeed, whereas, 
constructions of Britain took shape alongside the historical and cultural dominance of 
England, or, in the case of Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider framework, 
in a context of an ‘established’ English and ‘outsider’ home nation and dominion 
periphery, empire provided the opportunity for these established-outsider relations to 
be transplanted to a wider level of imperial interdependence.  Here, the expansion of 
the British Empire interdependently allied the home nations with a wider imperial 
network.  In doing so, a larger ‘imperial’ balance of power between Britain and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/graham-macphee/careful-what-you-wish-for-
thinking-through-neoliberal-nation, retrieved: 8 May 2013 and see 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/niki-seth-smith/ukip-and-rise-of-english-nationalism, 
retrieved: 18 July 2013. 
23 Here, connections can be drawn with the imperial expansion of Britain (Kumar, 2003; Malcolm, 
2012). 
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empire emerged, a process that provided Britain and its constitutive home nations the 
opportunity to form part of an imperial established strata, the British metropole 
(Bridge and Fedorowich, 2003a; 2003b; Hall, 2008, Ward, 2008). 
 In such instances, British tastes, values and culture formed an important part of 
British imperial power, reflecting the established status of the imperial British 
(MacKenzie, 1999; 2001; Wood, 2014).  Consequently, through empire, Britain’s 
established classes served to impose their values, tastes and customs – their habitus 
codes – onto the outsider dominions, colonies and territories (Maguire, 1999).  
Indeed, sporting practices played an important part in this process (Maguire, 2005).24  
Engh et al. (2013) note: 
 
Their sports confirmed their gentlemanly civilized status – for it was men who 
composed the established group within the imperial elite. The clubs and playing 
fields acted as zones of prestige that helped stratify relations not only among the 
British themselves, but also in their dealings with the ‘natives’. These zones of 
prestige thus conferred distinction, and allowing gentlemen to embody the 
qualities of honour, chivalry and fair play. Access to such prestigious clubs and 
playing fields could be regulated – only chosen outsiders would be allowed to 
emulate their imperial masters and become, through the adoption of their sports, 
more British than the British. Such individuals, acting as players, teachers and 
administrators, could thus spread British sports, and thus, British influence, 
more widely and deeply within a colony. (2013: 784) 
 
The diffusion of British sporting practices serves to reflect the cross-national and 
cross-imperial relations underlying Britain’s domestic and imperial figurations.  
Specifically this can be seen in how ‘British men’ transferred ‘qualities of honour, 
chivalry and fair play’ to the ‘natives’ (Engh et al., 2013: 784).  While domestic 
Britain revealed a society based upon an established England, at the imperial level, 
this established image was interdependently related to the home nations’ established 
‘British’ status. 
 In fact, dominion and colonial relations within the British Empire could also 
reveal their own established-outsider dynamics.  Indeed, this ‘was expressed 
politically in the incremental development of dominion status’ (Barnes, 2013: 20).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Maguire (2005) adds that, ‘In the diffusion of sport throughout the empire, the British, whatever their 
own ethnic origin, acted as the established group dealing with a range of outsider groups.  … Their 
sports confirmed their gentlemanly civilised status - for it was men who composed the established 
groups within the imperial elite.  The clubs and playing field acted as zones of prestige, which helped 
stratify relations not only among the British themselves, but also in their dealings with the ‘natives’. 
Access to such prestigious clubs and playing field could be regulated - only chosen outsiders would be 
allowed to emulate their imperial masters and become, through the adoption of their sports, more 
British than the British’ (2005: 10-11). 
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Therefore: 
 
The white colonies of settlement insisted instead on recognition of their 
metropolitan-like attributes, a position that required they leave both their own 
colonial pasts, and other, dependent, colonies, behind. Constitutional change 
therefore helped construct empire as a cultural hierarchy and affirmed the 
dominions’ superior place within it. (Barnes, 2013: 20)  
 
Over time, this ‘cultural hierarchy’ (Barnes, 2013: 20) within the empire would 
undergo transformation with the dominions seeking their own ‘radical nationalist 
histories’ separate from Britain (Van Duinen, 2013: 346).  Similarly, with regards to 
sport, Engh et al., (2013) argue that ‘the British, … experience[d] the same double-
bind processes that can be traced to the processes associated with functional 
democratization’ (2013: 784).  Accordingly: 
 
try as they might to maintain their own civilized status, gradually the cultural 
markers of power and prestige seeped out from beyond their exclusive control, 
and in the case of sport, the imperial masters began to be beaten at their own 
games. (Engh et al., 2013: 784) 
 
 Consequently, entwined within these processes are questions of identity, in 
particular, the use of sport to help promote and articulate an independent national 
identity.  Indeed, both within the UK and the empire, sport provided an important 
cultural signifier, with the desire to beat the English and the British adding to the 
spectacle of domestic and imperial sporting occasions (Maguire, 2005).  More 
importantly, however, the above remarks reveal how ‘cultural markers’ are subject to 
processes of functional democratization.  Indeed, it can be noted that as the empire 
became more closely entwined, there was a paradoxical move towards greater 
political freedom for the dominions (Kaul, 2006).  Accordingly, while ‘the cultural 
markers of power and prestige seeped out from beyond’ (Engh et al., 2013: 784) 
relations between the British and its colonies became more equal (a process which 
was reflected in the granting of dominion status). 
 Here, relations between established-outsider groups can be considered with 
regards to a power balance, upon which power ratios between established and outsider 
groups – over time – become relatively more equal.  These sociogenetic 
transformations corresponded with the gradual emergence of a separate dominion 
national identity, which began to reflect the distinct national culture and values of the 
dominions (psychogenesis).  This was, however, not an identity that was completely 
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‘re-invented’ (Hobsbawm, 1983), but instead included certain characteristics that 
were drawn from their historical relationship with Britain and the British Empire.   
 Moreover, the effects of this historical relationship reside in the relations 
between the British home nations, most noticeably, between Scotland and England.  
In fact, in interviews with members of the Scottish diaspora, Whigham (2012) has 
highlighted that: 
 
 One contrast cited by a majority of respondents was the view that England was 
financially richer than its neighbours in Scotland, positioning Scotland as an 
underdog in the relationship between the two countries. The perceived 
differences in wealth and lifestyle were also deemed to impact upon certain 
characteristics of the stereotypical English persona, such as a sense of 
superiority and entitlement. (2012: 11) 
 
Drawing upon the above, it is evident that an ‘outsider’ image of Scotland as 
‘underdogs’ is interdependently constructed in relation to an established sense of 
English ‘superiority and entitlement’ (Whigham, 2012: 11).  Yet, expressions of this 
‘underdog mentality’ were often ‘portrayed as a positive quality, with emphasis on the 
common bond felt with other nations who were felt to possess similar positions within 
global society’ (Whigham, 2012: 12).  In such instances, Scotland’s outsider location 
acted as a source of national distinction and camaraderie but also an expression of 
anti-English sentiment (Whigham, 2012).  Such examples, reveal how an outsider 
status can prove to be an important signifier in contesting established representations 
of outsider groups, that is, as a ‘David-and-Goliath relationship with the English’ 
(Whigham, 2012: 16).  Indeed, whereas, Whigham (2012) draws upon the work of 
McCrone (1992) to argue that ‘these perceived economic, cultural and political 
differences reflect a number of the “myths” of the Scottish nation’ (Whigham, 2012: 
11), their prevalence within institutions such as ‘the media’ can form an important 
part of the construction of English-Scottish relations. 
Moreover, they can also provide an important comparison with changes in the 
established image of England.  That is, in accordance with changes in the balance of 
power between established and outsider groups, it is possible to observe how 
England’s subsumed status within Britain and the British Empire has undermined the 
post-imperial identity of England.  From the point of view of a separate English 
identity much like that of its peripheral nations, constructions of England often draw 
upon British characteristics.  While it has been argued in this section that this can be 
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conceived in relation to England’s established position within Britain, a process that 
served to impede any separable conception of Englishness (Kumar, 2003; Malcolm, 
2012), such concerns have proven particularly significant when recent devolutionary 
measures have failed to provide England any separate political representation of its 
own (Perryman, 2009). 
Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that relations between 
established and outsider groups are often marked by processes of consolidation and 
emancipation.  Indeed, Van Stolk and Wouters (1987) note that, ‘when studying 
established-outsider figurations, it is relevant to ask to what extent they are 
characterised by an ideal of harmonious inequality’ (1987: 484).  That is: 
 
In a phase of consolidation and resignation the figuration ideal of harmonious 
inequality goes largely unchallenged, while in a phase of emancipation and 
resistance it is attacked, becoming subject to stress from the increasingly 
important ideal of more equal social contact. (1987: 485 [italics in origional) 
 
Indeed, it is through phases of ‘consolidation and resignation’ as well as 
‘emancipation and resistance’ (Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987: 485 [italics removed]) 
that attachments and (dis)attachments to Britain can be traced.  In particular, however, 
Van Stolk and Wouters (1987) ‘phases’ can be viewed in correspondence with the 
power differentials between particular groups and the balances of power that 
ultimately alter and reconfigure interdependent relations. 
 Therefore, by utilising the established-outsider model, constructions and 
(re)constructions of Britain within both the domestic British and Commonwealth 
coverage can be observed.  These constructions will be used to consider how, in a 
relational context, the framing of Britain is related to both the national identities of 
each nation as well as to larger British identifications.  More importantly, it is here 
that the established-outsider model can be used to consider cross-figurational 
interdependencies and balances of power between a British domestic and a larger 
imperial/Commonwealth figuration.  Here, tensions (Dunning and Hughes, 2012; 
Elias, 1996), changes (Dunning et al., 2004; MacAloon, 1984; Williams, 1977) and 
integration struggles (Mennell, 2007) can be observed in the discursive construction 
of Britain.   
 That is, in light of Britain’s post-imperial decline and devolutionary measures, 
do constructions of England remain wedded to, and, is the marginalisation of the rest 
of the UK, still apparent in representations of Britain?  Similarly, do the former 
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dominions still maintain attachments to Britain?  In light of these questions, the final 
section of this chapter will examine how power is discursively constructed within 
media discourses.  Indeed, adherence to the conception of power as fundamentally 
balanced will be maintained (Elias, 1991; 2010).  What will be considered, however, 
is the extent to which a discursive analysis of the British domestic and 
Commonwealth press can be used to examine how constructions of Britain and British 
identity are reflective of British domestic and Commonwealth established-outsider 
relations. 
 
3.2.4. The established-outsider model: mediated discursive constructions and 
established-outsider relations 
 
The study of discourse has endeavoured to explore how social practices are related to 
social structures of power and control (Fairclough, 1995).  In particular, Foucault 
(1978) has examined how discourses refer to systems of thought that seek to reflect 
particular knowledge claims.  Indeed, they perform an important role in aiding the 
individual through particular social encounters and constructing the individual’s own 
subjectivity (Foucault, 1978).  Similarly, Hall (1988d) argues that discourse ‘gives 
questions of culture and ideology, and the scenarios of representation – subjectivity, 
identity, politics – a formative, not merely an expressive, place in the constitution of 
social and political life’ (1988d: 27 cited in Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 63). 
 To this extent, it is possible to examine how the ‘psychological field [is] 
constituted through the social domain of discourse’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 75).  
Here, language has the capacity to present various forms of reality as well as organise 
and construct reality in various interpretive contexts (Barthes, 1972).  Relations 
within texts, the combining of its various elements and grammatical forms 
(Fairclough, 2003), are enveloped with cultural meanings that serve to organise social 
settings through which particular discourses can be identified and analysed (Van Dijk, 
1997).  Indeed, such understandings are not dependent solely on language but ‘are 
performed, enacted and embodied through a variety of linguistic and non-linguistic 
means’ (De Fina et al., 2006 : 3).  As a result, discourses of national culture provide ‘a 
way of constructing meanings which influences and organises both our actions and 
our conceptions of ourselves’ (Hall, 1995 : 613) across space and time as well as in 
relation to other national groups (Maguire, 1995).  These discursive contexts provide 
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national identity a social and psychological significance (Wetherell and Potter, 1992) 
through which language, collective memories and national behaviours are conveyed.  
Here, routine habits, personal expressions and ways of living (Rapport, 2012) form 
part of the nation’s long-term development ‘and should be perceived as individual and 
social at the same time’ (Van Daalen, 2013). 
 Nevertheless, De Cillia et al. (1999) note that ‘if we regard national identities 
purely as discursive constructs which are made up of specifically constructed 
national-identity narratives, the question remains why somebody will produce a 
specific given discursive construction’ (1999: 155-156). 25   Indeed, the work of 
Giddens (1991) provides one answer by allowing us to consider that national identity 
is not just located at a discursive level but also occupies a real and emotional 
vocabulary at the practical level too.  Giddens’s (1991) elaborates: 
 
All human beings continuously monitor the circumstances of their activities as a 
feature of doing what they do, and such monitoring always has discursive 
features … The knowledgeability of human agents, however, is not confined to 
discursive consciousness of the conditions of their action.  Many of the elements 
of being able to ‘go on’ are carried at the level of practical consciousness, 
incorporated within the continuity of everyday activities.  Practical 
consciousness is integral to the reflexive monitoring of action, but it is ‘non-
conscious’, rather than unconscious.  Most forms of practical consciousness 
could not be ‘held in mind’ during the course of social activities, since their 
tactic or taken-for-granted qualities form the essential condition which allows 
actors to concentrate on tasks at hand (1991: 36) 
 
In such instances, Giddens’s (1991) practical and discursive levels of consciousness 
can be compared with Freud’s structural model of the psyche.  Giddens (1993) notes 
that ‘the use of “I” [or “ego”] develops out of, and is … associated with, the 
positioning of the agent in social encounters’ (1993: 94).  However, while Giddens’s 
(1991) analysis views both discursive and practical consciousness as separate, through 
an Eliasian lens, the positioning of the ‘I’ forms part of on-going balance between the 
‘I-identity’ (ego-image) and ‘we-identity’ (super-ego-image).  Accordingly, in 
contrast to Giddens (1991), the construction of I/we identities are interdependently 
formed ‘through discursive practices and practical actions, both of which have an 
unacknowledged affective component’ (Maguire, 2005: 132).   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Whereas, De Cillia et al. (1999) draw upon the work of Martin (1995), this thesis will refer to the 
work of Giddens (1991) which has commonly been used within studies of the media, national identity 
and process sociology (Maguire, 1999; 2005; Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Maguire and Tuck, 1998; 
Poulton, 2004; Tuck, 2003). 
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 Subsequently, when examining national identity/habitus, one is essentially 
dealing with interconnected funds of social knowledge that operate at both practical 
and discursive levels of consciousness (Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Maguire and 
Burrows, 2005).  To this extent, national habitus/character is framed, constructed and 
represented by and through the discursive practices of the media and which are 
interwoven with activities occurring at the level of practical consciousness (Maguire 
and Burrows, 2005).26  As a result, a two-way traffic emerges between the two levels; 
a ‘mental traffic’ that reawakens sleeping memories, and which, at the practical level, 
makes the nation seem more real (Maguire and Burrows, 2005; Maguire and Tuck, 
1998).  Here, national newspapers can play an important role in discursively 
constructing the nation (Anderson, 2006; Billig, 1995; Maguire, 2005).  That is, the 
media ‘perform a “gate-keeping” role, filtering and restricting news input’ (Fowler, 
1991: 13).  Fowler (1991) elaborates: 
 
News values … are to be regarded as intersubjective mental categories.  In 
determining the significance of events, the papers and their readers make 
reference, explicit or more usually implicit, to what are variously called, in 
cognitive psychology and in semantics, ‘frames’, ‘paradigms’, ‘stereotypes’, 
‘schemata’ and ‘general propositions’ (1991: 17) 
 
Here, the ideological categories and classifications, which are familiar to certain 
groups within society, can be identified through particular themes that delineate 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Fairclough, 1995).  Consequently, within a newspaper 
article, the overall organization of its contents forms part of a larger thematic structure 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006; Fairclough, 1995; Joffe and Yardley, 2004; Lee and 
Maguire, 2009).  Locating these structures is, as Fairclough (1995) notes, intrinsic to 
understanding: 
 
the mental models of events and situations which reports bring to bear in 
interpreting events and source texts, models which reporters try to convey to 
audiences in the way they write reports, and models which audiences (readers 
etc.) draw upon in interpreting reports.  This cognitive perspective helps to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 In such instances, the framing of a newspaper article by the news producer and its decoding by an 
individual involves drawing upon a wide range of literal and cultural symbols (Hall, 1997).  Bullock et 
al. (2001) reveal that ‘in addition to using rhetorical devices such as metaphors, catch phrases, and 
imagery, news handlers frame stories by using reasoning devices that draw on causal attributions, 
consequences, and appeals to principle’ (2001: 233).  Accordingly, framing involves the ‘subtle 
selection of certain aspects of an issue by the media to make them more important and thus to 
emphasize a particular cause of some phenomena’ (Dearing and Rogers, 1996: 64 cited in Collins et al., 
2006: 91 [italics removed]). 
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specify how exactly the ‘news values’ that have been identified as shaping news 
coverage influence the way particular reports are produced (1995: 30)    
 
The ‘mental models’ that Fairclough (1995) comments upon provide a similar account 
of the ‘mental traffic’ (Maguire and Burrows, 2005; Maguire and Tuck, 1998; Tuck, 
2003) that occurs between both the practical and discursive levels of consciousness.  
If news stories are to be ‘constructed on the basis of mental categories which are 
present in readers and built on by the media’ (Fowler, 1991: 19) one can assume that 
the ‘mental models’ employed by journalists within media discourse can be 
investigated as one form of discursive practice whereby the constitutive role of 
discourse seeks ‘to construct and reconstruct social identities, relations and structures’ 
(Amer, 2012: 118; see also Fairclough, 1995; Maguire and Burrows, 2005; Tuck, 
2003; Wodak et al., 1999).  Consequently, in regards to the British Empire, imperial 
representations and the discursive construction of the empire’s colonial ‘others’ 
formed a regular part of British newspaper discourses and were included in the carried 
information on board British ships (Lester, 2001).  Therefore, through the discursive 
construction of the empire, both the colonies and the metropole were interdependently 
linked, but, also, more importantly, discursively represented (Lester, 2001).   
 Such representations, however, are always ‘re-representations’ of a particular 
reality.  Indeed: 
 
 There is always a mediating effect whereby an event is filtered through 
interpretative frameworks and acquires ideological significance.  News, then, 
provides its audience with interpretive frameworks, ways of seeing the world 
and defining reality (Poole, 2002: 23 cited in Meer et al., 2010: 91) 
 
Subsequently, by analysing such ‘interpretative frameworks’ in accordance with 
Elias’s (1978) conception of power, it is possible to examine how constructions of the 
nation are based upon established-outsider relations, at various levels of 
interdependence.  Indeed, this complex interplay between Britain’s domestic and 
Commonwealth figurations works against a conception of discourse as dictated solely 
by those who command social power through mechanisms of control (Foucault, 
1978).  Instead, these discourses can form part of wider interdiscursive processes 
through which the discursive construction of identity is contested, re-framed and re-
invented (Scollon, 1998).  In doing so, national identity is neither fixed nor static but 
processually negotiated in accordance with past and present contexts.  Wetherell and 
Potter (1992) argue that: 
 131 
 
identity and forms of subjectivity which become instantiated in discourse at any 
given moment should be seen as a sedimentation of past discursive practices.  A 
sense of identity and subjectivity is constructed from the interpretative resources 
– the stories and narratives of identity – which are available, in circulation, in 
our culture (1992: 78 [italics added]) 
 
Indeed, the use of ‘past discursive practices’ forms part of ‘the stories and narrative of 
identity’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 78) that construct the nation and its national 
identity.  In fact, Schumpeter (1976) argues that ‘life habits of the dim past’ play an 
important role in constructing the nation (1976: 73).   
 However, whereas discursive constructions seek to frame the nation through, 
amongst other means, continuities with the nation’s past (Conboy, 2005; Falcous and 
Silk, 2010) they can also reveal dis-continuities and debates regarding the national 
self (Wodak et al., 2009).  Here, Lavi (2013) explains that: 
 
The national flag flying in front of a house, for example, takes place in concrete 
time and space. However, it receives its national meanings since it is embedded 
in the national historical narrative. This is not to say that this narrative is given 
or static; the national narrative loads the flag with its national meanings while 
the flag (re)affirm the national narrative. In a different context, the same flag 
could have been considered as strange or even subversive. (2013: 6) 
 
Accordingly, while Lavi’s (2013) comments serve to highlight how national meanings 
are appropriated from earlier generations and are acquired personally, it also reveals 
how differing levels of integration (‘different context[s]’) can provide variations in 
national meaning.  By extension, Lavi’s (2013) comments can be used to explore the 
variations in national narratives and national meanings amongst established and 
outsider groups.  Here, changes in the balance of power between established and 
outsider groups (processes of functional democratization) can result in 
reinterpretations of the nation and its past.  In such instances, national identities ‘are 
discursively, by means of language and other semiotic systems, produced, 
reproduced, transformed and destructed’ via social institutions such as the media (De 
Cillia et al., 1999: 153 [italics in original]).   
 Indeed, these reproductions, transformations and deconstructions can be 
considered in the relationship between the past and contemporary constructions of the 
nation.  Consequently, the dissemination of national symbols, national traditions and 
nationalist images, during sporting and royal events, are themselves simultaneously 
present in the discursive and practical levels of consciousness that help to preserve 
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collective memory (Tuck, 2003).  Indeed, Conboy (2007) has explored how tabloid 
newspapers serve to present ‘a particular sort of history’ (2007: 257) that represents 
past occasions, events and individuals as myth (see also Barthes, 1972).  However, 
while myths are often connected ‘to the present in a highly significant and politically 
charged way’ they can also ‘be brought up against real experience of the past’ 
(Conboy, 2007: 268). 
 Whereas, Billig’s (1995)  ‘banal nationalism’ highlights the banal nature of such 
actions, these actions can be made ‘real’ through the reifying and figurative 
discourses that frame national news media (De Cillia et al., 1999; see also Poulton, 
2004).  An analysis of these discourses can allow us to examine how particular events 
can become constructed by the ‘memories that connect a nation’s present with its 
past’ and which serve as a reflection of the deeply enmeshed processes that structure 
the national habitus (Maguire, 1999: 177; see also McCormack, 2012; Poulton, 2004; 
Tuck, 2003).  As a result, rather than merely reflecting repetitive performances 
(Butler, 1990) the discursive construction of the nation, its history, and, in particular, 
its national identity, is constructed and (re)constructed through interdependent 
relations, past and present tensions and balances of power. 
 Therefore, taking the above into consideration, it is evident that the discursive 
construction of the nation in newspaper discourses posits a valuable source of enquiry 
regarding the construction, representation and framing of Britain.  More importantly, 
however, when considered through an established-outsider lens there is the potential 
to examine how the discursive construction of Britain is related to broader balances of 
power within the British state as well between its former dominions.  To this extent, 
this thesis argues for an extension of Elias and Scotson’s (1994) original model in 
order to examine how established-outsider relations form part of the discursive 
construction of the nation and national identity.  Indeed, rather than focusing on one 
particular population (Winston Parva) forthcoming chapters will seek to expose how 
established-outsider relations are shaped as well as re-shaped in accordance with 
changes in figurational interdependence.  It is here that accounts of the British past 
can prove particularly elusive in examining contemporary constructions of Britain as 
well as elucidating upon forms of attachment and (dis)attachment.  Indeed, 
Schumpeter (1976) argues that: 
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customary modes of political thought and feeling in a given age can never be 
mere ‘reflexes’ of, or counterparts to, the production situation of that age.  
Because of the persistence of such habits, they will always, to a considerable 
degree, be dominated by the production context of past ages. (1976: 71) 
 
Here, the persistence of the past, and, more specifically, Britain’s imperial past, can 
prove effective in examining how the decline of established groups (England/Britain) 
are reflected in newspaper discourses (Conboy, 2007).  That is, how far back within 
history does the national habitus relate too and to what extent is national habitus 
shaped and affected by processes of development and transformations in social 
relations?  In doing so, one can ‘consider how memories of empire did not simply 
neatly disappear but could be reactivated in more modern environments’ (Littler, 
2006: 25). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Alongside chapter two, the overarching purpose of the above sections has been to trace, 
from 1707 onwards, the interrelated processes underlying Britain’s state formation, 
imperial expansion and subsequent decline.  With regards to British identity, Thompson 
(2005) argues that: 
 
‘Imperial Britishness’ was not something superimposed over an array of disparate 
cultures and identities that made up the United Kingdom.  Rather, to varying 
degrees, the Scottish, the Welsh, the Irish and the English regions were to find in the 
empire a form of self-affirmation that helped them better contend with the political 
and cultural challenges they were facing (2005: 200)    
 
However, while Thompson’s (2005) remarks highlight how both ‘national’ and ‘imperial’ 
dimensions served to underlie British ‘self-affirmation’ (2005: 2000), the contents of this 
chapter has sought to expose how contending political, cultural and historical challenges 
and tensions have formed an important part of the construction of Britain.  Indeed, to a 
large extent, this approach has been structured by the requirements of the project and the 
problems it proposes.  Primarily, this involved accounting for a multi-national analysis of 
Britain, which based upon its diverse and international history, could provide numerous 
constructions and representations.  As a result, this chapter has sought to focus attention 
on the balances of power between the British home nations and former dominions in order 
to examine how past and present interdependencies continue to construct and frame 
Britain and British identity.  
 Consequently, in order to make sense of these characteristics, the above sections 
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have explored how an established-outsider model can be used to elucidate upon the 
discursive construction of Britain, both within the domestic and imperial/commonwealth 
figurations.  More importantly, however, it is through the interdependencies between these 
figurations that the established-outsider model can provide an insight into the various 
‘national’ discourses that construct, frame and represent national and international events.  
Indeed, these discourses are not fixed but are dependent upon changes in the 
interdependencies between groups.  Accordingly, while ‘the formation of habitus is a 
function of social interdependencies’ it is a formation that varies ‘as the structure of the 
society varies’ (Van Krieken, 1998: 58).  Therefore, in accordance with changes in the 
balance of power between established and outsider groups, it is possible to observe how 
the discursive construction of Britain has been shaped and re-shaped by its imperial past 
and multi-national relations (Thompson, 2000).  Indeed, this is of particular importance 
when analysing the long-term processes that underlie national identity formation (Colls, 
2012; Elias, 1996). 
 Furthermore, in the case of global media events, the symbolic operation of the media 
can help to produce and re-produce national ideologies (Blain et al., 1993), providing 
important ‘anchors of meanings’ for the nation (Maguire and Tuck, 1998: 112).  In 
particular, the media coverage surrounding sporting and royal events can prove useful 
when ‘studying beliefs, attitudes and human relations’ (Andriotis, 2010).  These attributes 
become communicated through a media discourse, which portrays the stories, memories 
and images that help form part of the ‘narrative of the nation’ (Maguire and Tuck, 1998: 
105; see also Lee and Maguire, 2009).  As a result, section 3.2.3. served to highlight how 
an analysis of newspaper discourses can serve to elucidate upon such narratives.  By 
referring deliberately to narratives in the plural, one can direct attention to Britain’s 
domestic and imperial (Commonwealth) histories as well as the interdependent relations, 
shared identity characteristics and power struggles that form part of the construction of 
Britain. 
 Consequently, by drawing upon a processually relational analysis of Britain (chapter 
one) and by providing a multi-national analysis of British identity (chapter two), it became 
apparent that Britain’s imperial past has formed an important part of the discursive 
construction of Britain.  In such instances, a historical perspective offers a useful way of 
communicating and understanding the changing interdependencies, power balances and 
spacial orientations that impede upon the nation.  By historically locating social research 
(Dunning, 1992), social investigations can avoid perceiving social life as timeless or 
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radically different in post-modern times (Maguire and Young, 2002 see Bauman, 2000 
and Giddens, 1985; 1991). Furthermore, Dunning (1992) and others (Maguire, 1995; 
Maguire and Young, 1992) have noted that by understanding how present circumstances 
are ‘historically’ formed, a greater level of detachment by the researcher can be achieved 
(Elias, 1987).  
 Ultimately, therefore, this proposes a complex analysis of British identity and a 
focus upon the ambiguities that envelop multi-national identifications, such as, Britain.  
Indeed: 
 
any long-term enquiry into state-formation and nation-building processes can show 
that every spurt towards greater interdependence, towards closer integration of 
human groups which were previously independent – or less dependent, or less 
reciprocally dependent – on each other runs through a series of specific integration 
tensions and conflicts, of balance of power struggles which are not accidental, but 
[rather] structural concomitants of these spurts towards greater functional 
interdependence of ‘parts’ within a ‘whole’. (Elias, 2008a: 111) 
 
Accordingly, if one considers, the gradual emergence of the British state and empire as 
well as its eventual decline, then one can observe how long-term processes of integration 
and dis-integration form an important part of the construction of Britain.  To this extent, 
analyses of Britain should pay attention to the historical complexity of particular events as 
well as the changes and continuities that they propose.  Here, identification processes form 
part of complex national and transnational contexts through which representations are 
shaped and re-shaped in accordance with a historical context of power relations. 
 Crucially, this can not be achieved by viewing the nation and its identity in isolation 
but instead as part of a much wider investigation whereby changes at the level of human 
organization can elucidate upon those processes involved in the methods of 
inclusion/exclusion that are attributed to ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinctions and which delineate 
between established and outsider groups within a particular social figuration.  The ability 
to examine established-outsider relations and we/they images can allow one to consider 
how habitus and identification is ‘always – in the modern world where people belong to 
groups within groups within groups – multi-layered’ (Mennell, 1994: 177 [italics added]).  
Indeed, Elias (1991) argues that: 
 
The usefulness of the concept of the we-I balance as a tool of observation and 
reflection may perhaps be enhanced if we pay some attention to this multi-layered 
aspect of we-concepts.  It matches the plurality of interlocking integration planes 
characteristic of human society at this present stage of development (1991: 202 
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[italics added]) 
 
Consequently, there can be a multiple of we-relations occurring across various integration 
levels, each with their own intensity of identification (Elias, 1991; Maguire and Tuck, 
2005).  When adopting Elias’ processual view, it is important to remember that these 
identifications, individually experienced and collectively authored, should be seen as a 
long-term process (Moore, 2010).  In this regard, by turning to an examination of the 
British ‘imperial figuration’ and its formation and reformation over time, one can further 
elaborate upon the ‘multi-layered aspects of we-concepts’ and its relation to British we-
images, as perceived by both ‘Britain’ and the former dominions (Elias, 1991: 202).  This, 
in turn, requires a methodological process that can seek to support as well as critically 
analyse a multi-national analysis of the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic 
Games.  With this in mind, the following chapter will outline this process in further detail. 
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Chapter Four: Method and Methodology – Involvement and detachment, 
Thematic Coding and the Data Sample 
 
Introduction 
 
In light of previous chapters, it is evident that British identity has been inextricably linked 
to both nationalist and imperialist ideologies and characteristics (Colley, 2005; Darwin, 
2009; 2010; Darian-Smith et al., 2007; Howe, 2010; Kumar, 2003; 2006; Lester, 2001; 
2006; Maguire, 1993b; Malcolm, 2012; Stockwell, 2008; Van Duinen; Ward, 2007; 
Wilson, 2004; 2006).  Indeed, these two dynamics provide the framework through which 
the social, cultural and political circumstances surrounding Britain and the British Empire 
can be conceived.  Here, imperial history provides a crucial segway to understanding the 
identity, values and character of contemporary Britain (Howe, 2010).  However, what is 
also apparent is that contrary to nationalist rhetoric, it remains difficult to locate an 
essential identity or character that can be demarcated to a specific geographical boundary 
or particular national group (Cohen, 1994).  In fact, such deductions lack historical 
perspective and how national culture, identity and history are based upon interdependent 
interactions, both internal and external, between various nations/nation-states.   
 With this in mind, this thesis has sought to follow an interdependent path by 
exploring how the historical emergence of the British state and empire was based upon, 
and, indeed, helped to consolidate, a number of national groups, both within the UK and 
the Commonwealth.  To this extent, this chapter will continue on this path by laying the 
foundation for a multi-national examination of the national press coverage of both the 
2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games.  Specifically, this chapter will 
outline how an analysis of the domestic ‘British’ as well as Australian, Canadian and New 
Zealand national press provided the opportunity to explore the national mediated 
construction of Britain and British identity.  Before this, however, a return to the research 
problem/aims will help draw together the former chapters in accordance with the 
research’s methodology. 
 
4.0. Returning to the research problem 
 
As detailed in the Introduction, this thesis aims to explore how the British domestic 
and Commonwealth national press sought to construct, frame and represent Britain 
and British identity during the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games.  
Indeed, as highlighted in chapter’s one and two, British identity was not just confined 
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to the UK but was also shaped by a wider ‘imperial figuration’ comprising – in this 
instance – the ‘old dominions’ of Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Boyce, 2008; 
Darwin, 2010; Howe, 2010; Peers, 2002; Mycock, 2010; Wellings, 2003).  The 
relationship between Britain’s domestic home nations and former dominions was 
considered further in chapter three.  Here, it was argued, that when conceived through 
a multi-layered analysis, Britain’s state and later imperial development and decline 
had resulted in various levels of integration within Britain and the Commonwealth.  
Accordingly, in order to account for these layers/levels and their tension struggles 
(Mennell, 2007), an established-outsider model was adopted in order to explore how 
such tensions between the British home nations and the former dominions have 
shaped, and, indeed, continue to shape, the construction, framing and representation 
of Britain.  In doing so, it was highlighted that a multi-national analysis of the British 
domestic and selected Commonwealth national press can be used to explore how 
Britain’s multi-figurational dynamics are discursively constructed along established-
outsider lines (Elias and Scotson, 1994; Fairclough, 1995). 
With this in mind, this chapter will explore how ‘an analysis of texts is a 
significant part of sociocultural analysis of media, by linking properties of texts to 
ideologies, power relations and cultural values’ (Fairclough, 1995: 24).  More 
importantly, in accordance with chapter three’s discussion on the discursive 
construction of power balances within media discourses and in light of Elias and 
Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model, the selected research techniques that 
have been used to analyse both the British domestic and Commonwealth national 
press will be considered.  In addition, this chapter will reflect upon the role of the 
researcher with regards to knowledge production as well as their position in the 
overall research process (Elias, 1987; 2008).   
Taking the above into consideration, this thesis is amenable to the critique that 
at this point in the research certain denigrations may suggest a level of ‘armchair’ 
theorising with regards to the theoretical foundations that have been declared thus far.  
That is, a separation of research and theory has occurred in which the application of a 
process sociological established-outsider model has been chosen, and, as a 
consequence, will continue to be used in order to interpret the data in an apriori 
fashion.  Therefore, in response, I would argue that an overriding aim of this thesis 
has been to undertake a processually orientated and relational account of Britain that 
has sought to consider how Britain has been constructed and represented under 
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particular figurational conditions, emanating from its state (1707) and later imperial 
emergence (post-1783).1  Under such an aim, it has been noted that constructions of 
Britain are based upon domestic state relations between the home nations as well as 
between a wider imperial metropole and periphery, of which the old dominions have 
been selected for further analysis.  Accordingly, revisiting literature on Britain and 
British identity from 1707 onwards has revealed how constructions of Britain were 
predicated on particular tensions, integration struggles, paradoxes and power 
balances.  Indeed, such interpretations have subsequently been viewed through an 
established-outsider lens and previous research, which has also used this model, has 
been consulted and drawn upon (Bloyce et al., 2010; Bucholc, 2013; Engh et al., 
2013; Lake, 2013; Loyal, 2011; Sutton and Vertigans, 2002; Maguire, 2011; Mennell, 
2007; Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987; Velija and Flyn, 2010; Vogler, 2000).  The 
contention here is that national newspaper discourses can reflect and be interpreted 
through the established-outsider model in order to ascertain concernable similarities 
and difference within each nation’s newspaper coverage.  Certainly, while this has 
provided, and, will continue to provide, a lens for the interpretation of the data, the 
Conclusion will highlight – in light of the data – revisions and adaptations to the 
established-outsider model, a process that not only seeks to build a link between 
theory and data, but which is also based upon important significances from the data.  
To this extent, the following section will explore how my involvement with the topic 
has shaped the research design. 
 
4.1. Involvement and detachment: defending and distancing 
 
Unavoidably, the identity of the social scientist is embedded within the social and 
cultural systems of various social groups.  Indeed, Billig (1995) accurately reflects the 
‘involved’ nature of sociological research on nationalism when he states that ‘one 
cannot step outside the world of nations, nor rid oneself of the assumption and 
common-sense habits which come from living within that world’ (1995: 37).  
Accordingly, the effect that such assumptions can have is highlighted by Biswas 
(2007) who, while drawing upon the work of Said, notes that: 
 
Said acknowledges the fact that all intellectual work occurs in a (national) 
context which imposes upon one’s intellect certain linguistic boundaries, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See chapter two, section 2.2 
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particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic 
political constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such 
restrictions upon the intellectual imagination (2007: 125-126) 
 
Certainly, while accepting that ‘analysts must expect to be affected by what should be 
the object of their study’ (Billig, 1995: 37), such assumptions can reflect both a cost 
and a benefit (Perry et al., 2004).  Baur and Ernst (2011) argue that ‘the problem is 
not whether subjectivity influences perception – it does’, instead, what is required is 
an understanding of ‘how it frames perception’ (2011: 120 [italics in original]).   
Consequently, while subjectivity displays the capacity to distort social 
research, it also provides a means for understanding the significances behind human 
action (Baur and Ernst, 2011).  Indeed, this can allow the social scientist to 
‘accurately [reflect] the reality of the personal situations of social researchers’ 
compared to that which traditional scientific methods allow (Perry et al., 2004: 139).  
Elias (1987) notes: 
 
By and large, theories of science still use as their principal model the physical 
sciences – often not in their contemporary, but in their classical form.  Aspects 
of their procedures are widely regarded as the most potent and decisive factor 
responsible for their achievements and as the essential characteristic of science 
generally.  By abstracting such aspects from the actual procedures and 
techniques of the physical sciences, one arrives at a general model of scientific 
procedure which is known as ‘the scientific method’ (1987: 17) 
 
Thus, detached forms of social control, induced emotional restraints and embodied 
conceptual tools have become institutionalized as part of the scientific tradition (Elias, 
1998a).  Here, Mennell and Goudsblom (1998) elaborate: 
 
It is the conception of the person (in the singular) as the ‘subject’ of 
knowledge, a single thinking mind inside a sealed container from which each 
one looks out and struggles to fish for knowledge of the ‘objects’ outside in 
the ‘external world’.  Among those objects are other minds, equally locked 
inside their own sealed containers, and one of the most difficult questions 
epistemologists (and sociologists influenced by them) pose for themselves is 
of how one thinking subject inside its own container can ever know anything 
of what is being thought and what is known by those objects – those other 
subjects – thinking away inside their own containers in turn (1998: 33)   
 
As can be seen from Mennell and Goudsblom’s (1998) remarks, such conceptions of 
the individual and the scientific method that this employs, has resulted in an approach 
to science, whereby a level of ‘detachment’ towards physical events has become the 
dominant method for acquiring ‘scientific’ knowledge (Elias, 1987) and the 
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measuring of ‘truth’ (Dunning and Hughes, 2012).  Here the scientist ‘takes up his 
position “in” the single individual … He looks through his eyes at the world “outside” 
as if through small windows; or he mediates from the same standpoint on what is 
happening “within” (Elias, 1998b: 290). 
In contrast to this approach, Elias argued that ‘sociological analysis moves 
constantly between the two poles of ‘involvement’ and ‘detachment’, between an 
expression of the sociologist’s subjective experience of the world, and the attempt to 
transcend that experience in gaining an objective, scientific perspective’ (Van 
Krieken, 1998: 71 [italics in original]).  What is required from the social scientist, 
therefore, is a ‘detour via detachment’.  Dunning and Hughes (2012) elaborate: 
 
What the metaphor of a ‘detour’ means is that, like other social scientists, 
sociologists have specific interests to defend emotionally involved positions 
but should strive to learn, at first, to distance themselves from and control 
them, and then return to them via a process of ‘secondary involvement’. 
(2012: 13) 
 
The process of moving from an involved to a detached position and then back to a 
more involved perception can help achieve what Elias (1987) referred to as ‘reality-
congruent’ knowledge (Dunning and Hughes, 2012). 2   Indeed, while the social 
scientist should not achieve complete detachment, the involvement-detachment 
balance can best be ‘viewed as a key sensitizing concept: one that brings to the 
forefront of the researcher’s consciousness the complexities – and, in particular, the 
risk of distortion – inherent in the process of conducting qualitative research’ (Perry et 
al., 2004: 138).  These concerns help sensitize the researcher to issues regarding the 
distance between participant and inquirer.  It acknowledges that ‘it is impossible to 
objectively analyse the social world because researchers are simultaneously analysts 
of and interdependent actors in the social processes they seek to understand’ (Moore, 
2010: 1.3).  Importantly, however, these dynamics can allow the researcher to ‘bring 
with them their own experiences, assumptions and their own, largely unconscious, 
habitus’ (Moore, 2010: 1.3).  It is here that: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Here, Elias (1987) aimed to move away from a distanced conception of knowledge, performed by an 
isolated and essentially rational human being.  Instead, and, in accordance with his processual 
orientations, Elias viewed knowledge as being developmentally tied to particular figurational 
arrangements.  That is, knowledge is entwined with particular figurational contexts and human 
psyches, of which progression and regressions can occur (Dunning and Hughes, 1987).  See Burkitt 
(1993) for a discussion of Elias’s concerns regarding the work of Nietzsche and his lack of 
‘detachment’.   
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The task of social scientists is to explore, and to make people understand, the 
patterns they form together, the nature and the changing configurations of all 
that binds them to each other.  The investigators themselves form part of these 
patterns (Elias, 1998a: 225 [italics added]) 
 
Indeed, it is this degree of critical reflection that this thesis will attempt to 
demonstrate and apply when analysing the printed press coverage. 
 
4.2. Data sample: analysing the printed press – benefits and justifications  
 
The reasons for analysing national newspapers have already been considered in 
chapter three. 3   However, in line with this chapter’s broader methodological 
discussions, the aim here will be to explore some of the benefits and justifications of 
performing a printed press analysis.  Historically, since the invention of the printing 
press, newspapers have provided a central role in re-presenting the ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson, 2006).  Similarly, Colley (2005) argues that the consumption 
of early newspapers allowed the population of Britain to ‘imagine’ itself as a larger 
polity.  The reporting of national events, such as the death of a member of the royal 
family, became instantly framed by newspaper coverage, demonstrated through both 
the text and layout of the newspaper.4 
Indeed, whereas, the format of the traditional printed newspaper may have 
undergone its own variations over time, the newspaper still commands a prominent 
role in communicating textual information (Whitlam and Preston, 1998).  Young and 
Dugas (2012) note that ‘newspapers remain an important contributor to public 
discourse on controversial issues, and are a key means by which claims and narratives 
are communicated and legitimized to the ‘lay’ public’ (Young and Dugas, 2012: 27).  
Accordingly, Holland (2008) argues that the newspapers ‘usefulness as a primary 
source for students, authors, and researchers is unrivalled; the wide range of topics 
and subjects they cover appeals to a broad range of users’ (2008: 18).  Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, analyses of newspaper content have been subject to numerous qualitative 
and quantitative investigations. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See section 3.2.3. 
4 In one particular example, Colley (2005) notes that ‘When the Prince Regent’s daughter and heir 
presumptive to the throne, Princess Charlotte, died in childbirth in November 1817, several provincial 
newspapers experimented with outlining their front pages in black for the occasion.  This became the 
standard practice for subsequent royal casualties, adding drama to reportage and instantly 
communicating the fact of national loss to those who could only look at print, not read it’ (2005: 220). 
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However, while press analyses have proven a popular source of enquiry in 
media analyses (Mayring, 2000), such an approach ignores the benefits associated 
with investigations of audience perception.  Subsequently, audience analyses can 
provide a further insight into the effects of media production and how the audience 
relate and ‘make sense’ of media texts relative to the ‘agenda setting’ capacity of 
news producers (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007).  In addition, decreasing newspaper 
sales and increasing use of online sources for news information have led to questions 
regarding the popularity and validity of the traditional printed press (Bardoel, 2002). 
Nonetheless, the purpose of this thesis, is to investigate how national, global 
and imperial forms of identification, were framed across the former old white 
dominions of the British Empire.  Accordingly, while newspapers have often claimed 
‘national’ status ‘their textual contents … provide useful evidence for examining 
perceptions of nations and national identity’ (MacInnes et al., 2007: 188).  
Consequently, examinations of media content provide a useful approach to analysing 
a range of international media outlets.  Indeed, five main benefits were identified. 
First, cross-cultural analyses of newspaper titles can be used to help produce a 
more nuanced sense of the various thematic representations that are used to denote a 
particular national identity across several national newspapers.  Whereas, the 
researcher should remain aware of the different linguistic conventions across cultures 
and the variations this may have upon text production, such differences can often 
reveal corresponding differentiations in the psychological and sociological structure 
of particular cultures (Lee and Peterson, 1997).  Accordingly, Goldthorpe (1987) 
states: 
 
In order to explain patterns of variation in social structure and culture, 
comparisons between societies are clearly essential; and if the range of 
comparison is not to be severely restricted then societies of the past as well as 
of the present must undoubtedly be included in the analysis (1987: 168) 
 
In such instances, ‘it is often through comparison with other worlds, historically as 
well as geographically distant, that our own social existence is made most intelligible’ 
(Goldthorpe, 1987: 170). 
Second, while Goffman (1979) assumed that the media played a vital role in 
shaping what was normal and desirable within society, often, the press’ use of agenda 
setting can help raise the salience of particular issues, which are portrayed within the 
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public agenda (Collins et al., 2006).  In the context of national identity these concerns 
can reveal how the media reflect and reinforce dominant ideologies of the nation. 
Third, by acknowledging that the news is shaped by commercial, ideological 
and semiotic structures, is to conceive that all news stories are distorted and that 
journalists remain largely biased (Bell, 1991; Bignell, 2002).  As a result, news stories 
‘never simply denote a reality ‘objectively’’ but ‘always encode connotated meanings 
… which support a particular ideological point of view’ (Bignell, 2002: 86).  The 
uncovering of these meanings can allow the social scientist to observe and describe 
the multiple patterns and themes that help frame the news story via the on-going 
processes that structure the nation and national identity (Holden, 2011). 
Fourth, Fairclough (1995) argues that ‘there tends to be a rather monolithic 
view of the role of media in ideological reproduction which understates the extent of 
diversity and change in media practices and media discourse’ (1995: 28).  Indeed, the 
extent to which media discourses can change over time is often a reflection of the 
wider social developments within national and international society (Connolly and 
Dolan, 2012).  This stands in contrast to the use of interview and survey data, which 
simply document and describe national identifications without appreciating that such 
data ‘may be subject to historical change and contextual variability’ (Collins et al., 
2006: 125).5  Accordingly, the use of archival newspaper sources can help to achieve 
a longitudinal analysis that identifies social changes over a specific period as well as 
provide an appreciation of the variable nature of newspaper content in relation to 
differences in newspaper nationality, ownership and political orientation. 
Finally, newspapers can be used as ‘sensitive barometers of cultural change’ 
(Fairclough, 1995: 60; see also Dimitrova et al., 2005).  Dimitrova et al. (2005) argues 
that: 
 
Despite the similarities of mass media institutions across societies, the media 
are by origin, practice and convention very much national institutions and 
respond to domestic political and social pressures and to the expectation of 
their audiences.  They reflect, express and sometimes actively serve the 
‘national interest’, as determined by other, more powerful actors and 
institutions’ (McQuail, 1994: 121 cited in Dimitrova et al., 2005: 24 [italics in 
original])   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 In addition, investigations of online blog material have also contested the originality of news material, 
with concerns that these sources repeat the information from official news sources (Young and Dugas, 
2012). 
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Consequently, the newspaper-based analysis situates the interpretative capacity of the 
research at its heart allowing them to critically explore power relations and identity 
politics. 
 With this in mind, a critical analysis of the construction of Britain and British 
identity across a data sample that included selected national newspapers from 
Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales was 
chosen.  MacInnes et al. (2007) note that whereas ‘a nation has an identifiable spatial 
boundary, the greater the extent to which newspaper circulation is concentrated within 
and evenly distributed across it the greater the potential claim to national status’ 
(2007: 194 [italics in original]).  As a result, national newspapers from each nation 
were selected according to: readers ‘national identity’; location of ownership; finance 
control; location of editing; publishing and printing; presentation and self-description 
and editorial objectives (MacInnes et al., 2007). 
 Subsequently, in total 15 national newspapers were selected.  Five English 
tabloid and broadsheet newspaper were analysed (the Daily Mirror, the Daily Mail, 
the Daily Telegraph, the Guardian, The Independent), two Scottish (The Scotsman, 
the Herald), one Welsh (Western Mail) and one Northern Irish (Belfast Telegraph).6  
From the Commonwealth press, two Australian (The Australian, The Age), Canadian 
(The Globe and Mail, the Vancouver Sun) and New Zealand (the Dominion Post, the 
New Zealand Herald) national newspapers were selected.  Sunday editions of each 
newspaper were included and supplementary magazines and ‘pull outs’ were also 
analysed.  Whereas, hard copies of the Daily Mirror and the Western Mail were 
obtained, the remaining newspapers were downloaded using the ‘Press Display’ 
online service. 7   Each newspaper was selected in order to reflect the national 
perspectives of newspaper readers in each nation.  The following sections will discuss 
how each of these newspapers was collated and analysed.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 UK editions of each newspaper were selected.  Indeed, each of the major UK newspapers produces 
‘Scottish’ editions that are sold and distributed within Scotland.  Despite this, UK editions are sold and 
available in England, Northern Ireland and Wales.  Consequently, despite the fact that the ‘English’ 
newspapers are sold across the UK they are all based in London, England and are sold and read 
throughout England.  Indeed, the London-centric nature of the UK press has helped to spawn 
nationalist titles within the other home nations.  To this extent, The Scotsman, the Herald, the Belfast 
Telegraph and Western Mail offer a forum for reporting on nationalist debates and issues. 
7 PressDisplay.com is an online newspaper service that allows you to browse and download 
newspapers from around the world.  This allowed access to the Australia, Canadian, New Zealand, 
English, Northern Irish and Scottish newspapers on the day that they were published.  Importantly, the 
service allowed access to the printed editions of each newspaper. 
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4.3. Reading cultural texts: newspaper analysis 
 
Notably, Elias (1991) argued that the make-up of the social habitus ‘grows out of the 
common language which the individual shares with others and which is certainly a 
component of his [sic] social habitus’ (1991: 82).    Indeed, if signs give form and 
meaning to thought and experience, then our own ‘identity’ and our own 
interpretation of these signs, is dependent upon a set of specific meanings that are 
socially constructed (Gaines, 2012).  Thus: 
 
When we consider advertising, news, and TV or film texts, it will become 
clear that linguistic, visual, and other kinds of sign are used not simply to 
denote something, but also to trigger a range of connotations attached to the 
sign (Bignell, 2002: 79) 
 
Accordingly, examinations of language-based media can prove crucial in 
understanding the culturally symbolic nature of particular signs, connotations and 
discursive practices, which are used to refer to a particular individual or national 
group (Gaines, 2012).  In such instances, human interaction involves the employment 
of socially learned signs, which are dependent upon the individual’s habitus (Danesi 
and Peron, 1999; Van Krieken, 1998).  Correspondingly, these signs reflect and form 
part of larger forms of human organization, such as the nation-state, which reflect 
their own national habitus codes.    
 Accordingly, in order to make sense of the particular signs, patterns and 
thematic categories that can be deduced from newspaper articles, an analysis of 
newspaper discourses is required that can help to elucidate upon the article’s notable 
characteristics.  Indeed, content analysis approaches can provide an effective method 
for collecting and counting particular themes within large quantities of data.  As a 
result, the method has often been used in relation to quantitative studies that have 
sought to make statistical and numerical inferences (Hedenborg, 2013).  However, in 
such instances, forms of meaning and wider discursive contexts are often ignored and 
a static reading of the text is provided.   
Nonetheless, despite these deficiencies the content analysis method can be 
used in combination with various other forms of data collection and analysis (Cotter, 
2001).  In particular, analyses of the thematic content of a wide range of newspaper 
articles can be inferred from examining and collating particular discourses within the 
text.  These discourses can be thematically highlighted and organised in order to 
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examine how notions of power, particular representations of ‘reality’ and the 
construction of social relations and identities form part of newspaper discourses 
(Millington and Darnell, 2014).8  In fact, Edmunds and Turner (2001) argue that ‘it is 
the task of the sociologist … to discern patterns’ within data  (2001: 88). 
With this in mind, a qualitative thematic content analysis was chosen as an 
effective method for examining the discursive properties and thematic patterns 
inherent within the Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and British newspaper 
coverage (Deacon et al., 1999; Jensen and Jankowski, 2002).  Providing a much 
broader vision to the traditional ‘content analysis’ method, which simply counts and 
describes the attributes of data, thematic content analysis extracts, categorises and 
interprets the essential characteristics of the newspaper article (Joffe and Yardley, 
2004; Kohlbacher, 2006).  This can be used to critically examine the language, 
meaning and tone of a newspaper article (Gunter, 2000).  In addition, this method can 
also be harnessed for national, international and cross-national analyses (Lee and 
Peterson, 1997).  Thus, it can provide a suitable method of analysis for the multi-
national approach used in this thesis. 
 
4.4. Thematic analysis: coding the data 
 
In accordance with the research aims, each newspaper article was analysed in order to 
highlight particular aspects of the article that alluded to the representation or framing 
of Britain and British identity.  Indeed, Berg (2006) notes that ‘In its simplest form, a 
theme is a simple sentence, a string of words with a subject and a predicate’ (2006: 
312).  However, this is not to suggest that all themes are clearly demarcated and 
distinct nor is it to argue that the collection of themes should be arbitrary.  Rather, it is 
to suggest that the obtaining of particular themes is based upon a process of 
categorisation whereby examination and comparison of the text is used to represent 
frequently occurring sentiments or significances. 
Accordingly, underpinning the development of themes within thematic 
analysis is the coding of specific aspects of an article, which are assigned a particular 
‘code’ or ‘theme’ (Hilton and Hunt, 2010).  These codes are subsequently recorded 
onto coding sheets.9  Indeed, this process is dependent upon whether themes are 
drawn from existing ideas that the researcher brings to the data (deductive coding) or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 See chapter three, sections 3.1. and 3.2.3. 
9 See Appendix I for an example of the coding sheet used in this study. 
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from the raw data itself (inductive coding) (Mayring, 2000).  Consequently, in 
deductive coding the focus of analysis tends to rely more on the verification of themes 
found in previous research (Sterkenburg et al., 2010).  Indeed, whereas the use of 
provisional ideas was obtained during the literature review, inductive coding ensured 
that new themes were allowed to emerge (Sterkenburg et al., 2010). 
With the above concerns in mind, it is evident that the ‘coding and analysis of 
data are activities that can begin in the early stages of data collection’ (Seale, 2004: 
319).  These stages will often involve interpreting both the manifest and latent content 
of the article.  In regards to the former, manifest content relates to characteristics that 
are directly observable from the article.  Conversely, latent content relates to the 
implicit meanings embedded within the article, whereby something is implicitly 
referred to (Joffe and Yardley, 2004).  In relation to thematic analyses, Joffe and 
Yardley (2004) note that: 
 
Thematic analyses often draw on both types of theme, and even when the 
manifest theme is the focus, the aim is to understand the latent meaning of the 
manifest themes observable within the data, which requires interpretation 
(2004: 57)    
 
More importantly, this requires staying ‘true to the raw data, and its meaning within a 
particular context of thoughts, rather than attaching too much importance to the 
frequency of codes which have been abstracted from their context’ (Joffe and 
Yardley, 2004: 67 [italics added]).  Measuring the frequency of codes is more 
commonly associated with quantitative thematic analysis, such as, the previously 
mentioned ‘content analysis’ method (Kohlbacher, 2006).  Here, the exclusive coding 
of each article (assigning a single theme to the whole article) is an important part of 
providing statistical results (Joffe and Yardley, 2004). 
However, the ‘meaning’ of an article can often be deduced through the use of 
a number of themes.  Indeed, for this thesis it was decided that an exclusively 
‘quantitative’ approach to coding would not elucidate upon the various attributes of 
the article.  Accordingly, a qualitative method of analysis was used to understand the 
ways in which the print media represented British identity (Andriotis, 2010).  As a 
result, it was decided that each article would be coded for as many themes as it 
contained (Joffe and Yardley, 2004).  Indeed, this decision was supported by a 
process of open and axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Vincent et al., 2010).   
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Strauss and Corbin (1990) define open coding as ‘the process of breaking 
down, examining, comparing, conceptualising, and categorizing data’ (1990: 61).  
This systematic approach to the generation of themes allows the researcher to become 
familiar with the text, highlighting and recording key sections of the text, which relate 
to a specific theme (Chamberlain, Camic and Yardley, 2004).  Consequently, ‘this 
stage involves initially underlining significant events, facts, and incidents … that 
assist in the identification of themes or key words’ (Noiseux and Ricard, 2008: 1151).  
In short, this can be conceived as stepping into the data, as the researcher consciously 
involves themself with the article’s characteristics, meaning and tone (Elias, 1978).  
Accordingly, an open coding of each newspaper article formed the first stage of 
analysis. 
The second stage of analysis involved refining the specific themes obtained 
during open coding (Noiseux and Ricard, 2008).  This stage of analysis is referred to 
as axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Vincent et al., 2010).  Here, initial themes 
are examined for explanation, justification and verification (Perry et al., 2004).  In 
doing so, the researcher begins ‘to confirm and elaborate the scope of categories 
established earlier’ in order ‘to identify how they may be related, and to identify 
limits to their applicability’ (Chamberlain et al., 2004: 76).  This helps to uncover 
relationships between themes, which were subsequently identified and clustered under 
broader thematic titles that underpin their association (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane, 
2006).  Indeed, this requires a degree of detachment from the researcher as they step 
out of their original involvement in order to consider the broader thematic structure of 
the news coverage (Elias, 1978; Lee and Maguire, 2009). 
 
4.4.1. Managing a thematic analysis: issues and concerns 
 
Overall, a crucial aim of the analysis of each newspaper was based upon ensuring that 
each theme was represented fairly across both the domestic and foreign press 
coverage.  Indeed, the open-coding stage ensured that the collected themes were 
sufficiently exhaustive in order to account for each variation in the article’s content 
(Berg, 2006).  As a result, this stage of coding worked inductively.  Axial coding 
provided a second stage whereby themes were compared, contrasted and justified 
(Berg, 2006).  Accordingly, axial coding ensured that less frequent themes were not 
forgotten or ignored but were considered in regards to their relationship with the 
overall thematic structure.  Ultimately, this stage of analysis provided a deductive 
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reading of the data as broader themes were developed and related to the overall 
thematic structure as well as the existing literature (Chamberlain et al., 2004; Elias, 
1978).  This allowed for the development of theoretical concepts and ideas to 
contribute to an analysis of the evidence (Maguire and Young, 2002).  Consequently, 
thematic categories were formed through theoretical discussions relating to existing 
bodies of knowledge regarding Britain and the established-outsider model.  In such 
instances, an interweaving between themes and theory was achieved (Elias, 1978; 
Maguire and Young, 2002). 
Incidentally, during the formation of thematic categories my own ‘theoretical 
sensitivity’ proved particularly important (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  Theoretical 
sensitivity refers to the ‘ability to give insight and meaning to data’ by understanding 
the role of the researcher in the research process (McCreaddie and Payne, 2010: 787).  
Ultimately, whereas, my own apriori beliefs, emotions and assumptions were 
reflective of my involvement with the subject, ‘the interpretive capabilities of the 
research can be enhanced – or diminished – by some degree of involvement’ (Perry et 
al., 2004: 144 [italics added]).  Therefore, a central part of the research process 
involved maintaining a balance between an inductive and deductive coding of the 
data, indeed, this worked alongside Elias’s (1978; 1987) involvement-detachment 
balance.  As a result, ‘no theme can be entirely inductive or data driven, since the 
researcher’s knowledge and preconceptions will inevitably influence the identification 
of themes’ (Joffe and Yardley, 2004: 58).  Subsequently, this influence was managed 
via the use of a notebook during the coding process, which allowed for any thoughts 
and observations to be recorded and used during the research process. 
 
4.5. Analysing the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games: the research 
process 
 
In regards to the media’s reporting of both the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic 
Games, it was decided that the following data ranges would provide sufficient 
coverage of both events: Diamond Jubilee: 1st June 2012 to 5/6th June, Olympic 
Opening Ceremony: 26th to 28/29th July 2012 and Closing Ceremony: 11th to 13/14th 
August 2012.10  In addition, it was also decided during the collection of data that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The Olympic Opening Ceremony took place on Friday 27th July 2012.  The Olympic Closing 
Ceremony took place on Sunday 12th August 2012.  Due to the time differences between Australia, 
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coverage of Team GB’s ‘Super Saturday’ (4th August) should also be included.11  
Collected articles were divided into two categories, domestic UK press coverage 
(England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales) and Commonwealth press coverage 
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand).  These were analysed separately.  In total 15 
newspapers and their Sunday equivalents were chosen.  Overall 772 newspapers were 
analyzed.   
Once all the newspapers had been collected, downloaded and separated into 
their respective categories the data process could begin.  Firstly, this involved reading 
through each newspaper in order to select those articles that related to the Diamond 
Jubilee and Olympic Games.  Once all the articles had been collected, each article was 
read through a second time in order to ensure that those articles relevant to the 
research aim were kept and those that were irrelevant were discarded.  This involved 
selecting articles that focused upon the following issues: their portrayal of Britain 
(people, landmarks, customs), reference to assumed British characteristics or values 
and any noted similarities and differences between Britain and the national origin of 
the newspaper.  In the case of the Diamond Jubilee, issues regarding the 
Commonwealth or suggestions of republicanism were also collected. 
Conveniently, this process ensured that each newspaper/article had gone 
through a process of filtration, whereby content that did not relate directly to the aims 
of this thesis could be eliminated (Fan, 1988).  Appropriately, this also began the 
process of ‘immersing’ the researcher within the data, allowing them to become 
acutely aware of its contents and themes (Mayring, 2000). 
Once all relevant articles had been selected attention turned to analysing each 
article.  Following the previously discussed research strategy, each article was coded 
inductively, drawing upon both its manifest and latent content (Joffe and Yardley, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Canada, New Zealand and Britain, newspapers from Australia, Canada and New Zealand were also 
collected on the 6th June, 29th July and 14th August in order to allow for any coverage of the previous 
days events to be collected.   
11 ‘Super Saturday’ referred to Day 8 of the Olympic Games (4th August).  On this day, Great Britain 
achieved its most successful day at an Olympic Games since the 1908 London Olympic Games.  Team 
GB won 6 gold medals in rowing, cycling and athletics.  The day culminated in three of the gold 
medals being won in the space of 46 minutes.  This included Jessica Ennis in the women’s heptathlon, 
Greg Rutherford in the men’s long jump and Mo Farah in the men’s 10 000 meters.  Due to the success 
of Team GB on this day it was decided that the day’s media coverage would provide a valuable insight 
into the press’ construction of Britain on this day.  As a result, press coverage on the 4th, 5th and 6th of 
August was included.  Therefore, the data ranges for each event was (including British and 
Commonwealth press coverage): 01/06/12 – 06/06/12 (Diamond Jubilee); 26/07/12 – 29/07/12 
(Olympic Opening Ceremony); 04/08/12 – 06/08/12 (‘Super Saturday’) and 11/08/12 – 14/08/12 
(Olympic Closing Ceremony).    
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2004).12  This involved reading through the whole article and selecting those areas 
that related to a particular theme.  This was then coded onto a separate coding sheet, 
upon which the title of the theme and an example were recorded.  If an article 
contained more that one theme then each theme was recorded onto the coding sheet.  
This stage of analysis followed an ‘open’ method of coding analysis, resulting in a 
large collection of themes being obtained (Strauss and Corbin, 1990).  Once each 
article had been coded, axial coding could begin. 
As previously discussed, the axial coding stage allowed for the previously 
obtained themes, to be subsumed by broader overarching thematic categories.  Again, 
this required returning to the data in order to ensure that these broader categories 
accurately reflected the previously obtained themes.  Eventually, several sub-themes 
were obtained forming an overall thematic structure for both the UK and foreign 
press.  The findings of which will be considered in the following chapter. 
However, before attention turns to the findings chapters, the following 
conclusion will provide a short discussion of the chapters’ aims and purposes, include 
a brief overview of both the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games as well as 
highlight some general observations that were recorded during both events as well as 
during the research analysis. 
 
4.6. The data: aims and purposes 
 
Preliminary discussions of the data had initially sought to find distinct comparisons 
between the various national newspapers, with the aim of uncovering a number of 
important contrasts across each nation’s coverage. 13   However, after numerous 
readings of the data, the degree of difference between each newspaper, in respect of 
providing a significant comparison, was of only minor significance.  Instead, it was 
found that nationalizing any particular set of themes served to ignore broader 
similarities across each nation’s coverage.  Accordingly, while the national 
particularities of each newspaper will be noted, the following chapters shall only refer 
to important differences where a substantive significance within a particular thematic 
category was observable.    
 With this in mind, the following themes, when placed within a wider historical 
narrative of Britain, will allow one to observe ‘thematic’ patterns across the data.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See section 4.4. 
13 These discussions took place between my tutor and myself. 
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Indeed, it is important not to view the following chapters as disparate sections but as 
part of a wider discussion relating to the press’ construction, framing and 
representation of British identity.  In accordance with the aforementioned research 
process, themes were selected due to their frequency but also, more importantly, upon 
the resonance that certain themes prescribed.14 
 Consequently, whereas previous work has sought to draw upon the relationship 
between Britain, British identity and the British Empire, the following chapters will 
reveal how contemporary constructions of Britain, were shaped by Britain’s imperial 
history, contemporary despondency and domestic contentions.  Indeed, for the 
moment, such suggestions provide a precursory insight into the multi-layered 
construction of habitus and the paradoxes, struggles and frictions that underlie 
representations of Britain.  As a result, these issues will be returned to in the 
conclusion chapter. 
 
4.6.1. The 2012 Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic Ceremonies: a brief 
overview 
 
Building upon the level of constructed patriotism and national fever which had 
surrounded the press’ coverage of the 2011 Royal Wedding, the preceding 2012 
Diamond Jubilee provided an additional source of British ‘celebration’ (Poulton and 
Maguire, 2012).  The Diamond Jubilee consisted of a four-day national holiday for 
the UK, commencing on the 1 June.  Notable amongst the celebrations was the River 
Thames Diamond Jubilee Pageant on the 3 June and the Diamond Jubilee Concert 
hosted outside Buckingham Palace on the 4 June.   
 Commenting upon the Thames Pageant, Gardiner and Westall (2012) suggested 
that the flotilla conflated ‘three main historical moments’ relating to Britain’s 
‘dominance over the Spanish Armada, Trafalgar, and Dunkirk’ (Gardiner and Westall, 
2012).15  Echoing the 1662 flotilla held for Charles II’s restoration, the 2012 ‘record-
breaking’ flotilla served as a reflection of the relationship between Britain, its 
maritime past and the British Empire (Black, 2005).16 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 See section 4.4. 
15 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/michael-gardiner-claire-westall/last-great-british-
summer-for-england, retrieved: 13 May 2012. 
16 The flotilla surpassed the previous record of 327 for the largest parade of boats (BBC, 2012a). 
 154 
 The prevalence of the British Royal Family would also continue throughout the 
London Olympics.  The attendance of Prince William and Kate Middleton (the Duke 
and Duchess of Cambridge) and Prince Harry (Prince of Wales) was largely 
acknowledged across the press.  Indeed, this included the participation of Zara 
Phillips, a Team GB silver medalist in the team equestrian.  Undoubtedly, however, 
this royal attention followed in the wake of the Queen’s dramatic involvement in the 
Games Opening Ceremony.  Here, alongside the fictional character, James Bond 
(played by the British actor Daniel Craig), the Queen provided a short segment, in 
which both she and Bond boarded a helicopter en-route to the Olympic stadium.  
Upon arrival, a pre-recorded film and a live helicopter hovering above the stadium, 
heralded the Queen’s dramatic entrance to the Games, with a stuntman providing the 
illusion of a parachuting Queen Elizabeth and James Bond.  Certainly, whereas 
elements of Britain’s past were clearly visible throughout the ceremony, this 
particular segment provided a preliminary insight into the reframing of Britain’s 
image during the games.  Since the games, the renamed Queen Elizabeth Olympic 
Park has sought to further cement the Royal’s relationship with the London Olympics 
(BBC, 2010).  
 Overall, the Opening Ceremony’s creative director, Danny Boyle, aimed to 
provide a ceremony ‘that celebrate[d] the creativity, eccentricity, daring and openness 
of the British genius by harnessing the genius, creativity, eccentricity, daring and 
openness of modern London’ (Boyle, 11 cited in LOCOG, 2012).  In fact, despite the 
ceremony’s English-centered prelude depicting ‘a pastoral vision of a “green and 
pleasant land” complete with real sheep, pigs and goats’ (Gibson, Guardian, 
27/07/12), traditional hymns from the four British home nations served to officially 
declare the ceremony open.17  Here, England’s ‘Jerusalem’ was followed by Northern 
Ireland’s ‘Danny Boy’, Scotland’s ‘Flower of Scotland’ and, sung in English, Wales’s 
‘Bread of Heaven’ (Peters, 2012). 
 The celebratory atmosphere of the Opening Ceremony continued during the 
games official finale, the Closing Ceremony, which offered a representation of Britain 
‘TM’ (Leonard, 1997).  Performances by an array of British musicians, a stage set 
designed by British artist, Damien Hirst, and a catwalk of British models, including 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See chapter five, section 5.2.1. for more detail. 
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Kate Moss and Naomi Campbell – all modelling British designers – served to display 
a rather commercial and largely branded representation of Britain and British culture. 
 
4.6.2. The research sample: general observations 
 
Variations in the amount of coverage across each national newspaper were clearly 
visible during the collection and analysis of data.  In particular, within Britain, the 
Daily Telegraph, the Daily Mail and The Scotsman focused specifically on the jubilee 
celebrations.  In addition, commemorative and souvenir editions were included 
(Dominion Post, 02/06/12; Vancouver Sun, 02/06/12) and coverage tended to center 
on each nation’s domestic jubilee celebrations, with articles focusing upon each 
nation’s relationship with the monarchy but also local celebrations.    
 Whereas, none of the newspapers attempted to ignore the jubilee entirely, The 
Australian, The Age as well as The Independent provided the least amount of 
coverage.  Scotland’s the Herald was the most negative source of coverage on both 
the jubilee and the royal family, framing the majority of its content in light of the 
upcoming Independence Referendum.  Incidentally, there was also a lack of jubilee 
coverage in the Belfast Telegraph on the 04/06/12 due to the passing of the London 
Olympic Flame Relay through Belfast and Northern Ireland on this day.   
 Unsurprisingly, in their coverage of the Olympic Opening Ceremony, each 
national newspaper included interviews with, and, editorials on, the medal hopes of its 
competing ‘national’ athletes.  In this regard, the Belfast Telegraph was the most 
nation-centric in its coverage of competing athletes.  However, this included articles 
on athletes from both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.  This was 
continued across all newspapers in their coverage of the Closing Ceremony. 
 More broadly, coverage of the Opening Ceremony was widely reported across 
all the Commonwealth newspapers.  ‘Olympic’ commemorative editions and special 
‘pull-outs’ were also used within the British press.  Critical attention of the games was 
provided by the Herald, which tended to include articles relating to problems with 
tickets and disruptions to the transport system.  Indeed, whereas the above comments 
suggest that the amount of coverage tended to vary with regards to each nation, the 
following sections will focus specifically on those articles relating to the construction, 
representation and framing of Britain and British identity during both the Diamond 
Jubilee and London Olympic Games. 
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Chapter Five: ‘A Dis-United Kingdom’: devolution, British uncertainty and the 
survival of the British State? 
 
Introduction 
 
Writing a decade before the SNP’s victory in the 2011 general election, Edmunds and 
Turner (2001) proposed that devolution brought ‘no dramatic “break-up” of the UK’ a 
process that they believed to be ‘entirely consistent with the past’ (2001: 105).  Here, 
devolution did not represent the complete dislocation of Britain, but ‘rather, … the 
redistribution of selected responsibilities, with core state power residing in the 
national, that is, the British parliament’ (Wilson and Stapleton, 2006: 2).  In such 
instances, devolution reflected a continuation of the flexible and partial union of 
Britain, a relationship which Colley (2014a) believes has underlined the historical 
development of Britain since the Union of the Crowns in 1603.  However, while 
devolution may form part of a long-term tradition in relations between the British 
home nations, ‘in recent decades … the flux, uncertainty and debate[s] that have 
characterised Great Britain and the United Kingdom have become more evident and 
more raw’ (Colley, 2014a: 7; see also Colley, 2014b).  Consequently, in accordance 
with the possible strengthening of Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish nationalism, 
some have alluded to the lack of support for traditional British culture, ideas and 
values (Colley, 2014a; 2014b; Perryman, 2012; Rojek, 2007; Ward, 2004).  Indeed, 
devolution may have ‘entrenched a process that whilst not yet complete nevertheless 
imprints an indelible question mark on what remains of a tattered and torn Union 
Jack’ (Perryman, 2012: 203). 
With this in mind, both the Diamond Jubilee and the Olympic Games took 
place within a British domestic figuration of continuing ‘dis-unity’.  As a result, Hoey 
(2012) questioned the Queen’s reaction to devolution and its effects upon Britain, 
noting that ‘as Head of State of the United Kingdom she cannot have welcomed 
devolution in Scotland and Wales, perhaps seeing its as the possible start of the break-
up of her realm’ (Western Mail, 02/06/12).  In fact, the disparity between England and 
its neighbouring nations was exemplified in Morgan’s (2012) remarks that ‘the 
Olympics is bringing out a few of the inherent tensions in that curious balance 
between the overwhelming size of England and the three far smaller Celtic countries’ 
(Western Mail, 28/07/12).  In particular, Morgan’s (2012) remarks sought to highlight 
the tensions between an ‘established’ England, dominant in size, and a smaller 
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‘outsider’ Celtic periphery (Bradley, 2008; Hechter, 1975; Kumar, 2003; Malcolm, 
2012). 
However, while Morgan’s (2012) remarks can be considered in relation to the 
dominance of English culture in constructions of Britishness, for the English press, 
such tensions were perceived as relating to a degree of uncertainty regarding the 
‘future unity of the United Kingdom’ (Guardian, 02/06/12a).  Consequently, Taylor 
(2012) asked ‘do we still run to “national” events capable of bringing a significant 
percentage of the population into the streets with a common purpose?’ (Daily 
Telegraph, 02/06/12).  Similarly, Riddell (2012) added, ‘The economy is suffering, 
and so is Britain’s claim to be the cohesive country on display throughout the Jubilee’ 
(Daily Telegraph, 05/06/12). 
Accordingly, it is possible that concerns regarding Britain’s lack of world role 
and anxieties regarding its future were related to a potential ‘break-up’ of Britain.  
Indeed, in one of the very few comments related to the Scottish Independence 
Referendum within the English press, Sandbrook (2012) noted that: 
 
Even the survival of the United Kingdom itself, perhaps the most successful 
state in history, now seems in doubt. Once an eccentric sideshow, Scottish and 
Welsh nationalism have been growing in confidence since the early Seventies.  
With a Scottish independence referendum scheduled for 2014, it is a sobering 
thought that by the seventh decade of her reign, Elizabeth II may no longer 
preside over a united realm, but a ramshackle collection of squabbling little 
kingdoms, jumbled together across the British Isles (Daily Mail, 02/06/12)  
 
Sandbrook’s (2012) comments clearly highlight how the very unity of the ‘United’ 
Kingdom was itself under question by Scottish attempts to pursue independence. 
To this extent, concerns regarding British cohesion (Riddell, 2012; Sandbrook, 
2012; Taylor, 2012) and the apparent resurgence in national identifications across the 
UK (Perryman, 2009) may reflect the disintegration of the British state as a structural 
apparatus and the decline in British identity as an effective collective attachment (De 
Swaan, 1995).  Indeed, such concerns can be viewed as part of the ‘inherent tensions’ 
(Morgan, Western Mail, 28/07/12) that arise when the British home nations are 
brought together to compete in international sporting events or to celebrate national 
occasions.  Certainly, as chapters two and three have highlighted, such tensions do not 
arise independently but are located within a figuration of changing power balances 
between different groups (Burkitt, 1993).  The fact that England failed to receive its 
own devolutionary measures provides one example of how established-outsider 
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relations within the British state, that is, the balance of power between England and 
the other home nations, has changed since devolution.  Instead of reinventing national 
polarities, attention can be given to exploring the relational aspects, which underscore 
contemporary constructions of Britain.  To this extent, it is possible to observe how 
the British and Commonwealth press seek to negotiate their representation of, and, 
relation to, Britain. 
With this in mind, Elias and Scotson’s (1994) work on established-outsider 
relations will be used in order to explore how changing power relations between 
various groups are related to changes in national habitus (Mennell, 1994; Velija and 
Flynn, 2010).  Indeed, this works alongside previous chapters, which have 
endeavoured to highlight how British home nation and imperial relations have 
‘coexisted and competed … according to complex rhythms’ (Potter, 2007: 646).  
Consequently, the following sections will explore these ‘complex rhythms’ in relation 
to changes in the British domestic and imperial/Commonwealth figurations (decline 
from empire, emergence of the ‘Commonwealth of Nations’, devolution).  Therefore, 
this chapter will be divided into two interrelated sections.   
The first section will aim to examine how constructions of Britain’s past and 
anxieties about its future were drawn upon in the British and Commonwealth 
coverage.  More importantly, this will explore how past/present constructions were 
used in the press’ framing of Britain, not just within coverage from the British home 
nations but also within the former dominions.  Rather than being viewed as distinct 
and separated however, such constructions can be used in order to ascertain a 
processual account of the press’ representation of Britain and British identity.  This 
will be considered further in the second part of this chapter, where Elias and 
Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider framework will be employed.  Primarily this 
section will seek to observe how representations of Britain within the domestic – in 
particular, Scotland and England – and Commonwealth press coverage, underwent 
negotiated constructions of alteration, assimilation and contestation (Atkinson, 2002; 
Bucholc, 2013; Mennell, 2007; Sutton and Vertigans, 2002; Van Stolk and Wouters, 
1987; Velija and Flyn, 2010).  In particular, the established-outsider theory will be 
used to explore how relations between the British home nations and the former 
dominions can elucidate upon aspects of British ‘dis-unity’ during both the Diamond 
Jubilee and London Olympic Games.  It is here that a relational analysis of the 
media’s coverage will be utilized in order to consider how constructions of British 
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identity are reflective of wider – yet changing – power structures involving both 
Britain and the Commonwealth. 
 
5.0. British history: imperial power, imperial decline, fractured state 
 
According to Gillis (1996) ‘National identities are, like everything historical, 
constructed and reconstructed; and it is our responsibility to decode them in order to 
discover the relationships they create and sustain’ (1996: 4).  Indeed, nations and their 
identities are often depicted in relation to their history and past achievements 
(Anderson, 2006; Elias, 1996; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983).  Here, portrayals of the 
nation’s past are produced and reproduced in response to changing social dynamics, 
which evoke ‘sleeping memories’, embedded in the national unconsciousness 
(Maguire, 2005; Maguire and Tuck, 2005; Poulton, 2004).  In such instances, national 
holidays or national events can provide an institutionalized occasion for remembering, 
whereby the nation’s past and present are given historical meaning (Zerubavel, 1997).  
However, Le Goff (1992) argues that if ‘attachment to the past can admit novelties 
and transformations, the direction of the evolution it perceives is usually that of a 
decadence or a decline’ (1992: 9).  In such instances, the depiction of a romanticized 
and largely re-created national past, serves to underlie contemporary crisis and 
purported problems regarding the ‘national sense of belonging’ (Hassan, 2013a).1 
Indeed, changes within the nation are often related to feelings of degeneration, 
whereby, a sense of national loss and a reverence for the past become reflected in the 
personality of the nation and its inhabitants (Elias, 1996; 2010; 2012).  Accordingly, 
while the importance of Britain’s past was highlighted by Kissane (2012), who noted 
that Britain was ‘a nation that revels in its history and loves looking back’ (The Age, 
02/06/12), it could also serve to emphasise contemporary problems within Britain.  
With this in mind, the following sections will examine how representations of 
Britain’s past and present formed an important part of the British and Commonwealth 
press’ coverage. 
 
5.1. Britain – then and now: an ordered past meets an uncertain future  
 
The hosting of both a national and international event provides a notable opportunity 
for the host nation to present a positive image of its history and culture (Rowe, 2012).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/gerry-hassan/power-of-past-after-thatcher, retrieved: 
17 April 2013. 
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Indeed, such events are often reported to have a significant effect upon the emotions 
and attitudes of the host nation’s population (Ismer, 2011; see also Dayan and Katz, 
1992).  However, in the case of Britain, it was evident that a sense of anxiety 
underlined the press’ coverage of both the Diamond Jubilee and Olympic Games, 
with particular reference to Britain’s economic problems and the cost of the Games 
(Baum, 2012; Riddell, 2012; The Weekend Australian, 2012; see also Mangan et al., 
2013).  Writing in the Vancouver Sun, Holden (2012) noted that ‘the chance of some 
extra days off work and to enjoy the sort of extravaganza and public ceremony for 
which Britain is renowned has made it a welcome break from austere times, pay 
freezes and deep public spending cuts’ (02/06/12).  Here, the Olympic Games were 
seen to underscore Britain’s ‘national malaise’ (Hayward, Daily Telegraph, 27/07/12).  
Indeed, Hayward (2012) argued that: 
 
Smart modern nation or raddled old kleptocracy? Rule of law or oligarchical 
carveup? If we have not been asking these questions about the hosts of 
London 2012 then we have disengaged our brains. The problem for the Games 
themselves was that large tracts of the population had come to regard them as 
a symbol of national malaise, with their hubris, overspend, rampant security 
needs, branding zealotry and probable failure to do much about rising obesity. 
(Daily Telegraph, 27/07/12)  
 
For, Freedland (2012b) such problems bared a similarity with Britain’s recent history 
and its ‘troubled political past’: 
 
Even up to the last minute, in the final days of preparation, the question of 
whether Britain can actually pull this off has seemed in doubt. A wearily 
familiar narrative is already in place: the Britain of the Daily Mail and Crap 
Towns, the Britain where nothing works any more. If it wasn’t the failure of 
G4S to provide security staff, it was the threat by the PCS to call border 
guards out on strike. One an incompetent company made rich by privatisation, 
the other a militant-led trade union, the two seemed to spell out twin aspects of 
our troubled political past: Thatcherism and the winter of discontent uniting to 
ruin the Olympics. (Guardian, 27/07/12b) 
 
In fact, British austerity proved to be a reoccurring theme in the Commonwealth 
press’ analysis of Britain and its analysis of Britain’s capacity to both afford as well 
as host the Olympic Games.  Milner, Waldie and Reguly (2012) highlighted that 
many of the generated jobs were temporary with ‘optimism … fading about what will 
happen when the Games end next month. (The Globe and Mail, 26/07/12).   
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Further examples of Britain’s ‘insecure environment’ were drawn upon by 
Saunders (2012), who sought to align Britain’s pre-Olympic problems with its recent 
history of riots, recession and rain.  Saunders (2012) argued: 
 
Right up through the opening week of the Games, it was being called the 
shambolympics – an event defined by eye-bleeding budget overruns, ham-
fisted sponsors, security fiascoes and acres of incomprehensibly empty 
stadium seats. Britain has had a recent history of botching big, expensive 
events, such as the millennium celebrations or the re-opening of Wembley 
Stadium. The ebullient mood is a welcome reprise after a 12month period that 
began with riots and descended into multiple quarters of recession, a budget 
that slashed public services and non-stop rain. (The Globe and Mail, 13/08/12) 
 
As highlighted in the above examples, the representation of Britain was embedded in 
wider discourses relating to its recent economical and political problems.  In such 
instances, understandings of Britain were evidently mired by its economic instability 
and continuing austerity.  This was confirmed by Nelson (2012), who noted that, ‘in a 
country already paralysed by massive welfare spending, spiraling unemployment and 
rising social problems, Britain is becoming an increasingly insecure environment’ 
(Dominion Post, 27/07/12 [italics added]). 
Indeed, both Burkitt (2008) and Megill (2011) highlight how concerns regarding 
identity can be embedded within particular locations and that these identities are 
predicated upon a feeling of security (Zarakol, 2010).  Burkitt (2008) has explored 
how particular places, such as, the town, city, or the nation, are closely related to an 
‘ontological sense of reality’ (2008: 155).  Here, national identity is intimately 
attached to a particular geography or topography that is deemed to be irreducibly 
evocative of the national ‘place’ (Bairner, 2009; Burkitt, 2008).  In fact, Megill (2011) 
has argued that ‘in a world in which opposing certainties constantly come into conflict 
with each other and in which a multitude of possible identities are put on display, 
insecurity about identity may be an inevitable by-product’ (2011: 194).  As a result, 
‘if these places decay or are destroyed, so too are the spaces and rhythms of life, the 
very substance of our ontological security’ (Burkitt, 2008: 155).   
Consequently, in light of the previous examples (Freedland, 2012b; Hayward, 
2012), it was evident that the press’ reference to Britain’s economic problems had 
clearly resulted in feelings of insecurity regarding British identity.  In particular, there 
resided a belief that life in Britain, during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, had become 
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worse (Hayward, 2012; Taylor, 2012; Toynbee, 2012a).  Writing in the Herald, 
McKie (2012) argued that: 
 
When the Queen acceded to the throne, Britain was in an era of austerity, a 
nation with its coffers empty, its international influence in decline and facing an 
uncertain future.  Indeed, unless you think George Osborne is an improvement 
on Rab Butler as Chancellor, and I think we can be fairly sure you don’t, things 
may be a good deal worse than they were in 1952. (04/06/12)  
 
To this extent, it became possible to observe how Britain’s contemporary problems, 
indeed, its ‘increasingly insecure environment’ (Nelson, Dominion Post, 27/07/12), 
were predicated upon comparisons with Britain’s past.  In their analysis of the 
Olympic Opening Ceremony, Reguly and Waldie (2012) noted: 
 
as Boyle’s £27-million ($42.6-million Canadian) creation pranced through the 
ages like a manic show horse, the message wasn’t just that Brits are an odd folk; 
it was that Britain’s past is more important than its future. But what a past. Your 
country should be so lucky. (The Globe and Mail, 28/07/12) 
 
Accordingly, the sense that Britain’s past was ‘more important than its future’ served 
to emphasize the disparity between Britain’s illustrious history and its contemporary 
problems.  In particular, this distinction was alluded to by Tweedie (2012), whose 
comments relating to Britain’s royal history suggested: 
 
Bloated royal families are fine when you run a quarter of the world and have 
to supply the crowned heads of 19th century Europe; not so good when you 
are in charge of a diminished, austere Britain, grappling with recession in the 
early 21st century. (Daily Telegraph, 06/06/12) 
 
Consequently, against concerns regarding Britain’s continuing austerity and 
economic instability (Baum, 2012; Ridell, 2012; The Weekend Australian, 2012) were 
examples within the press that sought to draw upon nostalgic interpretations of Britain 
and British society.  Here, reports of Britain’s ‘past offered a screen on which desires 
for unity and continuity could be projected’ (Gillis, 1996: 9), indeed, a representation 
of Britain through which its sense of self could be ontologically secured (Burkitt, 
2008).  Richards’s (2012) noted that: 
 
The artificial unity tries to meet the burning appetite for community as there 
seems to be so few other options.  Not so long ago, the church, political 
parties, social clubs helped to bring people together. Workplaces were also 
communities, the mining villages, the shipyards and the rest. I am not 
romanticising the often horrendous working lives in these places. Often the 
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horror formed part of the bond that gave these areas a vibrancy and sense of 
intense belonging. (The Independent, 05/06/12) 
 
From Richard’s (2012) comments it is possible to see how a sense of community was 
construed as forming an important part of the ‘vibrancy’ of Britain (Richards, The 
Independent, 05/06/12).  Moreover, Richard (2012) seeks to delineate between a sense 
of community deeply rooted in Britain’s past and the ‘artificial unity’ of the 
contemporary period (The Independent, 05/06/12).  In fact, elsewhere, Elias (2008a) 
has noted that analyses of ‘community’ are often presented in positive terms, adding 
that: 
 
Life in communities, by contrast, is warmer, more homely and affectionate.  
Solidarity and harmony, unity of purpose and co-operation, ensured by a firm 
tradition, are greater. … [It has] romantic undertones.  It reflects, at least in its 
initial version, the discontent and suffering connected with increasing 
urbanisation and industrialisation; it betrays a certain longing for a reversal of 
the trend, for a return to an earlier stage in the development of societies where 
life was simpler and appeared to posses all those desirable qualities that are 
missed in the present. (2008a: 121) 
 
In such instances, the notion of ‘community’ spirit can help cement a positive ‘we-
image’ (Mennell, 1994), which despite ‘horrendous working lives’, form the ‘bond’ 
that underlies feelings of ‘intense belonging’ (Richards, The Independent, 05/06/12).  
Indeed, this sense of community and belonging was also highlighted in reports 
of the British population.  Jones (2012), suggested that the Diamond Jubilee 
celebrations in her local town had ‘given it a retro air – harking back to a time when 
people were friendly rather than resentful’ (The Mail on Sunday, 03/06/12 [italics 
added]).  Consequently, for Harris (2012c) the Games helped turn ‘the clock back to 
an era when Britain had a highly motivated workforce, proud of its country and eager 
to show a positive face to the world’ (Daily Mail, 13/08/12b).  In both examples, the 
past was perceived as representing a positive Britain (Harris, 2012c) with a population 
more friendly than resentful (Jones, 2012).  Indeed, similar constructions could also 
be identified in reference to the Second World War. 
In fact, Conboy (2005) notes that the period of British history involving the 
Second World War is: 
 
particularly important to popular historical memory as … [it] coincide[s] with 
the lived experience of a significant number of people, directly or vicariously, 
through the many popular cultural re-imaginings of this period. (2005: 71) 
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Forming part of these ‘cultural re-imaginings’ is the British monarchy, whose own 
survival during the Second World War served to underline the supremacy of the 
British state and the united British nation who stood in defiance of the Nazi threat 
(Rojek, 2007).  Indeed, reenactments of wartime Britain were actively celebrated 
during the Diamond Jubilee, whereupon certain members of the British public staged 
‘nostalgic recreations of life in wartime Britain’ (Devine, Western Mail, 01/06/12).  
Similarly, the Daily Mirror’s Tony Parsons’s (2012a) noted that ‘for one sweet 
moment, we were more united than at any time since the war’ (Daily Mirror, 
04/06/12a [italics added]).  Indeed, Parsons (2012a) added that:      
 
The British celebrated their Queen, but they were also celebrating themselves.  
In an uncertain and frightening world, the Diamond Jubilee celebrations have 
been an affirmation of national identity and pride. (Daily Mirror, 04/06/12a) 
 
As can been seen from the above examples, the Second World War provided a 
notable moment in British history that served to celebrate the British monarchy but 
also provided an opportunity for the British population to celebrate ‘themselves’ 
(Parsons, Daily Mirror, 04/06/12a).  Consequently, while references to the Second 
World War may, as Hassan (2013c) argues, form part of an ‘increasing obsession’ for 
Britain, Colley (2005; 2014a; 2014b) notes that British battles against a range of 
foreign adversaries, such as Napoleon and Hitler, have often helped to unite Britain in 
common purpose and action.  Indeed, Gilroy (2005) has argued that for the British 
‘white’ population, the Second World War signified a period in time when feelings 
and sentiments towards Britain were unperturbed and Britain’s world power status 
was secure.  Drawing upon the English football chant ‘two world wars and one World 
cup’, Gilroy (2005) argues that the chant helped to reinforce ‘a sense in which 
Britain’s brave but confused affiliates prefer[ed] an ordered past in which they were 
exploited and pauperized, but nonetheless knew who they were’ (2005: 109 [italics 
added]).  As a result, in much the same way, Richards’s (2012) descriptions sought to 
draw upon an articulation of Britain’s ‘ordered past’ (Gilroy, 2005: 109) whereupon 
Britain’s contemporary insecurities were representatively juxtaposed against the 
invariable portrayal ‘of intense belonging’ and community spirit (Richards, The 
Independent, 05/06/12). 
 To this extent, when considered in light of the above examples, references to 
Britain’s wartime victory and the British armed forces, helped to provide a notable 
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contrast to an ‘uncertain and frightening world’ (Parsons, Daily Mirror, 04/06/12a).  
In such instances, reports of wartime Britain were ‘driven by the need to get back to 
the place or moment before the country lost its moral and cultural bearings’ (Gilroy, 
2005: 90).  Davis (2011) has argued that when: 
 
we are susceptible to feelings of anxiety and concern for our future selves when 
we are brought up short by some untoward historic event or intrusive social 
change, it can be seen how at the most elemental level collective nostalgia acts 
to restore, at least temporarily, a sense of sociohistoric continuity with respect 
to that which had verged on being rendered discontinuous. (2011: 449 [italics 
added]) 
 
Accordingly, while Richard’s (2012) description of ‘the mining villages’ and ‘the 
shipyards’ underlined a particular desire to regain a sense of ‘British’ community 
(Richards, The Independent, 05/06/12) and whereas ‘nostalgic recreations of life in 
wartime Britain’ (Devine, Western Mail, 01/06/12) were not only performed but also 
reflective of a Britain ‘more united than at any time since the war’ (Daily Mirror, 
04/06/12), (re)constructions of Britain’s ‘collective nostalgia’ (Davis, 2011: 449) 
served to underwrite the sense of decline (Lott, 2012; Paxman, 2012), increasing 
economic insecurity (Freedland, 2012b; Hayward, 2012) and lack of community 
(Richards, 2012).  Given what has been shown, it is possible to view these 
representations as reflecting wider disparities in the discursive construction of 
contemporary Britain, a distinction that was clearly related to Britain’s post-imperial 
decline. 
 
5.1.1. Nation in decline: ‘wilful nostalgia’, memories of empire and the maritime 
nation 
 
Taking the above sections into consideration, it is evident that representations of 
Britain were related to ‘a relatively recent past that [was] constructed – in positive 
contrast to the present – as the nation-state’s heyday and as a now bygone era of 
purported order, stability, standing-in-the-world and security’ (Karner, 2013). 2  
Indeed, ‘closely linked to nostalgia is a sense of melancholy – a longing for a time, a 
place or, sometimes, a person’ (Maguire, 1999: 189).  In such instances, these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/christian-karner/from-collective-myth-to-
counterpublics-negotiating-national-identity-in-, retrieved: 13 May 2013. 
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‘strategies of nostalgia’ served ‘to hide the cataclysmic decline in Britain’s 
international status’ (Rojek, 2007: 171).  
In fact, ‘the story of nation in decline’ was one that was often drawn upon in 
relation to Britain’s former imperial status (Paxman, Daily Telegraph, 12/08/12).  
Indeed, Bradley (2007) has noted that: 
 
 Where once British identity was about feeling superior, there is now perhaps 
something of an inferiority complex, allied to a culture of low expectations, an 
acceptance of the second-rate and a lack of drive and dynamism. (2007: 63) 
 
Consequently, the decline of the British Empire was compared with Britain’s lack of 
sporting achievements, a narrative which for Paxman (2012), ‘fitted comfortably into 
the story of a nation in decline, a country that has lost an empire and failed to find the 
goal net’ (Daily Telegraph, 12/08/12).  Similarly, in reference to Queen Elizabeth’s 
coronation – ‘the last heyday of Empire’ (Sandbrook, Daily Mail, 02/06/12) – 
Sandbrook (2012) added:  
 
In school classrooms, maps still showed much of the world coloured British 
pink, from the great dominions of Australia, Canada and New Zealand to the 
future independent states of Malaysia, Tanzania, Nigeria and Uganda.  After the 
Coronation, there was much talk of a New Elizabethan Age, encapsulated by the 
stunning conquest of Everest by Sir Edmund Hillary and Sherpa Tenzing, a 
New Zealander and a Nepali, representing an Empire on which the sun never 
set. (Daily Mail, 02/06/12) 
 
In relation to the above examples (Paxman, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012), Van Stolk 
and Wouters (1987) note that ‘changes in the international balance of power – being 
conquered in war, or losing a colonial empire – can affect the self-respect of an entire 
nation’ (1987: 482).  Analyses of Queen Elizabeth’s reign have highlighted how: 
 
Instead of reigning over an expanding empire she was destined to preside over 
its dissolution and symbolically the queen’s reign witnessed the ‘midnight 
hour’ of various independence celebrations, which linked her not only with 
decolonisation, but also with the transition from empire to commonwealth. 
(Craggs and Kumarasingham, 2014: 5) 
 
Indeed, the effect of this ‘transition from empire to commonwealth’ and the impact of 
Britain’s imperial decline on the British sense of self was exemplified by Norman 
(2012), who noted: 
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God knows it isn’t easy being a fading post-imperial power, and Britain has 
struggled dementedly with the diminishment for the Queen’s entire reign. The 
roots of the psychological disorder lie, needless to say, in the war. Winning that 
rarest of things, an unarguably just war, induced an understandable sense of 
moral superiority that would later curdle into distasteful arrogance.  Being 
effectively bankrupted by the victory – having to watch Germany and Japan 
became rich while food was still rationed here - encoded not just confusion but 
profound defeatism into the national DNA. Victory made the US and the USSR 
superpowers, and reduced Britain to an absurdity, feigning great power status 
long after Eisenhower’s peremptory order to Eden to get the hell out of Suez 
clarified the truth about that. (The Independent, 06/06/12) 
 
However, while Norman’s (2012) remarks seek to suggest that Britain’s ‘feigning 
great power status’ was informed by its experiences during the second world war and 
its decline as a world power (Ward, 2004), (re)constructions of Britain’s proud history 
could also serve as a reminder of its former hegemony.  That is, while representations 
of the nation can serve to glorify the nation’s past ‘through a shared sense of descent 
and destiny’ (Rivera, 2008: 622), it can also be used to provide ‘evidence of a 
country’s superiority’ (Rivera, 2008: 622). 
Drawing upon the work of Hyam (2010), Wood (2014) argues that notions of 
‘imperial prestige’ empowered ‘Britain to govern a vast, far-flung network of 
colonies’ (2014: 100).  In addition, Daddow (2013) notes that ‘memories of Britain’s 
global pre-eminence were never very far from the surface of British political debate or 
cultural repertoire’ (2013).3  Here, the British Empire served as an example of what 
Britain could achieve: 
 
From the moment we knew that the Olympics were coming to our shores, there 
was a symphony of self-loathing. It would be rubbish compared to Beijing. 
They would be too expensive. London would grind to a humiliating halt. The 
poor old British can no longer organise a drink-up in a brewery.  Wrong, 
wrong, wrong. The British ran an Empire covering the world for three centuries 
– why the hell did we ever doubt that we could run a sporting event for two 
weeks? (Parsons, Daily Mirror, 11/08/12c [italics added]) 
 
Similarly, for some, the ceremony was a reminder of Britain’s former role as head of 
a ‘global network’ (Grant Gascoigne cited in The Australian, 14/08/12).  Writing in 
the letter pages of The Australian, Grant Gascoigne noted that: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/34047?utm_source=feedly, retrieved: 12 June 
2013. 
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Many of us are happy to sink a boot into the British as only a shadow of its 
former self, but the magnificent closing show for the London Olympics put a 
sock in my mouth.  The immaculate planning, design, timing, direction of an 
imaginative display on such a scale reminds us the Poms established a global 
network of democratic, productive nations with laws, governments, defence and 
industry unmatched in scale anywhere else in the world. (Grant Gascoigne cited 
in The Australian, 14/08/12) 
 
This was echoed in reports of the Opening Ceremony, which according to Reade 
(2012) served to highlight ‘our genius, tolerance, humour, and all we have given to 
the world’ (Reade, Daily Mirror, 28/07/12 [italics added]).  
 Indeed, representations of what Britain had ‘given to the world’ were clearly 
evoked in the Opening Ceremonies depiction of the Industrial Revolution as well as 
more recent cultural icons, such as, the Beatles and the popular Harry Potter books 
(Brown, 2012; Harris, 2012a; MacDonald, 2012a).  The Scotland on Sunday (2012) 
noted that: 
 
What Danny Boyle’s opening ceremony did on Friday night was provide an 
alternative narrative of what it means to be British.  What it takes from history 
are the virtues of innovation, industriousness and shared endeavour – but its 
defining feature is the enormously rich legacy of half a century of British 
popular culture, and particularly pop music.  Dynamic, democratic, stylish and 
creative, it is Britain’s gift to the modern world. (29/07/12)  
 
Similarly, the game’s Closing Ceremony, provided ‘a set featuring outsized London 
landmarks covered in newsprint bearing quotations from Shakespeare, Dickens and 
other luminaries’ (Gibson, Guardian, 13/08/12), with Gibson (2012) adding that ‘the 
show was a camp, joyous romp through pop culture’ (Guardian, 13/08/12). 
Accordingly, in comparison to the 2008 Olympic Opening Ceremony in 
Beijing, Mangan et al. (2013) suggest that ‘if Beijing 2008 expressed Chinese cultural 
pride focused on Asian historic culture, the London Games displayed more cultural 
elements, which have had global impacts’ (2013: 1845-1846 [italics added]).  Such 
‘global impacts’ were representative of ‘London’s self-immersion in the modern 
world’ (Mangan et al., 2013: 1846) and were a reassurance of its prominent role in 
global popular culture (Mangan et al., 2013).  This sense of reassurance was echoed in 
The Observer (2012): 
 
Boyle’s lore took in Shakespeare, Milton, Brunel and Tim Berners Lee. It 
sought to sum up a country – a very multicultural land manifestly – which had 
played a full part in world literature, world construction, world invention 
 169 
(even if very few of those feats are taught in our core curriculum these days). 
(29/07/12 [italics added]) 
 
As can be seen, while Britain was no longer an imperial power, its global impact was 
still felt in relation to its impact on music, sport, literature and art.  Indeed, Mangan et 
al. (2013) argue that while Britain ‘had once been called an “Empire on which the sun 
never sets”, arguably in a very different way, was still an “Empire” as an innovator in 
the contemporary global popular culture industry’ (2013: 1848). 
 Consequently, whereas, the press’ coverage of the Olympic Ceremonies 
portrayed Britain as a ‘Dynamic, democratic, stylish and creative’ nation (The 
Scotland on Sunday, 29/07/12), comparatively, the Diamond Jubilee was represented 
as a appropriate display of British culture and history.  Commenting upon the 
organization of the Diamond Jubilee’s River Pageant both Phillips (2012) and 
Routledge (2012) heralded the flotilla as a form of celebration that was particularly 
reflective of the British sense of self.  For the former:  
 
Putting this pageant onto river boats touched yet further deep and emotional 
chords. The great artery of the Thames is a symbol of the now too-often 
overlooked fact that this island kingdom was always a maritime nation. 
(Phillips, Daily Mail, 04/06/12)        
 
Indeed, the ‘visceral connection’ that the pageant forged between the British people 
and their collective history (Phillips, Daily Mail, 04/06/12), was something that 
‘clearly resonate[ed] with our island population’ (Routledge, Daily Mirror, 04/06/12 
[italics added]).  Together, both Phillips’s (2012) and Routledge’s (2012) remarks 
sought to draw upon two abiding images in the construction of Britain: the island 
nation and the sea.4  Indeed, here the pageant served as a reminder of the ‘maritime 
nation[‘s]’ former naval supremacy (Phillips, Daily Mail, 04/06/12) that helped ‘to 
reinforce a sense of empire and of a dominant maritime presence’ (Lunn and Day, 
2004: 135).5  Continuing the nautical theme, Jack (2012) noted: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 In fact, the importance of Britain’s maritime history has been highlighted by the Guardian (2014).  In 
comments regarding the undermining of Britain’s nautical heritage, the Guardian (2014) noted that: 
‘Perhaps it was the rising costs of ships, perhaps it was the changing global security climate, but – from 
the first Gulf war onwards – the UK seems to have made the transition from feeling like a naval nation 
to feeling like an army nation. Not since the Falklands war have we collectively thought nautical’ 
(2014: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/20/guardian-view-public-services-post-
naval-nation, retrieved: 21 July 2014).  
5 Similarly, South Korean coverage of the 2012 bid process sought to draw upon Britain’s imperial 
rivalries with France, in light of the competing London and Paris Olympic 2012 bids (Mangan, et al. 
2013).  Here, the South Korean coverage drew upon Lord Nelson’s victory at the Battle of Trafalgar in 
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Spithead, however, showed what the nation was about. The convoy that 
followed the royal yacht around on its inspection duties included a large 
Atlantic liner, the Campania, filled with parliamentarians and newspaper 
reporters – witnesses and publicists to the naval supremacy that, in the words of 
the Times, was the ‘true bond’ of the British Empire. Since Nelson, Britain had 
thought of itself as a country of singular nautical genius. Certainly in no other 
country did seafarers enjoy so much respect and affection, or parents put so 
many of their children into sailor suits. (Guardian, 02/06/12) 
 
Indeed, this historical moment was also highlighted in the Vancouver Sun (2012): 
 
When Queen Victoria celebrated her Diamond Jubilee in 1897 at the age of 77, 
the Royal Navy mustered for a fleet review. British naval might was at its 
zenith. The 23 battleships, 51 cruisers and a multitude of destroyers and other 
ships covered 25 square kilometres of the English Channel. (02/06/12) 
 
Similarly, Tweedie and Harding (2012) added: 
 
For mile upon mile they stretched, their flag-bedecked ranks receding into the 
haze. The ships of the Royal Navy, 165 of them, drawn up at Spithead on June 
26 1897 to mark the diamond jubilee of Victoria, for 60 years Queen of Great 
Britain and Ireland and her dominions beyond the seas, and, since 1876, 
Empress of India.  There were 21 battleships and 44 cruisers, their names 
conveying the confidence of a worldspanning Empire: Victorious, Renown, 
Powerful, Terrible, Majestic and Mars. A vast, intimidating presence intended 
to impress on friend and foe alike the continuing potency of the British 
behemoth. And what was more, the assembly of this great fleet had required the 
recall of not a single ship from the Mediterranean or the farflung squadrons 
guarding the imperial sea lanes. (Daily Telegraph, 02/06/12)6 
 
It is worth noting that Conboy (2007) has argued that ‘The tabloids develop their 
construction of a common history for their readers by integrating selected episodes 
from the past into their already powerful, rhetorical strategies of popular imagination’ 
(Conboy, 2007: 265 [italics added]).  In doing so, the nation is ‘imagined historically’ 
(Conboy, 2007: 265).  However, as the above examples reveal, such ‘selected 
episodes’ (Conboy, 2007: 265) could also be recalled by both the broadsheet (Jack, 
2012; Tweedie and Harding, 2012) and foreign press (Vancouver Sun, 2012).   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1805 to help frame London’s success over its Paris rivals (Mangan, et al., 2013).  Similarly, Weight 
(2002) has argued that ‘in the half-century following the Battle of Waterloo, victory over Napoleon 
formed the basis of a sustaining national legend of strength through unity’ (2002: 6). 
6 Evidently there are differences in the historical record, with the Vancouver Sun (2012) highlighting 
that there were 23 battleships and 51 cruisers and Tweedie and Harding (2012) noting that there were 
21 battleships and 44 cruisers at the 1897 fleet review. 
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Furthermore, while each example served to emphasise Britain’s naval 
supremacy during the reign of Queen Victoria, Colley (2014a) notes that during the 
late 1800s the Royal Navy ‘came to be widely represented and viewed as an emblem 
and metaphor for Britain itself, its increasing victories and reach an expression and 
embodiment of national virility’ (2014a: 26).  Indeed, such accounts can have a 
particular effect when considered in accordance with present events.  Conboy (2007) 
argues that ‘Combined with the didacticism concerning the past is a campaign very 
much associated with the present’ (2007: 266).  That is, ‘the celebration of national 
heroes’ (Conboy, 2007: 266), such as, Admiral Lord Nelson, or reports of former 
naval dominance (Jack, 2012; Phillips, 2012; Vancouver Sun, 2012), can serve ‘as a 
way of reaffirming the values of the country in militaristic terms’ (Conboy, 2007: 
266).  Yet, in the case of Britain, there is a disparity in such accounts.   
Indeed, while the naval supremacy of sea-borne power ceased to be of 
importance by the 1960s, Blake (1986) argues that ‘of all the many changes which 
occurred during the period, this was the one that affected Britain most profoundly’ 
(1986: x).  Consequently, when viewed alongside those examples that served to 
emphasise Britain’s impact upon contemporary popular culture (Gibson, 2012; The 
Scotland on Sunday, 2012), notions of British decline were discursively implied in the 
Vancouver Sun’s (2012) suggestion that during the reign of Queen Elizabeth ‘Britain 
remade itself as an agile middle power that punched far above its weight in science, 
technology, the arts and entertainment’ (02/06/12 [italics added).  Whereas the empire 
was chosen as a particular period, where British achievements were at their greatest 
and its global power was at its zenith, such reports could, paradoxically, serve to 
underline Britain’s contemporary decline. 
Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that both the Diamond 
Jubilee and the London Olympic Ceremonies were irreducibly bound with collective 
memories of empire.  This is significant, particularly because, despite the brief 
inclusion of a model Empire Windrush during the Olympic Opening Ceremony, 
references to Britain’s imperial history were noticeably absent during the ceremony’s 
performance.  Indeed, the absence of empire was condemned by De Chickera (2012) 
as revealing: 
 
a very convenient – selective – history. All good. All celebration. No bad. No 
reflection. One may argue, that this was the point – it was a celebration – no 
point dragging the mood down by raising that ugly issue, particularly when 
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half the countries represented at the games and the opening ceremony, were 
victims of this ‘episode’ in history. (2012)7 
 
As a result, despite the decline of the British Empire, depictions of empire continued 
to form an important part of the press’ representation of Britain and British pride.  In 
addition, these discourses could also work in dialectic ways.  That is, while certain 
reports sought to return to a nostalgic and largely (re)constructed national 
representation of Britain (Harris, 2012c; Jack, 2012; Jones, 2012; Maguire, 1999; 
Richards, 2012; Vancouver Sun, 2012; Tweedie and Harding, 2012), other reports 
provided reassurance of Britain’s continuing global relevance (Phillips, 2012; The 
Scotland on Sunday, 2012).  In these instances, it was clear that a disparity existed 
between who the British once were and who they now believed themselves to be. 
 
5.1.2. ‘What kind of nation are we anyway?’: false imaginings and the ‘national 
malaise’ 
 
The sense of confusion surrounding Britain and the British sense of self was 
highlighted by Taylor (2012) who asked, ‘do we have any national signifiers left in 
2012?’ (Daily Telegraph, 02/06/12).  Subsequently, for Rawnsley (2012) such 
‘national signifiers’ had suffered from a lack of confidence and trust:  
 
The BBC, the monopoly broadcaster at the time of the Queen’s coronation, now 
has a cacophony of competition. The Church of England is divided in its beliefs 
and confused about its role. The City of London is feared and loathed for what 
the bankers did to the economy. At the time of the accession, the House of 
Commons was held in such esteem that a book could be published with the title 
The Glory of Parliament, not a proposition that would today secure an advance. 
(Guardian, 03/06/12) 
 
As a result, ‘in the middle of a national carnival of disillusionment’ (Hare, Guardian, 
02/06/12) the Diamond Jubilee was viewed as ‘infantilising us with false imaginings 
and a bogus heritage of our island story’ (Toynbee, Guardian, 01/06/12a).  Here, the 
‘imagined greatness’ of the Thames Pageant reflected a ‘decontextualised, nostalgic 
and branded history’ of Britain that stood in stark contrast to its contemporary 
problems (Gardiner and Westall, 2012).8 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/amal-de-chickera/games-have-begun-opportunity-missed, 
retrieved: 28 July 2012. 
8 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/michael-gardiner-claire-westall/last-great-british-
summer-for-england, retrieved: 13 May 2012. 
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 In contrast, the Olympic Games was perceived as providing an important 
opportunity for Britain to highlight to the world, and, itself, exactly what the British 
people were capable of.  The Scotsman (2012d) noted: 
 
And we very much hope the Games will live up to all that has been claimed for 
them, both in terms of regeneration of a problematic area of east London and 
also as a demonstration to the world of what we are capable of as a people. 
(The Scotsman, 27/07/12d [italics added]) 
 
Thus, for the ‘diminished’ and ‘austere Britain’ (Tweedie, Daily Telegraph, 
06/06/12), the Olympic Games provided an important moment to regain a sense of 
British pride.  Patterson (2012) argued that, ‘it was nice to feel a little stab of pride, 
because in the seven years since he [Jacques Rogge] announced London would host 
this year’s Olympics, pride hasn’t always been the main thing most of us have felt’ 
(Belfast Telegraph, 26/07/12).  This was shared by The Weekend Australian (2012) 
who highlighted that, ‘after three successive quarters of negative growth, Great 
Britain and its capital need a confidence and economic boost now almost as much as 
in 1948 when London last hosted the Olympics as it struggled to emerge from post-
war austerity’ (28/07/12). 
Certainly, the post-war image of Britain as a nation beset by decline and ‘where 
nothing works’ (Freedland, Guardian, 27/07/12b), served to overshadow Britain’s 
attempts to redefine its image in the run-up to the Olympic Games.  Baum (2012) 
alluded that:   
 
If a theme could be inferred, it might have been that post-empire, post-war 
Britain had lost its way, but now was back. It is not true, of course – look at the 
economy, already severely stressed, and soon with a pile of Olympic bills to pay 
(ultimately, Greece buckled beneath them). (The Age, 28/07/12) 
 
In fact, while Britain was ‘a country that has always imposed its view on the world, 
through imperial adventure, culture and commerce’ (Hayward, Daily Telegraph, 
27/07/12), Hayward (2012) added that: 
 
now the Games open in east London in an age of mass insecurity and 
collapsed assumptions, stemming from last summer’s riots, the Leveson 
inquiry, double-dip recession and the banking scandal, which has shaken all 
our senses of what Britain really is. (Daily Telegraph, 27/07/12) 
 
Consequently, despite the fact that Britain ‘looked very good’ during the games, 
Saunders (2012) was clear to point out that this was ‘something that Britain once took 
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for granted’ (The Globe and Mail, 13/08/12).  Implicitly, Saunders’s (2012) remarks 
served to signify Britain’s post-imperial troubles and its decline from power.   
Indeed, elsewhere Ward (2002) has noted how Britain’s ‘world position’ 
formed an important part of its identity, arguing that the sense of crisis surrounding 
such a loss was bound to be severe.9  Accordingly, for Britain such insecurity was 
intimately bound with perceptions regarding its ‘place in the world’ (Freedland, 
Guardian, 27/07/12b).  Freedland (2012b) suggested that: 
 
these Olympic weeks will offer answers to a clutch of questions that have 
nagged at us since the last time London hosted the Games in 1948. What 
exactly is our place in the world? How do we compare to other countries and to 
the country we used to be? What kind of nation are we anyway? (Guardian, 
27/07/12b [italics added]) 
 
Correspondingly, before the Opening Ceremony Toynbee (2012b), asked, ‘What will 
these visitors see? … What will they make of us, when we hardly know what to make 
of ourselves?’ (Guardian, 27/07/12b [italics added]).  Again, drawing upon the work 
of Burkitt (2008), both Freedland (2012b) and Toynbee’s (2012b) remarks can be 
considered in light of the effect that a particular place can have on our ‘sense of the 
world and our position within it’ (Burkitt, 2008: 155).  In addition, ‘place is not just 
made out of bricks and mortar: place is composed of relations – to the objects and 
people around us, and also to the people, real or imagined, outside of that pace who 
judge those living within it’ (2008: 155 [italics added]).  Indeed, elsewhere, Rojek 
(2007) has argued that:   
 
Tepid about Europe, pining for the long-lost global authority that Empire vested 
in British opinion and undergoing pressure for devolution from Whitehall to 
national and regional assemblies, the British are in the midst of a troubling 
assessment of who they are and where they figure in relation to other nations. 
(2007: 156 [italics added])10 
 
Consequently, in light of Toynbee’s (2012b) concerns it was evident that a secure and 
identifiable British ‘we-identity’ was interependently predicated upon a sense of 
confusion surrounding the British sense of self: ‘What will they make of us?’ as well 
as foreign visitors’ interpretations of Britain: ‘What will these visitors see?’ (Toynbee, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Elsewhere, Elias (1996) has noted that such descriptions are ‘particularly true of countries which have 
sunk in the course of time from a higher to a lower position within the pyramid of states’ (1996: 17).   
10 Similarly, Wood (2014) highlights that, ‘In any nation, … a critical mass is concerned about what 
others think of them. Most want their nation to be admired and are enthused by the transmission of 
esteem’ (2014: 111) 
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Guardian, 27/07/12b).  Evidently, in such instances, constructions of Britain were 
based upon a reflexive interdependence. 
 
5.1.3. Imperial Fantasies 
 
Despite reports that served to question ‘who’ the British were, research on the British 
monarchy and its associated iconography has often been found to form an important 
part of Britain’s identity and history (Bradley, 2008; Cannadine, 1983; Colley, 2014a; 
2014b; Jeffery, 2006; Ward, 2004).  Commenting upon the Diamond Jubilee, 
McNulty (2012) highlighted that ‘the monarchy is a symbol of Britain’s imperial 
past’, yet was clear to point out that ‘grandeur is expensive’ (The Scotsman, 
02/06/12).  Indeed, McNulty’s (2012) comments provide a clear disparity between the 
relevance of a monarchy located within Britain’s imperial past and a contemporary 
Britain, whose continuing economic instability served to emphasise the expenditure 
required in maintaining such an institution.  Correspondingly, Toynbee (2012a) noted: 
 
The more outrageously glorious the performance, the more preposterous its 
purpose. There at the heart, in the dead centre of all this pomp and 
circumstance, is the great emptiness, the nothingness, the Wizard of Oz in 
emperor’s clothes. The louder the bells, the more gaping the grand vacuity. 
What are we celebrating? A singularly undistinguished family’s hold on the 
nation, a mirage of nationhood, a majestic delusion. … The cost of the 
monarchy, though a hundred times the price of the modestly likeable Irish 
presidency, is counted not in palaces and royal trains, but in the fantasy of 
imperial power the crown bestows on British politics. Punching above our 
weight, we have just ordered a new Trident to cling to an undeserved UN 
security council seat from which to hector the world about a democratic idea so 
weakly applied at home. (Guardian, 01/06/12a [italics added]) 
 
Clearly, accounts of the Diamond Jubilee and the British monarchy were seen to form 
part of the British ‘fantasy’, that is, the ‘majestic delusion’ behind Britain’s 
nationhood (Toynbee, Guardian, 01/06/12a).  In fact, Cannadine (1983) has noted 
that the pageantry associated with the British monarchy reflects an ‘invented 
tradition’, harking back to Britain’s imperial glory and in so doing hiding the cracks 
in its post-imperial status.   
 Consequently, between the British monarchy’s ‘imperial past’ and ‘expensive 
grandeur’ (McNulty, The Scotsman, 02/06/12), the ‘majestic delusion’ (Toynbee, 
Guardian, 01/06/12a) underlying notions of Britain served to highlight how 
representations of the nation can reflect magical-mythical beliefs (Elias, 1978; 1996; 
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2010).  Indeed, Dunning and Hughes (2012) note that: 
 
Beliefs of this kind … may provide a degree of comfort, emotional warmth and 
satisfaction in what is for many people a cold, impersonal, rapidly changing, 
complex and puzzling social world, especially if the beliefs are shared with 
others and involve the group performance of apparently meaningful rituals. 
(2012: 145) 
 
In such instances, when ‘confronted with the difficulties of a highly mobile and 
quickly changing world one is apt to seek refuge in the image of a social order which 
never changes and projects it to a past that never was’ (Elias and Scotson, 1994: 160).  
This is echoed by, Dawson and West (1984): 
 
the gap between ‘who we are’ and ‘who we think we are’ has steadily widened, 
so that in recent years ‘British national identity’ had taken on aspects of fantasy.  
Despite economic decline, the long withdrawal from Empire and a subordinate 
relation to the US, ‘Britain’ has clung to a grandiose world role. (1984: 13 cited 
in Osmond, 1988: 31) 
 
Indeed, the importance of Britain’s world role has often been allied with exaggerated 
appraisals of British power (Gilroy, 2005; Kumar, 2003; Malcolm, 2012).  In 
particular, the impact of Britain’s post-imperial decline and its diminished world role 
is drawn upon by Cowley (2013) who highlights how the British Empire had a 
defining impact upon his own recollections of England/Britain: 
 
As someone who was born in the 1960s, the son of wartime evacuees from 
London, I had a sense from an early age that England, or Britain (during my 
childhood the two nouns seemed to be interchangeable), was oppressed by a lost 
greatness. As my father grew older, he seemed to become ever more nostalgic 
for an England that no longer existed – or had never existed, except perhaps as a 
construct of the imagination. (2013)11 
 
As can be seen, Cowley’s (2013) account of his father’s ‘imagined’ Britain, indeed, a 
Britain that may have never existed, echoes Dunning and Hughes (2012) comments 
on the ‘degree of comfort, emotional warmth and satisfaction’ that can be imparted 
upon a nation whose location within ‘a cold, impersonal, rapidly changing, complex 
and puzzling social world’ (2012: 145) is underscored by a sense of ‘lost greatness’ 
(Cowley, 2013).12  This was brought to light in Toynbee’s (2012a) suggestion, that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See http://www.newstatesman.com/2013/12/england-dreaming-break-britain-and-what-orson-welles-
knew, retrieved 26 December 2013. 
12 See http://www.newstatesman.com/2013/12/england-dreaming-break-britain-and-what-orson-welles-
knew, retrieved 26 December 2013.  Cowley’s (2013) comments also reveal how particular beliefs 
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British sense of self, and, in particular, the cost of the British monarchy, were today 
clearly based upon a ‘fantasy of imperial power’ (Guardian, 01/06/12a).  This was 
echoed in the Australian press where the sense of pageantry and the imperial fantasy 
that it helped to sustain, was highlighted in comments made by the London-based 
Australian author, Kathy Lette: 
 
the pageantry reminds the British of their glory days, when they ruled the 
empire and were not just one of the planet’s postscripts…The jubilee festivities 
are like a psychological sorbet in a diet of doom and gloom. (Lette cited in 
Kissane, The Age, 02/06/12 [italics added]) 
 
As a result, while the reign of Elizabeth I would lead Britain ‘to centuries of 
expansion and empire. In Elizabeth II’s case, the monarchy was a necessary mask to 
help Britain come to terms with its decline from empire to island’ (Strong, Vancouver 
Sun, 01/06/12).  This was echoed by Holden (2012), who highlighted that despite 
Queen Elizabeth’s ‘auspicious beginnings’: 
 
Elizabeth’s reign has not been all smooth sailing.  She has spent a large 
majority of her time saying farewell to the British Empire amassed by her 
forebears from Kenya to Hong Kong, although she remains head of state for 16 
countries and head of the Commonwealth. (Vancouver Sun, 02/06/12) 
 
Clearly, the above examples seek to suggest that Britain’s royal celebrations and 
monarchial grandeur failed to summon the same international role that it once held.  
Here, constructions of the past, particularly within an increasingly changing national 
context (Cantle, 2013; Dunning and Hughes, 2012; Gilroy, 2005; Goodhart, 2013a; 
2013b) can provide an image of social order (Dunning and Hughes, Elias and 
Scotson, 1994; Elias, 1987).  Indeed, such fantasies are based upon the power 
relations that help to form part of, and, indeed, serve to maintain, group charisma 
(Malcolm, 2012).  In doing so, national fantasies are often built upon a picture that is 
far removed from reality (Elias, 1996). 
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regarding the nation can form an important part of an individual’s identity (Elias, 1996; 2010; Elias and 
Scotson, 1994). 
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5.2. Britain 2012: an established-outsider dynamic – established practices and 
changing relations 
 
It is evident that constructions of Britain’s past were routinely drawn upon in both the 
British and Commonwealth press.  Indeed, for Williams (1973) ‘the idea of an 
ordered and happier past set against the disturbance and disorder of the present’ is an 
‘idealisation … based on a temporary situation and on a deep desire for stability, 
served to cover and to evade the actual and bitter contradictions of the time’ (1973: 
45).  In the case of Britain, such ‘contradictions’ stood alongside an acknowledged 
uncertainty and a lack of clarity regarding British identity (Hayward, 20120; Hoey, 
2012; Riddell, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012; Taylor, 2012).  Certainly, while the above 
examples have suggested that such ‘contradictions’ can result in nostalgic 
representations (Hardman, 2012; Hayward, 2012; Holt, 2012; Jack, 2012; Parson, 
2012; Phillips, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012) as well as ‘fantas[ies] of imperial power’ 
(Toynbee, Guardian, 01/06/12a), they can also allude to dynamic changes within the 
discursive construction of the nation (Dunning and Hughes, 2012).   
 Accordingly, contrary to Durkheimian approaches that seek to view national 
events as integrative devices (Dayan and Katz, 1992), periods of social transformation 
can often reveal processes of construction and/or (re)construction in the national 
image (Mihelj, 2008; Poulton and Maguire, 2012).  Consequently, while ‘media 
events’ can help to sustain established institutions (Dayan and Katz, 1992), the second 
part of this chapter will utilize Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider 
framework in order to examine how the press’ coverage of both the Diamond Jubilee 
and London Olympic Games revealed processes of negotiation and contestation in 
their construction of Britain and British identity.13  Here, the established-outsider 
framework can prove particularly useful in exploring how social changes impact upon 
media discourses and how ‘social relations of power and domination’ (Fairclough, 
2000: 158-159) can be observed between national newspaper coverage of the same 
event.  More specifically, Elias and Scotson’s (1994) approach will be used to 
examine how newspaper discourses reflected wider power relations within the British 
state and Commonwealth (Atkindons, 2002; Sutton and Vertigans, 2002; Van Stolk 
and Wouters, 1987). 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See section 5.2.3. and section 5.2.4. 
 179 
5.2.1. Confused boundaries and allegories of England: ‘Stiff upper lips’ and a 
‘Green and Pleasant Land’ 
 
It was highlighted in chapter three that Elias and Scotson’s (1994) analysis of 
established-outsider relations revealed how the longevity of the ‘established group’, 
that is, their shared common history, served as an important component of their 
superiority and established status.  Indeed, ‘history can often be used as an instrument 
for the imposition of power over others’ (Panagiotopoulou, 2010: 243) with historical 
narratives serving to legitimate boundary formations (Chan, 2012) as well as 
maintaining apparent distinctions between established and outsider groups (Elias and 
Scotson, 1994).   
Indeed, the framing of Britain as an ‘established’ nation was illustrated by The 
Independent on Sunday (2012a) who noted, that according to The New York Times, 
‘Britain [had] offered a display of humour and humbleness that can only stem from a 
deep-rooted sense of superiority’ (29/07/12a [italics added]).  As can be seen, the 
‘group identity’ of Britain was clearly predicated ‘on ideals transmitted from the past’ 
(Sutton and Vertigans, 2002: 62), in this instance, ‘a deep-rooted sense of superiority’ 
(The Independent on Sunday, 29/07/12a) that still ‘continue[d] to have a resonance in 
the present’ (Sutton and Vertigans, 2002: 62). 
 As a result, appreciations of Britain’s established superiority were exemplified 
in press reports that often served to present such assertions as taken for granted and 
widely acknowledged British traits.  Indeed, this was exemplified by Collins (2012):   
 
We dislike being instructed on how to behave by people wholly unqualified to 
offer such instruction.  It is one of our oldest and most endearing traits. In any 
case, our history has earned us the right to exercise our own choice on these 
matters. Again, it is central to who we are. (The Mail on Sunday, 29/07/12 
[italics added]) 
 
Similarly, Phillips (2012) noted that: 
 
We recognised our history with pride and unashamed acceptance that it has 
made us the country we are today, a country still able to put on such an 
extraordinary event with style and to welcome visitors from around the world 
with open arms and with open minds. (Daily Mirror, 28/07/12) 
 
Such accounts were closely tied to a ‘British system of national beliefs [which] had, 
since time immemorial, legitimated their claim to superiority at least partially through 
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Britain’s service and achievements for others, for humanity and civilisation’ (Elias, 
1996: 348).  Subsequently, The Mail on Sunday (2012) argued: 
 
We have no need to assert ourselves.  These small islands have influenced the 
world in countless ways for centuries.  No other capital has hosted the Games 
three times, or is likely to do so. (29/07/12)14 
 
Accordingly, while the games provided ‘confirmation of London’s predominant place 
in the world’ (Milner, Waldie and Reguly, The Globe and Mail, 26/07/12), the 
recognition of London as the only city to have hosted the Olympic Games three times, 
served to underscore Britain’s influential world role, a role which, rather ironically, 
did not need asserting. 
However, closer examination of the above examples, reveals that it was the 
English press that sought to draw upon Britain’s history as a powerful signifier of its 
established position within the world (Collins, 2012; Crompton, 2012; Phillips, 2012).  
While this was bolstered by the fact that it was the English capital, London, which 
was hosting the Games for a third time, accounts of British history reflected a 
particular form of ‘group charisma’ and established status within the English press 
(Elias and Scotson, 1994; Kumar, 2003; 2006b).15 
In relation to the coverage of the Opening Ceremony, representations of 
Britain’s past were sanctioned by a traditional interpretation of ‘Britain’ which 
depicted the British landscape and its people as an ‘essentially pastoral island’ of 
milking maids and morris dancers (Storry and Childs, 1997: 21-22).  Consequently, in 
Hardman’s (2012) report of the Opening Ceremony, she noted that: 
 
The stadium show opened to a quintessential rural idyll of happy yokels set in 
a non-specific sepiatinted yesteryear.  Boyle called this his ‘Green and 
Pleasant Land’ section and a choir duly sang Jerusalem over the top of it all.  
A waterwheel spun round above a babbling brook while young maidens 
danced around maypoles, plodding farmhands tended real sheep and cows and 
young blades enjoyed a game of cricket (Daily Mail, 28/07/12) 
 
Here, the Opening Ceremony presented a dramatic representation of an ‘immutable 
pastoral England’ (Reviron-Piegay, 2009: 4).  As a result: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Again, comparisons can be made between the press’ representation of ‘These small islands’ (The 
Mail on Sunday, 29/07/12) and Littler’s (2006) analysis of the 1952 Festival of Britain.  In particular, 
Littler (2006) notes that, ‘The Britain being represented around the Festival was often portrayed as 
whimsically small: a little country with a big history’ (2006: 31). 
15 See chapter three, section 3.2.2. 
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The bucolic scenes on the stadium’s infield were pleasingly evocative of Olde 
England and happily quirky.  The ‘Pandemonium’ of the transformation 
wrought by the Industrial Revolution and the turning of the nation into a land 
of dark satanic mills was a darkly magnificent sequence. (Holt, Daily Mirror, 
28/07/12) 
 
This was continued in the New Zealand Herald (2012) whose post-ceremony analysis 
sought to highlight how the inclusion of ‘meadows’, ‘livestock’, ‘a farmer ploughing 
his field’ and the very English ‘cricket match’ during the Opening Ceremony, helped 
to ‘evoke a pastoral idyll, the “green and pleasant land” described in William Blake’s 
poem Jerusalem, which, set to music, is regarded as England’s unofficial national 
anthem’ (26/07/12).  Evidently, ‘evocative’ recreations of ‘Olde England’ and its 
‘Green and Pleasant Land’, served to recreate an idealized portrayal of Britain, 
indeed, one that was drawn upon in both the English and Commonwealth press.   
Accordingly, Weight (2002) has highlighted that: 
 
The squalor caused by industrialization provoked a reaction to Victorian 
economic liberalism and to urban life. … From around the 1880s, this 
transformed the popular image of the countryside from that of backward hovel 
into a picturesque repository of national values. (2002: 7) 
 
However, what is noticeable in the above examples is the degree to which a rather 
‘English’ portrayal of Britain was adopted within the press’ coverage.  On the 
contrary, Weight (2002) has argued that while ‘the British were … the first people in 
the West to romanticise the countryside’ (Weight, 2002: 7), this was not, ‘a peculiarly 
English fixation’ (2002: 72).16  In fact, there are ‘countless books, songs and paintings 
which celebrated the Scottish and Welsh countryside’ (Weight, 2002: 73). 
Nonetheless, Reicher and Hopkins (2001) have argued that the rural depiction 
of England suggests a form of ‘metonymic stereotyping [that] is partial and involves 
exclusion’ (2001: 65).  In doing so, such constructions ‘[become] a mode of 
domination rather than a possible form of identification’ (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001: 
65).  In exploring Reicher and Hopkins (2001) analysis further, it is possible to draw a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Indeed, this is undermined somewhat by Weight’s (2002) example of a BBC publicity statement for 
the British soap opera, The Archers, which described the soap’s fictional village as ‘a gentle relic of 
Old England, nostalgic, generous, incorruptible and (above all) valiant.  In other words the sort of 
British community that the rootless townsman would like to live in and can involve himself in 
vicariously. (Laing, 1992: 146 cited in Weight, 2002: 159 [italics added]). 
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comparison between the press’ 2012 discourse and the 1952 Festival of Empire.  
Here, Littler (2006) notes that: 
 
The villages of Finchingield, Thaxted and Bardield had been singled out by 
Essex Rural Community Council to be put on display because they had a 
‘community spirit lively enough’ and because they were deemed to be 
‘beautiful in setting and style’ as well as being close together. If such activity, 
where people were recurrently described as ‘playing their part’, indicated the 
participative nature of the Festival (accompanying its equally vehement 
emphasis on top-down planning), it also indicated the ‘littleness’ of Britain 
under construction – a Britain most often depicted in the national press as 
English, despite the activities going on in Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Wales. It created a Britain of a nation of villages, the whole as the sum of very 
small and very picturesque parts. (2006: 31 [italics added]) 
 
Littler’s (2006) highlighting of the distinctly rural, and, reportedly English, depiction 
of Britain, strikes a notable similarity with the English and Commonwealth press’ 
coverage of the 2012 London Olympic Opening Ceremony.  To this extent, it is 
possible to observe how the dominance of ‘England’ within representations of 
‘Britain’ have formed, and, continues to form, an important part of the press’ 
representation of popular ‘British’ culture and community. 
Similar representations could also be identified in reference to the British ‘stiff 
upper lip’, used in both the domestic (Freedland, 2012a; Goring, 2012; Smith, 2012; 
Walker, 2012) and Commonwealth coverage (Hinds, 2012; Lane, 2012; McLaren, 
2012).  Indeed, Vincent and Harris (2014) note that the British ‘stiff upper lip’ is a 
characteristic that is deeply evocative of the civilized English gentleman, one that 
‘emerged during the age of imperialism when the British/English code of civility was 
revered for its socializing influence on colonial subjects’ (Vincent and Harris, 2014: 
232; see also Hislop, 2012).  Other labels, such as the Australian label ‘Pom’ – used 
to refer to England immigrants within Australia – could also be found within the 
Australian press (Hinds, 2012; Lette, 2012; Silvester, 2012).  Together, these 
constructions all served to provide a particularly ‘English’ representation of Britain, 
with Lette (2012) noting that ‘in a Stiff Upper Lip competition, there’s no question 
the Poms would win bronze, silver and gold’ (The Age, 28/07/12). 
Consequently, whereas a number of commentators have alluded to the growing 
separation between England and Britain (Bragg, 2014; Perryman, 2012), Colley 
(2014a) notes that: 
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the unfortunate English habit that still lingers of using ‘England’ as a synonym 
for the entire island of Britain is often interpreted as one more expression of 
English arrogance.  Might it not also testify to a certain lack of clarity about 
boundaries and identity? (2014a: 60) 
 
With this in mind and with the above examples considered, it is evident that ‘this 
unfortunate English habit’ (Colley, 2014a: 60) was one that was shared by the 
Commonwealth press (Hinds, 2012; Lette, 2012; Silvester, 2012).  That is, while the 
English press revealed a propensity to resort to nostalgic depictions of 
England/Britain (Harris, 2012c; Holt, 2012; Jones, 2012; Richards, 2012), 
correspondingly, the Commonwealth press served to frame ‘Britain’ through the use 
of a distinctly rural and imperially ‘English’ form of representation (‘stiff upper 
lip’/’Pom’) (Goring, 2012; Hinds, 2012; Lane, 2012; McLaren, 2012; Smith, 2012; 
Walker, 2012).  Here, constructions were historically rooted in, and continually 
related to, Britain’s imperial past.  Indeed, despite wider processes of change within 
Britain and the British ‘we-image’, most notably, the decline of the British Empire 
and the devolving of the British state (McCrone, 2006; Perryman, 2009; Wilson, 
2006), newspaper coverage remained tied to an English-centered and imperially 
constructed, representation of Britain. 
Nonetheless, whereas the above examples reveal how established practices 
formed an important part of the English press’ discourse, these constructions can also 
be considered in relation to wider changes within the British figuration.  Indeed, while 
the previous section sought to highlight how examples of Britain’s imperial past could 
be used as a form distinction within the press’ coverage, section 5.1.2. noted how this 
past could result in ‘imperial fantasies’ (Toynbee, 2012a).  With this in mind, Loyal 
(2011) notes that: 
 
The nature of group fantasies and emotions, which can often slip through 
theoretical conceptual nets, need to be acknowledged: their logic is, however, 
not arbitrary but possesses a structure and discernible dynamic of its own. 
(2011: 192) 
 
Accordingly, the ‘discernible dynamic[s]’ underlying ‘group fantasies and emotions’ 
(Loyal, 2011: 192) in addition to feelings of contemporary decline, may be reflective 
of broader changes in the figurational dynamics between established and outsider 
groups.  Consequently, the following section will consider the effect of these changes 
within the Commonwealth press. 
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5.2.2. Britain and Commonwealth interdependence: new relations and old 
anxieties 
 
In comments related to the British royal family, the remarks of one individual were 
highlighted by Stone (2012): 
 
King Charles is about as un-Kiwi as they come. It’s not his fault, he’s a born-
and-bred British aristocrat. It’s just plain daft expecting him to be a symbol of 
New Zealand. And I’m sure that if Kiwis were given the chance to choose, 
they would back one of their own as head of state. (Dean Knight cited in 
Stone, New Zealand Herald, 02/06/12) 
 
Indeed, the belief that the British royal family no longer reflected the former 
dominions was shared by Holden (2012) who noted that ‘in the latter half of the 
Queen’s reign New Zealand’s national identity has developed to the point where most 
New Zealanders see the monarchy as irrelevant, the royals as a slick public relations 
machine’ (Dominion Post, 04/06/12). Rothwell (2012) added that: 
 
by 1986, it was clear New Zealand’s love affair with the Empire was waning.  
The Queen’s tour was only nine days long and marked by two incidents of 
activism. (Dominion Post, 02/06/12) 
 
In fact, the disparity between the ‘English’ royal family and New Zealand was drawn 
upon in Milne’s (2012) questioning of the royal’s sporting allegiances: 
 
The Duke and Duchess of Cambridge are lovely people, but they’re English 
through and through.  They don’t understand Christmas on the beach, or 
pohutukawa.  They can’t cheer for the ALL BLACKS.  And when we’re 
desperate for the Black Sticks to win, Kate is ‘jumping for joy’ at seeing them 
miss out on a medal.  They can never be loyal supporters of New Zealand – so 
how can they ever expect us to be their loyal subjects? (New Zealand Herald, 
12/08/12) 
 
Frustrations with the monarchy were evident in reports of the Diamond Jubilee.  
Watkins (2012) sought to draw upon New Zealand frustrations with the Jubilee’s year 
long celebrations:   
 
Public servants are losing their jobs by the tens of thousands, pay packets are 
frozen and Britain’s national debt is a staggering £1.2 trillion. But poor 
Britannia can still afford to throw a glittering Diamond Jubilee bash for Queen 
Elizabeth – and Commonwealth countries including New Zealand are helping to 
foot the bill for the year-long celebration. (Dominion Post, 02/06/12) 
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This was echoed in the Australian coverage, which noted that ‘any excitement about 
the whole occasion seems about as remote as, well, England’ (Southphommasane, The 
Age, 04/06/12a).  Instead: 
 
Here in Australia, we are holding no equivalent river pageant to that in London 
to mark the Queen’s diamond jubilee. There is no bunting in our city streets, no 
memorabilia being mass-produced. So far as official commemoration goes, 
Prime Minister Julia Gillard will light a jubilee beacon on Parliament House 
today. But that is about it. (Southphommasane, The Age, 04/06/12a) 
 
Alluding to Australia’s failed republican referendum in 1999, Carney (2012) stated 
that: 
 
only a little over 10 years ago, there appeared to be a genuine prospect that 
Australia would come to look upon these activities in the way that Americans 
do: fondly, but at a remove, the expression of a peculiar form of British 
nationalism that no longer had anything specifically to do with us.  But it was 
not to be. (The Age, 06/06/12 [italics added]) 
 
Clearly for Carney (2012) the feeling that such royal celebrations ‘no longer had 
anything specifically to do with us’ (The Age, 06/06/12 [italics added]) served to 
emphasise Australia’s loosening attachment with the British monarchy.  This was 
shared by Tate (2012), who’s disdain for the Australian media’s ‘gushing about our 
ties to the ‘motherland’ (The Sunday Age, 29/07/12), helped to unveil a much more 
problematic issue during the Opening Ceremony.  In reference to the pre-Olympic 
debate surrounding which Australian athlete would carry the Australian flag during 
the Opening Ceremony, Tate (2012) noted: 
 
So the delightful Lauren Jackson won the race that seemed to matter most to 
our athletes in the lead-up to the London Olympics – carrying the Australian 
flag into the opening ceremony.  It’s a shame then that this undoubted honour 
saw one of our sporting greats hoisting an ensign that prominently featured the 
flag of the host nation.  All those union flags waving madly in the crowd may 
be comfortingly familiar, but were also a reminder of how infantile we are when 
it comes to national symbols. Is it any wonder our Canadian cousins regularly 
cack themselves laughing at us (and New Zealand) during these soirees.  And 
while the athletes’ joy is well earned, the orgy of nationalist backslapping that 
is about to overwhelm us would be easier to take if the oi, oi, oi hangers-on 
weren’t so laughably idle in forging real change. You know, simple things like 
getting your own flag.  Australia’s elite athletes would never win a medal if 
they were as lazy and scared in competition as the rest of the country appears to 
be on the issue of changing ‘‘old hoary’’. (The Sunday Age, 29/07/12) 
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Evidently, both Carney (2012) and Tate’s (2012) use of the personal pronouns ‘our’, 
‘we’ and ‘us’ served to highlight Australia’s contested relationship with Britain. 
 Moreover, what is apparent from the above examples is the extent to which the 
use of personal pronouns reflected Australia’s ambivalent post-imperial relationship 
with Britain. Whereas the use of the pronouns ‘our’ and ‘we’ were clearly used to 
dissociate Australia from Britain, it was a separation that sat alongside ‘our Canadian 
cousins’ (Tate, The Sunday Age, 29/07/12 [italics added). Here, Australia’s former 
imperial history was clearly evoked in its attachment to those Canadian’s whose own 
history was tied to the British Empire. In such instances, Tate’s (2012) use of the 
personal pronouns ‘us’, ‘we’ and ‘our’ sought to distinguish Australia from the former 
‘motherland’ (Tate, The Sunday Age, 29/07/12). Evidently, the use of personal 
pronouns by the Australian press served to reflect wider confusions regarding the 
multi-national imperial history of the British Empire (Malcolm, 2012).   
Similarly, reports pertaining to the dominion’s imperial history could also be 
found within the New Zealand coverage.  Indeed, Rothwell (2012) noted: 
 
The New Zealand that the Queen met as she stepped off the Gothic was quite 
different from the New Zealand she would find today. Emerging from World 
War II, it was the period of the happy family, where birth rates were rising, 
where 80 per cent of the population could trace their ancestry back to Britain, 
where people rarely left New Zealand except by arduous ship voyage. We 
were proud as a country – Edmund Hillary had just given the Queen his 
coronation ‘gift’, the first summit of Mt Everest. … During her first welcome, 
she told crowds of adoring Kiwis that she was delighted to be ‘not in a foreign 
land and amongst alien people, but at home with our kinsman’.  When she 
gave her Christmas address from Government House in Auckland, she said, ‘I 
want to show that the Crown is not merely an abstract symbol of our unity but 
a personal and living bond between you and me’.  Many people in the 1950s, 
with memories of World War II and New Zealand’s part in protecting Britain 
still an important part of our identity, would have felt that. (Dominion Post – 
Your Weekend, 02/06/12 [italics added]) 
 
Clearly, Rothwell’s (2012) comments reveal the importance afforded to New 
Zealand’s British heritage and the significance of this heritage, particularly with 
regards to its involvement in the scaling of Mount Everest and its part in aiding the 
British forces during the Second World War.  However, as Rothwell (2012) clearly 
states, while Britain was once ‘an important part of … [New Zealand] identity’, today 
New Zealand was signaled as being ‘quite different’ (Dominion Post – Your Weekend, 
02/06/12).   
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To this extent, accounts of Britain’s imperial decline served to highlight the 
differences between Britain and the former dominions.  Indeed, Hyder (2012) sought 
to measure Canada’s recent successes by noting that: 
 
If Britain has become modest by coming to terms with the fact that its days as a 
global empire are behind it, Canada has increasingly built on its recent 
successes to become emboldened by the emerging role we have assumed on the 
world stage. (Vancouver Sun, 11/08/12) 
 
As can be seen, whereas the decline of the British Empire had helped to create an 
emerging sense of modesty within Britain, Canada had undertaken its own emerging 
role within global politics.   
 Notably, the emergence of Canada ‘on the world stage’ (Hyder, Vancouver 
Sun, 11/08/12) offered a stark contrast to reports within the Australian press.  Here, 
Australia’s ties with the former British Empire revealed ‘deep concerns about the 
status of its historical experience’ (Hughes-d’Aeth, 2003: 220).  Indeed, commenting 
upon Australian anxieties towards the former motherland, Van Duinen (2013) has 
argued that whereas Australian nationalism was clearly evident in politics and the 
arts:    
 
all too often such proto-nationalist voices were found to be trumped or drowned 
out by various manifestations of Britishness: the perceived need for British 
military protection; a conservative and frustratingly prevalent ‘Anglo-
Australianness’; and, associated with the latter, a nagging inferiority complex or 
‘cultural cringe’. (2013: 345-346) 
 
In fact, since the 1960s, debates concerning the ‘quality of Australian nationhood’ 
have been widely contested and deeply embedded in discussions relating to its 
national history (Ward, 2007: 239).  Indicative of these debates was the launching of 
Rupert Murdoch’s Australian newspaper in 1964.  In its inaugural editorial, the paper 
noted that: 
 
We Australians have always been proud – and perhaps a little self-confident too 
– about describing our country as a ‘young country’ … Yet something we all 
know in our hearts when we are very young is that sooner of later we will be 
grown up … We have fought successfully against British control of our 
political affairs.  We have made a lot of obey, speaking of us collectively.  But 
have we really grown up? It seems we have not … We are growing up.  But we 
have manifestly not yet achieved maturity. (Australian, 15/07/12 cited in Ward, 
2007: 239) 
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Accordingly, in 2012, the ‘maturity’ of Australia was still being questioned.  While 
the previous example from Tate (2012) sought to remind its Australian audience of 
how ‘infantile’ the nation was, other reports revealed that feelings of anxiety, 
continued to impact upon Australian identity and culture, particularly with regards to 
Britain, and, as the following example reveals, with specific reference to the British 
monarchy: 
 
The idea of someone inheriting the highest public office in the land offends 
democratic principles, pure and simple.  This gets to one of the anomalies of 
Australia remaining a constitutional monarchy. How odd that a country that 
prides itself on being egalitarian has a constitutional framework that is anything 
but.  One of the problems is that grandeur and glamour still attach to royalty. 
There is also the vexed question of which model of republic Australians may 
want.  After all, what kind of aspirational society are we talking about when 
Australians cannot even aspire to be the head of state? (Southphommasane, 
The Age, 04/06/12a [italics added]) 
 
As can be seen, while attempts to disassociate Australia from Britain were evidently 
pursued (Carney, 2012; Tate, 2012), Australia’s national history was undermined by 
the contradictions and insecurities surrounding its transnational imperial heritage 
(Codell, 2003; Darian-Smith et al., 2007; Hughes-d’Aeth, 2003; Ward, 2007). 
 In addition, while concerns regarding Australia’s monarchial ties were 
highlighted within the press, Britain’s successful Opening Ceremony brought further 
concern.  With regards to the Opening Ceremony, Hinds (2012) noted that: 
 
Infuriatingly, the dour, buttoned down Poms had come up with an opening that 
was part artistic triumph; part rollicking, self-mocking celebration of their 
nation’s endearing quirkiness. A tribute to a country that doesn’t take itself 
nearly so seriously as it tries to make us think. Not even, you couldn’t help 
thinking, as seriously as we take ourselves. (The Sunday Age, 29/07/12) 
 
In fact, the success of London 2012 encouraged a reflexive attitude within the 
Australian press.  Here, Australia’s poor performance at the games resulted in wider 
questions regarding the Australian national character.  As a result: 
 
For Australia, London 2012 may just have said something about the rise of a 
cocky and complacent nation – which has forgotten the role of luck in life. It 
was once the mark of the national character that we were a laconic and 
resilient people. London highlights that we may have become a braggart 
nation that can’t always walk the walk. (Southphommasane, The Age, 
13/08/12b) 
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Similarly, Cooper and Butt (2012) considered: 
 
Which is worse – Olympic defeat to Britain or New Zealand?  Australians like 
to say we punch above our weight at the Olympics, but even taking population 
into account won’t mask an underwhelming medal tally at the London Games. 
(The Age, 14/08/12) 
 
Indeed, Wilson (2012) went as far to suggest that London had ‘knocked Sydney off its 
pedestal as the best host of a modern Olympic Games’ adding, ‘as awful as it is to 
admit, London 2012 was bigger, slicker, almost as friendly and more thoughtfully 
planned than Sydney in terms of the legacy it will leave the host city’ (The Australian, 
13/08/12).17 
To this extent, comparisons with the former British motherland reflected the 
hierarchical organization of the former colonial period (Trovao, 2012).  Cole (2001) 
has examined how colonial memories often draw upon the ‘tensions and 
contradictions’, within former colonial territories (2001: 281).  In the case of 
Australia, however, such tensions and contradictions sought to reveal a sense of 
inferiority towards Britain, especially when compared to both the Canadian and New 
Zealand coverage.  The inability to freely choose its own head of state 
(Southphommasane, 2012a) as well as concerns relating to that fact that Britain had 
beaten Australia both in the medal tally (Cooper and Butt, 2012) and its hosting of the 
games (Hinds, 2012), all served to underline a sense of Australian inadequacy and 
anxiety within the press.  Accordingly, despite Australia’s independence, the 
Australian press’ construction of Britain was forged in relation to Australia’s 
historical location within a wider British imperial/Commonwealth figuration.   
 
5.2.3. Scotland: the challenging outsider 
 
While previous chapters have explored how national identity could serve as a form of 
distinction and resistance to British imperialism (Darian-Smith et al., 2007), the above 
examples suggest that constructions of Britain, within the Commonwealth press, were 
dependent upon a residual understanding and contested appreciation of Britain’s 
imperial history.18  Indeed, for Scotland, both the Diamond Jubilee and the London 
Olympic Games provided a context in which old alliances could be questioned and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Equally, London’s attempts to help rejuvenate the Stratford area, was also heralded in reports within 
the South Korean media (Mangan et al., 2013). 
18 See chapter two, sections 2.3., 2.3.1. and chapter three, section 3.0. 
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identities debated.  In fact, whereas Boyle and Haynes (2012) noted that the Olympic 
Games ‘revealed a temporary suspension in the pressing debate on Scottish 
independence, with hegemonic Britishness and the symbolic flying of the Union Jack 
more in evident across the UK than had been witnessed in recent decades’ (2014: 91), 
within the Scottish press, questions on ‘the current mood of Scotland and Britain’ 
(Hassan, The Scotsman, 02/06/12) formed an important part of the Diamond Jubilee 
and Olympic coverage.  
Accordingly, while the games represented ‘an astounding success story for 
Scottish and British sport’ (Spiers, Sunday Herald, 12/08/12), Spiers (2012) noted 
that: 
 
there is currently a complex cultural and political game being played out 
between these Olympics, Scotland’s First Minister Alex Salmond, and the 
theme of 2014 and Scottish independence (Sunday Herald, 12/08/12) 
 
In particular, Spier’s (2012) comments can be read alongside wider concerns 
regarding the disillusionment and lack of confidence in the central Westminster 
government.  Porter (2014) added that:  
 
To sympathise with the Scottish independence movement, yet at the same time 
ardently hope that the UK remains intact is an odd position to take, but there is 
some consistency if you look at Westminster’s political decline … I’m not the 
only one who has lost faith in Westminster, and that can be felt just as keenly in 
London as in Edinburgh. (2014 [italics added])19 
 
However, the sense that ‘Scotland’ could leave the Union with Britain was echoed in 
Hassan’s (2012) remarks on the need ‘to junk the stories of decline and 
disappointment, and find a new northern song’ (The Scotsman, 02/06/12).  
Correspondingly, others were clear to point out Scotland’s increasing disillusionment 
with the Union.  Cowing (2012) noted: 
 
But many Scots have been left unmoved by such overt Union-pushing 
marketing.  With discussions about independence and the Union at a critical 
time, the Union flag has become a symbol that many Scots not only reject, but 
associate with negative sentiments (The Scotsman, 03/06/12)  
 
Instead, ‘in 21st century Scotland, the Union flag has acquired a political significance 
that robs it of its traditional power as a unifying symbol’ (Herald, 02/06/12a).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/05/magna-carta-rebirth-british-politics, 
retrieved: 7 January 2014. 
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Similarly, Hamilton (2012) noted: 
 
The sense of cohesion and co-operation which ‘Team GB’ exudes is all about 
parity of esteem and harnessing individual ambition towards a common goal.  I 
can’t thinks of a better description of precisely what an independent Scotland 
would be seeking to achieve. (The Scotsman, 05/08/12)  
 
 Accordingly, in each of the above examples, attempts were clearly made within 
the Scottish press to highlight Scotland’s growing separation from the British state.  
Indeed, such disillusionment with the Westminster system may reflect broader 
processes of functional democratization; in which the granting of devolved legislature 
and executive powers across the UK have led to greater insecurity and anxiety 
regarding a coherently stable British identity and culture. 20   However, closer 
examination of the above examples revealed an underlying shift in how the British 
state was being perceived, that is, primarily as an entity that was unrepresentative of 
Scottish interests (Macwhirter, 2012).   
 Consequently, despite the Opening Ceremony’s rather positive portrayal of 
Britain, it was clear that the Britain being performed ‘bore little relation to the social 
reality of the UK under the Coalition’ (Macwhirter, Sunday Herald, 12/08/12).  In 
fact, for Macwhirter (2012), the myths surrounding Boyle’s Britain had a far more 
unfavorable effect: 
 
And though Danny Boyle’s Britain is a myth, it remains a potent one. It was 
what persuaded Scots to meekly hand over Scotland’s oil to the British state, in 
a gesture of almost wilful altruism, in the 1960s and 1970s. (Sunday Herald, 
12/08/12) 
 
Notably, Macwhirter’s (2012) remarks did not reflect any apparent longing for the 
past (Boym, 2001) but instead revealed an implicit criticism of the ‘British myth’ and 
its effects upon Scottish national sovereignty.  More specifically, Macwhirter’s (2012) 
comments elucidate upon what Hassan (2013b) has referred to as a change in ‘the way 
the British state and government is seen in Scotland’ (2013b).21  Whereas, Hassan 
(2013b) makes the distinction that in the past referring to the British state ‘marked 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 There are varying forms of and definitions attributed to the term ‘Westminster System’ (Rhodes, 
Wanna and Weller, 2009; Rhodes and Weller, 2005).  In this instance it is used to refer to the executive 
power, which is currently held by the Queen Elizabeth, the British government and the devolved 
national authorities. 
21 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/gerry-hassan/history-in-making-battle-for-
scotland’s-future, retrieved 2 December 2013. 
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you as a dangerous left-wing nationalist’, today, ‘it has entered wider popular usage 
and behind this lies a shift in how it is understood’ (2013b).22  Here:      
 
The British state has come to be seen increasingly as a problem for Scotland: in 
how it governs for a small elite and an unrepresentative corner of the UK in a 
way which harms Scotland’s national interests (along with a majority of the 
people of the UK). (Hassan, 2013b)23 
 
In fact, in comparison with the Scottish coverage, English press reports revealed a 
distinct lack of opinion on Scotland, Scottish society and the forthcoming Scottish 
Independence Referendum. 24   This stood in contrast to Scottish reports, which 
actively sought to frame both the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Ceremonies 
in light of the forthcoming Scottish Independence Referendum. 
 As a result, for the Scottish press, both the Jubilee and the London Olympic 
Games provided a wider context in which Scottish interests in the Union could be 
debated.  Barnes (2012) argued that: 
 
This extraordinary political backdrop to the Games in London has been a 
running thread over the last two remarkable weeks of spectacle and drama.  
From the singing of the Flower of Scotland in the opening ceremony, to the 
sight of Edinburgh’s Sir Chris Hoy leading out Great Britain’s competitors, to 
the spectacle of Dunblane’s Andy Murray highfiving London’s Laura Robinson 
in the mixed-doubles tennis, and Glaswegian rower Kath Grainger hugging Sir 
Steve Redgrave after finally winning Olympic gold, the images have placed the 
question of Scotland’s status in the United Kingdom far more graphically than 
any politician’s speech. (The Scotsman [pullout], 12/08/12)  
 
Indeed, while the London Olympics provided a ‘political legacy’ for Scottish 
involvement in the Union, it also proved ‘to be a watershed moment in the complex 
debate about national identity that lies at the heart of Scotland’s independence 
referendum’ (Scotland on Sunday, 29/07/12).  As a result, despite the Opening 
Ceremony’s theatrical portrayal of ‘Great Britain’, MacDonald (2012b) argued that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/gerry-hassan/history-in-making-battle-for-
scotland’s-future, retrieved 2 December 2013. 
23 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/gerry-hassan/history-in-making-battle-for-
scotland’s-future, retrieved 2 December 2013. 
24 Certainly, while Scotland’s decision to vote on independence in 2014 would affect both Northern 
Ireland and Wales, the general trend within the English coverage was to ignore England’s relations 
with the home nations.  Accordingly, while other examples have highlighted Northern Irish concerns 
regarding the Queen (Curran, 2012) as well as the tensions that arise between England and its Celtic 
partners (Morgan, 2012; Spiers, 2012), within the English press, attention focused primarily on those 
non-English athletes who failed to participate in singing the national anthem.   
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‘Scotland and Great Britain still have questions to address that cannot be answered by 
an opening ceremony, however brilliant and barmy’ (Sunday Herald, 29/07/12b). 
Indeed, the distinct lack of attention towards Scotland and the Scottish 
Independence Referendum by the English press, shares in Craig’s (2011) analysis of 
Anglo-Scottish relations.  Craig (2011) notes that:  
 
the Scots’ view of England and the English are complex and vary enormously.  
The range of views testifies to one important fact about the Scots – England 
matters very much to them.  Yet Scotland barely registers on the English 
horizon. (2011: 282 [italics added])   
 
With this in mind, it is possible to observe how the Scottish press formed part of a 
wider British figuration of established-outsider relations.  Indeed, Mennell (2007) 
notes that, ‘a general characteristic of established-outsider relations [is] that the 
outsiders “understand” the established better than the established do the outsiders’ 
(2007: 312).  As a result, comparisons between the Scottish and English press 
revealed that Scottish reports provided a far more detailed assessment of the 
differences between Scotland and England.  Notably, such detail was absent within the 
English coverage.  That is, the English press, failed to elucidate as well as provide any 
informed discussion on the differences between England and Scotland.  Indeed, one 
particular difference that was highlighted within the Scottish press was in its 
celebrations of the Olympic Games and the British monarchy.  The Herald (2012b) 
noted that: 
 
Many Scots have succumbed to Olympic fever only belatedly. In the years 
following the 2005 announcement, there was much carping over the escalating 
scale of taxpayer support for an event from which Scotland had seemingly little 
to gain, especially as it was conceived in an era of prosperity but delivered 
amidst mounting austerity.  The somewhat restrained Scottish response to the 
royal Diamond Jubilee celebrations prompted suggestions that attitudes north of 
the Border to emphatically British events might have been tempered by the 
debate about independence. Would the same apply to London 2012? 
(28/07/12b)  
 
Consequently, whereas ‘the lack of interest’ in the Jubilee was seen to represent 
Scotland’s disillusionment and loosening attachment with the British monarchy 
(McNulty, The Scotsman, 02/06/12), it was also seen as a particularly ‘Scottish’ way 
of celebrating.  This stood in contrast to England, where Fry (2012) noted that: 
 
if the Scots do not show their attachment to the Queen in the same way as the 
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English show theirs, then somehow the Scots are wrong – even though recent 
opinion polls demonstrate that the level of support for the monarchy is roughly 
the same in both countries, at about three quarters of those asked. (The 
Scotsman, 05/06/12) 
 
Consequently, instead of denouncing the British monarchy, it became evident that the 
Scottish press constructed a distinctively Scottish, and, more importantly, non-
English, form of royal celebration.   
 Elsewhere, Craig (2011) has examined the differences between Scottishness and 
Englishness, noting that Scottish identity and character is often juxtaposed against the 
English via the statement: ‘The Scots are not English’ (2011: 266 [italics in original]).  
Here, she argues that: 
 
No matter what happens it is still there.  And the very fact that it is always there 
has helped the Scots resist some of the pressures of continual Anglicisation and 
assimilation, and ensured the continuation of a strong Scottish sense of self.  So 
if we were trying to chart why Scottish identity since 1707 has been robust and 
resilient, the sense of ‘not being English’ is our first port of call. (Craig, 2011: 
266 [italics in original]) 
 
Accordingly, such sentiments were clearly uncovered by Fry (2012), who in 
comments regarding the British monarchy, noted that ‘Scotland’s relationship is 
simply not conducted on the same terms as England’s relationship with the monarchy’ 
(The Scotsman, 05/06/12).  This was, as Fry (2012) explains, a historically typical 
response to the British monarchy in Scotland:  
 
the subdued attitude to royalty in Scotland is an old one rather than a new one. I 
can trace it back at least to the beginning of the 19th century, when Britain was 
embroiled in one of the earliest of its world wars, the fight to the death with 
Napoleon Bonaparte. Again, certain keen observers among the English detected 
that the Scots were not quite with them. Then too, it was less a matter of any 
real sympathy with the French, whose failure to give effective help to the 
rebellions of the 18th century had convinced even Jacobites that they were just 
too shifty, and never again to be trusted. Somehow, all the same, the Scots were 
not true-blue enough. (The Scotsman, 05/06/12)  
 
Evidently, Fry’s (2012) comments served to draw upon the fact that Scottish 
indifference to the monarchy had formed part of Scotland’s ‘robust and resilient’ 
history of maintaining a Scottish attitude to the royal family (Craig, 2011: 266).  
Indeed, Fry (2012) added that: 
 
In a nutshell, the answer to the charges of deficient devotion must then be that 
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Scotland does not always do things in the same way as England does them, 
something which we all ought to have known already. We might have hoped, in 
these days of devolution, that the idea had got around of Scotland being allowed 
to do some things in its own way. (The Scotsman, 05/06/12)  
 
In such instances, it was evident that discussions pertaining to the British monarchy 
were a signification of the differences between Scotland and England as well as the 
cultural and political tensions that underlie British events (Cowing, 2012).  As a 
result, Fry’s (2012) reference to devolution suggested that such differences, and, 
indeed, Scotland’s ability ‘to do some things in its own way’ should not only be 
permitted but also acknowledged by it English neighbours (Fry, The Scotsman, 
05/06/12). 
Consequently, contrary to revealing a complete disavowal and (dis)attachment 
with the Jubilee, the Scottish press sought to define Scotland’s location within a wider 
British collective by demarcating its own ‘Scottish’ relationship with the monarchy, a 
relationship that stood in contrast to England’s.  Here, Scottish differences were 
perceived as traditional and long-standing.  As a result, in comments relating to the 
2002 Golden Jubilee, Randall (2012) suggested that: 
 
But there is another reason why the Golden Jubilee was marked in a different 
way…This has less to do with any political antipathy to the institution than to 
the type of people that we are.  Scots as a whole tend to be more reserved and 
less demonstrative on occasions of this sort…Such plainness is not necessarily a 
lack of enthusiasm, but, on the contrary, evidence of a wish to be direct and true 
in our public gestures.  For us, less is more. (The Scotsman, 02/06/12)  
 
Therefore, while Scottish reports served to highlight how analyses of Scotland are 
often measured by ‘the usual assumption of the dominant nation in the United 
Kingdom’ (Fry, The Scotsman, 05/06/12) – i.e. England – the above examples reveal 
how outsider groups can draw upon their outsider identification as a way of 
negotiating or resisting established groups.  In fact, in interviews conducted with 
Scottish respondents, Whigham (2012) noted that the presence of an ‘underdog 
mentality’ within Scotland was often ‘portrayed as a positive quality, with emphasis 
on the common bond felt with other nations who were felt to possess similar positions 
within global society’ (2012: 12).  In such instances, Scotland’s ‘underdog mentality’ 
or ‘outsider status’, vis-à-vis England, was not ignored but was instead used to 
discursively construct Scotland in contrast to those ‘south of the border’ (Cowing, The 
Scotsman, 03/06/12; see also Rojek, 2007: 158). 
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Accordingly, while Scotland’s outsider image formed an important part of its 
self-identification, this process was predicated on its location within a wider British 
domestic figuration.  That is, within the context of celebrating the British monarch the 
Scottish coverage discursively worked as a form of resistance to, and, separation 
from, its established English neighbour.  While certain reports served to highlight 
Scotland’s growing separation from the British state (Hassan, 2012; Macwhirter, 
2012), the differences between Scotland and England (Herald, 2012a; 2012b; 
Randall, 2012), were based upon, and, framed by, Scotland’s position as a distinct and 
separate ‘outsider’ nation within Britain (Fry, 2012; Hassan, 2012).  Indeed, such 
discourses do not occur independently but are forged in relation to wider figurational 
dynamics and established discourses.  With this in mind, the following section will 
explore how tensions between the British home nations were portrayed within the 
British press. 
 
5.2.4. British tensions: marginalisation, stigmatisation and where is Northern 
Ireland? 
 
Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that the Scottish press was well 
attuned to dominant perceptions of Britain and the differences between themselves 
and England.  In addition, examples of marginalisation were frequently noted.  In 
regards to the success of Team GB, anger towards the marginalisation of Scotland’s 
contribution to Team GB’s victory over New Zealand in the Hockey was clearly 
evoked by McCall (2012): 
 
The British Olympic Association might have heralded this victory over New 
Zealand with a press release entitled ‘England women on their way’ but Scots 
Kim Little and Ifeoma Dieke were both central to a gritty display in the opening 
event of the 2012 Games at Cardiff’s Millennium Stadium. (Herald, 26/07/12) 
 
Indeed, concerns regarding Scottish marginalisation are highlighted by Craig (2011), 
who compares the effects of Scotland’s relationship with England to that of a 
marriage.25  She notes: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 In fact, in light of Scottish and English relations, the marriage metaphor has often been used to 
describe Scottish contentions towards its established English neighbours (Craig, 2011; Reicher and 
Hopkins, 2001).  Drawing upon their interviews with Scottish MP’s and the Scottish author, Irvin 
Welsh, Reicher and Hopkins (2001) highlight how representations of England and Scotland are often 
presented as ‘partners in a marriage’ whereby ‘the marriage is unhealthy and abusive, and what is 
more, the abused partner is psychologically trapped into the relationship’ (2001: 98).  Elsewhere, 
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Women’s experience of marginalisation is similar to the daily experience of 
many Scots.  This helps to explain the Scots’ greater sensitivity about 
terminology on the BBC or other English-dominated media.  When ‘England’ is 
used instead of ‘Britain’ many Scots intuitively know it symbolizes Scotland’s 
marginal status; her role as ‘inessential Other’. (Craig, 2011: 275) 
 
In accordance with debates surrounding the Scottish Independence Referendum, anger 
towards Westminster’s alienation of Scottish aspirations echo Craig’s (2011) analysis 
of Scotland as the ‘inessential Other’ (2011: 275).  Indeed, Cowley (2014) notes that: 
 
For far too long, the Westminster establishment has been complacent about 
Scotland and the aspirations of the Scottish people. It’s as if they misunderstood 
or hadn’t bothered even seriously to think about why so many Scots were 
restless for change. Or why so many Scots felt alienated from the globalised 
quasi-city state that is London and from the Westminster jamboree. (2014)26 
 
To this extent, McCall’s (2012) remarks served to highlight how Scottish success 
during the Olympics mirrored Scottish grievances regarding its lack of sovereignty in 
issues related to the British state (Macwhirter, 2012).  Similar forms of 
marginalisation were also reported within the Belfast Telegraph, which served to draw 
attention to Northern Ireland’s lack of representation in the ‘Team GB’ name.  Poole 
(2012) noted that ‘there have been calls recently to have the Team GB name changed 
to Team UK, as it does not reflect Northern Ireland athletes’ presence’ (Belfast 
Telegraph, 06/08/12).  In the face of such exclusion, Wathan’s (2012) remarks sought 
to ensure that Wales’s contribution to the hosting of the Olympics was duly noted: 
 
Still, Wales did its bit and played its part in history.  The record books will 
forever state that the 2012 Games began in Wales and the Olympics can be 
added to a list that already boasts the Rugby World Cup, FA Cup, Ryder Cup 
and the Ashes in recent years alone. (Western Mail, 26/07/12)  
 
Evidently, the marginalisation of Britain’s Celtic periphery served to highlight how 
particular tensions can emerge in constructions of the multi-national British state.  
Indeed, as highlighted in Poole’s (2012) remarks, these tensions could also be found 
in the marketing of ‘Team GB’.  In fact, elsewhere, Bradley (2008) notes that at 
various airports across the UK, it is ‘English’ goods, ranging from ‘policeman’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Colley (2014a) draws upon the Seamus Heaney poem ‘Act of Union’, where the Union between Britain 
and Ireland in 1801 ‘becomes a rape, perpetrated by an imperially male Britain upon a female Ireland 
who turns her back in pain and revulsion’ (2014a: 96).   
26 See http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/03/even-if-scotland-votes-no-status-quo-will-not-
hold, retrieved: 3 March 2014. 
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helmets and models of London taxis’, that can be seen on the shelves of ‘Glorious 
Britain’ shops (2008: 49).27  Noticeably absent from such stores are ‘any Saltires, 
Welsh Dragon or St. Patrick’s flags’ (Bradley, 2007: 49).    
Consequently, by taking the above into consideration it is evident that the 
marginalisation of the home nations within the UK is often at the behest of a tendency 
to either ignore the home nations altogether (McCall, 2012; Poole, 2012) or to 
represent Britain in solely English ways (Bradley, 2007).  Accordingly, while 
previous sections have highlighted how representations of England tended to underlie 
constructions of Britain, it is possible to locate these examples of marginalisation as 
characteristic of broader established-outside relations (Bucholc, 2013; Elias and 
Scotson, 1994; Lake, 2013; Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987).28  Here, ‘exclusion and 
stigmatization are powerful weapons for maintaining identity, asserting superiority, 
and for keeping others subordinate’ (Loyal, 2011: 191).  More importantly, when 
confronted with changes in the relationship between established-outsider groups, 
established groups will often resort to particular measures in order to secure and 
reinstate their established status (Atkinson, 2003).29  In such instances, appropriate 
‘established’ practices and forms of conduct serve to reinforce the outsider’s 
marginalisation, a process that maintains the interests of the established group, and, 
which consequently, helps to sustain the wider figuration (Elias and Scotson, 1994; 
Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987).30 
Subsequently, in accordance with the aforementioned examples of 
marginalisation (McCall, 2012; Poole, 2012), overt displays of Scottish and Welsh 
nationalism served to follow a particular pattern of derision within the English press.  
Moss (2012) highlighted that during Andy Murray’s gold medal win in the Men’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 The website for ‘Glorious Britain’ notes that ‘Glorious Britain is the UK’s premier gift and souvenir 
retailer and we are pleased to bring many of our customers’ favourite products together for you to buy 
online.  Our award-winning airport stores serve thousands of customers every month with our wide 
range of quirky souvenirs and essentially British gifts and souvenirs’ (see Glorious Britain ‘About Us’ 
https://www.gloriousbritain.co.uk/staticpage.aspx?spageid=101472).  
28 See section 5.2.1. 
29 Elsewhere, Mennell (2007) has noted how changes in the relationship between established-outsider 
groups can elucidate upon how both groups perceive themselves and others.  
30 Attempts to maintain the current British state and discourage Scots from voting ‘Yes’ in the 
forthcoming Independence Referendum were bolstered by declarations from the British Chancellor, 
George Osbourne, that an independent Scotland would not be able to join a currency union with 
Britain.  The prospect of an independent Scotland, financially marginalised from the rest of the UK 
was, as Freedland (2014b) highlights, ‘an attempt to scare Scots into rejecting independence’ (2014: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/28/scottish-independence, retrieved: 30 March 
2014).   
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single tennis, ‘Murray Mount was a sea of union flags, and there was hardly a saltire 
in sight – this has been a tricky week for Alex Salmond, with a vibrant new 
Britishness born before our eyes’ (Guardian, 06/08/12).  Elsewhere, the Daily Mail 
(2012d) noted that:    
 
Our sporting heroes, who wrapped themselves so passionately in the Union 
Flag, came from England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – silencing the 
nationalists and proving irrefutably that we are stronger united. (13/08/12d 
[italics added])  
 
Here, the Daily Mail (2012d) follows a similar trend to that seen in British media 
reporting of Northern Ireland (Billig, 1995).  Indeed, while Britain’s sporting success 
was believed to have silenced ‘the nationalists’ (Daily Mail, 13/08/12d), Billig (1995) 
notes that: 
 
In describing political events in Northern Ireland, the British media typically 
use the term ‘nationalist’ to describe those who seek to abolish the border 
between the United Kingdom and Eire, especially if they advocate violence in 
the pursuit of these aims. (1995: 48) 
 
Accordingly, while the use of the term ‘nationalist’ was clearly used as a source of 
derision for those who wanted the break-up of Britain, Sanbrook (2012) noted that 
‘once an eccentric sideshow, Scottish and Welsh nationalism have been growing in 
confidence since the early Seventies’ (Daily Mail, 02/06/12 [italics added]).  
Noticeably, Sandbrook’s (2012) comments seek to portray both Scottish and Welsh 
nationalism as in some way different, even, ‘mad’ (‘eccentric slideshow’).  In doing 
so, he discursively marginalises both nationalisms as a peculiarity, and, in the process, 
undermines their legitimacy. 31   In other instances, attempts by Scotland’s First 
Minister, Alex Salmond, to garner support for Scottish Independence were openly 
criticised by the English press.32  In one example Parsons (2012c) argued that ‘Alex 
Salmond no longer looked like the cat who got the fried Mars bar’ (Daily Mirror, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Indeed, elsewhere, Billig (1995) notes that ‘Nationalism … is typically seen as the force which 
creates nation-state or which threatens the stability of existing states’. (Billig, 1995: 43 [italics added]). 
32 In light of the global attention which was drawn to London during the Olympic Games, the Scottish 
government sent a trade delegation from Scotland to Scotland House in London’s Pall Mall (BBC, 
2012b).  Settle (2012) highlighted that Salmond has stated that Scotland House ‘would become a "little 
bit of England that is forever Scotland" with receptions promoting Scottish business, sport and culture’.  
However, despite Salmond’s aims, reports suggested that ‘soon after it opened … the venue was 
largely deserted for much of the day with suggestions many visitors were officials transported down 
from Scotland’ (Settle, 2012 see http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/political-news/salmonds-
olympic-club-hire-criticised.18670163, retrieved: 10 January 2013). 
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11/08/12c).   
 Indeed, closer examination of these examples can reveal how examples of ironic 
humour and condensation were used by Sandbrook (2012) and Parsons (2012c) in 
their framing of British home nation nationalism and Scotland’s First Minister.  
Indeed, Tyler (2008) has explored how ‘laughter’ or the use of certain phrases to 
induce comedy ‘is always shared’ and based upon an ‘other’ which sits as the ‘object 
of comedy’ (2008: 23).  Consequently, ‘In the case of laughter at those of a lower 
class’, Tyler (2008) notes that laughter can be ‘boundary-forming’, that is, ‘It creates 
a distance between “them” and “us,” asserting moral judgments and a superior class 
position’ (2008: 23).  When considered through an established-outsider lens, however, 
it is possible to apply Tyler’s (2008) analysis to the stigmatisation that underlies both 
Sandbrook’s (2012) ‘eccentric slideshow’ (Daily Mail, 02/06/12) and Parson’s (2012) 
‘fried Mars bar’ remarks (Daily Mirror, 11/08/12).33  In each instance, Sandbrook 
(2012) and Parsons (2012c) ‘create a distance between “them” and “us”’ (Tyler, 2008: 
23), by using their descriptions of Scottish and Welsh nationalism and Alex Salmond 
as a discursive attempt to assert English authority.  Indeed, examples of stigmatisation 
and marginalisation were also evident within English coverage of Team GB’s Scottish 
and Welsh athletes. 
 Accordingly, Platell (2012) sought to openly deride those Scottish and Welsh 
athletes who failed to sing the British national anthem, ‘God Save the Queen’.34  
Platell (2012) argued:   
 
two of Team GB’s women footballers, Kim Little and Ifeoma Dieke, refused 
to sing the National Anthem because they are Scottish. They were playing in 
the very first event in the 2012 games – the greatest sporting occasion many of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 A deep-fried Mars Bar involves the frying of a chocolate bar in batter.  Originally the item was 
believed to have originated in Scotland and has since become a signifier of Scotland’s unhealthy eating 
habits.  As can be seen from Parsons (2012) remarks, it has also become a source of negative cultural 
appropriation for Scotland as a whole.  The item has since become a novelty dish in Scotland 
(Brocklehurst, 2012). 
34 Acting as a ‘musical sign of the UK’s asymmetric constitution’ (Withers, 2012) the use of ‘God Save 
the Queen’ is the official national anthem of all four of the British home nations.  Incidentally, the song 
is also shared by New Zealand (which has two national anthems) as well as acting as the Royal Anthem 
of Australia and Canada.  Despite this, within the UK during political, national and sporting events 
Scotland (‘Flower of Scotland’) and Wales (‘Land of my Fathers’ [Hen Wlad Fy Nhadau]) often 
choose to sing their own national songs, a distinction, which was reflected in the Opening Ceremony.  
In Northern Ireland the official national anthem is ‘God Save the Queen’, apart from the 
Commonwealth Games, where the lyrics for ‘Danny Boy’ are set against the tune for ‘Londonderry 
Air’ (Bairner, 2001).  Officially, England has no associated national anthem, despite the Opening 
Ceremony playing ‘Jerusalem’ as England’s national song.  
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us will ever witness in our country.  Frankly, this mean-spiritedness was not 
just disgraceful but a national embarrassment. (Daily Mail, 28/07/12) 
 
The Daily Mail (2012c) added: 
 
What a pity that a small minority of Scottish and Welsh athletes, while prepared 
to play under the banner of team GB, have so sourly refused to sing the national 
anthem – cheap, parochial point-scoring that is the very antithesis of the 
Olympic spirit. (28/07/12c) 
 
Indeed, the lack of respect Welsh athletes afforded the ‘Olympic spirit’ was seen to be 
particularly enraging for Kelly (2012), who noted:   
 
The sight of Welsh players standing there tight-lipped as the camera panned 
along the line of the British football team at Old Trafford on Thursday night 
was embarrassing. It was rude, dispiriting and out of keeping with the 
Olympian spirit.  This is a quite simple scenario. If you’re British enough to 
wear the Team GB badge and represent Britain at the Olympic Games then 
you should be British enough to sing the National Anthem. That just happens 
to be God Save The Queen. So sing it. (Daily Mail, 28/07/12)  
 
This was echoed by the British Olympic Association, who according to Faulkner, 
Madeley and Eccles (2012), were said to be ‘furious’ about Little’s decision not to 
sing the anthem.  Faulkner et al. (2012) added that ‘a spokesman for the association – 
which has previously stated that all athletes should learn the National Anthem – gave 
a terse statement saying it was Miss Little’s choice whether or not to sing but that all 
British athletes should ‘show respect’’. (Daily Mail, 27/07/12).  
 Certainly, tensions regarding the British national anthem remain a contentious 
issue within sporting competitions where the British home nations compete as a 
united British team (Holt, 2012; Tongue, 2012).  The singing of national anthems has 
been widely acknowledged as an important part of engineering national pride and 
identity (Billig, 1995; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Zuev and Virchow, 2014).  
However, despite reports on the lack of passion presented by English footballers 
during international events, most noticeably, the lack of singing by England striker 
Wayne Rooney (Kelly, 2012), Scottish and Welsh objections proved particularly 
enraging for the English press.  To such an extent, English derisions of the ‘cheap, 
parochial point-scoring’ (Daily Mail, 28/07/12c) and ‘mean-spiritedness’ (Platell, 
Daily Mail, 28/07/12) which were displayed by the athletes was perceived as a 
national ‘embarrassment’ (Platell, Daily Mail, 28/07/12), indeed, the ‘very antithesis 
of the Olympic spirit’ (Daily Mail, 28/07/12c).  Ultimately, such reports revealed a 
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particular inability to identify and engage with the national identities and national 
objections of Team GB’s Scottish and Welsh athletes (Abell et al. 2006).   
 Evidently, the English press sought to actively construct a normative code of 
Britishness in which the singing of the national anthem played an important part in 
‘performing’ Britishness (Bhabha, 1994).  However, this was not the same for all 
Scottish athletes, in particular, the Scottish born, Team GB Gold medalist, Andy 
Murray.  The ranked British No. 1 tennis player beat Rodger Federer in the final of 
the Men’s singles becoming the first British men’s single champion since 1908.35  
Despite Murray’s success, his identity has often been commented upon within the 
English media, with some suggestions that comments by the player have been ‘anti-
English’ (BBC, 2006; Mott, 2012; Parsons, 2008). 
 Consequently, while Peck (2012) was clear to point out ‘the man has 
occasionally had a difficult relationship with the English, mainly because his words 
have been misrepresented’ (The Independent, 06/08/12), his efforts to sing the 
national anthem during the medal ceremony provided a stark contrast to the coverage 
surrounding the Welsh and Scottish athletes who refrained from singing (Daily Mail, 
2012c; Platell, 2012).  Instead, Peck (2012) noted that ‘when the medal was placed 
round his neck and the national anthem played. … His lips at least moved in pattern 
with the words of “God Save the Queen” (The Independent, 06/08/12).  In addition, 
Harris (2012b) noted that ‘he even had a stab at mouthing the national anthem – and 
willingly draped himself in a Union Flag after being presented with his first Olympic 
gong’ (Daily Mail, 06/08/12b).  In such instances, Murray’s construction within the 
English press was negotiated in accordance with his ability to display those normative 
codes, which were believed to help signify his ‘Britishness’.   
Indeed, these examples expose how the ‘socio-dynamics of stigmatisation’ 
(Sutton and Vertigans, 2002: 64) are embedded in newspaper discourses.  Here, 
encoded messages and established cultural codes seek to define appropriate forms of 
British identification.  However, while such codes can serve to stigmatise and degrade 
‘outsider’ individuals/groups who do not conform to established practices, they can 
also reveal how such constructions are not fixed but instead are subject to processes of 
change and negotiation (Engh et al., 2014; Loyal, 2011).  As a result, once Murray’s 
actions were eventually perceived as aligning with the established status quo, his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Incidentally, Federer had also beaten Murray in the Wimbledon final in the previous month.   
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rather unfavourable media image was noticeably reconstructed (Harris, 2012b; Peck, 
2012; Mitchell, 2012; see also Addley, 2014).  Murray’s performance highlighted 
how ‘Murray went in as the underdog and emerged as the victor, and there’s nothing a 
British crowd likes better than that’ (Harris, Daily Mail, 06/08/12b).  Similarly, 
Mitchell (2012) noted that ‘the mutual affection has grown since he wept openly on 
Centre Court at Wimbledon after losing with grit and style to Roger Federer in the 
men’s final. How typically British is that?’ (Guardian, 05/08/12).  Rather than being 
portrayed as an outsider to Britain, Murray’s outsider (re)construction was negotiated 
within the English press coverage to the extent that Murray’s underdog image was 
constructed as being ‘typically British’.36  In doing so, Murray’s Scottishness was 
ignored, and, as a consequence, his Britishness was highlighted.  In this instance, 
Murray was reframed with regards to established British practices, such as singing the 
national anthem, a narrative that allied with the established English press.  Indeed, 
‘this illustrates how established-outsider relations are under constant negotiation and 
change’ (Engh et al., 2014: 793). 
 
5.2.5. ‘Getting it wrong’: Scottish apprehensions and the fear of failure 
 
In commenting upon the relationship between established-outsider groups, Mennell 
(2007) highlights that the relationship is often characterised by a sense of 
ambivalence, which is forged upon a ‘sense of inferiority and superiority to “the 
others” (Mennell, 2007: 44).  In fact, in their analysis of women who had suffered 
from domestic abuse, Van Stolk and Wouters (1987) found that despite changes in the 
balance of power between the sexes, one interviewee seemed ‘poised between 
resignation and resistance, between submission and emancipation’ (1987: 479).  In 
reference to the same study, Mennell (2007) notes that the women’s relationship with 
their husbands was ‘highly ambivalent’, adding that: 
 
in part, the women’s conscience still took the husband’s side, and his view 
remained embedded in her personality; that was why they were ‘torn two ways’, 
and typically returned at least once to their husbands. (2010: 313 [italics in 
original])  
 
Accordingly, while attempts were made to clearly identify Scottish differences within !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Similarly, the reflections of how the English press ‘loves a trier’ have also been noted in analysis of 
the English cricketer, Freddy Flintoff (Malcolm, 2012). 
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the Scottish coverage (Fry, 2012; Hassan, 2012), the feeling of being ‘torn two ways’, 
that is, between Scotland’s ‘British’ history and an independent ‘Scottish’ future, 
were conveyed.  This could be seen in The Scotsman (2012b), which debated the 
symbolism of the British monarchy in an independent Scotland: 
 
In the debate about Scottish independence, the issue about whether the Queen 
would remain head of state if Scotland secedes is likely to be a key issue.  In 
discussing a post-independence Scotland, the British monarchy is either a 
symbol of a country starting with a clean slate and ending centuries of shared 
history, or a symbol of enduring relationships between the British nations 
(03/06/12b) 
 
 In fact, Delaney (2014) has argued that ‘understanding the relationship between 
identity and risk, … is key to understanding how citizens engage with and indeed 
determine constitutional change’ (2014).  Consequently, analyses of the Scottish press 
revealed a multitude of anxieties and apprehensions regarding the possibility of an 
independent future.  Indeed, MacDonald (2012b) noted that: 
 
The odd, daft Tory was predictably upset but there may be just some genuine 
concern for Alex Salmond. The biggest political theme for the Caledonian 
observer was not the promotion of healthcare for all or inclusion for everyone. It 
was the idea that Britain is an entity and one that is bigger and better when all 
its parts are joined together.  This, of course, is not the script for Salmond’s 
blockbuster that is due to premiere in the autumn of 2014. Before that, Glasgow 
hosts the Commonwealth Games and it will be intriguing to see how political 
parties use that event to further arguments. (Sunday Herald, 29/07/12b)  
 
In accordance with suggestions that Britain was ‘bigger and better when all its parts 
are joined together’ (MacDonald, Sunday Herald, 29/07/12b), reports within the 
Scottish coverage revealed that the possibility of voting on Scottish independence 
alighted with Scottish fears of ‘getting it wrong’ (Craig, 2011: 288).  Indeed, 
Macwhirter (2012) noted:  
 
Becoming independent requires immense self-confidence and a willingness to 
draw attention to yourself – qualities that timid and self-doubting Scots lack.  
You have to stand alone, exposed in the world, for what you really are. (Sunday 
Herald, 12/08/12)  
 
Accordingly, whilst Williamson (2009) notes that it is a ‘politics of identity and self-
confidence’ which are ‘central to any project in Scotland that seeks to increase and 
strengthen democracy to the point of self-government and independent statehood’ 
(2009: 66), the above examples present a far different picture.  Here, uncertainties 
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surrounding whom exactly the Scottish were, served to underline the risks enveloped 
in Scottish independence.  The Sunday Herald (2012) asked:   
 
Who are the Scots? Would independence weaken our sense of Britishness – and 
does that matter anyway? Do we risk alienating our neighbours by going it 
alone, or would our relationships with England, Europe and the rest of the world 
actually be enhanced? Do non-native Scots care whether a 300-year-old wrong 
is righted … and what role should history play in a decision that affects our 
future? (05/08/12)  
 
Consequently, while emotional attachments to Britain served to question the 
independence vote, highlighting the sense of unity felt across Britain during the 
Diamond Jubilee (Barnes, 2012; Macwhirter, 2012), with regards to the Opening 
Ceremony, Macwhirter (2012) remarked: 
 
I’m not saying sport will determine, or even greatly influence, the outcome of 
the independence referendum in 2014.  However, it would be foolish to dismiss 
the Olympic effect.  Even I felt a sense of emotional solidarity with the multi-
talented and multicultural UK team. (Sunday Herald, 12/08/12)  
 
As a result, Scottish ambivalences towards Britain were clearly portrayed after the 
success of Team GB, and, more specifically, the Opening Ceremony.  Indeed, for 
Macwhirter (2012):    
 
the Danny Boyle pageant of British history, The Isle of Wonder, brought a tear 
to my cynical eye, as it did to most people’s.  Boyle’s opening ceremony did 
more for the Unionist cause than all of Gordon Brown’s and Alistair Darling’s 
speeches put together. (Sunday Herald, 12/08/12)  
 
In fact, Kidd (2012) has argued that ‘it is Salmond himself who has made the most 
compelling case for union’ (2012: 9).  In a Hugo Young lecture delivered by Salmond 
in January 2012, Salmond argued that: 
 
when you consider our shared economic interests, our cultural ties, our many 
friendships and family relationships, one thing becomes clear. After Scotland 
becomes independent, we will share more than a monarchy and a currency. We 
will share a social union. (2012 also cited in Kidd, 2012: 9)37 
 
Instead the sense ‘that Scotland and England should be on an irrevocable path to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 See http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Speeches/fmhugoyoung24012012, retrieved: 18 April 2014.  
Certainly, Salmond’s comments contradict ‘the impression that Scotland and England have become 
such vastly different places that it is impossible for them to remain together’ (Massie, 2014 see 
http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9131482/union-in-peril/, retrieved: 9 February 2014). 
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separation were weakened by a display which demonstrated the value placed in UK 
institutions such as the NHS, the love of a shared culture and a team led into the 
Olympics stadium by a Scottish athlete’ (Barnes, The Scotsman, 29/07/12).  As a 
result, the sharing of a Scottish-British ‘social union’ (Salmond, 2012) was vividly 
framed by the Guardian’s Jonathan Freedland (2012c), who stated that, ‘Alex 
Salmond cannot easily claim the union has lost its emotional pull, not after he’s seen 
the ease with which so many Britons, including Scots, draped themselves in its once 
terminally unfashionable colours’ (11/08/12c).38 
 
Conclusion 
 
It has been the intention of this chapter to locate constructions of Britain and British 
identity alongside wider changes in the post-devolution British state.  Here, attention 
has been paid to relations between the British home nations, in particular England and 
Scotland, as well as the former dominions.  Furthermore, in order to explore how the 
press’ construction of Britain reflected particular tensions and changing power 
relations between an ‘established’ England and an ‘outsider’ home nation and 
Commonwealth periphery, Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider framework 
was used.  This helped to elicit the following results. 
 First, the findings examined how interpretations of British history were used to 
frame Britain within the British and Commonwealth press.  One consequence of this 
was the ability to see how discourses regarding Britain drew upon Britain’s 
contemporary decline and low self-esteem (Baum, 2012; Hayward, 2012; Norman, 
2012; Paxman, 2012; Richards, 2012; Riddell, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012; Taylor, 2012; 
The Weekend Australian, 2012).  Coupled with the possible disintegration of the 
British state, deeper uncertainties regarding the British sense of self were debated 
(Toynbee, 2012b).  Yet, despite such uncertainties, the predominance of a particularly 
‘English’ representation of Britain was found to form an important part of the English 
and Commonwealth press’ discourse.  Here, the representation of a pastoral, rural 
‘England’ during the Olympic Opening Ceremony (Hardman, 2012) and references to 
the British ‘stiff upper lip’ (Freedland, 2012a; Goring, 2012; Smith, 2012, Walker, 
2012; Lette, 2012) could be identified.  In both instances, such examples served to 
represent England’s cultural dominance over the other home nations, a dominance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38See http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Speeches/fmhugoyoung24012012, retrieved: 18 April 2014. 
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that could be identified by the fact that popular constructions of the ‘English’ 
countryside, the civilized ‘English’ gentleman and the imperial hegemony of England, 
continued to be used as representative signifiers of the wider British state (Hardman, 
2012; Holt, 2012; New Zealand Herald, 2012).  Similarly, references to Britain’s 
imperial history and memories of its imperial past were routinely highlighted in 
accounts of the post-imperial decline of Britain as well as in efforts to draw upon 
Britain’s imperial supremacy in order to evoke feelings of national pride and prestige 
(Collins, 2012; Crompton, 2012; Jack, 2012; Phillips, 2012; see also Wood, 2014).  
Interwoven with representations of ‘England’s’ established status, these discourses 
served to reveal how the hosting of royal events were perceived as reflecting a fantasy 
image of British imperial power (McNulty, 2012; Toynbee, 2012a). 
 Second, within the Commonwealth press, constructions of Britain were 
predicated on its imperial history as well as discussions regarding the relevance of the 
Commonwealth for each nation (Arthur, 2012; Milne, 2012; Rothwell, 2012; Watkins, 
2012).  Comparisons with Britain provided an opportunity for each nation to evaluate 
their own societies, which in the case of both Canada and New Zealand, was 
positively presented (Hyder, 2012; Rudman, 2012).  In contrast, examples of anxiety 
were routinely highlighted within the Australian press, particularly with regards to the 
maturity of the Australian state and the preserving of its ‘British’ Head of State 
(Cooper and Butt, 2012; Hinds, 2012; Southphommasane, 2012a; Tate, 2012). 
 Third, while the Scottish press served to highlight Scottish disillusionment with 
the British state (Hassan, 2012; Macwhirter, 2012), such constructions were often 
based upon discourses that aimed to emphasise the differences between Scotland and 
England.  Accordingly, while these differences were used to highlight Scotland’s 
outsider identity vis-à-vis England, they remained part of a wider British dynamic.  
Notably, this could be observed in accounts of Scotland’s relationship to, and, 
celebration of, the British monarchy (Fry, 2012; Herald, 2012b; Randall, 2012). 
 Fourth, normative accounts of established ‘British’ behaviour within the English 
press sought to marginalise Team GB’s Scottish and Welsh athletes who declined 
from singing the British national anthem (Daily Mail, 2012c; Platell, 2012).  Indeed, 
feelings of marginalisation were also shared by the Northern Irish press, who felt that 
their status within The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was 
undermined by the lack of recognition afforded to ‘Northern Ireland’ in the ‘Team 
GB’ name (Poole, 2012).   
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 Finally, while attempts to highlight Scottish differences were actively pursued 
within the press, forms of ambivalence were also noted.  That is, in regards to the 
possibility of an independent Scotland, some sections of the Scottish press conveyed a 
sense of apprehension towards leaving Britain (Barnes, 2012; MacDonald, 2012b; 
Macwhirter, 2012).       
 Taking the above into consideration, it is important not to view these relations 
as static but as part of a process of changing power balances between the British home 
nations and the wider Commonwealth (Dunning and Hughes, 2012).  Indeed, the 
effects of devolution within the British state, the sense of national confidence within 
Canada and the forging of new international relations in New Zealand as well as the 
possible threat of Scottish independence in 2014, all alluded to changes in the British 
domestic and imperial/Commonwealth figurations.  Indeed, what emerges from these 
conclusions is how both established and outsider constructions within the press served 
to dynamically frame Britain as well as actively (re)construct their relationship with 
Britain.  Therefore, while English reports were clear to point out Britain’s imperial 
history and former imperial supremacy, coverage from the Scottish, Welsh and 
Northern Irish press, sought to actively construct their own press coverage in 
resistance to, or, in accordance with, the wider British domestic figuration.  This was 
echoed across the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand coverage.  
 Accordingly, while this chapter has highlighted how the British and 
Commonwealth press sought to draw upon examples of British dis-unity, evidently, 
the research findings present a far more complicated picture.  That is, across both the 
British and Commonwealth press, examples of (dis)attachment to Britain were shared 
with examples of British attachment.  This was most apparent in section 5.2.5., which 
noted that Scottish apprehensions towards independence were framed in relation to its 
shared ‘British’ culture (The Scotsman, 2012a; 2012b).  Similarly, Commonwealth 
reports provided a complicated account of their own imperial histories and continuing 
ties with Britain (Carney, 2012; Rudman, 2012; Southphomassane, 2012a).   
 Consequently, in correspondence with a ‘layered’ conception of social habitus 
(Elias, 2012; Mennell, 1994), forms of attachment and (dis)attachment can help to 
elucidate upon processes of social integration and disintegration, particularly with 
regards to national identity.  Indeed, Conover and Feldman (1987) note that national 
patriotism is based upon ‘a deeply felt affective attachment to the nation’ (1987, 1).  
This is often reflected in displays of national pride.  However, as previous chapters 
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have suggested forms of group attachment are forged interdependently.39  That is, 
while particular national groups are comprised of groups in addition to being part of 
lager multi-national groups, forms of (national) attachment are rarely forged in 
isolation but are instead marked by intensities of attachment and (dis)attachment to 
local, regional, national and multi-national group formations (Mennell, 2007; Van 
Benthem van den Bergh, 1992).  Accordingly, in such instances, examples of 
attachment and (dis)attachment, are shaped by processes of alignment and 
contestation (Burkitt, 2008; De Swaan, 1995; Van Stolk and Wouters, 1987).40  To 
this extent, the present chapter has highlighted how forms of (dis)attachment to 
Britain – both past and present – were represented within newspaper discourses on 
Britain and British identity.  Here, examples of (dis)attachment were reflected within 
the discursive construction of home nation and British-Commonwealth relations 
(established-outsider relations), group identifications (national/British) as well as 
feelings of disorientation, anxiety and apathy (British decline).   
 Therefore, in conjunction with these findings, the following chapter will 
continue along this path in order to explore how examples of British unity were 
constructed within the British and Commonwealth press’ framing of Britain.  In 
particular, it will examine how the press’ construction of Britain was predicated upon 
established-outsider relations and past (re)constructions that served to reveal 
examples of British attachment within the national press. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 See chapter one, sections 1.3.1., 1.5.1. and chapter two, sections 2.0.1., 2.3. and 2.3.1. 
40 In opposition to using the term ‘detachment’, I am using the prefix ‘dis’ in reference to its Latin 
meaning.  Here, the prefix is used to denote a reversing force, such as, ‘apart’ or ‘away’ and as a result 
is often used to refer to a negative or opposing relationship.  In the context of this thesis, it provided a 
useful description of how particular groups may represent their ‘attachment(s)’ in both negative and 
opposing ways.  Hence, they would present a ‘(dis)attachment’ to a particular ‘attachment’.    
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Chapter Six: ‘A United Kingdom’: Britain’s ‘finest hour’, multiculturalism and 
unnecessary doubt 
 
Introduction  
 
It was suggested in the previous chapter that the press’ attention towards the 
mythologized and idealized representation of the rural, pastoral idyll in the Olympic 
Opening Ceremony was reflective of a particularly ‘English’ construction of Britain 
and an example of the ‘wilful nostalgia’ that is drawn upon by the English press more 
generally (Maguire, 1999; Maguire and Poulton, 1999; Vincent and Harris, 2014).  
Certainly, whereas these constructions may serve as a particular point of discord with 
Scottish, Northern Irish and Welsh depictions of ‘Britain’ (Reicher and Hopkins, 
2001), Ismer (2011) has noted how social conflicts within the nation can often lead to 
a ‘growing need for unifying moments’ (2011: 560).  Therefore, in accordance with 
the previous chapter’s findings on British ‘dis-unity’, it was clear that some sections 
of the press sought to highlight how the Olympic Games provided a ‘unifying 
moment’ for Britain (Ismer, 2011: 560), paying particular attention to the shared sense 
of unity that being British provided the home nations.  In reference to the Olympic 
Games, the Guardian (2012b) highlighted that: 
 
The Games brought out much that is best in this country. They allowed us a 
golden glimpse of a nation that celebrates men and women with equal awe, and 
embraces British athletes of all racial backgrounds. They celebrated the rich 
shared Britishness of competitors and supporters who are also fiercely proud of 
diverse roots. London had a wonderful Games, to be sure, but so did Scotland, 
Wales, Northern Ireland and English counties from Buckinghamshire to 
Yorkshire. Few events have done more to rescue the Union Jack from racists 
and royalists alike, creating a generous mood and a flag to share. (13/08/12b) 
 
Alongside Britain’s diverse ‘racial backgrounds’ the Olympic Games were framed as 
a reflection of a united Britain, undeterred by those ‘nationalists’ seeking the break-up 
of the UK (Hassan, 2012).  Parsons (2012b) added that ‘for two weeks, we are not 
English, Scottish, Welsh or Irish – we are British, and that beautiful old flag belongs 
to all of us’ (Daily Mirror, 28/07/12b).  Similar sentiments were evoked by Lott 
(2012):     
 
For this, more than anything else, was a collective Games, appealing to our 
collective, unitary consciousness.  I would now joyfully include the Scots and 
the Welsh in this definition of national personality, because the Games also 
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brought home something else that has lately become counter-intuitive: that we 
are, truly, a United Kingdom, not just a drifting set of disparate nations making 
their own way. (The Independent, 12/08/12) 
 
Consequently, while Lott’s (2012) remarks neglected the inclusion of those Britons in 
Northern Ireland, the belief that the games represented a ‘truly … United Kingdom’ 
was a feeling that was underscored by its ‘collective, unitary consciousness’ (The 
Independent, 12/08/12).1  Therefore, when set against the sense of confusion that 
pervaded newspaper concerns regarding British identity (Sandbrook, 2012; Taylor, 
2012; Riddell, 2012), the above examples served to remind the British of their sense 
of unity and purported pride (Dayan and Katz, 1992; Ismer, 2011).   That is: 
 
At a time when Britain has been demoralized by the unintended consequences 
of welfarism, the upheavals of devolution, rampant political correctness and 
social dysfunction, the Games are another important opportunity for the 
British to rediscover their national pride, building on the Queen’s Diamond 
Jubilee. (The Weekend Australian, 28/07/12 [italics added])  
 
In fact, the Olympic Games served as a potent reminder of ‘the capabilities of this odd 
little island and its people’ (The Independent on Sunday, 12/08/12b), a sentiment that 
was shared by the Commonwealth press.  Accordingly, while Scanlan (2012) 
considered that ‘something about these Games has brought the British out of 
themselves’ (Vancouver Sun, 11/08/12), Baum (2012) noted that the Games ‘might 
act as the UK’s timely reminder to itself about what is possible when it puts its mind 
to it and its heart in it’ (The Age, 13/08/12 [italics added]).  Lane (2012) added:   
 
the Games of the 30th Olympiad have been exceptional. Viewed from the other 
end of the planet they have achieved a glorious synergy: majesty with the 
common touch, modernity with tradition, boisterous celebration with dignity, 
and fierce striving for victory with countless illustrations of Pierre de 
Coubertin’s dictum that the taking part is more important than the winning.  All 
against a perfect backdrop: one of the world’s great cities. A brilliant, creative 
nation has had occasion to once again believe it hasn’t lost it. (The Sunday Age, 
12/08/12) 
 
In particular, Lane’s (2012) remarks chose to frame Britain’s sense of achievement as 
a direct reflection of the country it used to be, a country that, according to Lane 
(2012), ‘hasn’t lost it’ (The Sunday Age, 12/08/12).  Echoing such sentiments, 
Crompton (2012) stated that during the Olympic Games ‘Britain … begun to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Indeed, elsewhere, Orwell (1941) has referred to an ‘invisible chain’ that binds the nation.   
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remember the country it can be’ (Daily Telegraph, 11/08/12 [italics added]) providing 
‘a potent reminder of the sheer creative potency of such a small island’ (MacDonald, 
Sunday Herald, 29/07/12b [italics added]).  
 As can be seen from each of the highlighted examples, comparisons with 
Britain’s past, and, in the case of Lane (2012), its former self, were set against notions 
of British decline (‘the country it used to be’).  To this extent, it was the Olympic 
Games which were portrayed as ‘reminding’ the British of what it was capable of as 
well as allowing it to ‘rediscover’ its ‘national pride’ (The Weekend Australian, 
28/07/12). 
 Consequently, amidst the ‘sheer creative potency’, which the Opening 
Ceremony displayed (MacDonald, Sunday Herald, 29/07/12b), was an underlying 
sense of surprise within the press’ coverage.  Indeed, in comments relating to the 
Closing Ceremony, Saunders (2012) reported that ‘when it ended in a spectacle of 
pomp-free pop and quintessentially East London polyglot pageantry, there was a very 
surprising national sense of elation’ (The Globe and Mail, 13/08/12 [italics added]).  
Saunders (2012) added that ‘the mood of national euphoria – and it can be witnessed 
far beyond the tightly controlled bubble of London – has been cathartic and entirely 
unexpected’ (The Globe and Mail, 13/08/12).  Wilson (2012) added that there was a: 
 
feeling of surprise among ordinary Londoners and people close to the Games 
that after all that anticipation and all their doubts, they had pulled it off so well. 
It is not a sense of ‘We told you so’, more one of ‘My god, we actually did it!’ 
(Wilson, The Australian, 13/08/12 [italics added])   
 
Within the British press similar feelings were shared by Collins (2012), who argued 
that, ‘the entire process is being carried out with an air of blushing disbelief, for the 
development seems wholly un-British and thoroughly admirable’ (The Mail on 
Sunday, 05/08/12).  Similarly, Rose (2012) noted that ‘it is hard now to imagine the 
success of the Games was ever in doubt’ (The Scotsman, 13/08/12).  Instead:  
 
The political crisis when G4S revealed it could no provide the promised 
security, the fears that the London transport system would collapse under the 
weight of millions of visitors, or that the games would be the target of a terrorist 
attack, all seem a lifetime ago.  There was a happy buzz around the city. Police 
and stewards chatted with fans as they entered the Olympic complex in 
Stratford. (Rose, The Scotsman, 13/08/12)     
 
In fact, the sense of apprehension that pervaded the post-Olympic coverage, was 
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drawn upon by the Western Mail (2012): 
 
Ever since it was announced back in 2005 that London would host these 
Games, the volume of grumbling from the naysayers has rarely dipped below 
the audible.  Anger over budgets, rows over allocation of funding, discontent 
with the economic benefit to Wales, ticketing problems, the Team GB football 
saga, and the G4S scandal that threatened to engulf the Games before they 
even started – for seven years, a negative headline was never far away.  But as 
the first participants entered the Olympic Stadium for a remarkable opening 
ceremony, all those concerns dissolved.  Those early empty seats aside, this 
has been an impeccably managed event of almost unimaginable scale. 
(13/08/12)2 
 
In such instances, the games were perceived as seeing ‘a more confident Britain 
emerge’ (Southphommasane, The Age, 13/08/12b).  Southphommasane (2012b) 
added:   
 
The opening ceremony also served to underscore that Britain remains an 
ongoing project; it is still working towards that New Jerusalem. This might just 
be the cultural legacy of these Olympics: equipping Britain with a new 
confidence and an ability to speak about itself, to itself. (The Age, 13/08/12b) 
 
Certainly, the belief that Britain had achieved a new sense of confidence was echoed 
by the Daily Mirror’s, Tony Parsons (2012c), who highlighted that ‘the legacy of 
these Games will be a massive boost to national self-confidence’ (11/08/12c).  In fact:     
 
When they are over, and the bunting is packed away, there will still be one 
million young people on the dole.  But somewhere deep down in our national 
soul, London 2012 has made us believe in ourselves again. (Parsons, Daily 
Mirror, 11/08/12c)   
 
Evidently, the Olympic Games were portrayed within the British and Commonwealth 
press as allowing Britain to ‘regain’ its sense of national confidence.  This was 
confirmed by Hubbard (2012) who suggested that the Olympic Games had been 
‘received with a pride that ha[d] been lacking in the nation of late’ (The Independent, 
12/08/12). 
 With these examples in mind, it is important that such constructions are located 
alongside those concerns which were highlighted in the previous chapter, in 
particular, the sense of disenchantment within Britain (Toynbee, 2012b) as well as 
wider insecurities regarding its political culture and economic instability (Lott, 2012; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 See chapter five, section 5.0. and 5.1. 
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Moore, 2012; Norman, 2012).  In analyses of the South Korean media, Mangan et al. 
(2013) highlighted that various South Korean media outlets served to highlight 
Britain’s ‘political, social and economic fragility’ (2013: 1841).  Consequently, 
alongside such concerns, Lawton (2012) noted that:   
 
We came so fragile and, let’s be honest, fearful into the 30th Olympic Games 
that ended here last night with all the poignancy of the sweetest parting.  
Already it seems like an impossible stretch of memory but it is true and it is why 
the closing rites were filled with so much pride and emotion and, maybe above 
all, a feeling not so much of a job well done but a spirit regained, a sense of 
ourselves and the world around us that might just defy, for a little while at least, 
the bleakest forecasts. (The Independent, 13/08/12) 
 
Indeed, the sense of a ‘spirit regained’ (Lawton, The Independent, 13/08/12) posited a 
poignant ‘a reminder of what Britain [could] still achieve, even in the most testing 
times’ (Daily Mail, 27/07/12b).  The former British Athlete, Sir Roger Bannister, 
expressed similar feelings when he stated, ‘how thrilling it is that I can see again 
today, on the Olympic track, the spirit that I recall from another era’ (The Mail on 
Sunday, 12/08/12).  Here, Britain’s renewed ‘spirit’ was entwined with a belief that 
contemporary Britain had reconnected with a past notion of Britain, that is, a Britain 
‘from another era’ (Bannister, The Mail on Sunday, 12/08/12).  Indeed, the regaining 
of a particular ‘spirit’ can prove effective in providing ‘a sense of renewal based upon 
coherence and inspiration’ (Rojek, 2007: 68).  Such sentiments were revealed in 
Sandbrook’s (2012) declaration of a ‘rekindling of Britishness itself’, indeed, 
something that had been ‘in danger of dying out’ (Daily Mail, 11/08/12).  
 Taking the above into consideration, it has been the purpose of this introduction 
to briefly highlight how the British and Commonwealth press sought to frame and 
represent a sense of British unity and confidence within their coverage of the 
Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Ceremonies.  Subsequently, while post-
Olympic concerns regarding a ‘fragile’ Britain (Lawton, The Independent, 13/08/12) 
were expressed, other reports suggested that Britain had begun to ‘remember’ the 
country it could be (Crompton, Daily Telegraph, 11/08/12), resulting in an 
‘affirmation of national identity and pride’ within the UK (Parsons, Daily Mirror, 
04/06/12a).   
 Accordingly, the following sections will explore how constructions of Britain 
served to represent its contemporary self both in relation to the nation’s purported 
history and in contrast to its former self.  Indeed, in the case of Britain, any form of 
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national regeneration, stands precariously ‘between two identities – the imperial and 
the post-imperial’ (Colls, 2012: 111).  While Britain’s ‘post-imperial’ identity may be 
vividly portrayed in reports on Britain’s multicultural society and its diverse 
population, such reports are formed in relation to the nation-wide rioting which 
blighted British cities in the summer of 2011 as well as Britain’s ‘long-standing 
economic and political struggles’ and reported ‘corruption among the police, the 
financial sector, the press and the politicians’ (Lott, The Independent, 12/08/12). 
 With this in mind, a critical examination of constructions of British ‘unity’ 
within the British and Commonwealth press will be provided.  More importantly, the 
aim of this chapter will be to explore how such constructions were allied with the 
national identities of each considered nation.  Consequently, the following sections 
will be divided into four broad sections.  First, attention will be given to exploring 
how the British and Commonwealth press constructed Britain in relation to its past.  
Here, it will be argued that the press’ framing of Britain chose to actively dissociate 
contemporary Britain from its former self.  Section two will develop upon this by 
considering how the success of the Team GB athlete, Mo Farah, and reports of 
Britain’s cultural diversity, reflected a ‘new’ and ‘modern’ Britain.  Indeed, the 
complexities and tensions involved in these constructions will be explored as part of a 
wider discussion regarding British multiculturalism and post-imperial immigration.  
Furthermore, in accordance with chapter five, this section will also draw upon Elias 
and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider framework in order to reveal how 
discourses surrounding Britain’s multicultural image underlied established practices, 
based upon presenting a progressive, inclusive, modern Britain (Engh et al., 2014).   
Finally, sections three and four will separately consider how attachments to Britain 
and British identity were framed within the Commonwealth and British press. 
 
6.0. Living with the ‘truth’: constructing Britain as a ‘different place’ 
 
In his analysis of national identity, Colls (2011) notes that national identity ‘is 
probably best understood in terms of how we manage our collective relationship with 
the past’ (2011: 580).  That is, Colls’s (2011) remarks can be elaborated upon in order 
to consider how changes in the nation are perceived in relation to the nation’s past.  
For Walker (2012), writing in the Belfast Telegraph (2012), such changes were 
particularly evident in regards to Northern Ireland’s violent history.  In comments 
relating to the Diamond Jubilee, Walker (2012) highlighted that ‘10 years ago, we 
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would have had furore and anger. But not now. We are all changing. And that is 
reason enough to keep on celebrating’ (Belfast Telegraph, 05/06/12). 
 Consequently, while Walker’s (2012) remarks sought to draw upon Belfast’s 
complicated history with Britain and its royal patronage, other reports sought to 
highlight how the Diamond Jubilee served to underscore wider changes in the British 
sense of self.  Indeed, in his analysis of the British monarchy, Cannadine (1983) notes 
that ‘it is … elements of continuity which both disguise and explain changes in 
‘meaning’. (1983: 150 [italics in original]).  As a result, amidst the continuity of 
Britain’s royal pageantry was a sense that the Diamond Jubilee represented ‘a Britain, 
whose like will not be seen again, because it is passing so swiftly into history’ (The 
Independent, 06/06/12).  The Independent (2012) added:  
 
It was not just the carriage procession from Westminster Hall, or the cavalry, or 
the massed military bands, with their air of empire and antiquity, that harked 
back to another age – they have a few outings left in them – but the church 
service itself, and above all the congregation: mostly white, of a certain age and 
a certain background. But the Anglican cathedral experience is no longer as 
widely shared as it was. As the flag-waving crowds on the Mall testified, Britain 
is already a different place. (06/06/12) 
 
Indeed, the feeling that Britain was a ‘different place’ was echoed by Norman (2012), 
who argued that:   
 
without wishing to lessen by an iota the grotesque social problems and 
horrendous economic and political uncertainties, I cannot lie by denying the 
unwontedly warm feeling about Britain which the four-day weekend leaves, for 
today at least, in its wake. … From the tone to the celebrations, nebulous to the 
point of meaningless though this must sound, there was a sense of a country 
finally learning to live with the truth about itself. (The Independent, 06/06/12 
[italics added]) 
 
In fact, the belief that Britain reflected a ‘country finally learning to live with the truth 
about itself’ (Norman, The Independent, 06/06/12) was one that was echoed in 
discussions regarding Britain’s place within the world.  Indeed, Freedland (2012b) 
stated that ‘London 2012 is predicated on an answer to that stubborn question about 
where we belong’ (Guardian, 27/07/12b).  Here, Britain’s post-imperial decline was 
duly acknowledged as a part of British history that Britain had finally managed to 
overcome.  In such instances, the Olympic Games represented a particular ‘turning 
point’ (Lott, The Independent, 12/08/12). Lott (2012) noted:   
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For me, the Olympics feels like a turning point, a moment in which for the first 
time since our decline from empire, we felt genuinely self-confident.  For the 
first time I can remember, we like ourselves. (The Independent, 12/08/12) 
 
Consequently, ‘no longer was Britain casting itself as the imperial power, which once 
came to the countries of others, determined to shape their futures’ (Freedland, 
Guardian, 27/07/12b), but instead the Olympic Opening ceremony ‘celebrated 
modern Britain, a post-imperial nation, still half in and half out of Europe but 
surprisingly comfortable with its role’ (The Independent on Sunday, 29/07/12b). 
 Accordingly, whereas the previous chapter revealed how references to the 
British Empire sought to reveal wider anxieties regarding Britain’s post-imperial role, 
its sense of identity and declining power (Lott, 2012; McKie, 2012; Norman, 2012; 
Paxmans, 2012; Strong, 2012; Toynbee, 2012a) the above examples reveal a far 
different appraisal of Britain’s imperial past and its contemporary self.  In such 
instances, a changed Britain (Lott, 2012) one that was both ‘modern’ (The 
Independent on Sunday, 29/07/12a) and ‘self-confident’ (Lott, The Independent, 
12/08/12) was juxtaposed against Britain’s ‘decline from empire’ (Lott, The 
Independent, 12/08/12).  Here, the British Empire and Britain’s imperial identity was 
used to underscore Britain’s renewed sense of self.  In fact, Lawton (2012) argued that 
‘what the Olympics have is renewal, a wiping-away of the past and a huge investment 
in the moment’ (Belfast Telegraph, 28/07/12).  This was shared by the Western Mail 
(2012), who added that ‘today, Britain wakes up to life after London 2012 feeling like 
a different country … Already, this feels like a truly momentous fortnight in the 
history of this nation’ (13/08/12). 
 Elsewhere, Falcous and Silk (2010) have observed how ‘contemporary 
concerns’ can be superimposed ‘onto reconstructed versions of the past’ (2010: 175).  
Indeed, they argue that ‘these narratives are mythologies that point to the capacity of 
the media to tell us stories about ourselves’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010; see also Barthes, 
1972).  Similarly, these ‘mythologies’ can be identified in the work of Wetherell and 
Potter (1992) who draw upon Anderson’s (2006) ‘imagined community’ to highlight 
how national discourses seek to convey the ‘common fate’ of the nation, that is, a 
group of people ‘travelling together through time’ (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 141).3  
Instead, however, the above examples served to reveal a dis-continuity with the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 This is shared by Hobsbawm (1983) who notes how a cohesive national society is one that is 
predicated on an established continuity with the nation’s past (Hobsbawm, 1983).   
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British past, centered on the assumption that Britain had traversed its post-imperial 
decline in order to present a united and largely confident depiction of itself.  Here 
‘particular cultural values and traditions’ (Meer et al., 2010: 93) were believed to be 
largely irrelevant and, indeed, unreflective of contemporary British society (The 
Independent, 2012b).4  It was during the Olympic Games that ‘we got a glimpse of 
another kind of Britain’ (Freedland, Guardian, 11/08/12c).  In addition, The 
Independent on Sunday (2012b) highlighted:  
 
We may not be galvanised by the Olympics into suddenly transforming the 
economy or curing the ills that tainted our streets last summer.  But we’d like to 
think that more than a passing feel-good factor has been generated by London 
2012 – not just the immediate luster of gold, silver and bronze, but the 
knowledge that this was a triumph not of old Britain, but new: competitors in 
their teens or fifties, black, white and shades in between; ageing rockers, young 
rappers; women, contributing nearly half the glory and more than their shares of 
the smiles; volunteers from every background; the witty, the imaginative, the 
accomplished.  The knowledge of that, the confidence to be drawn from it, 
could be the real legacy of these Games. (12/08/12b [italics added]) 
 
Underlying such remarks was a sense of British unity that was bolstered by a shared 
sense of British identification.  For The Scotsman (2012c) the fact that the 
celebrations continued, despite the poor weather, ‘was nothing if not typical of the 
sort of people we are right across the UK … that alone is cause for celebration’ 
(04/06/12c [italics added]).     
 As a result, in contrast to those examples that sought to draw upon Britain’s 
post-imperial decline (Lott, 2012; Paxman, 2012), efforts within the press to dislodge 
contemporary Britain from the ‘one [it] used to be’ were evidently pursued 
(Freedland, Guardian, 11/08/12c).  Indeed, for Freedland (2012), ‘the opening 
ceremony set the tone, suggesting that we should love the country we have become – 
informal, mixed, quirky – rather than the one we used to be’ (Guardian, 11/08/12c).  
Similarly, Collins (2012) added ‘no longer prisoners of our stultified, stiff-lipped past, 
we have made a real effort to become the kind of people we always hoped we might 
be’ (The Mail on Sunday, 05/08/12).  Clearly such accounts suggested a sense of 
renewal regarding the British sense of self. The belief that Britain was ‘informal, 
mixed, quirky’ (Freedland, Guardian, 11/08/12c) served to construct an image of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 In comments relating to the Parekh Report, published in 2000, Rojek (2007) highlights how the 
advice of the report sought to argue for ‘a new positive vision of Britain’ (2007: 196).     
 219 
British far removed from its ‘stiff upper lip’ portrayal (Goring, 2012).5 
 Accordingly, the above examples reveal a clear demarcation between a past 
Britain and a sense that the country had to some extent discovered ‘who’ it was (Daily 
Telegraph, 2012; Lott, 2012).  Indeed, Rojek (2007) has argued that:     
 
If it is right to propose that the contemporary British are riddled with anxieties 
and doubts about who they are and where they are going it prompts us to ask 
who they formerly believed themselves to be and what sense of national 
direction they had. (2007: 12 [italics added])   
 
This was shared by Lott (2012) who noted that ‘over the past several generations we 
have been a nation obsessed with “who we are” (The Independent, 12/08/12).  Here, 
the Diamond Jubilee was regarded by some, as a significant celebration of who the 
British were.  The Daily Telegraph (2012) suggested that: 
 
Over this Diamond Jubilee holiday, the people of the United Kingdom have 
come together not only to celebrate, but also to show their pride in who and 
what the British are. The events of the Jubilee show that it is a pride that shines 
undimmed. (04/06/12) 
 
Indeed, this was echoed in accounts of the Olympic Opening Ceremony, which the 
Sunday Mirror (2012) declared, ‘told the world what the United Kingdom is about 
and, even more, what the Games mean’ (29/07/12).  Kenyon (2012) added that the 
ceremony was ‘a supremely humane vision of where we are now, and how we have 
become what we are’ (The Observer, 29/07/12).   
 Indeed, attempts to define Britain can be located as part of a long-term process 
of defining and re-defining Britain and the British populace.  For instance, British 
history provides a number of examples relating to discourses concerning the 
formation of a ‘new Britain’: 1945 and the beginning of the welfare state; 1979 and 
the election of Britain’s first female Prime Minster; 1997 and the election of ‘New 
Labour’.  In each example, a new confident Britain, united in purpose and popular 
support, was portrayed (Rojek, 2007).  Correspondingly, while the reports of the 
Olympic Ceremonies served to construct Britain as an ‘informal’, ‘mixed’ and 
‘quirky’ nation, in no instance was a clear depiction provided of exactly who the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Elsewhere, Turmen-Dervisoglu (2013) has highlighted how, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, 
state elites sought to renounce Turkish history of its Ottoman myths and memories and, in the process, 
install a new Turkish state identity.  In doing so, commemorative narratives surrounding the Turkish 
nation, that is, its ‘founding myths and memories’ (2013: 4), were undermined via ‘attempts by the 
state elites to cause collective amnesia’ (2013: 4).  See also chapter five, section 5.2.1 
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British were and what exactly they had become.  Certainly, this aligns with chapter 
five, whereby questions regarding the British ‘we’ were debated and discussed within 
the press’ coverage.6 
 To this extent, such confusions can be related to the temporal construction of 
the nation in coverage pertaining to national media events (Lavi, 2013).  Mihelj 
(2010) highlights that:  
 
The clock time that governs the routines of media production is … ultimately an 
extension of calendar time, and the news stories of today derive their meaning 
and newsworthiness from the historical narratives stretching back into the 
depths of calendar time. (2010: 143)  
 
Indeed, while there is the potential in Mihelj’s (2010) remarks to view both time and 
history ‘as inevitable progress’ (Dunning et al., 2004: 2), something that becomes 
reified in her use of ‘clock time’ and ‘calendar time’, it is possible to use Mihelj’s 
(2010) comments in order to highlight how such terms are used as a form of 
orientation by the media (Dunning et al., 2004).  That is, while selected mediated 
constructions may seek to portray a particular version of the national past, these 
constructions can reveal stories about the nation that, for the purpose of contemporary 
identifications, seek to orientate the nation through processes of ‘re-invention’ and 
‘re-imagining’ (Anderson, 2006; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Silk and Falcous, 
2005).   
 Consequently, as the above examples reveal, an important aspect of the press’ 
(re)construction relies upon the use of ‘past [national] events in order to shape the 
national collective in the present’ (Lavi, 2013: 4).  Accordingly, rather than presenting 
the nation-state as an entirely modern construct (Gellner, 1964; 1973; 2005; 2008), 
‘detached from the past’ (Lavi, 2013: 5), the mediated representation of the nation 
suggests an interdependent relationship between ‘contemporary concerns’ and 
‘reconstructed versions of the past’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 175 [italics added]; see 
also Hare, 2012; Jack, 2012; McNulty, 2012; Norman, 2012; Phillips, 2012; Richards, 
2012; Sandbrook, 2012; The Independent, 2012; Toynbee, 2012a; 2012b; Tweedie, 
2012; Tweedie and Hardin, 2012).  That is, the relationship between the press’ 
defining of ‘past’ and ‘present’ creates a temporal representation tangibly located 
within the national collective memory and open to disparity, discontinuity and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See chapter five, section 5.1.2. 
 221 
(re)construction.  For example, Bastani (2012) highlights how: 
 
London 2012’s opening ceremony offered an epic history of the British worker, 
but with no acknowledgement of what contemporary work is like. Its 
celebration of modern Britain was a trans-historical mash-up, flattening all 
history as repackaged and ‘inevitable’ British national identity. (2012)7 
 
Therefore, rather than acting as ‘mere reflections of far more fundamental realities’ 
(Mihelj, 2010: 13), the press’ ‘flattening’ and repackaging of the nation’s past 
(Bastani, 2010) can result in competing and contested imaginings of the nation 
(Anderson, 2006).  Here, the press: 
 
simplifies, dramatizes and selectively narrates the story of a nation’s past and its 
place in the world, its historical eschatology: a story that elucidates its 
contemporary meaning through (re)constructing its past (Bell, 2003: 75 cited in 
Falcous and Silk, 2010: 175 [italics added]) 
 
In particular, such (re)constructions served to highlight the tensions and difficulties 
involved ‘in engineering a new, viable post-imperial identity in Britain’ (Rojek, 2007: 
191).  With this in mind, it is towards the analysis of the press’ construction of this 
‘post-imperial, multicultural, multi-ethnic Britain’ (Rojek, 2007: 191), which we now 
turn. 
 
6.1. The ‘Rebirth of Britishness’: established-outsider relations in multicultural 
Britain 
 
Accordingly, while the construction and (re)construction of the nation is ‘subject to 
constant change’ (Lavi, 2013: 7), in the case of Britain, such changes were 
represented as reflecting a ‘new’ multicultural Britain, uniquely diverse and happily 
multi-ethnic (Alibhai-Brown, 2012; Macwhirter, 2012; The Observer, 2012).  In fact, 
nationalist movements have often drawn upon ‘stories’ of the nation for emotive 
purposes, particularly around ideas surrounding national ‘rebirth’ (Bell, 2003: 67).  
For the media, however, this ‘rebirth’ was closely aligned with the representation of a 
new multicultural Britain (Sandbrook, 2012).  In these instances, athletes, such as, Mo 
Farah, formed part of the press’ collective pride in Britain’s inclusive multiculturalism 
(Fortier, 2005).  Here, the nomination of ‘national icons or symbols that will be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/aaron-peters/olympic-britishness-and-crisis-of-
identity, retrieved: 4 August 2012. 
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relevant to post-imperial, multicultural, multi-ethnic Britain’ (Rojek, 2007: 191) can 
prove particularly useful in identifying wider power relations and discursive codes.  
That is, if the mediated construction of the nation was open to processes of ‘re-
invention’ and ‘re-imagining’, then examining how minority cultures were involved in 
such processes, and, in particular, who was being (re)presented within the national 
culture, can provide an insight into exploring the discursive construction of 
multicultural Britain. 
 Consequently, in accordance with chapter five, the following sections will seek 
to draw upon Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider framework in order to 
explore how discourses pertaining to British multiculturalism were constructed within 
the press.8  Indeed, previous research has highlighted the tensions that can arise in 
discussions relating to multiculturalism and national identity (Goodhart, 2013a; 
2013b; Rietveld, 2013).  Here, debates suggest ‘that multiculturalism erodes the 
shared foundations of national citizenship’ degenerating feelings of national 
solidarity, trust and loyalty (Rietveld, 2013: 2).  With this in mind, the application of 
an established-outsider framework to discussions on multiculturalism and national 
identity can be used to identity how established cultural codes seek to construct the 
boundaries between groups.  In addition, these codes can also be examined in order to 
explore how established nations seek to construct a developmental and progressive 
image of themselves (Falcous and Silk, 2010; Engh et al., 2014).  Consequently, 
attention will be given to exploring how the press sought to draw upon Britain’s 
achieved multiculturalism as an important part of its established image.  Here, 
representations of the Team GB athlete, Mo Farah, will be considered in order explore 
how the press’ framing of Farah reflected broader tensions in the discourse 
surrounding immigration within Britain. 
 
6.1.1. ‘As British as fish and chips’: constructing British tolerance and 
newspaper representations of Mo Farah 
 
Often, constructions of the national ‘we’ are based upon the nation’s ability to 
appropriately re-define a positive relationship with the nation’s past while at the same 
time construct a unified account of the nation that is not undermined by cultural 
diversity and mass immigration (Littler and Naidoo, 2004).  To this extent, Lott !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 See chapter five, sections 5.2. to 5.2.5. 
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(2012) was clear to point out that during the Olympic games ‘our multicultural 
character felt very natural and unforced now, deeply and uncontroversially part of 
who we are’ (The Independent, 12/08/12 [italics added]).  Indeed, Southphommasane 
(2012b) argued that: 
 
But more than anything else, Danny Boyle’s charming and authentic opening 
ceremony set the tone. Here was a Britain possessed with wit, humour and self-
deprecation. One that finally seemed comfortable in its own post-imperial skin. 
A mature Britain acknowledging the multitude of voices within its borders – 
those not only of the nations within the union, but also of its increasingly 
diverse population. (The Age, 13/08/12b) 
 
In fact, writing in the Sunday Herald, Macwhirter (2012) added that ‘the London 
Games have provided an image of the UK that isn’t just about imperialism, English 
nationalism and public schoolboys singing Rule Britannia on the last night of the 
proms.  It isn’t white any more, you know’ (12/08/12).  As can be seen, references 
relating to the ‘multitude of voices’ that now resided in a ‘mature Britain’ 
(Southphommasane, The Age, 13/08/12b), sought to construct a sense that Britain was 
no longer ‘just about imperialism’ (Macwhirter, Sunday Herald, 12/08/12) but was 
instead surprisingly comfortable with its ‘multicultural character’ (Lott, The 
Independent, 12/08/12).  This sense of British multicultural unity was echoed in 
Alibhai-Brown’s (2012) observation: 
 
But these two weeks have been a watershed of true significance. There has been 
a visceral reaction among black and Asian Britons to what we have seen. For 
some, it has been perhaps the first time they have really felt a part of this 
country. For others, the promise of tolerance and integration has come true.  
Seeing the mixed-race and black competitors fighting fiercely for their personal 
bests and for their country has been the moment when history turned a page. 
(Daily Mail, 13/08/12)  
 
Here, Alibhai-Brown’s (2012) reference to black and Asian Britons and the effects of 
seeing mixed-race and black competitors compete ‘for their country’ was reflective of 
the fact that Britain’s ‘promise of tolerance and integration ha[d] come true’ (Daily 
Mail, 13/08/12).  This was echoed by Walker (2012) who noted that ‘Britain may not 
be homogenous any more but it is inclusive’ (Belfast Telegraph, 05/06/12). 
 In fact, the effects of immigration within Britain form an integral, yet often 
ignored, part of Britain’s history.  Eighteenth-century London possessed an already 
large population of black immigrants as well as Chinese and Indian sailors (Colley, 
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2014a).  Similarly, by 1911, Cardiff was ‘a city where half the population came from 
somewhere else, not just from other parts of Europe and the UK, but also from the 
West Indies, China, Central American and East Africa’ (Colley, 2014a: 29).  The 
arrival of the Empire Windrush to Tillbury’s docks in June 1948 formed another part 
of Britain’s post-war immigration (Colley, 2014a).  Today, it may be difficult to 
determine the extent to which these immigrants felt ‘British’ but what it does reveal is 
that multi-national and multicultural Britain had been in existence for large parts of its 
recorded history. 
 Accordingly, in their analysis of London’s Olympic bid, Falcous and Silk 
(2010) note that the bid formed part of a wider initiative to promote Britain as a 
tolerant and multicultural nation, an initiative that was dependent upon presenting 
non-white British athletes ‘as proud subjects of multicultural Britain’ (2010: 177).  In 
fact: 
 
selective narrations of olympic bidding take impetus from a coalition of 
interests: state-political, civic, sporting and corporate. Their significance is in 
asserting a mythic, inclusive post-imperial Britain. … The representations of 
harmonious, youthful multiculturalism and the provision of ‘ideal’ multicultural 
subjects within London 2012 Olympic bidding that we have observed are 
proffered as embodiments of this very assertion. (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 178) 
 
Britain’s Olympic bid served to construct an understanding of Britain ‘as being 
developmental, multicultural and progressive’ (Engh et al., 2014: 785).  Indeed, such 
constructions can form part of a wider ‘developmental discourse’ in established 
nations (Engh et al., 2014).  Fortier (2005) notes that: 
 
The effect of the politics of pride is to separate ethnic ‘others’ into subjects that 
must be hailed as figures of the tolerant, multiracial Britain that many 
commentators ‘cherish’. They constitute ‘our’ diversity, which is what ‘we’ are 
proud of. (2005: 568)     
 
This can be identified in Engh et al.’s (2014) analysis of youth football tournaments in 
Scandinavian countries and how such tournaments’ served to maintain a clear 
distinction between the Scandinavian organisers and the invited African teams.  
Employing an established-outsider model, Engh et al. (2014) noted that while the 
Scandinavian communities were portrayed as communities of ‘democracy, peace, 
equality and multicultural tolerance’, perceptions of the competing African nations 
failed to elicit the same ‘established’ qualities (Engh et al., 2014: 788).  In much the 
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same way, reports within the British press shared in Engh et al.’s (2014) findings.  
Here, Britain’s ‘inclusive’ image was used in order to portray Britain as an 
established, progressive, multi-cultural nation (Walker, Belfast Telegraph, 05/06/12). 
 With this in mind and without any objective qualification (see Alibhai-Brown, 
2012), much of the coverage on the Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games 
stood to suggest that foreign immigration had resulted in a multi-ethnic and 
multicultural British society, which, as a consequence, had resulted in a reconstructed 
sense of Britishness, based not on homogeneity but on diversity (Guardian, 2012b; 
Lott, 2012; Southphommasane, 2012b).  In doing so, the press aimed to portray 
Britain along favourable lines, that is, as a multicultural nation par excellence.  Here, 
Britain was portrayed as an established nation who had successfully managed to 
become a multicultural nation (Alibhai-Brown, 2012).   
 In fact, these reports failed to highlight Britain’s multicultural imperial history 
and stood in stark contrast to the rioting, which afflicted London’s streets in 2011.  
Mitra (2013) notes that the riots ‘threatened the very multicultural fabric of the British 
society’ (2013: 6).  As a result:  
 
According to reports in the British media, the country’s reputation as an 
inclusive setting in which people from diverse communities came together as a 
peaceful and respectful whole was fatally damaged in light of the full 
outworking of these riots. They revealed a less tolerant side of the British 
society, it was said, and with the Olympics then only 1 year away, question 
marks were raised over aspects of the country’s very fabric, in terms of its 
security situation, ethnic assimilation (the riots are said to have been sparked by 
the killing of a 29-year-old man of mixed race) and the difference between the 
‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ resident in the country. (Mitra, 2013: 6-7) 
 
In contrast to the above, and, in spite of the 2011 London riots, the 2012 Olympic 
Games provided a powerful space for a multicultural Britain to be displayed. 
 As previously mentioned, however, an important part of this representation was 
the framing of Black-British and Black-Asian athletes ‘as exemplary embodiments of 
multicultural Britain, the perfect rejoinder to assertions of ethnic essentialism, racism, 
and intolerance’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 178).  Whereas this formed an important 
part of the 2012 Olympic bid, the Games coverage continued this trend with the 
representation of Team GB’s non-white athletes as examples of a ‘tolerant’ and 
‘inclusive’ nation (Falcous and Silk, 2010; see also Alibhai-Brown, 2012).  Indeed, 
one particular Team GB athlete who was seen as representing Britain’s new 
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inclusivity was the athlete Mohamed Farah, commonly known as, Mo (Macwhirter, 
2012). 
 In contrast to the Sheffield born, mixed-ethnicity, ‘Golden Girl’, Jessica Ennis, 
Farah’s identity provided an interesting insight into Britain’s multicultural identity.  
Farah competed as part of Team GB’s athletic squad, running in both the long and 
middle distance track events, where he succeeded in achieving Olympic Gold in the 
10,000m and 5,000m events.  Originally born in Somaliland, an unrecognised 
sovereign state that succeeded the former British Somaliland protectorate, Farah 
moved to Britain as a child.9  Farah is also a devout Muslim, the abbreviated ‘Mo’ for 
‘Mohamed’, being a common Islamic name.10  More importantly, however, was how 
the press sought to draw upon Mo’s Somali-born British identity as a way of 
highlighting Britain’s multicultural society.  Indeed, Samuel (2012) questioned ‘is 
there a nobler representation of what modern Britain is about than 10,000 metres 
champion Farah?’ (Daily Mail, 06/08/12 [italics added]).  Similarly, Holt (2012) 
argued: 
 
Farah has become a powerful symbol at these magical London Olympics. … 
there is a sense that these Games have helped this country cross the Rubicon in 
the last two weeks. … as a nation, we are finally celebrating what we are, not 
what we were. … this win for a son of Mogadishu was a victory for our oft-
maligned multicultural society. (Daily Mirror, 13/08/12)  
 
In doing so, ‘the Games … allowed Britain, almost for the first time in memory, to 
celebrate its history while acknowledging its rich multicultural present, which is now 
leading the way into the future’ (Crompton, Daily Telegraph, 11/08/12).   
 In each of the above examples, Farah’s depiction within the press was used to 
construct a ‘modern Britain’ (Samuel, Daily Mail, 06/08/12) which was finally able to 
celebrate ‘what we are, not what we were’ (Holt, Daily Mirror, 13/08/12).  
Ultimately, Farah’s acceptance within British society was regarded as a signifier of 
British tolerance, as noted by Crompton (2012): 
 
the tolerance that welcomed Mo Farah when he arrived as a child from Somalia 
– and which has been rewarded with one of the best pictures of the Games, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 See http://somalilandgov.com/country-profile, retrieved: 7 February 2014. Somaliland is a recognised 
autonomous region of Somalia (‘The World Factbook: Somalia’, www. cia.gov, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html, retrieved: 7 February 2014). 
10 In fact, Farah has mentioned that his full name ‘Mohamed’ often results in him being stopped at US 
airports by custom officials in order to be questioned on the suspicion of terrorism (Wilkes, 2013). 
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sight of Britain’s greatest distance runner wrapped in a flag, hugging his wife 
and child, applauded to the skies. (Daily Telegraph, 11/08/12) 
 
Crompton’s (2012) framing of Farah as ‘a child from Somalia’ who had become 
‘Britain’s greatest distance runner’ (Daily Telegraph, 11/08/12) clearly constructed 
Farah as a unique ‘symbol’ (Holt, Daily Mirror, 13/08/12), a process that not only 
reflected Britain’s achieved multiculturalism but which also presented Farah as being 
unquestionably British. 
 Indeed, elsewhere, Storry and Childs (1997) note how non-white British athletes 
have often had to manage their British identity.  Indeed: 
 
Frank Bruno, the heavyweight black boxer has in contrast remained closely 
connected to an idea of national representation in which his physical strength 
and modest, self-depreciating personality have caused him to be accepted as 
‘British’.  Sport has in this sense been a way of reinforcing black stereotypes 
while at the same time providing more visibility for black people and hence a 
recognition of the ‘multicultural’ nature of modern Britain. (Storry and Childs, 
1997: 323) 
 
Certainly, the recognition of ‘the “multicultural” nature of modern Britain’ (Storry 
and Childs, 1997: 323) corresponded in reports relating to Farah (Samuel, 2012).  In 
fact, ‘a growing openness and tolerance of difference in … definitions of 
“Englishness’/’Britishness” have also been found in examinations of English cricket 
and the English cricketer Monty Panesar (Fletcher, 2011: 23).  Accordingly, although 
he was ‘born in Somalia’ Farah was ‘as British as fish and chips’ (Beacom, Belfast 
Telegraph, 06/08/12), indeed, ‘a product of the UK system’ (Gillon, Herald, 
06/08/12).  This was aided by Farah’s apparent embracing of British culture.  Alibhai-
Brown (2012) highlighted: 
 
Today Mo, while remaining a devout Muslim, extols his adopted country.  
When he was asked last week after his victory in the 10,000 metres if he’d 
rather be representing Somalia, his simple response spoke volumes. ‘Not at all, 
mate. This is my country’.  His joyful embrace of Britishness, replicated by 
other British Olympians of immigrant stock, has aroused the same rapturous 
feelings of pride in people who, until now, were wary of nationalistic 
celebrations and expressions – including me. (Daily Mail, 13/08/12)      
 
Similarly, Sandbrook (2012) added: 
 
In many ways, the most heartening Rebirth of Britishness moment of the Games 
came at Mo Farah’s post-race press conference, when an African journalist 
asked him whether he would rather have competed for Somalia, where he was 
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born.  ‘Look, mate’, Farah said firmly. ‘This is my country. When I put on the 
Great Britain vest, I feel proud. Very proud’.  Farah – whose victory in the 
10,000 metres was, for me, the defining and most emotional moment of the 
Games – came to this country from Somalia at the age of eight. He did not 
speak a word of English. But here he was, a proud Londoner and a proud Briton, 
suffused with joy after winning in front of his home crowd.  What better symbol 
could there be of a united, inclusive country in the post-imperial age? What 
better advert for British identity: confident and colour-blind? (Daily Mail, 
11/08/12)    
 
In such instances, those born outside Britain (Littler and Naidoo, 2004) or those from 
non-white ethnic communities (Fletcher, 2011) were continually required to justify 
their presence within Britain, and, as Alibhai-Brown (2012), Sandbrook (2012) and 
Beacom (2012) revealed, were continually required to justify their Britishness.  
Indicative of such concerns has been the implementation of a citizenship test for those 
seeking British citizenship, a process that includes an oath of allegiance to the British 
Queen and the learning of the national anthem (Bryne, 2013; Vincent and Harris, 
2014).  Furthermore, in contrast to Crompton’s (2012) assertion that Britain 
‘celebrate[d] its history while acknowledging its rich multicultural present’ (Daily 
Telegraph, 11/08/12), Farah’s representation within the press served to detach Farah 
from the historical context that brought him to the UK as well as wider issue relating 
to skin colour and religion in order to present an image of Farah as thoroughly British. 
 As a result, in accordance with the ‘Rebirth of Britishness’ (Sandbrook, Daily 
Mail, 11/08/12) Farah was ‘the multicultural pin-up for the new Britain’ (Macwhirter, 
Sunday Herald, 12/08/12).  In these examples, references to Farah’s ‘Britishness’ 
were required in order to justify his acceptability as a ‘Brit’.  As a result, Farah 
became an important signification of Britain’s achieved multiculturalism.  Indeed, 
there are similarities here with Carrington (2000) who argues that non-white athletes 
are often heralded as important and celebrated examples of the nation.  Certainly, the 
sense that Farah represented a ‘new’ Britain was clearly evident in the above 
examples (Macwhirter, 2010).  In doing so, they reveal how Farah’s difference was 
used to enhance a constructed multicultural Britain.   
 However, at a more latent level the above examples reveal the complexities 
surrounding dual-nationals, particularly between notions of an Anglo/Celtic Christian 
model of Britishness and ‘outsiders’ (Poulton and Maguire, 2012).  Indeed, the ability 
of established groups to allow certain ‘outsiders’ to become part of established 
discourses is often ‘contingent on them toeing the line(s) in several ways – corporate, 
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nationalist, conservative, and gendered – as “appropriate” national subjects’ (Falcous 
and Silk, 2010: 172).11  Consequently, although non-white British athletes may be 
‘taken up as legitimate multicultural racialised subjects’, there ‘inclusion is 
contingent’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 173).  Indeed, ‘they are “allowed” to be 
“racialised” but only in bounded ways’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 173).   
 Similarly, while Farah’s success allowed him to be constructed within the press’ 
reports as a signifier of Britain’s multicultural society and apparent tolerance towards 
immigrants, his story revealed a form of ‘double consciousness’ (Whannel, 2002: 
175).  That is, despite Farah’s declared Britishness being exemplified, in each of the 
above examples, Farah’s outsider status was reaffirmed through the qualification of 
his Somali heritage.  In fact, Farah’s Somalian background was largely inescapable as 
the following examples reveal: ‘son of Mogadishu’ (Holt, Daily Mirror, 13/08/12); 
‘Mo Farah, who came here from Mogadishu’ (Ashley, Guardian, 06/08/12); ‘child 
from Somalia’ (Beacom, Belfast Telegraph, 06/08/12) and ‘Mo Farah, from Somalia’ 
(Macwhirter, Sunday Herald, 12/08/12).  Indeed, alongside the qualifications required 
to reaffirm Farah’s Britishness, Farah’s ‘outsider’ heritage was routinely 
acknowledged.  
 Accordingly, while previous work has highlighted how Britain’s non-white 
athletes are routinely presented within the press as ‘racialized subjects’ (Fortier, 2005: 
569), a similar process can be identified in the press’ representation of Farah due to 
the continued reference to his original place of birth.  In such instances, the press 
sought to continually (re)define Farah as once ‘Somalian’ but now ‘British’.  In such 
instances, it was evident that immigrant ‘outsiders’ were required to prove their 
Britishness, by demonstrating their identifications with British culture (‘as British as 
Fish and Chips’ [Beacom, Belfast Telegraph, 06/08/12]; see also Rojek, 2007).  
Nowhere within the press’ coverage were attempts made to certify the Britishness of 
the mixed-ethnicity Jessica Ennis.  Certainly, Farah’s double Olympic gold’s 
undoubtedly resulted in greater press attention but the latent need to qualify Farah’s 
British identity revealed wider complexities surrounding British multiculturalism and 
British identity. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Similar processes can also be observed in the work of Carrington (2001) and Burdsey (2008).   
 230 
6.1.2. Accepting diversity: English anxiety and immigration  
 
The above examples regarding Mo Farah can be seen as forming part of a wider, yet 
limited, assimilation of immigrant ‘outsiders’ within Britain (Vogler, 2000).  Indeed, 
Rojek (2007) highlights that: 
 
A gap has opened between the representation of the nation and the positioning 
of the population in relation to ‘the nation’.  In this gap are emerging a wide 
variety of flexible, strategic approaches to British national identity. (2007: 176) 
 
Accordingly, Ward (2004) has considered how the effects of multiculturalism within 
Britain has resulted in it having ‘much in common … with countries like Australia 
and Canada, where the unraveling of Greater Britain has given rise to new 
multicultural civic identities’ (2004: 257 [italic added]).  With this in mind, it was the 
emphasis on the ‘new’ that seemed to underlie the press’ coverage of Britain.12  As a 
result, while reports of Britain’s achieved multiculturalism were evident within the 
press, such accounts revealed how processes of assimilation, civic integration and 
national cohesion could be invoked in reports on Farah and British diversity (Anthias, 
2013; Ward, 2004). 
 Indeed, elsewhere Littler and Naidoo (2004) highlight how contemporary 
accounts regarding multiculturalism and diversity follow a ‘white past, multicultural 
present’ formula.  They note that: 
 
The ‘white past, multicultural present’ formation occurs simultaneously as a 
lament and a celebration – a celebration of our nation being modern, young, hip 
and in tune with the globalized economy as well as harbouring a nostalgia and 
lament for a bygone contained, safe and moncolutral world. (Littler and Naidoo, 
2004: 338)  
 
Consequently, in accordance with the press’ coverage of Mo Farah, it is evident that a 
similar process was at play.  That is, by highlighting Farah’s tolerable acceptance as 
‘British’, Farah was heralded as a potent ‘symbol’ (Holt, Daily Mirror, 13/08/12) of 
Britain’s modern, diverse and multicultural society, in fact, as a symbol of the 
‘Rebirth of Britishness’ (Sandbrook, Daily Mail, 11/08/12).  However, as previously 
revealed, such discourses stood alongside wider lamentations regarding Britain’s 
imperial past (Norman, 2012) and former imperial supremacy (Toynbee, 2012a).  
Here, the effects of the ‘white heritage, multicultural present’ dynamic reinforced the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See section 6.1. 
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disparity between past Britain and new Britain (Littler and Naidoo, 2004).  
 With this in mind, the topic of immigration within Britain has formed an 
important part of debates concerning Britain and British identity and the ability of 
immigrants to assimilate with, or, from part of, British society (Burdsey, 2012; Mitra, 
2013).  Accordingly, one of the consequences of immigration has been a concern that 
‘old certainties’ regarding values of Britishness have been called into question 
(Fletcher, 2011: 19).  Indeed, since the end of the Second World War, such debates 
have aimed to determine what constitutes Britishness, and, perhaps, less favourably, 
who shouldn’t be included (Gilroy, 2005; Goodhart, 2013a; 2013b; Rojek, 2009).  
Coalescing with the loss of Britain’s imperial prestige, devolution and the EU, 
multiculturalism is seen as forming part of a wider process of British decline.  Ewen 
(2012) notes that ‘intellectuals of the conservative right Roger Scruton, Simon Heffer, 
Ferdinand Mount, Peter Hitchens and Melanie Phillips are fond of arguing that 
Britain’s “greatness” has been banished to history; its coherent culture lost to the past’ 
(2012: 315).  In part, such disdain has been fuelled by those on the far right, with the 
National Front, and, the more recent ‘English Defense League’, serving to re-invoke 
national fervor with the aim of excluding those from black or Asian descent (Edgar, 
2013).   
 Accordingly, for England, the issue of immigration has proved particularly 
provocative.  Commenting upon the diversity of Britain and the problems this has 
caused for England, Kumar (2006a) notes that ‘the English are alarmed at the 
pluralism they have so far encouraged, but find it difficult to define the model of 
English or British identity to which they might expect people – themselves included – 
to conform’ (2006b: 424).  Indeed, such fears coalesce around a revamped sense of 
Englishness, which is often set against a pluralized British culture (Fletcher, 2011; 
Maguire, 2011), resulting in a defensive ‘Little Englander’ mentality (Burdsey, 2006; 
Gilroy, 2005).  
 Certainly, the sense that Britain’s increasing diversity had changed Britain, was 
highlighted in accounts that sought to measure Britain’s transformation during the 
reign of Queen Elizabeth.  The Sunday Telegraph (2012) noted that: 
 
The Queen’s capacity to unite her subjects in admiration and respect for her and 
for the achievements of her reign is remarkable. Britain is a far more diverse 
country than it was in 1952, when [Queen Elizabeth] came to the throne. The 
fissures between us are more obvious, and in some ways deeper and sharper, 
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than they were 60 years ago. Britons no longer share a single common culture. 
In 1952, the nation was still emerging from the shadow of the Second World 
War. Some goods were still rationed. Most of us wore the same clothes, ate the 
same food, and shared the same religion and amusements. In the years since 
then, parts of our cities have been transformed in ways which, in 1952, would 
not have been recognised as ‘British’ at all. While we all enjoy a much higher 
standard of living, the gap between rich and poor is larger than it was in 1952. 
And resentments over immigration have increased, largely because in 1952, 
there had been very little immigration. (03/06/12) 
 
As can be seen, while the Sunday Telegraph (2012) sought to ignore Britain’s history 
of imperial immigration and migration (Colley, 2014a; Ward, 2004), the conflicts 
surrounding immigration were vividly outlined by Riddell (2012), who noted that: 
 
With beacons of welcome ablaze around the Commonwealth, we forget at our 
peril that economic interest decrees a sensible immigration policy, while our 
shared humanity demands that Britain, a nation of migrants spearheaded by a 
monarch of German ancestry, offers safety to the tortured. (Daily Telegraph, 
05/06/12) 
 
In fact, although Riddell (2012) was able to point out the British monarchy’s 
‘German’ ancestry, it was clear that Britain’s ‘openheartedness’ was a cause of 
concern, particularly, regarding its sense of culture and identity.  Here, Riddell (2012) 
added that, ‘in a Jubilee of fantasy and imagination, listen out amid the celebration of 
this country’s openheartedness for a rustle from the chancel of Holy Trinity Church in 
Stratford. That would be Shakespeare turning in his grave’ (Daily Telegraph, 
05/06/12). 
Indeed, the image of England’s most famous playwright ‘turning in his grave’ 
served to manifest around English fears concerning Britain’s cultural erosion in the 
face of continued immigration.  This was exemplified by Taylor’s (2012) reference to 
‘the creeping cultural fragmentation that anyone over the age of 50 becomes darkly 
aware of the moment he or she opens a newspaper’ (Daily Telegraph, 02/06/12).  
Similarly, Moore (2012) added that: 
 
Behind these irritations lies an uneasy feeling that London is ceasing to be 
umbilically British. If this is a place where a third of the births are to parents not 
born in this country, if this is Londonistan, or Londongrad, does it have any 
unity? How would it survive the strain of economic disaster, let alone of 
physical attack? (Daily Telegraph, 28/07/12) 
 
In accordance with the sense of unease, which surrounded Britain’s economic and 
political problems, English press reports sought to actively highlight Britain’s 
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‘cultural fragmentation’ and lack of unity as a consequence of its increasing 
diversity. 13   In such instances, the reports suggested that foreign migration had 
polluted the purity of Britain, resulting in London feeling less and less ‘British’ 
(Moore, Daily Telegraph, 28/07/12).   
 To this extent, it is possible to locate these examples in relation to wider 
concerns regarding national decline and crisis.  Indeed, Karner (2013) argues that 
feelings of decline and national crisis reveal ‘a disposition to seek and find solace in 
nationalist populisms that are often equally opposed to “those up there” and to “those 
out there”’ (Karner, 2013).14  Consequently, for the Daily Mail (2012a), it was ‘those 
out there’ who had come to Britain in ‘unprecedented waves of mass immigration’ 
and as a result had ‘challenge[d] our identity as a people’ (02/06/12a).  This has been 
echoed by government proposals concerning the effects of immigration within Britain 
and the sense of disruption this has afforded British communities (Watt, 2011).  In a 
speech made by David Cameron in 2011 on immigration, Cameron referred to ‘a kind 
of discomfort and disjointedness in some neighborhoods’ due to the ‘significant 
numbers of new people’ who had arrived in British ‘communities’ unable to speak the 
English language (BBC, 2011; see also Bryne, 2013; Edgar, 2013; Watt, 2011).15 
 In such instances, the Guardian’s Jonathan Freedland (2012c) was able to point 
out that the success of the Olympics would fail to change British opinion on 
immigration.  Freedland (2012c) highlighted that:   
 
False dawns are frequent, in sport especially. Witness the victorious French 
football team of 1998 that was meant to hail a new, racially inclusive future for 
that country: it didn’t quite work out that way. As today’s Guardian/ICM poll 
shows, most Britons are not going to let the Olympics shift their views on 
immigration: those Somali-born asylum seekers unblessed by Mo Farah’s gifts 
will not be applauded as they walk into the pub. Our problems haven’t gone 
away just because the news bulletins have barely mentioned them for two 
weeks. (Guardian, 11/08/12c) 
 
In fact, work by Poulton and Maguire (2012) and Meet et al. (2010) has highlighted 
how the right-wing British press tend to frame stories that argue for tougher 
immigration policies within Britain.  Meer et al. (2010) note that for ‘the Daily 
Telegraph and the Daily Mail, Britishness is not multicultural’ (Meer et al., 2010: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See chapter five, section 5.0. 
14 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/christian-karner/from-collective-myth-to-
counterpublics-negotiating-national-identity-in-, retrieved: 13 May 2013. 
15 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13083781, retrieved: 16 December 2013. 
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105).  Accordingly, as the above examples reveal, this was also evident within both 
the Diamond Jubilee and Olympic press coverage, with a clear sense of paranoia 
embedded within the right-wing English press’ views on immigration (Daily Mail, 
2012a; John, 2012; Riddell, 2012; Sunday Telegraph, 2012).  This was exemplified in 
John’s (2012) comments, which suggested: 
 
we’re going to need the Olympic village to accommodate all the ‘overstayers’. 
It looks like the ‘legacy’ of the Games is going to be another milestone in 
Britain’s world-class record for accepting asylum seekers, no questions asked. 
(Daily Mail, 27/07/12)   
 
Similarly, in interviews with individuals involved in the organisation of Scandinavian 
youth football tournaments, Engh et al. (2014) highlighted that ‘the risk of team 
members “jumping off” and applying for asylum in either of the Scandinavian 
countries prior to or after participating in a tournament’ was based on ‘a logic that 
presume[d] that individuals from so-called “poor countries” [were] likely to use their 
participation in a tournament as a migratory opportunity; a way into Scandinavia’ 
(2014: 792).  In accordance with John’s (2012) remarks, Engh et al. (2014) 
highlighted that such suggestions helped to form an established image of the host 
nation, that is, as a ‘promised land’ upon which those from outside groups wished to 
join (Engh et al., 2014: 792).  In doing so, ‘outsiders’, in this case, athletic ‘asylum 
seekers’ (John, Daily Mail, 27/07/12), were constructed upon a ‘minority of the 
worst’ distinction (Elias and Scotson, 1994).  In fact, just one year after the 2012 
Olympic Games, British Home Office vans patrolled London’s streets in order to 
tackle illegal immigration within Britain by warning illegal immigrants to ‘go home 
or face arrest’ (Casciani, 2013).16 
To this extent, it is possible to observe how various ‘kinds of nationalistic 
discourse may come to be strengthened and magnified by paranoid social defence 
mechanisms in which shame about the nation’s weak or declining international 
position is associated with anger and rage against foreigners and the enemy within 
who are seen as to blame’ (Vogler, 2000: 31).  Certainly, such an explanation would 
align with those, primarily English, fears regarding the erosion of British culture 
(Richards, 2012; Riddell, 2012; Taylor, 2012) and its sense of unity (Hayward, 2012; 
Sandbrook, 2012; Taylor, 2012).  Here, Mennell (2007) notes that ‘the advent of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24452551, retrieved: 16 December 2013. 
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multiculturalism and separatism is more likely a symptom of the dynamics of 
established-outsider relations during a period of high immigration than a significance 
cause of a possible failure of the assimilating process’ (2007: 223).  Accordingly, for 
‘established states, an important condition is “age” and “continuity” (Van Bentem van 
den Bergh, 2001: 210).  Here: 
 
Homogeneity is a result of long-term integration processes that make 
minorities disappear.  The Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and 
France are examples of such highly integrated state-societies, though long-
distance migration now disturbs the self-evident character of their ‘we-
feelings’.  The United States has always combined a high level of national 
integration with recognition in politics of different ‘we-groups’ named 
according to their country of origin – the ‘ethnic vote’. (Van Benthem van den 
Bergh, 2001: 210) 
 
To this extent, such anxieties regarding immigration may reflect wider insecurities in 
the British ‘we-identity’.  More specifically, in comparison with the Northern Irish, 
Scottish and Welsh coverage, it was clear that concerns regarding immigration within 
Britain, formed an important part of the English press’ coverage.17  Here, concerns 
regarding immigration may have alluded to a sense of English insecurity regarding 
Britain and British identity, one that was reflected in the attention given to the topic of 
immigration within the English press.  Notably, it was England’s ‘Shakespeare’ who 
was viewed as being besmirched by the assimilation of diverse ethnic groups (Riddell, 
2012).  In doing so, the English press revealed a common practice amongst 
established groups, which involved confirming their history and cultural superiority in 
relation to changes in the British domestic figuration (Bucholc, 2013; Elias and 
Scotson, 1994).   
Indeed, elsewhere, it is claimed that processes of globalisation, multiculturalism 
and transnational global developments have increasingly destabilised dominant or 
established notions of the nation and its national identity (Maguire, 2011).  Certainly, 
the British press’ ability to herald the success of Farah and other Team GB athletes 
while at the same time anxiously debate the presence of immigration within Britain, 
suggests how such processes can form part of the complexities and ambiguities 
involved in newspaper (re)constructions of Britain.  The fact that Britain’s successful !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Indeed, Burdsey (2006) notes that ethnic minorities within Britain often find it easier to identify with 
the British identity rather the English identity.  In fact, ‘the reasons for this identification with 
“Britishness” rather than “Englishness” are multiple, and contextually and temporally specific’ 
(Burdsey, 2006: 16).   
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athletes were being framed as a representation of a modern, multicultural, post-
imperial Britain, may, on the one hand, present a over-zealous picture of multicultural 
and multinational British unity.  The sense that Britain’s ethnic communities 
represented an allegiance to Team GB and the monarchy during both events is 
undermined by analyses, particularly within sport, which have endeavoured to reveal 
how:  
 
The sporting affiliations of young diasporic citizens are multiple, with interest 
and support simultaneously directed towards nations of residence and those of 
ancestry.  Indeed, research on minority ethnic Britons shows that sport is an 
important arena for the reproduction and contestation of ethnic and national 
identities, and that these patterns are complex, nuanced and influenced by a 
wide range of factors. (Burdsey, 2012: 78 [italics added]) 
 
However, on the other hand, the lack of British posturing regarding its imperial 
heritage during the Opening Ceremony may have ‘helped make possible re-
appropriations of the flag in later contexts, not least Mo Farah victoriously wrapped in 
it’ (Branston, 2012: 2).18 
 With this in mind, Loyal (2011) draws upon Gramsci’s (1971) ‘contradictory 
common sense’ (1971: 323-343) in relation to ‘the contradictory attitudes … which 
many in the indigenous population have towards immigrants’ (Loyal, 2011: 186).  
Here, Loyal (2011) highlights how ‘specific concerns about … jobs and pay levels … 
co-exist with feelings of mutual identification and humanitarian concern towards 
asylum seekers and migrants and their social conditions in other social contexts’ 
(2011: 186).  Certainly, the above examples revealed a particular propensity for the 
English press to highlight specific concerns and anxieties regarding immigration and 
its effects upon British culture and identity.  At the same time, however, other reports 
took the time to herald Britain’s multicultural diversity and unity.   
Furthermore, while it is evident that such feelings may reflect ‘specific 
concerns’ regarding wider changes to the British state (Loyal, 2011: 186), in the case 
of Scotland, immigration provides a notable difference to England.  Here, the SNP has 
actively encouraged immigration in an independent Scotland (Freedland, 2014a; Jack, 
2013).  While this may provide another example of the disparity between Scotland 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 The only notable signifier of Britain’s imperial history was the inclusion of a model Empire 
Windrush. 
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and England, it can also add to the complex and contradictory attitudes regarding 
immigration within Britain. 
Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that a number of paradoxical 
processes were at play in the press’ construction of Britain and its multicultural 
depiction.  Indeed, Maguire (2011) asserts that ‘the discourse and actions of dominant 
groups within a national culture constructs identities that are ambiguously placed 
between past and present’ (2011: 981).  As a result, there is ‘both a drive to return to 
former glories and a drive to go forwards ever deeper into modernity’ (Maguire, 2011: 
981).  In light of this, section 6.1. suggested that while representations of Britain’s 
‘new’, and, largely, multicultural identity, were constructed within the press, the 
above examples reveal how anxieties regarding immigration, and, in particular, the 
assimilation of ‘outsider’ cultures, served to reveal wider ambivalences regarding the 
representation of a multicultural Britain (Bygnes, 2013).  Accordingly, while Bygnes 
(2013) reveals that ‘multicultural society is [ambivalently] described as both hopeful 
and problematic’ (2013: 127), set against Britain’s imperial history, the press’ 
coverage served to reveal the ambiguities ‘between past and present’ (Maguire, 2011: 
981), that is, between a representation of the Britain that ‘used to be’ and the one that 
it had ‘become’ (Alibhai-Brown, 2012; Parsons, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; Sawer, 2012; 
The Independent on Sunday, 2012b).  Here, discourses within the press reflected a 
‘(cultural) politics of diversity’ (Falcous and Silk, 2010: 171), split between a 
multicultural Britain (Alibhai-Brown, 2012; Guardian, 2012b; Macwhirter, 2012; 
Sandbrook, 2012; The Independent on Sunday, 2012b) and a hostility to immigration 
(John, 2012; Moore, 2012; Riddell, 2012; Sunday Telegraphy, 2012).  
Consequently, ‘as people recognise and experience the variety of the present’ 
(Storry and Childs, 1997: 327), other complexities surrounding Britain’s ‘multi-
national’ history were revealed.  Indeed, Ridden (2004) notes that while: 
 
On the one hand, Britishness has formed part of the basis for a common 
citizenship and for social cohesion among diverse groups, associated with 
attempts to extend identity from the center outward to the periphery, either in 
the form of anglicisation or as a flexible umbrella form of identity.  On the other 
hand, Britishness has been consistently associated with attempts by various 
interest groups to change the relationship between the British state and its 
constituent parts, or between the various social groups that live within the 
United Kingdom. (Ridden, 2004: 197) 
 
Drawing upon Ridden’s (2004) comments, we can extend the centre to periphery 
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analysis by exploring those within the wider ‘Commonwealth’ periphery.  Here, the 
Diamond Jubilee celebrations provided an opportunity for both Britain and the 
dominions to share in the celebration of its mutual Head of State. 
 
6.2. ‘Connecting cultures’: constructions of Britain within the Commonwealth 
press 
 
Forming part of the Jubilee’s theme of ‘Connecting Cultures’ (Grove-Wright, 2012), 
the lighting of beacons across Britain and the Commonwealth sought to symbolically 
unite the British home nations with its former dominions.  McLaughlin (2012) 
recorded that: 
 
From an extinct volcano in Fife to a sunkissed archipelago in the South Pacific, 
they were the sites coming together in a show of unity which reached around 
the globe.  In what was one of the most visually striking celebrations of the 
Queen’s Diamond Jubilee, thousands of beacons were set alight the world over 
yesterday, as communities touched by the monarch’s six decade-long reign paid 
tribute with an ancient British custom. (The Scotsman, 05/06/12) 
 
Indeed, the cross-national sense of community was shared by Pelling (2012), who 
noted that, ‘it’s these moments of sudden camaraderie that I find hardest to explain to 
the cynics and naysayers: the peculiar sense that you really are one big British and 
Commonwealth family, headed by an extraordinarily admirable matriarch and united 
by a common heritage’ (Daily Telegraph, 05/06/12).  While Zerubavel (1997) has 
examined how certain events can focus attention on a particular moment in the past, 
providing a moment of ‘mnemonic synchronization’ across the nation (Zerubavel, 
1997: 97), the above examples reveal that such commemorations of collective 
sentiment could also work trans-nationally, by synchronizing attention to a particular 
event with shared historical meaning.  In the case of Britain, this mnemonic 
community reflected a legacy of imperial contact (Berg, 2012), which today was 
framed, rather positively, as ‘one big British and Commonwealth family … united by 
a common heritage’ (Pelling, Daily Telegraph, 05/06/12).   
In fact, references to the Commonwealth’s ‘family arrangement’ (Craggs and 
Kumarasingham, 2014) were alluded to in Blair’s (2012) description of Britain, 
suggesting that Britain: 
 
is not a youngish country trying to find its sea legs on the international sports 
landscape. It is rather a much-beloved, huggable older relative – a bit dusty, still 
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wearing clothes that are a little tight from a kind of mid-life crisis when ‘Cool 
Britannia’ was all the rage. (The Globe and Mail, 28/07/12) 
 
Blair’s (2012) rather affectionate account of Britain as the ‘much-beloved, huggable 
older relative’, served to reveal how forms of figurative connection continue to 
underlie the post-imperial relationship between Britain and the former dominions 
(Winter, 2006).  Incidentally, these relations could also reveal tangible familial ties.   
Consequently, while one New Zealand school helped to ensure that its students 
‘learnt about where they came from’ (Dominion Post, 02/06/12) other reports 
reflected upon the Commonwealth diaspora in Canada.  In accordance with Winter’s 
(2006) analysis of Empire as a ‘family history’, the family history of one interviewee 
was drawn upon by Alldritt (2012): 
 
Zelley’s life is a classic example of the Commonwealth diaspora. Shortly after 
Elizabeth was crowned, Zelley’s family emigrated to Canada to join his father, 
a recently demobilized Seaforth Highlander. A sea voyage to Montreal was 
followed by a train ride across the continent and a final ferry ride to Nanaimo.  
‘Canada’s a good place,’ said Zelley, now a semi-retired accountant. ‘If we 
keep the monarchy we’ll just keep getting better. It’s part of our history and it’s 
a good system. It’s a successful method and it has history. It’s a multi-layered 
positive thing’. (Vancouver Sun, 02/06/12) 
 
Clearly, Zelley’s ‘private memories’ of emigrating to Canada highlight the ties of 
interdependence which were forged between Britain and its former dominions by 
empire (Schilling, 2013).  Here, Zelley’s comments represented how national 
attachments (‘Canada’s a good place’) were forged in interdependence with Britain, 
and, more specifically, through Canada’s monarchial ties with Britain. 
Accordingly, elsewhere, the image of Queen Elizabeth was seen as being 
particularly reflective of the New Zealand national character, as Oldfield’s (2012) 
comments suggest:   
 
There’s something about the Queen that appeals to our national character. She 
inherited her father’s reserve and work ethic and her mother’s practicality and 
dry Scottish sense of humour – none of which differs greatly from the traits of 
her Kiwi subjects. We, too, are frank, straightforward and not prone to displays 
of excess emotion. But her intense dedication to duty marks her out as a truly 
extraordinary person. (Dominion Post, 02/06/12) 
 
Here, the Queen’s ‘dry Scottish sense of humour’ was constructed as reflecting that of 
‘her Kiwi subjects’ (Oldfield, Dominion Post, 02/06/12).  In addition, the Vancouver 
Sun (2012) noted that, ‘she has proved one of the most durable, remarkable and 
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beloved monarchs in British history – and, by extension, in Canada’s history as a 
fond, former, British colony over whose constitutional monarchy she still presides as 
symbolic head of state’ (02/06/12). 
 Evidently, emotional attachments to Britain (Blair, 2012) the ‘Commonwealth 
family’ (Pelling, 2012) and Queen Elizabeth (Alldritt, 2012; Oldfield, 2012; 
Vancouver Sun, 2012) were clearly evoked within some sections of the British and 
Commonwealth press.  These constructions, while highlighting shared family ties and 
common history, helped to maintain a symbolic link with Britain that transcended 
national boundaries for a sense of tradition based upon transnational associations.  
Elsewhere, Ho (2013) has viewed such attachments as a form of ‘Colonial 
(re)connectivity’, a process which defines the ‘emotional imagination and 
reconnection between the coloniser and the colonised’ (2013: 2210).  Whereas the 
imperial prestige of royal occasions throughout the 1900’s helped to encourage a 
‘sense of belonging to the Empire’ (Ward, 2004: 19), the 2012 Diamond Jubilee 
provided a comparable form of imperial extension via the Commonwealth’s shared 
cultural values (see also Cannadine, 1983). 
 In fact, while the reign of Queen Elizabeth had ‘overseen the transformation of 
the Commonwealth, as it threw off its colonial past to become a international 
organisation based on shared history and values’ (The Scotsman, 02/06/12a) the belief 
that the ‘Anglosphere’ continued to be of value for Australia, was drawn upon by 
Berg (2012): 
 
The Anglosphere is not about the English language. It is about a collection of 
values – individual liberty, the common law, parliamentary democracy, and 
open markets – we share with Britain, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the 
US. It recognises that different nations are joined by a common political 
culture. Carr and Rudd can protest all they want: the existence of that common 
culture is beyond question, and we are part of it. (The Sunday Age, 12/08/12) 
 
Clearly, Australia’s ties to Britain remained prominent within its domestic politics.  In 
accordance with the above, this ‘common political culture’ was held together through 
a shared collection of values.  Indeed, these values and its history was something 
which Australia should not be ashamed of: 
 
It is obvious and important that we are part of the English-speaking world. Our 
heritage is not something to be ashamed of. It is not a coincidence the oldest 
surviving democracies are in the Anglosphere. Or that the Anglosphere 
harbours the wealthiest countries. Or that a tradition of liberty, stretching back 
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to the Magna Carta, has given English-speaking nations a greater protection of 
human rights and private property than anywhere else. We ought to be proud, 
not bashful. … for Australia, the Anglosphere will still shape our social, 
cultural and political views over the next 100 years. It’s a shame only 
conservatives feel comfortable talking about it. (Berg, The Sunday Age, 
12/08/12) 
 
As can be seen, the conviction that ‘a tradition of liberty’ and the protection of human 
rights and property which this endowed, helped to provide an emotional foundation 
for continuing relations between Britain and the Commonwealth.  Indeed, the 
‘language of liberty’ has often been used in support of British unionism both within 
the UK and the former empire, as well as being universally adopted by a majority of 
Western nation-states (Colley, 2014a: 39; see also Colls, 2012; Rojek, 2007).  
Equally, while liberty has played a significant part in constructions of Britishness and 
British identity it has also provided a locus for various resistance and revolutionary 
movements around the world, most notably, the American Revolution (Colley, 
2014a).  As a result: 
 
while liberty has provided a broadly accessible and multiform master narrative 
whereby varieties of Britons over the centuries have been able to tell and 
organize stories about themselves and their state, the political repercussion of 
this have been decidedly mixed. (Colley, 2014a: 37)   
 
Consequently, while Berg’s (2012) comments reflected a distortion of the wider 
ambiguities surrounding ‘British liberty’, reference to Commonwealth freedoms and 
the ‘liberties’ they entailed continued to be reflected upon within the Commonwealth 
press.19  Accordingly, Foster-Bell (2012) noted that: 
 
As the head of the Commonwealth of Nations, the Queen plays an important 
role binding together this disparate group of 54 countries – 16 of which she 
serves as head of state. The promotion of democratic good governance, the rule 
of law, individual liberty, prosperity through free and fair trade and peaceful 
international relations remain the key tenets of the Commonwealth. These are 
all values to which New Zealand readily subscribes.  This country plays an 
active and useful role in the Commonwealth, having furnished its immediate 
past secretary-general, Sir Don McKinnon, and lobbied for suspension of 
membership for states that violate democratic norms. (Dominion Post, 
04/06/12) 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Indeed, Rojek (2007) argues that ‘by no means can the country be said to have a spotless record in 
applying or protecting these values - many examples of official national policy against the Irish and 
other colonised peoples and refugees demonstrate that these values have been vitiated’ (2007: 110) 
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Here, the Commonwealth presented not only an opportunity to represent New 
Zealand’s interests but also acted as an important intermediary in maintaining 
‘democratic norms’ amongst its member states.  In doing so, New Zealand was 
construed as an important part of the Commonwealth playing ‘an active and useful 
role’ in its endeavours (Foster-Bell, Dominion Post, 04/06/12).   
To this extent, attachments to the monarchy were not fixed upon present 
conditions but instead formed part of a cumulative process, based upon past 
interactions and future contact (Gordon, 1990).  Interdependently, these discourses 
served to contribute to the maintenance of former imperial links by collectivizing 
cross-national sentiment between the former dominions and Britain (Berg, 2012; 
Foster-Bell, 2012; Oldfield, 2012).  Here, national identity was constructed in 
interdependence with constructions of Britain.  Moreover, while accounts of national 
identity in Australia, Canada and New Zealand have aimed to examine how such 
identities were formed as part of the British Empire (Berg, 2012; Dominion Post, 
2012; Oldfield, 2012), these examples suggest that the legacy of British imperialism 
has not resulted in a cross-national homogenous account of Britishness.  Instead, they 
reveal how former dominions have internalized certain values and customs and used 
them to form part of their own national cultures.  Consequently, while: 
 
The British world provided opportunities for colonized people to become 
British, and they could rework Britishness to their own ends, including anti-
colonial ones; but in doing so they accepted its legitimacy and the hold of its 
social institutions on their lives. (Darian-Smith et al., 2007: 9) 
 
In doing so, certain ‘British’ values remain an important part of contemporary post-
colonial identity.  Here, symbolic links with Britain and the former empire were 
maintained through the British and Commonwealth press’s construction of ‘imagined 
communities’ based on Commonwealth ties and shared history (Anderson, 2006).   
Therefore, while it was clear that the former British Empire continued to shape 
the national histories of Australia, Canada and New Zealand, equally, these imperial 
histories continued to impact upon the press’ construction of both themselves and 
Britain, post-empire (Hyder, 2012; Southphommasane, 2012b; Stone, 2012).  Indeed, 
previous sections have highlighted how the press served to re-construct the former 
imperial figuration via accounts of each nation’s contemporary standing vis-à-vis 
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Britain.20  This was, however, a varied re-construction, with Australia revealing a 
greater degree of insecurity regarding the strength of its national character, compared 
to Canada and New Zealand (Hyder, 2012; Rudman, 2012; Tate, 2012).  Whereas 
Black (2005) argues that ‘the now-independent former colonies widely reject the 
legacy of British colonial rule as part of their public foundation myths’ (2005: 365), 
the above findings suggest a far more complicated attachment to Britain.  
Accordingly, while on the one hand, the legacy of empire and British imperialism can 
provide a familiar and consensual part of the national history of the former dominions, 
on the other, it can continue to be portrayed as impacting upon the tensions and 
ambivalences between Britain and its former dominions. 
 
6.2.1. A ‘United’ Kingdom: national pride and the ‘continuity’ of Britain 
 
In relation to the previous section, it is evident that Britain’s multinational history can 
serve to reveal a number of contradictions with regards to the post-imperial 
construction of Britain.  In such instances, Nairn’s (2013) more recent concern with 
‘boundaries’ can prove particularly unhelpful as it directs attention towards the 
contrasts that lay beyond a specific location rather than the tensions that exist between 
national and multi-national figurations, such as, former imperial groups.  Furthermore, 
while analyses of ‘the other’ can prove analytically important, such approaches can 
fail to consider the multiple interactions that underlie national identifications. 
 Consequently, while ‘the national “we” invoked by celebratory media events 
can accommodate many competing and even incompatible definitions of national 
identity’ (Mihelj, 2008: 477), the mediated coverage of such events can also reveal 
moments of cross-national interdependence.  Indeed, in the case of Scotland, the 
historical interdependence between England and Scotland was drawn upon by 
Hamilton (2012), who noted: 
 
we are already a fusion of different identities.  That is the inevitable 
consequence of our history.  It is also the nature of the modern world where the 
EU, IMF and UN dominate the daily news in a way that rams home the advent 
of global citizenship.  There are two paths here – one is to become obsessed 
about purity of identity, the other to relax and enjoy the inevitable cross-currents 
of an interdependent world.  My overwhelming sense here is that Scots, like 
most others around the globe, have already chosen that second path. (The 
Scotsman, 05/08/12)  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 See chapter five, sections 5.2.2. 
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Similarly, Macwhirter (2012) added:   
 
The United Kingdom, as the name suggests, was created by the Union of the 
Crowns in 1603, not the Treaty of Union in 1707, and that won’t change just 
because the Scottish Parliament acquires economic powers. The difference is 
that for 300 years, Scotland existed as a nation without a state. If and when 
Scotland achieves statehood, Scots may legitimately regard themselves as part 
of a kind of ‘continuity’ Britain. (Sunday Herald, 12/08/12)  
 
Instead of reflecting a complete disassociation with Britain, the ‘if and when’ 
surrounding Scottish statehood, was perceived as a progressive continuation of 
Scottish associations with Britain and an important part of Scotland’s ‘British’ 
history.  In fact, while drawing upon the work of McCarthy (2005), Whigham (2012) 
highlights that whereas Scott’s living in England may adopt ‘a more implicit, social-
mental Scottish identity’ (2012: 8) this does not prevent their integration within the 
local culture.  Indeed, such associations stand in the way of debates concerning 
national identity that seek to polarize analyses along an either/or distinction (Nairn, 
2013).  Accordingly, whereas some sections of press sought to highlight Scotland’s 
growing disassociation with Britain via suggestions that argued for a conspicuously 
independent Scottish identity (Fry, 2012; Hassan, 2012), in other instances, Scottish 
identity was widely accepted and seen as an important part of the British identity.   
 Subsequently, in analyses of the effects of devolution in Scotland, Ichijo (2012) 
argues that:   
 
With affirmation of Scottishness firmly entrenched in political discourse, the 
focus of the discussion of national identity in Scotland appears to have shifted to 
debates on Britishness, a vexed question for the UK as a whole. (2012: 35) 
 
In fact, Scottish devolution has, Ichijo (2012) notes, proved ‘a double-edged sword in 
managing multiple national identities’ (2012: 35).  Consequently, with the SNP 
claiming that ‘it isn’t just Unionists who can claim to be both Scottish and British’ 
(Barnes, The Scotsman, 12/08/12), the assumption that British attachments require a 
choice between two identities: British or English; British or Scottish; British or Welsh 
and British or Northern Irish, may be a false one.  Indeed Orwell (1941) argued that: 
 
It is quite true that the so-called races of Britain feel themselves to be very 
different from one another. A Scotsman, for instance, does not thank you if you 
call him an Englishman. You can see the hesitation we feel on this point by the 
fact that we call our islands by no less than six different names, England, 
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Britain, Great Britain, the British Isles, the United Kingdom and, in very exalted 
moments, Albion. Even the differences between north and south England loom 
large in our own eyes. But somehow these differences fade away the moment 
that any two Britons are confronted by a European. It is very rare to meet a 
foreigner, other than an American, who can distinguish between English and 
Scots or even English and Irish. (1941: 21-22) 
 
Orwell’s (1941) account of the foreigner’s inability to distinguish the British home 
nations may find evidence in the shared history, culture and sense of unity that could 
be found in both the British and Commonwealth coverage (Berg, 2012; Blair, 2012; 
Pelling, 2012).  Accordingly, writing in The Scotsman, Labour MP and Shadow 
Foreign Secretary, Douglas Alexander (2012) argued that: 
 
The nationalists have worked hard at their story of Scotland over the last 
decade. They have worked hard to harness to the cause of independence the 
confidence and prosperity built in the years following the establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament.  ‘Be Part of Better’, their slogan in the 2011 elections, 
captured their determination to try and make voting SNP the inevitable choice 
for voters with a sense of pride and aspiration for Scotland.  In pursuit of their 
goal – separation of Scotland from the UK – the nationalists have had to tell a 
story about Britain to justify the break-up they seek.  That’s why, despite their 
claims to be ‘positive’, they suggest at every opportunity that the rest of the UK 
is now so foreign in its values and so different in its outlook that break-up is not 
just appropriate but inevitable.  The problem for the nationalists is that this 
narrative of separation has never proved a winning story. It does not ring true to 
the majority of us because whether through reasons of family ties and 
friendship, an affinity with aspects of shared culture, or an admiration of shared 
institutions from the NHS to the BBC and Team GB, millions of us reject 
separation as our fate.  These feelings, held by millions of Scots, help explain 
why the Olympics have proved such a nightmare for the nationalists. It is not 
simply that their unwillingness to offer good luck to Team GB made them 
sound small, and their talk of Scolympians just sounded embarrassing. 
(13/08/12)  
 
As can be seen in Alexander’s (2012) remarks, notions of shared culture, shared 
institutions and familial ties between Scotland and England were clearly evoked.  In 
fact, the normalization of Scottishness within political debates was drawn upon by 
Hamilton (2012), who sought to emphasize the shared support for both Scotland and 
Britain during the Olympics:  
 
First, the Olympic Games has nothing whatsoever to do with whether Scotland 
want to become independent in 2014.  One is a global sporting spectacle 
showing human endeavour and spirit at its most fabulous, the other is a local 
political decision for Scots on the best political and economic future for our 
country.  Secondly, it is wholly possible to be a passionate Scottish Nationalist 
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supporting ‘Team GB’ (I’m, happy to be ‘Exhibit A’) just as avowed Scottish 
Unionists will doubtless be right behind ‘Team Scotland’ in the Commonwealth 
Games in 2014. (Hamilton, The Scotsman, 05/08/12)  
 
In fact, Britain’s ability to successfully host the Olympic Games provided a source of 
confidence for Glasgow’s hosting of the 2014 Commonwealth Games.  The Scotsman 
(2012e) argued: 
 
The London Games have also shown what we are capable of in terms of staging, 
organisation and logistics – all the more creditable given the real doubts that 
surrounded this event. This has set a high bar for the Commonwealth Games in 
Glasgow in 2014. But it has also shown what, with foresight and dedication, our 
public authorities and services can do. (13/08/12e)  
 
Indeed, this stands in contrast to Perryman (2013) who suggests that Glasgow’s 
Commonwealth Games reflect another form of separation between Scotland and 
Britain.  Rather, the above comments reveal a far more positive account of Scotland’s 
hosting ability and one that is based upon the success of the London Olympics and its 
transference to Glasgow.  Accordingly, Chairman of the 2014 Glasgow 
Commonwealth Games, Michael Cavanagh (2012), highlighted: 
 
Team GB has grasped the opportunity of home advantage with both hands and 
our intention is to do the same with Team Scotland in 2014. Team GB, as a 
name for the British Olympic team, has been used since the Sydney 2000 
Games but it’s only in the last few weeks that the whole country has become 
aware of it to the extent that every second person on the streets in London seems 
to be wearing Team GB kit and the venues are resounding to chants of ‘GB’ 
whenever any British athletes are performing. (The Scotsman, 11/08/12)  
 
Indeed, the sense that Scottish success and pride stood alongside that of Britain, was 
mirrored in Welsh reports of the Olympic Games and its hosting capabilities.  This 
could be seen in comments relating to Wales’s hosting of the Games opening football 
event (Wathan, 2012).  Liew (2012), writing in the Daily Telegraph, noted that: 
 
They kept a welcome in the hillside, and in the grandstand, and also in the bars 
and the hot dog stalls, and on the streets. A giant sculpture in the form of the 
Olympic rings stood proudly outside City Hall in Cathays Park. For this, the 
prologue to these Olympic Games, was Wales’s moment as much as it was 
London’s. There was a certain irony in the fact that Team GB were playing here 
– as well as once more on Saturday and the men’s team next Wednesday – 
given how ardently the Football Association of Wales once strove to extinguish 
it. But where once there was suspicion, there is only goodwill, as exemplified on 
the front page of the Western Mail yesterday morning, which simply read: 
‘Welcome to Wales’. (26/07/12)  
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Indeed, Boyle and Haynes (2014) note that ‘part of the rhetoric of London 2012 
suggested the Games would not only engage people in the capital but also everyone 
living across the UK’ (2014: 89).  In doing so they note that: 
 
One might conclude from the BBC’s presentation of national unity in its 
coverage that the geopolitics of sport, at least in the British context, had 
subsumed any discordant or contradictory voices from Celtic nations about the 
overbearing London-centric nature of the Games and had created the sense that 
the entire British population was engaged in the event with equal emotional 
investment and resonance. (Boyle and Haynes, 2014: 91) 
 
While ‘contradictory voices from Celtic nations’ were clearly visible within both the 
Celtic and English coverage, the domestic press provided a slightly different 
‘presentation of national unity’ (Boyle and Haynes, 2014: 91).  Here, home nation 
achievement was constructed alongside, and, as an integrative part of, Britain’s 
successful hosting of the games.  That is, in addition to Wales’s credited hosting 
abilities (Liew, 2012), a sense of Welsh achievement was also reflected in their 
contribution to the ‘Team GB’ medal count.  Griffiths (2012) highlighted: 
 
But if these Games have become a source of British pride for decades, then 
Wales has every right to take a bow.  Seven medals we claimed, three golds, 
three silvers and a bronze.  Who could have dared dream we would punch above 
our weight in such style?  Organiser-in-chief Lord Sebastian Coe said he wanted 
great British moments from these Games and Wales helped grant him his wish. 
(Western Mail, 13/08/12)  
 
Moreover, while advocates for Welsh independence remained somewhat muted, 
historical loyalty to Britain and the empire have been largely compatible within Wales 
(Colley, 2014a; Macleod, 2013; Ward, 2004).21  In accordance with Griffiths’s (2012) 
remarks and in contrast to the BBC’s attempts to divert attention away from ‘the 
overbearing London-centric nature of the Games’ (Boyle and Haynes, 2014: 91), 
Welsh reports sought to capitalize upon the success of the London Games by 
highlighting the combined home nation effort of Britain.  The Western Mail (2012) 
argued that: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Indeed, Macleod (2013) notes that it has been Wales’s intense localism, not its incorporation within 
Britain, which has led to contestations over definitions of ‘Welshness’.  Colley (2014a) adds that 
imperial ‘ideas circulated widely in print and manuscript until at least the eighteenth century, and the 
notion that Britain – and its empire – had originally been Welsh creations seems to have allowed some 
men and women in Wales to rationalize and cope with the loss of their country’s independence’ 
(2014a: 79).  In such instances, Wales’s incorporation within Britain and its imperial administration 
may have allowed Wales to develop and maintain ‘dual identities’ (Colley, 2014a: 79).   
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And the wonderful light in which Britain – all of Britain – has been shown must 
be capitalised upon.  London has grown immeasurably over the past two weeks.  
We must make sure that the same is true for Wales and the rest of the UK. 
(13/08/12) 
 
Indeed, such remarks reveal a far more stable relationship between Wales and Britain, 
one that was secured by Wales’s integrative role within Britain’s hosting and medal 
success. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In accordance with chapter five, the aim has been to examine how both the British 
home nations and the former dominions sought to construct, frame and represent 
contemporary relations between themselves and Britain during the 2012 Diamond 
Jubilee and London Olympic Ceremonies.  Here, it was perceived that a relational 
account of the press would help elucidate upon contemporary constructions of Britain 
and British identity within both Britain and the former dominions.  In doing so, 
examples from the data were used to highlight how the press’ coverage sought to 
reveal themes related to aspects of British ‘dis-unity’ and British ‘unity’.  
Accordingly, while it was found that in some instances, contemporary relations 
remained consistent, in other instances, these relations were being re-negotiated or 
contested.22  With this in mind, the final part of this chapter will briefly summarize 
some of the key aspects of this data.  These themes will be returned to in the 
conclusion. 
 Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that a sense of British unity 
and British attachment was clearly evoked within the British and Commonwealth 
coverage.  In particular, it was found that during both the Jubilee and London 
Olympic Games, Britain was represented as a new, confident and modern nation 
(Southphommasane, 2012b), happy with its place in the world and finally over it post-
imperial decline (Lott, 2012; The Independent on Sunday, 2012b).  In doing so, 
Britain was framed as a multicultural nation (The Independent, 2012b), with a shared 
attachment for the British monarchy (Berg, 2012; Pelling, 2012) and a united sense of 
pride in its successful hosting of the 2012 Olympic Games (Parsons, 2012b; The 
Independent on Sunday, 2012b; The Scotsman, 2012d; 2012e).  Nevertheless, this is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 See chapter six, sections 6.2. and 6.2.1. and chapter five, sections 5.2.2. and 5.2.3. 
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not to suggest that the press’ coverage was entirely positive.  Indeed, in accordance 
with the previous chapter’s findings it is clear that a sense of anxiety still pervaded the 
right-wing English press’ views on immigration and its effects upon British culture 
and identity (John, 2012; Riddell, 2012). 
 Similarly, while drawing upon narratives of imperial and national history, the 
Commonwealth press reports exposed tensions within their framing of Britain during 
both events.  That is, whether revealing examples of anxiety relating to Australian 
society and its national character (Hinds, 2012; Southphommasane, 2012b), 
championing Canadian success (Hyder, 2012) or revealing disillusionment with an 
‘English’ monarch (Milne, 2012; Rothwell, 2012; Stone, 2012), attachments to Britain 
oscillated between processes of attachment and (dis)attachment.  This was 
exemplified in the following comments by Rudman (2012): 
 
Most of us have grown up with the Queen as head of state, safely in her place in 
Buckingham Palace, as permanent as the sun and the moon. It no doubt made 
some sense when New Zealand’s role was the supplier of food and fighting men 
to the motherland. But at the end of her reign, in an era where our future is 
bound up with Asia, the concept of a new head of state, who must be Anglican, 
and preferably a male, oh yes, and comes from an English farming family 
called Windsor, is just barking mad. (New Zealand Herald, 06/06/12) 
 
Here, the changing character of interdependence between New Zealand and Britain – 
and the emerging interdependence of New Zealand with Asia – served to highlight a 
change in attitudes towards Britain and the British monarchy.  Furthermore, in 
conjunction with analyses of sport (Collins, 2011; Falcous, 2007; Maguire, 1993b; 
2011c; Malcolm, 2012) and Commonwealth war commemorations (Winter, 2006), 
ties between Britain and the Commonwealth served to reinforce former imperial 
associations and memories of empire, while interdependently serving to fortify 
contemporary national identity in the former dominions (Rudman, 2012). 
In addition, the overwhelming support that was afforded the Somali born, 
British Muslim, Mo Farah, was one example of how British identity was constructed 
as inclusive and diverse.  To this extent, it is important to view these representations 
as part of a wider dynamic of established and outsider relations and images (Atkinson, 
2002).  That is, while Goodhart (2013b) refers to Britain’s ‘new’ identity as a 
‘shedding of a skin’, adding that, ‘as we move further away from the purposes and 
symbols of one national period – the British imperial and then post-imperial period –
we gradually put on the clothes of another’ (2013b), such descriptions fail to 
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acknowledge how the press’ coverage of both the Diamond Jubilee and London 
Olympic Games revealed underlying tensions regarding the framing of Britain.23  
With regards to the coverage on the Scottish athlete, Andy Murray and the Somali 
born, Mo Farah, both individuals were regularly constructed within the press as 
assimilating to ‘established’ British images.  As a result, instead of ‘mov[ing] away 
from the purposes and symbols of one national period’ (Goodhart, 2013b), such 
examples suggest that normative accounts of constructing Britain continued to 
underlie the press’ coverage during both events.24  Moreover, references to, and, 
representations of, Britain’s imperial history proved to be a reoccurring theme 
throughout the British and Commonwealth coverage.  Similarly, accounts of Britain’s 
past were also maintained via the press’ reference to the Second World War (Parsons, 
2012a).   
 With this in mind, it is possible to consider whether constructions of a 
multicultural and diverse Britain are accurate reflections of a ‘new’ or ‘changed’ 
Britain.  In such instances, do these multicultural representations undermine 
established images of Britain’s imperial history and past depictions of a united British 
society?  Is multicultural Britain a new articulation of this same unity, one that will be 
able to accommodate the further fragmentation of the British home nations?  How 
will these changes impact upon British identity, its collective significance, its 
emotional appeal and its mediated construction?  
 In light of such questions, it is evident that both established and outsider groups 
will construct and (re)construct the nation, drawing upon both national and cross-
national influences.  That is, whether heralding British ‘unity’ through reports of its 
shared imperial history, popular British culture, and diverse society, or by reflecting 
upon British ‘dis-unity’ via accounts of its post-imperial decline, contemporary 
problems and lack of world role, the findings of this research reveal that 
representations of Britain and British identity are constructed and (re)constructed in a 
figuration of national, cross-national and historical interdependence.  This suggests 
that while certain histories will be dramatized as part of the nation’s collective unity, 
identity and memories, alternative representations that aim to highlight national 
distinctiveness and emerging constructions of the nation will also be formed.  It can !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/david-goodhart/nation-state-is-in-rude-health-
solving-british-puzzle, retrieved: 4 June 2013. 
24 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/david-goodhart/nation-state-is-in-rude-health-
solving-british-puzzle, retrieved: 4 June 2013.  
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be assumed that such changes will further impact upon established and fantasy-laden 
images of Britain’s former imperial supremacy.  For now, however, it is possible to 
suggest that the contested framing of Britain’s past, alongside its diverse present, will 
continue to form an important part of the press’ framing of Britain.  
 Consequently, when considered in accordance with chapter five it is evident that 
constructions of Britain involved processes of integration and attachment (British 
unity) as well as disintegration and (dis)attachment (British dis-unity).  Furthermore, 
these constructions served to divide identifications as well as unite cross-national 
attachments.  Indeed, while press discourses can serve to define sanctioned 
constructions of the nation (Dayan and Katz, 1992), they can also be resisted and 
(re)constructed (Maguire, 2011; Mihelj, 2007).  Subsequently, through an 
interdependent analysis of the domestic and Commonwealth press’ construction, 
framing and representation of Britain and British identity, we can begin to see how 
these constructions are related to power balances within the wider British state and 
Commonwealth. 25   In particular, it highlights how British identity works by 
paradoxically enabling national identification as well as subsuming such national 
identifications under a larger more capacious British identification.  Freedland 
(2014a) has argued that: 
 
‘British’ has become a capacious, even a generous, category. It hyphenates 
easily. Because it always stood for a plural, multinational identity, it is able, by 
definition, to accommodate difference: you could always be Welsh-British or 
Scottish-British, so now you can be Black British or Muslim British. (2014a)26 
 
To this extent, while it is evident that a nation’s history provides a prominent marker 
in constructions of the nation and its national identity, these findings suggest that it is 
a construction that is marked by processes of unification, re-unification and dis-
unification as well as wider structural balances of power.  Discussion of these 
processes and what they reveal about British identity in 2012 will be concluded in the 
following chapter, whereupon attention will also be given to the multi-layered British 
habitus. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Indeed, this figurational framework can be used to study numerous power relations comprising 
smaller national differences, such as that seen in the divide between Northern and Southern England as 
well as larger figurations, such as the differences between the white dominions within empire and 
Britain’s colonies in Africa and the Asian pacific.   
26 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/07/scot-vote-yes-independence-scotland, 
retrieved: 8 February 2014. 
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Conclusion 
 
I. Britain in 2012 
 
Commenting upon the social construction of ‘time’, Dunning et al. (2004) note that: 
 
‘Time’, ‘year’ and ‘century’ are symbols constructed by humans, means of 
orientation developed to aid their understanding and to control and coordinate 
their activities in the socio-physical universe in which they live. (2004: 2 
[italics added]) 
 
Accordingly, while the social construction of time allows humans to orientate 
themselves, control their surroundings and coordinate their lives, comparably, nations 
follow a similar process when constructing national images and ideologies.  In such 
instances, national constructions help to orientate humans into national groups, 
control who is and who isn’t part of the nation as well as coordinate the national 
present in relation to the nation’s past.   
Equally, both the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and London Olympic Games can be 
considered in relation to the ‘succession of changes that societies undergo in the 
sequence of time’ (Elias, 2008a: 127 [italics added]).  That is, both events did not 
occur independently but took place within a multi-national state whose cultures and 
populations have undergone numerous changes and transformations.  The temporality 
of both events, while forming part of a long-line of British royal and sporting 
occasions, stood to mark two important ‘moments’ in British history.1  Here, it was 
possible to examine how contemporary constructions of Britain and British identity 
were historically related and developmentally formed (Dunning et al., 2004; Falcous 
and Maguire, 2013; Maguire, 1995). 
Accordingly, Chapters One and Two both examined how Elias’s attention 
towards sociogenetic and psychogenetic transformations could, in the context of 
Britain, be used to explore how state development and national identity are 
interdependently related.  Here, attention shifted away from viewing Britain as a 
separate category towards one that was interdependently related to those nation-states 
outside of the UK, whose own national histories were once ‘British’.  Following this, 
Chapters Two and Three served to highlight the trans-national entanglements 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The Diamond Jubilee marked the sixty-year reign of Queen Elizabeth II – only the second British 
monarch in British history to reach this milestone – and the London Olympic Games represented the 
third time that the games had been held in London. 
 254 
surrounding British identity.  This approach was further developed in Chapter Three, 
which outlined an analysis of the press that was fundamentally relational and 
historically rooted in the socio-historical development of the British State and empire.  
Here, national and multi-national identifications, such as Britain’s, were viewed as 
being constructed in accordance with broader balances of power, in which British 
representations have often been framed by an established English/British discourse.  
In doing so, this chapter examined how changes in the balance of power between 
functionally interdependent groups, in this case, between the British home nations and 
the former dominions, were reflected in the discursive construction of Britain. 
In particular, appropriating for the past and making sense of the present 
formed an important part the discursive construction of Britain.  Chapter Five 
examined how Britain’s sense of displacement was often reflected in examples of 
British dis-unity and decline.  Here, the belief that Britain was very different to its 
former ‘imperial’ self was clearly visible within the press’ attempts to ‘orientate’ as 
well as ‘re-orientate’ their constructions of Britain (Haywar, 2012; Phillips, 2012; The 
Independent on Sunday, 2012b).  This was further considered in Chapter Six, 
whereupon the press’ framing of Britain’s multicultural society was used to 
(re)construct Britain’s image (Alibhai-Brown, 2012; Lott, 2012; Sandbrook, 2012). 
To this extent, while Falcous and Silk (2010) highlight that ‘Britain’s post-
imperial self imaginings’ posit an important insight into Britain’s ‘ongoing national 
anxieties’ (2010: 170), newspaper coverage of both the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and the 
London Olympic Games revealed a number of ‘resolutions’ and ‘anxieties’ in the 
discursive construction of Britain.  As a catalyst, each event served to draw upon 
Britain’s past, present and possible future(s), through discourses that gestured towards 
the complexity and ambiguity of British identity.  Here national ‘symbols’ were 
constructed in particular ways, presenting versions of the nation and orientating 
particular individuals and groups (Dunning et al., 2004). 
Indeed, the following sections will argue that constructions of national identity 
and national habituses are complex phenomena that, in the case of Britain, are 
predicated upon social relations, historical contingencies and balances of power.  
Indeed, this is driven by the research findings which revealed that constructions of 
Britain were not based upon an unlimited conception of Britain’s ‘multiple identities’ 
(cf. Llwellyn, 2012; 2014), that is, a capacious notion of Britain, both vast and 
indefinite (cf. Bradshaw and Roberts, 1998), but instead formed upon a multi-layered 
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construction of Britain and British identity.  To this end, each of the following 
sections will explore the multi-layered construction of Britain as it was presented both 
within the domestic and Commonwealth national press. 
 
II. The multi-layered construction of Britain 
 
As previously noted, if changes in national identification are to be examined, then 
changes at the ‘level of state-building’ (Bowden, 2009) should also be examined.  
Indeed, Goulbourne (1991) argues that: 
 
If we accept that it is sufficient for groups of people to feel that they share 
certain things in common and want to be separate from others, then we can 
easily enough envisage very many more nation-states being formed out of 
present nations-states … There would be, for example, minorities of English 
and Welsh people in an independent Scotland as well as Scottish minorities in 
other parts of Britain … [This also suggests] that – like individuals and groups 
within nearly all Britain’s ethnic minorities today – individuals and groups 
within new national majorities of a dis-United Kingdom would experience, 
simultaneously, majority and minority statuses, depending on their specific 
points of location at particular moments (1991: 223 [italics in original])    
 
Taken into consideration, Goulbourne’s (1991) remarks indicate the various ‘levels’ 
of social organisation enveloping the nation and how such ‘levels’ are based upon 
majority/minority statutes.  Similarly, Calhoun (2004) adds, ‘large families are always 
composed of smaller families’ and along a ‘sliding scale of loyalties’ (2004: 38).   
 Accordingly, there are important implications in both Goulbourne (1991) and 
Calhoun’s (2004) analysis.  In particular, relations between majority and minority 
groups (Goulbourne, 1991), which can be locationally and temporally defined along a 
‘sliding scale’ (Calhoun, 2004) of ephemeral or long term identification, can be 
afforded a more critical consideration when the relationships between 
individuals/groups are viewed as power balances.  Here, national constructions and 
discourses (De Cillia et al., 1999; Wodak et al., 1999; Van Dijk, 1988; 1997; 2011) as 
well as identification processes (Elias, 1991; 1996; 2008a) are never homogenous or 
unchanging but are instead formed in relation to the balance(s) of power between 
groups.  De Swaan (1995) elaborates: 
 
Social identification is a process in which people come to feel that some other 
human beings are much ‘the same’ as they are and still others are more ‘unlike’ 
them.  It occurs in the course of group formation, as part of the dialects of 
inclusion and exclusion from which groups emerge in a dynamics of 
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competition. (1995: 25 [italics added]) 
 
Drawing attention to the processes underlying group formation, De Swaan’s (1995) 
‘dialectics of inclusion and exclusion’ posits a far more contested appreciation of the 
multi-layered dynamics concerning social groups (‘dynamics of competition’) and of 
majority/minority statuses in general.  In particular, De Swaan’s (1995) remarks point 
towards the contested relations underlying identification processes.  As a result, while 
Elias (1991) is clear to point out that ‘the use of the pronoun “we” is probably 
strongest in relation … to a nation-state’ (1991: 202), it is evident that there are a 
multitude of we-identifications existing at various levels of human organisation.  
Therefore: 
 
It is to give a mere selection of the possible we-relations to point out that people 
can say ‘we’ in relation to their families or friends, to villages or towns where 
they live, to nation-states, to post-national units combining several nation-states 
and finally in relation to mankind. (Elias, 1991: 202) 
 
Consequently, if identification with the nation-state continues to provide a powerful 
source of ‘we-identity’, then it is plausible to suggest that across the British Empire 
similar ‘we-relations’, that is, an ‘imperial we-identity’, was formed in relation to the 
empire’s constituent dominions and colonial territories.2 
 Indeed, beginning with the contested emergence of the British state in 1707, 
constructions of Britain were later expanded into ‘one large categorical identity’ – the 
British Empire – a process that encompassed many ‘smaller categories’ of dominions, 
colonies and territories (Calhoun, 2004: 39).  Here, the ‘distinct cultural codes, 
institutional arrangements and ideologies’ (Maguire, 2005: 14) within Britain, formed 
part of a wider integrated network of figurational interdependence.  Consequently, it 
was examined in Chapter Two how the formation of a denser social network of 
interdependence across Britain during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Elias, 
2012), helped to forge a collective – yet always contested – British identification. 
 This extends our understanding of national habitus codes by indicating the 
wider identifications that can be made between individuals, the nation and larger 
collective units (Mennell, 1994).  In such instances, examinations of the British !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Accordingly, while various scholars have considered how relatively recent trans-global interactions 
have eroded nation-state sovereignty (Appadurai, 1996), national cultures have been restructured and 
re-imagined as part of empire and imperialism for far longer.  As a result, national memberships and 
attachments have often been multiple, contested and constructed along complex axes of national and 
imperial association as well as through coloniser and colonised relations. 
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‘imperial’ figuration revealed that individuals were not shackled to one ‘national’ 
consciousness, history or culture but could possess ‘multiple and complex identities’ 
through which various (national) categories of people could share a collective 
‘imperial’ consciousness (Maguire and Tuck, 1998: 104; see also Mennell, 1994).  
Accordingly, as both national and imperial affiliations were functionally dependent on 
one another, the British Empire became deeply embedded within the shared histories 
and collective memories of the colonial nations that constituted it (Stockwell, 2008).  
Indeed, as highlighted by one member of the ‘Commonwealth diaspora’ (Alldritt, 
Vancouver Sun, 02/06/12), Canada’s monarchial links were ‘a multi-layered positive 
thing’, adding that, ‘It’s part of our history’ (Zelley cited in Alldritt, Vancouver Sun, 
02/06/12, [italics added]).  Thus, Moore (2010) argues that: 
 
Individual identity/habitus has to be understood, not only in the context of the 
collective habitus/identity but also as a temporal phenomenon formed over 
generations and linked as much to the past as it is to the present.  It is also 
important to recognise that identity and habitus are multi-layered and multi-
perspectival and are shaped by the relations or figurations we have with those 
around us (Moore, 2010: 4.6) 
 
With this in mind, it is possible to apply Moore’s (2010) analysis to the multi-
figurational dynamics underlying constructions of Britain and British identity and 
how these constructions are themselves shaped by past/present reflections and 
interdependent figurations.  Here, the ‘multi-layered aspect of we-concepts’ (Elias, 
1991: 202) can be seen in McCrone’s (2006) suggestion that: 
 
If Scotland was ‘unionist’ and politically British in the 1950s (there was 
virtually no difference in how Scotland and England voted in this decade, nor in 
the 1960s), it was not because its people did not think of themselves as Scots 
rather than Brits, but because these territorial identities were sufficiently nested 
one in the other, and the political frames of reference were very similar.  Since 
the 1970s, we have grown used to the apparent contradiction between the 
frames of reference because of the emergent political-cultural conditions of the 
period.  The point is not that suddenly Scots changed their values and attitudes, 
but that the political prism through which they expressed these altered. (2006: 
19 [italics added]) 
 
Consequently, there can be, during particular periods, a multitude of we-relations 
occurring across various integration levels that can result in a restructuring of 
relations, attitudes and identifications.  Importantly, however, these changes are 
related to emerging political, cultural and national ‘prisms’ through which particular 
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values and attitudes may undergo various changes in intensity (De Swaan, 1995; 
Elias, 1991; Maguire and Tuck, 2005; McCrone, 2006). 
 Furthermore, McCrone’s (2002) reference to the ‘nested’ identities of Scotland 
can be identified in McEwen’s (2013) analysis of Scotland’s position within the 
British Union during the Scottish Independence Referendum.  Indeed, McEwen 
(2013) has noted how the referendum increasingly reflected Scotland’s ‘embedded 
independence’ within the UK.  In such instances, an independent Scotland would 
reconfigure Scotland’s relationship with the British state as one based upon ‘a 
partnership of equals’ (McEwen, 2013).3  These sentiments were echoed in the SNP’s 
assertion that Scotland would maintain ties with the British pound (via a currency 
union) and would maintain the British monarchy as its Head of State (Merco Press, 
2013).   
 What is made clear in the above examples is the extent to which the balance of 
power between groups, in this instance between Scotland and the rest of UK, is 
related to ‘the emergent political-cultural conditions of … [particular] period[s]’ 
(McCrone, 2006: 19).  To this extent, when viewing power as relational and 
historically contextualised, understanding multi-national group identifications, such as 
Britain’s, requires a closer examination of how processes of marginalisation, relations 
of power and historical traditions, form an important part of group identity.  Much 
like ‘the conditional nature of [social] integration’ (Rojek, 2006: 677), social 
identities are not definite, unchanging or unceasingly multiple, but are instead 
constrained and enabled by wider processes of interdependence and balances of 
power.  Indeed, rather than revealing a sudden change in values and attitudes, 
processes of identification can reflect the complexity and residuality of group 
attachments.  Such attachments often change over time as well become more or less 
salient for particular groups. 
 Therefore, when examining the construction, representation and framing of 
Britain and British identity one can begin to perceive the ‘multi-layered aspects of 
we-concepts’ and its relationship to British we-images (Elias, 1991: 202; Moore, 
2010).  While personal pronouns are often used to help create and forge a sense of 
group belonging, in certain instances ‘they/them’ distinctions may be ignored or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See http://www.scotsman.com/news/nicola-mcewen-partnership-after-independence-1-3051194, 
retrieved: 2 April 2014.  Indeed, such processes are echoed in other independence movements, such as, 
Catalonia and Quebec.   
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undermined by larger ‘we’ identifications.  As a result, there can also be ‘We-We 
balances’.  That is, it is possible to conceive how at a national level, the national ‘We’ 
can form part of, and, indeed, has formed part of, larger levels of multi-national 
identification. 
 For example, if one returns to Elias and Scotson’s (1994) original investigation 
of the town ‘Winston Parva’, it was evident that the disparity between an established 
and outsider group within the town was subsequently reflected in the identities of 
each group.  That is, an established ‘We’ identification existed amongst the 
established group, and, correspondingly, an outsider ‘We’ identification existed 
amongst the outsider group.  However, by extending this level of analysis, both 
groups belonged to – despite their various appropriations and housing locations – 
‘Winston Parva’, and, as a consequence, could both subscribe to a ‘Winston Parva’ 
‘We’ identification.  Further still, let us imagine that the investigation had been 
extended to consider a neighbouring, less favorable town, yet one that was still 
located in the same region.  In this hypothetical scenario, interviews with ‘Winston 
Parva’s’ established and outsider groups may have revealed a larger established-
outsider dynamic existing between ‘Winston Parva’ and the neighbouring town, one, 
that may have possibly resulted in ‘Winston Parva’s’ residents (both established and 
outsider) appropriating the ‘established’ identification in comparison to their 
‘outsider’ neighbours.  Indeed, in accordance with process sociological work on 
football hooliganism, ‘we-group’ identifications and ‘we-bonds’ can form part of, as 
well as, go beyond residential, local, regional and national borders.4 
 In the extended example used above and in investigations of ‘we-identities’ in 
general (De Swaan, 1995; Malcolm, 2012; Mennell, 2007), it is evident that there are 
‘degree[s] of difference’ (Skey, 2014), ‘degree[s] of social differentiation’ (Loyal, 
2004: 137), ‘sliding scale[s]’ (Calhoun, 2004: 38) and intensities of attachment and/or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Indeed, this is considered further in Bairner’s (2006) discussion on ‘The Leicester School’s’ 
contribution to the study of football hooliganism.  Indeed, Bairner (2006) states that ‘in attempting to 
establish a sociological understanding that is capable of transcending national boundaries, the Leicester 
School notes that in all cases the shared characteristic consists of social formations that involve intense 
“we-group” bonds’ (2006: 593).  In spite of certain criticisms (Armstrong, 1998), Bairner (2006) adds 
that in the case of Northern Ireland, ‘The Leicester School’s’ analysis provides ‘an accurate description 
of the source of the problem in Northern Ireland where, despite the presence of an alternative fault line, 
much of the hooliganism that has occurred owes more to segmental bonding within lower working-
class Protestant communities than to divisions between nationalist and unionist fans’ (2006: 593 [italics 
added]). 
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(dis)attachment at play (De Swaan, 1995; Elias, 1991).5  Amidst these ‘integration 
struggles’ (Mennell, 2007) the application of the established-outsider model has 
provided a ‘matrix of interpretation’ (Atkinson, 2003: 210) that is particularly adept at 
examining national and multinational forms of identification and interdependence.  
Through its use, it is evident that the press’ construction, representation and framing 
of the British ‘we’ was fundamentally multi-layered due to the numerous ‘we’ 
identifications it enveloped.  Indeed, while this is reflected in the examples referred to 
above (McCrone, 2006; McEwen, 2013) it is also apparent in the extent to which 
national newspaper discourses can reveal tensions in the ‘We-We balance’ as social 
integration is altered or the balances of power between groups’ changes (see Cowing, 
2012; Guardian, 2012; Herald, 2012b; Hoey, 2012; Holt, 2012; Lawton, 2012; Lott, 
2012; Macwhirter, 2012; Morgan, 2012; Norman, 2012; Poole, 2012; Randall, 2012; 
Rudman, 2012; Southphommasane, 2012a; 2012b; Taylor, 2012; The Independent, 
2012; The Independent on Sunday, 2012; Tongue, 2012; Walker, 2012; Western Mail, 
2012).  In fact, the ability to examine established-outsider relations across multiple 
and interdependent figurations provided the opportunity to consider how habitus is 
power related and is ‘always – in the modern world where people belong to groups 
within groups within groups – multi-layered’ (Mennell, 1994: 177 [italics added]). 
 
III. British history: imperial characteristics and established practices 
 
If it is understood that recollections of the past serve to ‘orientate’ the nation 
(Dunning et al., 2004), then it is possible to observe how national ‘myths’, former 
figurations and past identifications can occupy a residual place within the national 
habitus, a residuality that can, at certain times, be re-imagined and re-invented for 
particular purposes.  In fact, Braudel (1994) argues that: 
 
Just as civilizations may welcome or refuse elements from another civilization, 
so it may accept or reject survivals from its own past.  It does so slowly, and 
almost always unconsciously or partly so.  In this way, it gradually transforms 
itself.  Little by little, it sifts the mass of data and attitudes offered by the remote 
or recent past, stressing one or setting aside another; and as a result of its 
choices it assumes a shape which is never wholly new but never quite the same 
as before (1994: 30-31)      
 
Here, Braudel’s (1994) remarks serve to highlight how the gradual transformation of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/michael-skey/tales-of-one-city-london-
superdiversity-and-paradox-of-belonging, retrieved: 29 May 2014. 
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particular civilizations are formed in relation to perceptions of its past.  In doing so, 
former traits or characteristics can occupy a residual place within contemporary 
societies and can be re-interpreted and re-used.  This was reflected in the 
Commonwealth coverage whereby references to the ‘British stiff upper lip’ were used 
to frame the British people (Goring, 2012; Lette, 2012; Walker, 2012).  However, 
what is also apparent is the extent to which civilizations consciously or unconsciously 
choose which elements to accept, adapt or reject and, perhaps more importantly, 
‘what’ is and ‘who’ is being rejected in the process.  There are, therefore, relations of 
power at play. 
 Consequently, to return to the Commonwealth press’ use of the ‘British stiff 
upper lip’, it is evident that constructions of Britain were still predicated on past 
‘imperial’ images.  Indeed, in comments related to the marginalisation of Scottish and 
Welsh culture, O’Hagan (2014) notes: 
 
the English domination of Britain has led to the marginalisation – if not 
jingoistic ridiculing – of Scottish and Welsh identity. Our unique cultures and 
languages are habitually erased in favour of an umbrella Englishness. To take a 
trivial example: the book and Twitter account Very British Problems portrays 
the British as socially awkward, Earl Grey-sipping Hugh Grant caricatures. But 
that’s not an image I recognise from Wales – it’s not even an image I recognise 
in a lot of England (try looking for a stiff upper-lip on a night bus in Liverpool). 
It’s a particular stereotype of the English upper-middle classes which has been 
extrapolated to represent everyone in Britain, overshadowing Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and Wales (and the English working class) in the process. 
(2014)6 
 
Both the Commonwealth press’ use of the ‘stiff upper lip’ representation and 
O’Hagan’s (2014) remarks suggest that, in the case of Britain, ‘survivals from its own 
[imperial] past’ (Braudel, 1994: 30-31) continue to form an important part of the 
construction, framing and representation of Britain. Moreover, these constructions 
were based upon an established, and, in the case of O’Hagan (2014), evidently 
middle-class, representation of Britain, that served to marginalise and undermine both 
Scottish and Welsh culture.  In such instances, Britain’s imperial characteristics had 
not vanished but instead form a residual part of the British character (Williams, 1977).  
With this in mind, reports of Britain’s history elicited a number of important 
distinctions.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/22/welsh-taught-in-british-schools-scottish-
independence-referendum-english-wales-scotland, retrieved: 23 July 2014. 
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First, within the English press, it was clear that references to Britain’s imperial 
past were frequently drawn upon in its construction of Britain (Parsons, 2012a; 2012c; 
Sandbrook, 2012; Phillips, 2012).  However, while accounts of Britain’s history could 
serve as a form of national distinction (The Independent on Sunday, 2012b), it could 
also reveal examples of nostalgia.  That is, a ‘golden era’ when Britain’s 
contemporary economic and political problems as well as its wider cultural 
insecurities were non-existent (Hayward, 2012; Norman, 2012). 
Second, whereas reports of Britain’s imperial history formed an important part 
of the English press’ construction of Britain, when compared with the Northern Irish, 
Scottish and Welsh coverage, it was clear that Britain’s imperial past failed to elicit 
the same attention.  Certainly, while historical discourses were drawn upon within the 
Scottish coverage (Fry, 2012; Macwhirter, 2012), these were often used to help 
highlight a specific Scottish attachment to the British monarchy, one that was notably 
different to the English (Herald, 2012b; Randall, 2012).  
Third, across the selected Commonwealth press, references to Britain’s 
imperial past were widely used in the construction of Britain (Hinds, 2012; The 
Australian, 2012; Vancouver Sun, 2012).  In fact, while Britain’s imperial history 
formed an important part of the Commonwealth press’ coverage, it also served as an 
opportunity to reflect upon their shared imperial history (Tate, 2012).  Notably, 
however, these discourses served to highlight the disparity between Britain’s imperial 
past and its contemporary problems (Kissane, 2012; Milner et al., 2012).  Contra 
Britain, such examples helped to emphasise the positive developments that the former 
dominions had made since achieving independence (Hyder, 2012; Rudman, 2012). 
Taking the above into consideration, Conboy (2007) has noted how the tabloid 
press serve to ‘recreate a chronicle of national history’ (2007: 258).  In particular, 
with regards to the sixtieth-anniversary of the D-Day landings, Conboy (2007) argues 
that the tabloids used this ‘history to create a picture of the British past but, … [also] 
to use it as a context to both criticize and celebrate the British present’ (2007: 258 
[italics added]).  Indeed, while similar processes were observed within the Diamond 
Jubilee and Olympic coverage (Richards, 2012; Tweedie, 2012), the above examples 
suggest two important distinctions.  That is, in contrast to Conboy (2007), references 
to Britain’s history were conspicuous across both the tabloid and broadsheet 
coverage.  Furthermore, such historical contextualisation was not resigned to the 
‘British present’ (Conboy, 2007: 258 [italics added]) but instead served as a context in 
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which the former dominions could compare their own post-imperial societies to 
Britain’s imperial past (Hyder, 2012). 
 
IV. Constructions of Britain: permitting some ‘degree of difference’ 
 
Consequently, as the above examples highlight, while it is impossible ‘to escape the 
weight of the past’ (Fox, 2014: 499), interpretations of the past can be used to 
elucidate upon wider concerns regarding the present.  How constructions of the past 
help to form ‘a consistent sense of [national] “self” (Zarakol, 2010: 3) are 
consequently based upon an understanding of what traces of this past remain 
important today.  In fact, Fortier (2005) argues that ‘One of the challenges in facing 
up to the past lies in the tension between acknowledgement/interpretations of the past, 
… and accountability/self-examination for social relations in the present’ (2005: 564).  
This can be found in the ‘identity crisis’ that has surrounded debates on Britain and 
British identity since the decline of the British Empire and its move towards the EU 
(Goodhart, 2013; Nairn, 1977).  With this in mind, it was evident that the press’ 
construction of the 2012 Diamond Jubilee stood awkwardly between a form of 
celebration that reflected Britain’s monarchical traditions but also as a marker of 
British change, most noticeably, the extent to which the Jubilee no longer represented 
contemporary Britain (Hare, 2012; McNulty, 2012; Norman, 2012; Toynbee, 2012a). 
Accordingly, there are important decisions that remain to be made regarding 
how Britain’s imperial history is interpreted, re-used, and, perhaps, forgotten.  Indeed, 
the literature has explored the effects of national trauma and global decline on 
particular nations (Neal, 1998; Olick, 2005).  Often a desire to ‘move on’ is 
highlighted, a process that still requires agreement on how and what exactly the 
‘move’ should be.  This is a contested process however, and, as the findings reveal, 
one that is based upon the demarcation between a perceived ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
In fact, the following comments by Ramsay (2014a) highlight how 
understandings of the past serve to delineate between particular groups within the 
present.  He notes that: 
 
We … cling with white fisted knuckles to the notion that Britannia rules, 
unwilling to let go of our imperial past for fear that we might find we are just 
another European country. It’s a myth which works much more in England, and 
which helps explain differences in the tendancy to believe immigrant 
scapegoating North and South of the border ‘if Britain is uniquely great’ people 
infer ‘it can’t be the system that’s to blame, it must be outsiders’. (Ramsay, 
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2014a [italics added])7 
 
As can be seen in Ramsay’s (2014a) remarks, for Britain, and in particular, for the 
South of England, notions of British national prestige reside heavily in constructions 
of its imperial self.  Indeed, Gilroy (2005) has argued that ‘the multi-layered trauma – 
economic and cultural as well as political and psychological – involved in accepting 
the loss of the empire’ (2005: 99 [italics added]) has resulted in confused 
understandings and contested identifications within Britain.  Similarly, this is echoed 
by Baxter (n.d.) who asserts that, ‘Without the defining characteristics of an empire, 
modern Britain seems lost as how to clearly define itself’ (n.d.)8 
 What is of perhaps greater concern, however, is the extent to which this past and 
Britain’s subsequent decline is found in examples of ‘immigrant scapegoating’ 
(Ramsey, 2014a).9  That is, it is Britain’s ‘unique form of life’ (Billig, 1995: 72), its 
national identity and history which allows the ‘English’ to ‘cling with white fisted 
knuckles’ to its imperial past and which is subsequently threatened by ‘outsiders’ 
(Ramsay, 2014a; see also Moore, 2012; Taylor, 2012).10  Beyond the ‘patriotic card’, 
recollections of Britain’s imperial past often ‘evok[e] anger against those who would 
cause “us” to abandon “our” heritage, “our” duty, “our” destiny’ (Billig, 1995: 101). 
Indeed, while perceptions of the ‘other’ form an important part of the national sense 
of self, Ramsay’s (2014a) comments reveal how these perceptions are based upon the 
balance of power between established and outsider groups (‘it must be outsiders’). 
 In fact, while ‘national histories are continually being re-written’ an established-
outsider framework can observe how ‘the re-writing reflects current balances of 
hegemony’ (Billig, 1995: 71).  In such instances, and in accordance with processes of 
historical and social change (Dunning et al., 2004; Elias, 2008a; 2008c; 2008d), past 
and present narratives can be used for the imposition of ‘power over others’ 
(Panagiotopoulou, 2010: 243), a process that can result in ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinctions 
becoming particularly charged (Maguire and Tuck, 1999; 2005; Tuck, 2003). 
 With this in mind, it was evident that embedded within newspaper discourses 
were encoded messages and established cultural codes that sought to define !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/adam-ramsay/scotland-isnt-different-its-britain-
thats-bizarre, retrieved: 23 March 2014. 
8 See http://realtruth.org/articles/120811-001.html, retrieved: 12 March 2014. 
9 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/adam-ramsay/scotland-isnt-different-its-britain-
thats-bizarre, retrieved: 23 March 2014. 
10 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/adam-ramsay/scotland-isnt-different-its-britain-
thats-bizarre, retrieved: 23 March 2014.  
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appropriate forms of British identification.  This was most noticeable within the 
English press.  Indeed, Hastie and Rimmington (2014) highlight that: 
 
Privilege allows you to assume a homogenisation of experience, whereby you 
are not required to have knowledge of the experiences of others, instead 
assuming you can understand others through the lens of your own (dominant) 
culture. (2014: 2) 
 
Noticeably, these comments expose how the English coverage represented a 
homogenously ‘English’ version of Britain as well as a rather negative, and, at times, 
ignorant, attitude towards the other home nations. 
To this extent, the discursive construction of privilege and entitlement is a 
complicated process.  Indeed, while established discourses can serve to marginalise 
outsider groups (Engh, 2014; Lake, 2013; Sutton and Vertigans, 2002; Van Stolk and 
Wouters, 1987), social differences are often based upon contested boundaries of 
separation and processes of inclusion and exclusion (Silk and Francombe, 2011).  
That is, while it is the point of origin that takes precedent in the construction of 
diasporic communities (Anthias, 2001), the inclusion of ethnic minorities is often 
predicated on their ability to declare and confirm their attachment to the host nation.  
In fact, in his analysis of ethnic minorities in Norway, Bucholc (2013) highlights how 
processes of ‘relative exclusion’ between established and outsider groups was evident 
(2013).  Accordingly, Fortier (2005) has examined how ethnic minorities are 
continually obliged to ‘hail’ their Britishness, a process that ‘re-racializes the speakers 
in a particular way’ (2005: 571). 
Here, it is possible to apply Fortier’s (2005) examination in order to explore 
how established groups seek to confront, and, on particular occasions, may accept 
outsider individuals/groups.11  In relation to the topic of immigration, Skey (2014) 
notes how in interviews with members of the ethnic majority in England, it was 
found: 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 This has been explored elsewhere by Lake (2013).  In his analysis of established-outsider relations at 
a prestigious tennis club, Lake (2013) noted that certain, new ‘outsider’ members were, overtime, 
slowly accepted within the club’s established circles.  This was a process that was beneficial for the 
established group as new members ensured the continuation of the club, and, as a consequence, their 
established status.  However, Lake (2013) notes that this acceptance was based upon those 
characteristics that the established group deemed most worthy.  Here, acceptance was predicated on 
established terms.  There were ‘yardsticks’ that outsider individuals/groups had to achieve in order to 
‘belong’.  
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that some degree of difference is permitted, even welcomed, provided it 
doesn’t threaten the status and position of those who claim to belong at the 
heart of national life. … it … explains the somewhat puzzling and often 
contradictory attitudes that many express when wrestling with these issues. 
(2014 [italics added])12 
 
It is possible to observe Skey’s (2014) remarks through an established-outsider lens, 
notably, via the ‘degree of difference’ that is allowed and permitted by outsider 
groups believed to be of threat to established positions (i.e. jobs, housing, welfare).  
However, these are, as Skey (2014) notes, contested processes, exemplified in 
‘contradictory attitudes’ (2014).13 
As a result, alongside reports of Farah’s Somali background, newspaper 
discourses continually served to confirm Farah’s British identity via references to his 
own British declarations during an Olympic press conference (Alibhai-Brown, 2012; 
Crompton, 2012; Samuel, 2012).  This was often supported by reports that highlighted 
his London accent (Sandbrook, 2012).  Evidently, British acceptance was something 
that had to be achieved, debated and performed, indeed, a process that paradoxically 
served to re-define Farah as ‘different’.  This could also be identified in the Olympic 
pre-coverage whereby the ‘Britishness’ of those Team GB athletes who had been born 
outside the UK was continually scrutinized (Poulton and Maguire, 2012).  In doing so, 
processes of exclusion and stigmatisation (Kelly, 2012; Parsons, 2012c; Platell, 2012; 
Poole, 2012) were used to construct a sense of Britain that adhered to a ‘dominant’ 
appreciation of how to be British. 
Furthermore, while reports within the English press served to highlight 
concerns regarding immigration and its negative effects upon ‘British’ culture 
(Moore, 2012; Riddell, 2012; Taylor, 2012), in other instances, newspaper coverage 
was proud to hail Britain’s multicultural society as representative of contemporary 
Britain (Guardian, 2012b; Lott, 2012; The Observer, 2012).  To this extent, it can be 
argued that an established-outsider dynamic can extend Fortier’s (2005) original 
analysis by exploring how processes of acceptance and non-acceptance were apparent 
within the press’ discourse.  In particular, comparisons can be made between Farah 
and the press’ representation of the Scottish Team GB athlete, Andy Murray.  In each 
instance, ‘allegiance to the nation’ was for, both athletes, ‘something [that had] to be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/michael-skey/tales-of-one-city-london-
superdiversity-and-paradox-of-belonging, retrieved: 29 May 2014. 
13 See http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/michael-skey/tales-of-one-city-london-
superdiversity-and-paradox-of-belonging, retrieved: 29 May 2014.  
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achieved and repeatedly tested’ (Fortier, 2005: 571).  Correspondingly, while the 
press served to highlight Farah’s British identity, Murray’s allegiance to Britain 
centered on his singing of the national anthem.  In doing so, both athletes were re-
positioned as acceptable ‘Brits’; yet, it was an acceptance that was predicated on their 
construction as both the same and different (Fortier, 2005). 
Consequently, while Andy Murray and Mo Farah were represented via 
discourses that served to accentuate their British behaviour (Sandbrook, 2012), at the 
same time, other discourses served to marginalise home nation nationalism (Daily 
Mail, 2012c; Platell, 2012) as well as highlight problems and fears regarding 
immigration (Freedland, 2012b; John, 2012; Riddell, 2012).  Notably, the ambivalent 
representation of both athletes in the English press (Bygnes, 2013; Schall, 2014), 
failed to elicit the same amount of attention in the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish 
coverage. 
 
V. Past and present constructions and established-outsider discourses 
 
Taking the above into consideration, it is evident that two important strands within the 
press’ discourse can be brought together.  First, the contemporary construction of 
Britain’s past, and, second, the existence of both established and outsider 
constructions of Britain.  Indeed, with regards to the latter, evidence of an outsider 
‘group disgrace’ and sense of inferiority was clearly evident within the Scottish and 
Australian press.  In fact, despite devolution and independence, Scottish 
apprehensions regarding Scottish independence and examples of Australian anxiety 
could be found.  For Scotland, the prospect of independence suggested an underlying 
anxiety regarding the potential break-up of the UK and the possibility of achieving an 
independent future (MacDonald, 2012b; Macwhirter, 2012; Sunday Herald, 2012).  
As a result, anxieties and apprehensions within the Scottish press were formed in 
relation to an ‘established’ England/Britain (Cowing, 2012; Fry, 2012).14  Within the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Indeed, the discursive construction of English dominance can be found in various reports on British 
home nation relations.  For example, in February 2014 the South Coast of England suffered severe 
weather conditions that resulted in major damage to transport networks, homes and businesses.  In 
comments that drew upon the storms, the Scottish Independence Referendum and the 2012 Olympic 
Games, The Observer (2014) noted that: ‘Vast areas of Somerset are under water. Dozens of flood 
warnings come and, occasionally, go. Cornwall’s rail artery is suddenly severed. More gales and 
lashing rain spiral across the Atlantic. Meanwhile, in Stratford, east London , the prime minister 
delivers an eloquent speech asking people in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to get on the phone 
and urge their friends and relatives in the north not to break away. Mr Cameron, wrapping himself in 
the glories of Chris Hoy, wants Team GB to win again. At which point, Alex Salmond, beginning to 
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Australian coverage the overall success of Team GB as well as Britain’s successful 
hosting of the Olympic Games was perceived to have overshadowed the Sydney 
Olympics, held twelve years previously (Wilson, 2012).  In particular, the Australian 
press displayed an increasingly critical attitude towards Australia and Australian 
society (Cooper and Butt, 2012; Hinds, 2012; Tate, 2012).  Consequently, while 
Australian discourses remained part of a wider power structure in which the national 
representation of Australia was wedded to its former imperial metropole, considered 
alongside the Scottish reports, it was evident that each nation’s position within a 
British ‘domestic figuration’ and a wider ‘imperial/Commonwealth figuration’ was 
interdependent to an established England/Britain. 
Combining the above with contemporary constructions of Britain’s past, it is 
evident that references to Britain’s history, and, in particular, its imperial history, 
served to underlie the established status of Britain (Collins, 2012; Hayward, 2012), a 
status that was correspondingly acknowledged by the Commonwealth press (Kissane, 
2012; Milner et al. 2012; The Australian, 2012).  As previously highlighted, however, 
it was the English press who served to draw upon and highlight Britain’s ‘imperial’ 
history (Parsons, 2012a; 2012c; Sandbrook, 2012; Tweedie and Harding, 2012).  This 
emphasised how historical legitimacy, most notably England’s former imperial 
hegemony, formed an important part of England’s established image and imagined 
charisma (Elias, 1996). 
Indeed, this raises some important questions regarding the use of history by 
the press.  That is, what motivates the construction and (re)construction of certain 
historical periods within contemporary reports (Edy, 1999) and how are constructions 
of the past related to, and, indeed, shaped by, established-outsider relations in 
general?  In fact, when compared to Britain’s contemporary problems and the possible 
break-up of Britain, such discourses allowed the press to redirect attention to a period 
of British history when Britain, and, in particular, England, was head of the world’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
sense momentum for his own referendum dreams of Scottish independence , snorts that Mr Cameron 
would be better off visiting Somerset, and certainly better anywhere but preaching to Edinburgh from 
London, the rich city state of national disconnection’ (2014: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/08/londonism-flooding-scotland-observer-
editorial, retrieved: 16 February 2014).  Evidently, while the 2012 Olympic Games provided an 
important moment for British unity, one that was being actively used by the British Prime Minister, 
David Cameron, the sense that England’s established position within Britain and, indeed, the sense that 
Britain was still a united state, was evidently undermined by a growing disparity between England and 
Scotland.   
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largest global empire.15  In such instances, there was a tendency to reference Britain’s 
‘eternal, unalterable heritage’ (Elias, 2012: 508) through accounts of its rural 
landscape and imperial history.  In effect, such rhetoric forms part of the invented 
traditions that envelop national constructions (‘Olde England’).  Indeed, in comments 
regarding the sport of cricket, Fletcher (2011) notes that: 
 
though the ethnic make-up of the England [cricket] team has – and continues to 
be – anything but exclusively English, the mores and values in English cricket 
carry on promoting ‘Englishness’ as something inherent, something which 
belongs to white English people, and as something that is inaccessible by 
foreigners. It has been through this notion of originality that English/British 
people have maintained a cultural monopoly over the game’s dominant mores 
and values. I have argued that the attempted exclusion or assimilation of 
minority ethnic communities may be best understood as defensive reactions 
amongst white British people to the perceived threat of minority ethnic 
communities and their Otherness within the post-colonial epoch. This helps us 
to understand why, for many, even in the age of globalization and diversity, 
nostalgic visions of cricket and ‘Englishness’ continue to be relevant. (2011: 
31[italics added]) 
 
Here, ‘nostalgic visions’ of the nation serve as ‘defensive reactions’ (Fletcher, 2011: 
31), whereby ‘the attempted exclusion or assimilation of minority ethnic 
communities’ (Fletcher, 2011: 31) could be identified in examples from the English 
press (Poole, 2012; Riddell, 2012).16 
 In particular, such discourse can be seen as a ‘defensive reaction’ to figurational 
changes within the British state, such as: Britain’s post-imperial decline, colonial 
independence, devolution and the Scottish Independence Referendum.  However, in 
accordance with processes of functional democratisation, examples of established-
outsider interdependence are based upon contested processes (Elias, 2012).  Indeed, it 
has been argued in chapter three that while the British home nations formed an 
established part of the British imperial project, British culture and its national !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Similarly, Elias (2012) notes that, ‘The idea of the unique nature and value of one’s own nation often 
serves as legitimation for that nation’s claim to lead all other nations.  It is this self-image, this claim to 
leadership by the older industrial nations, that has been shaken in the second half of the twentieth 
century by what is still a very limited increase in power among the poorer, previously dependent and 
partly subjugated pre-industrial societies in other parts of the world. … this reality shock … merely 
reinforces a tendency already present in national feeling that what the nation is and always has been - 
its eternal, unalterable heritage - posses a far greater emotive value, as a means of self-legitimation and 
as an expression of the national scale of values and the national ideal, than any promise or ideal located 
in the future’ (2012: 508). 
16 This has been explored elsewhere by Little (2006), whose analysis of the 1951 Festival of Britain, 
revealed a discourse of ‘heroic littleness’ could be found.  Little (2006) notes that ‘the construction of 
insularity’ within certain parts of the Festival could ‘be understood as a defense mechanism against loss 
of power in which decolonisation played a major part’ (2006: 32). 
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variations was adopted, reinvented and resisted within the dominion societies (Barnes, 
2013).  In regards to the findings, however, it is evident that while ‘[p]rocesses of 
exclusion and stigmatization alter as power ratios between groups become less 
uneven’ (Loyal, 2011: 196), there is the possibility for outsider groups to challenge 
traditional and established discourses.   
 Consequently, Commonwealth press reports openly highlighted a sense of 
(dis)attachment with the British monarchy (Carney, 2012; Holden, 2012; Rothwell, 
2012; Southphommasane, 2012a; Stone, 2012; Watkins, 2012).  In addition, further 
reports served to emphasise how other forms of global interdependence, such as Asia, 
may represent a more productive source of interdependence (Rudman, 2012).  
Notably, it was here that changes within the long-term, historical relationship between 
Britain and the former dominions could be observed.  Evidently, these discourses 
served to reveal how established-outsider relations form part of broader, and, indeed, 
changing processes of interdependence through which ‘integration struggles’ between 
established and outsider groups are continually negotiated and challenged. 
 Therefore, the contested nature of established-outsider relations are, in part, a 
product of historical developments and interdependencies, through which, ‘The power 
to stigmatize … diminishes when a group can no longer maintain a monopoly on the 
principal sources of power available’ (Loyal, 2011: 196).  Consequently: 
 
Over the long term, power differences may lessen between established natives 
and immigrant outsiders, the fantasy-laden collective ‘we-images’ of social 
superiority characteristic of the established may begin to diminish. … Outsider 
groups that had formerly accepted their inferiority and low position in the social 
hierarchy may come to challenge and contest their stigmatization, and to pursue 
a more equal access to various power resources in a dialectic of oppression and 
counter-oppression. (Loyal, 2011: 196) 
 
Indeed, through ‘a dialectic of oppression and counter-oppression’, the research 
findings reflect how newspaper constructions of Britain during the 2012 Diamond 
Jubilee and London Olympic Games revealed a number of changes within the British 
figuration which were reflective of, and, contoured by, established-outsider 
discourses. 
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VI. The multi-layered construction of Britain: balances of power and established 
outsider relations 
 
With this in mind, it is evident that established-outsider discourses were clearly 
visible within the press’ construction of Britain.  Elsewhere, Silk and Francombe 
(2011) note that: 
 
sporting discourses often serve as a means by which particular dominant 
groups further (re)define the parameters of the ‘sanctioned’ national identity 
and these discourses are often mobilised and appropriated with regard to the 
organisation and discipline of daily life. (2011: 262 [italics in original]) 
 
Accordingly, while it is possible to observe how the English press sought to construct 
a particular representation of Britain, indeed, a ‘“sanctioned” national identity’, the 
above examples reveal how this ‘(re)defin[ing]’ of the nation is not a one-sided 
process commanded by established groups (‘particular dominant groups’) but is 
instead based upon balances of power between established-outsider groups.  Here, 
power is interdependently experienced as part of a multi-figurational dynamic through 
which national habitus is produced, learned and altered.  More importantly, this is not 
to suggest that the power of established groups is ‘common sense’ (Grasmci, 1971) or 
authoritively imposed (Foucault, 1972), but is instead balanced upon ongoing 
processes and historical contingencies. 
Subsequently, in light of the research findings, this thesis argues that 
constructions of Britain and British identity are based upon a contested national 
habitus, one that can be observed when broader state formation processes, such as, the 
expansion of empire, are taken into consideration.  These larger sociogenetic 
transformations have impacted upon nation-states in multiple ways, often resulting in 
well defined, yet, contested forms of identification.  Indeed, Mennell (2007) notes 
that: 
 
one should always look for the sociogenesis and psychogenesis of the values 
and traditions in changing social structures (particularly balances of power 
and control), and then at the ways in which values and traditions have become 
embodied in social structures and practices. (2007: 313 [italics added])   
 
Consequently, constructions of Britain and British identity, are never stable, nor are 
they based upon a simple ‘us’ and ‘them’ dynamic.  Instead, forms of British mutual 
identification are far more complex and predicated upon ‘tensions’ between 
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established-outsider groups, both ‘within’ and ‘outside’ the UK.  In fact, Jenkins 
(1975) argues that ‘The British way of life is one of balance in tension rather than that 
of a unified community moving towards a commonly acknowledged goal’ (Jenkins, 
1975: 136 cited in Bradley, 2007: 34 [italics added]).  Indeed, ‘balance[s] in tension’ 
and/or balance(s) in power (Elias, 1978) serve to highlight ‘the conditional nature of 
integration’ (Rojek, 2006: 677).  Here we-identities, much like ‘social bonding which 
is both constraining and enabling’ (Rojek, 2006: 677), are based upon segmented 
forms of identification and interdependent associations.17 
Subsequently, it is evident that by following an established-outsider dynamic, 
particular ‘integration struggles’ within the press’ discourse can be located between 
examples of British ‘unity’ and ‘dis-unity’ and within conflicting attachments and 
(dis)attachments with Britain.  Indeed, Moore (2010) has noted that while identities 
are characterised by ‘similarity, belonging and interconnectedness’ they are also 
marked by processes of ‘difference, otherness and separation’ (Moore, 2010: 4.4).  In 
fact, elsewhere, Bolin (2010) has recorded similar characteristics in his analysis of the 
effect of national and international representations during the Eurovision Song 
Contest (ESC).  Here, the ESC was ‘analysed as both integrative and conflictual 
simultaneously’ (Bolin, 2010: 131), with Bolin (2010) highlighting that ‘the idea of 
the nation-state and … the value of Europeanness’ (Bolin, 2010: 131) were both 
evident.  Similarly, with regards to Britain, Colley (2014a) has noted that ‘while 
monarchy has often functioned as a national cement and emblem, it has also served to 
connect all or sections of these islands with other parts of the world’ (2014a: 45).     
 Accordingly, while national and international events may offer an opportunity 
for ‘proposed integration’ (Bolin, 2010: 134 [italics removed]), they can also be 
employed to ‘performatively … energize different “social solidarities”’ (Cottle, 2006: 
428).  To this extent, the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympic Games were 
‘integrative and conflictual simultaneously’ (Bolin, 2010: 131).  Here, both the home 
nations and the former dominions were interdependently related in their constructions 
of Britain, whether attaching themselves and their national histories within a larger 
British imperial history (Berg, 2012; Tate, 2012) or by highlighting differences 
between themselves and Britain (Carney, 2012; Hyder, 2012; Rudman, 2012).  
 With this in mind, the following sub-sections will aim to briefly summarise !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 See footnote 4. 
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three key paradoxes within the British and Commonwealth press’ construction of 
Britain and British identity.  These paradoxes suggest that there is a need of caution 
when examining media constructions of Britain, particularly due to the contradictory, 
and, often, ambiguous framing of Britain and British identity.  Specifically, they serve 
to reveal how established-outsider discourses are used in constructing national 
identifications.  Therefore, the aim will be to explore the paradoxical construction of 
Britain in relation to three ‘integration struggles’ that were identified within the press’ 
discourse: British attachment/(dis)attachment, past/present constructions and British 
multiculturalism.  Indeed, these three discourses will be used to provide a final 
summary of the research findings but also to outline important significances regarding 
the future of Britain and British identity. 
 
VII.  Integration struggles: British attachment and (dis)attachment 
 
Colley (2014a) highlights that ‘Virtually every state that has ever existed has 
contained multiple fault-lines, be they ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural or 
territorial differences, or other sources of internal division’ (2014a: 4).  As a result: 
 
the divided nature of these islands is hardly exceptional, and the current disputes 
over these divisions possess ample precedents.  Although ‘Britain’ is still 
sometimes viewed as an old and peculiarly stable country, these are selective 
visions.  Historically speaking, Great Britain, and still more the United 
Kingdom, are comparatively recent and synthetic constructs that have often 
been confused and in flux in the past, just as they continue to be contested and 
in flux now. (Colley, 2014a: 4) 
 
As previously highlighted, this sense of flux and contestation is predicated on 
Britain’s multi-national structure.  This has resulted in varying, and, at times, 
contested appreciations of Britain.  Indeed, in regards to the Act of Union, Weight 
(2002) notes that:   
 
While the English came to regard the arrangement as permanent, the Scots 
continued to see it as conditional upon their getting a good fiscal return on the 
loss of their sovereignty.  The conditional way they viewed the Union was 
highlighted by the fact that people north of the border called the agreement the 
Treaty of Union while south of the border it was referred to as the Act of Union. 
(2002: 3) 
 
As a result, it is evident that discourses pertaining to Britain can be viewed across 
various spatial scales as well as numerous national conditions.  That is, collective 
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memories of Britain’s shared imperial history, while providing a common cross-
national past for the British home nations and the former dominions, has resulted in 
an array of diverse challenges and national identity politics.  It is here that 
constructions of Britain can be seen to be undermined and disrupted by its constitutive 
nationalisms both within Britain and the Commonwealth.   
 Yet, to perceive these various national interpretations as exclusive is to ignore 
the discursive complexity of national identity but also, more importantly, its multi-
layered construction.  Accordingly, Ward (2009) has argued that: 
 
Historians such as J.G.A. Pocock and Hugh Kearney have emphasised just how 
important it is to consider the history of the Atlantic archipelago in its Britannic 
context, as a history consisting of unity and integration as well as disunity and 
disintegration. This array of historical examination suggests that current debates 
are part of a continuum rather than a break with the past. (2009: 3 [italics 
added]) 
 
This ‘array of historical examination’ is reflected in the unity and dis-unity of the 
‘Britannic context’, through which the layers of British habitus are structured by 
intensities of attachment and (dis)attachment. 
 In fact, international events, such as the Commonwealth Games, have aimed to 
promote British and cross-Commonwealth relations and celebrate their shared 
sporting and cultural heritage (The Round Table, 2002).  Here, ‘important similarities 
(as well as instructive differences) in institutions, values and cultures’ (Schreuder, 
2002: 653) can be identified.  In particular, while both the domestic and 
Commonwealth reports served to represent British and Commonwealth unity 
(‘important similarities’), each nation’s construction of Britain was framed by their 
own national figurations (‘instructive differences’).  Here, the Commonwealth 
coverage presented an amalgam of British identifications.  Indeed, while attempts 
were made to highlight the continuing importance of Commonwealth relations 
(Foster-Bell, 2012; Oldfield, 2012; Rothwell, 2012) and references to the British 
Empire remained conspicuous (Lette, 2012; The Australian, 2012; Vancouver Sun, 
2012), examples of (dis)attachment from each nation’s imperial history and the 
possibility of further international relations, separate from the Commonwealth, were 
displayed (Carney, 2012; Hyder, 2012; Rudman, 2012).  Consequently, ‘as the British 
empire fades into historical memory and regional blocs and organisations grow in 
salience’ (Black, 2007: 267) struggles between the former dominion’s own imperial 
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heritage and a future of lessening Commonwealth involvement and monarchial 
relations could be found (Oldfield, 2012; Rudman, 2012). 
 With this in mind, it is apparent when studying constructions of Britain and 
British identity that a focus upon British interdependence – and the tensions this 
creates – must be considered.  Not only does this help to extend analyses of Britain 
beyond a nation-centric approach but it also directs attention to the emotional 
intensity underlying particular forms of attachment/(dis)attachment.  Indeed, within 
any figuration, and, more importantly, between figurations, there are: 
 
specific functional interdependences which at a given stage bind those who 
form a community more closely to each other than to those who do not belong, 
and at the same time those other interdependences binding them, individually 
and communally, to others outside (Elias, 2008a: 153)   
 
This collective ambiguity forms an important part of the identifications of larger 
social units, such as, multi-national unions and federations.  In such instances, ‘the 
threatened loss of function and power of social units on the verge of becoming a 
lower level of integration leads to struggles of dominance, to balance of power 
struggles of a specific kind’ (Elias, 2008a: 137).18  As a result, it is these power 
struggles that are echoed across the research findings and which go some way to 
exposing how discourses on British integration are dialectically marked by processes 
of ‘partial disintegration’ (Elias, 2008a: 146 [italics added]).19  This echoes Calhoun’s 
(1997) assertion that ‘The discourse of nationalism can be employed equally in the 
service of unification or secession’ (1997: 103 [italics added]).  To add, I would argue 
that discourses of British nationalism are based upon examples of British attachment 
(‘unification’) and (dis)attachment (‘succession’) (Calhoun, 1997).  That is, national 
newspaper constructions of Britain ‘were bound up in the dual-sided production of 
national difference and “sameness”’ (Bloyce et al., 2010: 464).   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Indeed, these integration struggles echo Mannheim’s (1933) theory of distanciation (Kilminster, 
2004; 2007).  In fact, it is possible, within the press’ discourse, to uncover requisite levels of social 
distance in each nations’ attachment to Britain.  That is, while constructions of Britain revealed 
particular forms of distanciation (dis-attachment) within each nation’s newspaper coverage (Scottish 
and Northern Irish marginalisation, Scottish celebrations of the monarchy, Welsh pride in Team GB 
success, Commonwealth significance), other examples exhibited processes of de-distanciation 
(attachment) with Britain (British unity, Commonwealth unity, Team GB success).  Consequently, via 
an interdependent analysis of the domestic and Commonwealth coverage, it was possible to perceive 
how levels of attachment/dis-attachment were related to particular national contexts, and, as argued in 
the conclusion to chapter six, particular historical perspectives. 
19 Indeed, while the success of Team GB can serve to unite the British home nations in shared 
celebration, ‘When England play Scotland at rugby the skirl of nationalism echoes across Murrayfield’ 
(The Observer, 2014). 
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 Indeed, these dynamics stand in the way of political attempts to define Britain, 
Britishness and British values in relation to a distinct set of national moral values or 
ideals (Wintour, 2014).  Instead, claims of British dis-unity, debates on British 
identity and reports of British decline are predicated upon observations of Britain that 
seek to focus on the disintegration of a particular ‘version’ of Britain.  In doing so, 
these announcements fail to acknowledge the ties of interdependence, or, to a greater 
or lesser extent, the processual reconfiguration of these ties, that underlies the 
construction, representation and framing of Britain.  In effect, it is a multi-layered 
conception of identity – local, regional, national, British and Commonwealth – that 
has underscored both the political arrangement and discursive construction of Britain 
and which is ultimately marked by processes of British attachment and 
(dis)attachment. 
 
VIII. Integration struggles: past and present constructions 
 
It has already been highlighted that the sharing of a common heritage forms an 
important part of belonging to the nation.  For example, during the Olympic Opening 
Ceremony a sense of continuity with Britain’s past was theatrically presented via 
performances that served to draw upon Britain’s rural heritage, the industrial 
revolution and its contribution to global popular culture.  Similarly, with regards to 
the Diamond Jubilee, the royal pageantry and river flotilla were represented as a 
recurrent part of Britain’s history, indeed, a form of celebration and part of British 
culture that was effectively representative of the British populace (Phillips, 2012; 
Routledge, 2012).  In doing so, references to Britain’s ‘island character’ were closely 
tied to its imperial heritage and former naval supremacy.  However, it is important to 
note that: 
 
It is not the island situation … which sets its stamp on the national character of 
the population, but the significance of this situation in the total structure of the 
island society, in the total context of its history. (Elias, 2012: 599) 
 
Consequently, while references to Britain’s ‘island kingdom’ (Phillips, Daily Mail, 
04/06/12) were closely allied with Britain’s imperial past (Jack, 2012), the degree to 
which Britain’s imperial history continued to form part of the construction of Britain 
revealed a number of problems. 
 Indeed, reports pertaining to Britain’s imperial heritage suggested a particular 
 277 
sense of ‘English’ insularity.  This conclusion has argued that such insularity may 
form part of a defensive reaction amongst the English press, based upon the decline of 
the British Empire and a lack of political representation within the current British 
political system.  Accordingly, Bunting (2014) argues that: 
 
The Celtic Atlantic seaboard has been powerfully creative and outward 
orientated, the crucial counterbalance to English caution, reserve and desire for 
privacy. This has rarely been acknowledged; initially because of a persistent 
strain of Anglo-Saxon racism which has now morphed into a South-East 
metropolitan self-absorption. … The danger is that without a strong Celtic 
component, England becomes self-absorbed and insular. The ever-present 
temptation in Englishness is a retreat into a nostalgia about the pastoral English 
ideal of soporific village greens and the ‘old maids cycling to church in the 
mist’ nonsense. (2014)20 
 
As a result, newspaper discourses regarding the Olympic Opening Ceremony’s 
‘Green and Pleasant Land’ section served to construct a specifically nostalgic 
recollection of England/Britain (Holt, 2012; New Zealand Herald, 2012).  In addition, 
while the rural depiction of ‘Britain’ provided a rather English-centric account of 
Britain’s past, constructions of the rural countryside have also been marked by 
connotations of a predominantly white ethnic background (Cloke, 2006; Neal and 
Agyeman, 2006).  Here, nostalgia for a ‘pastoral English ideal’ (Bunting, 2014) 
served to cement an English preponderance in constructions of Britain (Neal and 
Agyeman, 2006).21  Ultimately, such constructions conflicted with representations of 
British multiculturalism, an aspect of British society that had provided an important 
‘selling point’ for the 2012 Olympic bid campaign (Falcous and Silk, 2010). 
 To this extent, I would argue that it is England’s association with a history of 
British imperialism and a sense of British global power – however misguided – that 
serves to encourage English isolationism.  Indeed, this dilemma is considered further 
in the concluding chapter of Kumar’s (2003) analysis of English nationalism.  With 
regards to the present study, however, it is this imperial outlook and a sense of 
imperial authority that serves to underscore Britain’s global image.  Indeed, this was 
echoed by the current Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, who in response to the 
prospect of Scottish Independence, stated that ‘We are on the verge of trashing our !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/21/british-identity-scotland-independence-
english-scottish-no, retrieved: 25 July 2014. 
21 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/21/british-identity-scotland-independence-
english-scottish-no, retrieved: 25 July 2014.  
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global name and brand in an act of self-mutilation that will leave our international 
rivals stunned, gleeful and discreetly scornful’ (Johnson, 2014 [italics added]).22  In 
such instances, Britain’s ‘global name’ is presented as being undermined by home 
nation nationalism (Ramsey, 2014), rather than viewing these nationalisms as 
constitutive parts of Britain’s global history.   
 Indeed, there is the opportunity here to further explore how ‘established’ 
imperial images remain part of the national habitus of established groups.  The 
equaling of power balances amongst the home nations (Loyal, 2011) and the absence 
of British involvement in international military action, such as Britain’s decision to 
abstain from its inclusion in the ‘Syrian Crisis’ (Toynbee, 2013), may help to defer 
Britain away from former imperial images and representations.23  Similarly, in the 
case of England, it may also ‘help nudge England away from delusions of 
exceptionalism and imperial grandeur … towards a more normal position as an 
average sized wealthy country on the edge of Europe’ (Ramsey, 2014c [italics 
added]).24  In effect, therefore, a reconfiguration of British constructions, one that 
moves away from a particularly imperial, and, subsequently English-centric 
representation, is required (Colley, 2014a; Perryman, 2009; Ramsey, 2014).  
Certainly, any attempt to do so will be interdependent to outsider constructions of 
Britain; constructions that at the moment, particularly within the Commonwealth, 
remain wedded to imperial discourses. 
 
IX. Integration struggles: British multiculturalism 
 
Reports concerning Team GB’s success, and, in particular the athlete Mo Farah, 
served to frame Britain as a nation upon which multiculturalism and diversity were 
widely accepted (Alibhai-Brown, 2012; Southphomassane, 2012b; Walker, 2012).  
Here, Farah was heralded as an important emblem of Britain’s post-imperial identity, 
its multicultural character and diverse citizenship.  Indeed, Rietveld (2013) argues !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/11080893/Scottish-independence-Decapitate-
Britain-and-we-kill-off-the-greatest-political-union-ever.html  
23 See http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/29/no-10-curses-but-empire-is-over, 
retrieved: 30 August 2013.  This is a process that can be seen to have emerged from the re-opening of 
the Scottish Parliament in 1999.  In doing so, ‘powers over education, health and policing have been 
transferred to it from London’, indeed, ‘More will follow in 2016, including further freedom to vary 
income-tax rates’ (The Economist, 2014 see http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21617033-even-
if-scots-reject-independence-union-will-grow-looser-and-messier-unitedish-kingdom, retrieved: 13 
September 2014). 
24 See https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/adam-ramsay/england-do-not-be-afraid, retrieved: 
28 August 2014. 
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that: 
 
emphasis[ing] shared national values and identity … would not contradict 
multiculturalism but rather provide it with a ‘civic re-balancing’, emphasising 
shared citizenship alongside the accommodation of minority cultural identities 
(2013: 2) 
 
Yet, this is to ignore the limitations and boundaries that discursively underlie forms of 
‘accommodation’ and ‘inclusion’.  Here, ‘inclusion’ is not achieved or unquestionably 
accepted but is instead constrained by balances of power and established-outsider 
dynamics.  Accordingly, Falcous and Silk (2010) argue that: 
 
soft Olympic narratives have nothing to say about the complexities of everyday 
life as it surrounds the Olympic games and beyond: intensified hostility towards 
British Muslims since the commencement of the ‘war on terror’; feelings of 
disillusionment and resentment; ‘Islamophobia’; urban segregation; 
disproportionate levels of unemployment, health, and poverty; and differential 
immigration statuses and the concomitant restrictions of rights (2010: 180) 
 
In such instances, outsider groups maintain a liminal space within newspaper 
discourses (Fortier, 2005).  That is, while newspaper reports served to celebrate 
Britain’s achieved multiculturalism, representations of Farah continually highlighted 
Farah’s ‘difference’ (via references to his Somali background) as a central part of his 
newspaper construction (Fortier, 2005). 
 Indeed, this process of accepting certain outsiders as part of the nation may exist 
as a residual part of the British imperial character.  As previously referenced, Maguire 
(2005) highlights that: 
 
Access to such prestigious clubs and playing fields could be regulated – only 
chosen outsiders would be allowed to emulate their imperial masters and 
become, through the adoption of their sports, more British than the British. 
(2005: 11 [italics added]) 
 
Subsequently, in the same way that ‘chosen outsiders’ were ‘allowed to emulate their 
imperial masters’ (Maguire, 2005: 11), the adoption of particular ‘British’ attributes 
allowed both Farah as well as Murray the opportunity to be ‘British’.  Indeed, rather 
than accepting difference, acceptance was grounded in assimilation with established 
‘English/British’ practices.  
 Nevertheless, while the above sections have highlighted how particular 
‘outsider’ individuals can become accepted within established discourses, such 
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processes can also have particular benefits for established groups.  Indeed, depicting a 
progressive, multicultural Britain, happily diverse and safely heterogonous, could also 
serve as a form of established status (Engh et al., 2014).  Falcous and Silk (2010) 
elaborate: 
 
the Olympic Games are framed as an exemplar of our own apparently 
unproblematic diversity and inclusivity. The unresolved contradiction in 
subsequent media coverage arises in how the olympics are framed as both a 
symbol of how ‘our’ values differ from ‘others’ and also an exemplar of our 
apparent inclusivity and ‘tolerance’. In a familiar construction, sport, as a soft-
core ideological domain, is constructed as a utopic social field – the foremost 
exemplar of integration and multiculturalism. Yet, it also serves as a symbol of 
our humanism and civility in (apparently) stark opposition to that of others. 
(2010: 179) 
 
Similarly, during the London games, the press’ framing of Britain’s multicultural 
pride, tolerance and inclusivity served to bolster its established image as a progressive 
multicultural nation state (Engh et al., 2014).  In doing so, reports of Britain were 
notably positive, with certain suggestions that a new and more confident Britain had 
been displayed.  Indeed, such positive reports can have a particular effect on a 
nation’s sense of self, especially when there are disparities between the national past 
and present.  Black (2007) has highlighted how there is a ‘pursuit of symbolic 
politics’ at play during the hosting of sporting mega-events that offer a chance to 
change and to ‘“reframe” dominant narratives about the host, and/or reinforce key 
messages about what the host has become/is becoming’ (2007: 262).  It is apparent 
that a similar process can be identified in the press’ reporting of the 2012 London 
Olympic Games.  Here, reports pertaining to British multiculturalism served to reflect 
the national prestige of Britain by presenting a revised society, based upon its 
accepted diversity (Guardian, 2012b; Sandbrook, 2012).   
 More pertinent, however, was what dominant narratives were being ‘reframed’ 
and who was reinforcing key messages.  Accordingly, while it has been observed that 
Britain’s achieved multiculturalism, and diversity was signified as representing a 
‘new’ Britain, closer examination of the press’ discourse reveals that these ‘symbolic 
politics’ were discursively constructed in accordance with established criteria. 
 To this extent, it wasn’t until the final performance of the Olympic Opening 
Ceremony, in particular, during its ‘multicultural’ section, that ethnic diversity was 
regarded as a normative part of British society.  In these instances, a clear distinction 
 281 
was made between Britain’s ‘past’ and ‘present’ society.  This was echoed in the 
newspaper coverage, whereby references to British multiculturalism were used to 
construct a decisively ‘new’ Britain, one that had overcome, and, was different to, its 
imperial self.   
 Accordingly, whereas on the one hand, recollections of the past within the 
press’ coverage aimed to transcend difference in order to highlight Britain’s distinct 
origins and national characteristics (‘island nation’), on the other hand, this difference 
served as a key marker of Britain’s ‘new’ society.  As a result, newspaper coverage 
reflected a disparity between Britain’s ‘white past and multicultural present’ (Littler 
and Naidoo, 2004: 338), a process that revealed broader ‘integration struggles’ 
regarding the acceptance of outsider individuals within established constructions of 
the nation. 
 With this in mind, Black (2007) argues that the ‘various signals and 
representations of unity, transcendence and cosmopolitanism are therefore at best 
partial and caricatured. As such, they tend to mask as much as they reveal’ (2007: 
270).  In light of this, British multiculturalism provided the press an opportunity to 
separate Britain’s imperial past from its multicultural present, yet, at the same time, 
dictate a liminal acceptance of outsider groups (Fortier, 2005).  In doing so, analyses 
of the press served to highlight how such events ‘become vehicles for similar 
messages with potentially contradictory implications’ (Black, 2007: 262). 
 
X. Final Comments 
 
This thesis has aimed to examine how the British domestic and Commonwealth press 
constructed, framed and represented Britain during the 2012 Diamond Jubilee and 
London Olympic Games.  With this in mind, it has endeavoured to explore the 
relationship between both the domestic and Commonwealth press in order to shed 
further light on the complexities and struggles embedded in newspaper constructions 
of Britain and British identity.  In addittion, this analysis has served to draw upon ‘the 
fundamental importance of power differentials in society’ (Maguire, 2005: 9) by 
exploring how contemporary constructions of Britain were framed in relation to 
power differentials between the British home nations and the former dominions.   
 Indeed, tracing historical patterns can allow one to observe how the construction 
of identity is predicated upon changing balances of power.  Consequently, attention 
has been given to exploring the historical development of the British state, its imperial 
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expansion and eventual decline.  This was considered further in the use of Elias and 
Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model.  In particular, by applying this model to 
an analysis of Britain, inter- and intra-figurational dynamics could be observed. Here, 
particular ‘integration struggles’ were highlighted (Mennell, 2007), struggles that 
served to reveal a sense of decline, examples of marginalisation and a ‘sliding scale’ 
(Calhoun, 2004: 38) or ‘degree of social differentiation’ (Loyal, 2004: 137) in the 
press’ construction of Britain. 
 With this in mind, a key part of undertaking this research was based upon the 
assertion that studies of national identity have seemingly overlooked the importance 
of larger multinational figurations and the effects of such forms of organisation on the 
construction and framing of national identity.  Accordingly, this research has explored 
how changes within the British state and empire have impacted upon constructions of 
British identity.  Indeed, Ridden (2004) states: 
 
Historical analysis which provides a more sophisticated assessment of how 
various competing groups have sought to create change in the British state and it 
its relationship to the various constituent groups, and how these changes were 
connected with various interpretations of Britishness, is increasingly showing 
that Britishness was never either static or wholly stable.  Instead, British identity 
was contested, highly politicised and adapted in response to changing 
circumstances and pragmatic political strategies. (2004: 210) 
 
Subsequently, rather than providing an ahistorical and static appreciation of British 
identity, the process sociological application of a long-term, interdependent analysis 
has allowed for a multinational analysis of Britain to be undertaken.  Moreover, by 
examining national identity, and, in particular, British identity, as a processually 
related phenomenon, a detailed examination of the multi-layered construction of 
British social habitus was achieved.  To this end, this concluding chapter has served to 
highlight how constructions of Britain are predicated on a number of important 
characteristics.  First, there is a historical context underlying the press’ construction of 
Britain (past and present constructions).  Second, these constructions are 
interdependently formed (established-outsider relations).  Third, a number of 
integration struggles serve to shape the press’ construction of Britain. 
 With this in mind, this research has also hoped to extend the application of 
process sociology.  In comments relating to process sociological work on football 
hooliganism (‘The Leicester School’), Giulianotti (1999) has noted that the work of 
process sociologists: 
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make no meaningful attempt to employ Elias’s figurational approach at the 
everyday level. The Leicester researchers fail completely to examine the 
complexity of figurational dynamics within a football hooligan group, such as 
the interdependency of individual hooligans or the fluidity of power relations 
within the group generally. (1999: 47)25 
 
Whereas this study has not attempted to investigate football hooliganism, it has aimed 
to meet these criticisms, most notably, Giulianotti’s (1999) concern regarding ‘the 
complexity of figurational dynamics’ and ‘the fluidity of power relations’ (1999: 47).  
By examining how the meditated construction of Britain and British identity are 
interdependently related to wider power balances within the British state and 
Commonwealth, the complexity of multi-figurational and processually changing 
relations of power have been highlighted. 26   Furthermore, while the process 
sociological concepts of figuration and interdependence have been employed, this 
research has also drawn upon Elias and Scotson’s (1994) established-outsider model 
in order to examine how media discourses serve to construct power balances.  Indeed, 
in using the established-outsider model, two important distinctions can be made. 
First, this thesis has aimed to extend its application in order to examine its 
effectiveness across multiple figurations, that is, across a domestic ‘British’ and an 
‘Imperial/Commonwealth’ figuration.  This hybrid analysis aimed to explore how 
established and outsider groups were located across various established-outsider 
relations and figurations (Bucholc, 2013).  In fact, Mennell (2012) argues that: 
 
Not all forms of social oppression of one group by another take the form of 
class relations. … the class model is too narrow; one needs a broader overall 
concept to deal with the varieties of group oppression and group rise.  I have 
found it helpful to use the term established-outsiders relationships as a more 
comprehensive concept in that sense. (Elias, 2012: 475, F/N: 6)27 
 
It is in this ‘more comprehensive’ sense that the established-outsider concept has been 
used in this thesis.  In fact, the established-outsider model ‘serves as an empirical 
exemplar for more general dynamics involving power and inequality’ (Quilley and 
Loyal, 2004: 14).  To this extent, it has provided an insight into the dynamics at play !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Similar criticisms are made by Layder (1990). 
26 In addition, Bairner (2006) in his own appraisal of the ‘The Leicester School’ argues that it is 
perhaps ‘not worth devoting too much time … to considering the pernicious influence that Giulianotti 
claims the Leicester School has exerted on academic debate on football hooliganism’ (2006: 588). 
27 The following quote is an author’s note that was included in the 1982 English translation of Elias’s 
‘The Civilising Process’.  It was subsequently included in the 2012 edition, from which the following 
quote is taken from. 
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within domestic and national newspaper discourses; particularly how notions of 
‘power and inequality’ are discursively constructed and how intensities of mutual 
identification can be felt between nation-states as well as between established-outsider 
groups within the nation-state (Mennell, 1990).  Rather than being viewed as binary 
classifications, this thesis highlighted how established-outsider relations and identities 
are based upon dynamic processes of unity and dis-unity and attachment and 
(dis)attachment. 
 Second, the work of Billig (1995) has examined how established nation’s 
remember their identity through subtle ways of ‘forgetting’: 
 
national identity in established nations is remembered because it is embedded in 
routines of life, which constantly remind, or ‘flag’, nationhood.  However, these 
reminders, or ‘flaggings’, are so numerous and they are such a familiar part of 
the social environment, that they operate mindlessly, rather than mindfully. 
(1995: 38) 
 
Here, ‘small words instead of grand memorable phrases, offer constant, but barely 
conscious, reminders of the homeland, making ‘our’ national identity unforgettable’ 
(Billig, 1995: 93). 
 However, there is a distinction between national practices and attitudes, a 
distinction that Billig’s (1995) analysis may ignore.  Indeed, Ismer (2011) argues that 
there are practices that reproduce the nation and attitudes that are expressed regarding 
the nation.  Accordingly, while national practices may construct and (re)construct the 
nation, national attitudes are historically and socially variable (Ismer, 2011).  Thus, 
‘banal reminders can in fact accommodate many competing and even incompatible 
definitions of collective identity, which allows the exact content and boundaries of the 
fictive “we” to remain fuzzy and flexible’ (Mihelj, 2011: 99-100).  In such instances, 
nationalism, national identity, and the attitudes and practices that surround it, are very 
rarely stable, uncontested or entirely ‘banal’.  Instead, ‘banal’ reminders of the nation 
are predicated upon power relations that are often organised and reflective of 
particular national distinctions (Mihelj, 2011). 
 Furthermore, the potential for national events to unite the nation are ‘not always 
… consensual nor uniformly inflected’ (Cottle, 2006: 415).  In fact, Cottle (2006) 
notes that in order: 
 
To avoid Durkheim’s totalizing claims about the nature of ‘society’ we would 
do better to situate our analysis in respect of a particular society or constellation 
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of social relations at a particular moment in time and, importantly, to see these 
as structured and invariably conflicted. (2006: 415) 
 
In most instances, discourse analyses have aimed to explore how power is constructed 
through language (de Cillia et al., 1999; Wodak et al., 1999).  Consequently, this 
research has indicated how changing power relations between the British home 
nations and its former dominions were reflected in discourses concerning Britain. 
 Finally, I am fully aware that this research is indebted to the process sociology 
framework.  Indeed, the above comments have sought to highlight how its use has 
served to meet certain criticisms (Giulianotti, 1999; Layder, 1990) as well as provide 
a further extension of the theory.  In this endeavour, the aim has always been to use 
the process sociology perspective as ‘an interpretative and analytic framework’ 
(Malcolm, 2013: 166).  Consequently, this framework has served to direct attention 
towards the long-term social processes underlying state formation, to explore 
relationships of dynamic interdependence and to be aware of changes over time.  To 
this extent, the emergence of the British state, the loss of the American colonies, the 
nationalization of the British royal family, the expansion of the British Empire, the 
social impact of the industrial revolution, the move towards dominion status within 
the colonies, the effects of the first and second world war, the statute of Westminster, 
the decline of empire, the diversification of British society through immigration, 
Thatcherism and New Labour, are just a few of the large scale social processes that 
have been considered in this thesis and which have impacted upon the construction of 
Britain and British identity in complex and diverse ways. 
 With this in mind, I would like to suggest that this analysis presents an 
opportunity to further extend this research by including other former imperial 
locations.  Indeed, it has not been possible to examine the former British Empire as a 
whole.  Instead, this project has been constricted to an analysis of the old ‘white’ 
dominions.  To this extent, there remains the potential to explore the construction of 
Britain and British identity in other independent nation-states who were once formerly 
part of the British Empire.  Accordingly, analyses of the South African and Indian 
press would elicit further details regarding the post-imperial construction of Britain 
and its relation to the national identities of each nation.  In addition, the framework of 
this analysis could also be extended to include archival examinations of national 
newspaper coverage on former imperial occasions.  The coronation and death of 
Queen Victoria as well as the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II would provide further 
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investigation.  Similarly, analyses of imperial sporting occasions would provide 
additional insights into the mediated construction of ‘imperial Britain’.  To this end, 
the Commonwealth Games would provide a notable source of comparative 
examination.28 
 To this extent, the examinations of both royal and sporting occasions would, as 
this thesis has aimed to explore, provide an examination of Britain via two important, 
and, often, cited, British characteristics: monarchy and sport.  Indeed, while it was the 
British who codified most of today’s sporting practices, a process that was fuelled by 
empire, royal events and the pageantry of monarchy have formed an important part of 
Britain’s identity and history.  As a result, events that seek to bring together Britain’s 
royal and sporting endeavours, such as those in 2012, provide a valuable opportunity 
to examine the construction, representation and framing of Britain.   
 In support of this, future investigations could seek to explore the year 1953.  
Much like 2012, this year also saw two important ‘British’ events.  On May 29th, 
Edward Hillary, from New Zealand and Tenzing Norgay, a Sherpa from Nepal, scaled 
the summit of Mt. Everest, the first time it had been achieved.  The news of 
‘Britain’s’ victory was announced on 2nd June 1953, the day of Queen Elizabeth II’s 
coronation (Hansen, 2000).  The extent to which British imperialism served to 
underlie the press’ construction of these events, and, more importantly, how this post-
imperial period served as the beginning of the end for the British Empire, would offer 
a valuable and accompanying investigation to this thesis’s topic. 
 Undoubtedly, however, future analyses of Britain will be required to explore the 
changing power relations between the British home nations, most notably, between 
Scotland and the rest of the UK.  Here, there are continuing ‘sociogenetic changes’ 
affecting Britain and British identity, which can be explored (Atkinson, 2003: 8).  
Accordingly, future examinations could extend the use of the established-outsider 
model in order to consider how processes of functional democratization in the British 
state have shaped the Scottish Independence Referendum and its aftermath.  Equally, 
the strengthening or weakening of ties with Europe, both for Britain and its 
(independent?) home nations, will only serve to encourage ‘the degree of social !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 In fact, Polley (2014) notes that ‘Intriguingly, the Games have also been under-explored within the 
large literature on sport and British imperialism. This literature has been dominated by cricket and 
rugby union. Important as these sports are for their high profile, and for what they tell us about the 
cultural meanings that have been attached to imperial relations, they have only ever included a fraction 
of the territories that have made up the Empire, and still make up the Commonwealth’ (2014: 384). 
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differentiation’ (Loyal, 2004: 137) within Britain.  Central to this will be the contested 
longevity of ‘Britain’ as a common source of identification, indeed, a process that will 
undoubtedly have both royal and sporting implications for the British home nations.   
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